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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
Compared with other areas of private law, the law of property in the countries on 
which this study focuses is usually considered a static area of law.1 Where in other 
fields, for example, in contract law and in company law, many changes have been 
made over time, property law has remained static, upholding principles and 
methods of doctrinal reasoning that have been used for ages, some even directly 
derived from Roman law.2 The reason for this is that property law is not only 
concerned with legal relations between persons, but also with legal relations that 
have an effect against third parties, in some cases even an effect against the whole 
world. Technically speaking, following from legal relations in respect to land – the 
most valuable object of property law known in pre-industrial societies, in particular 
in Roman law – a sophisticated system of property rules developed. Rather than 
having to add new rules to the system, property law was structured so that, when 
new developments in society arose, these could be included in the existing system.3 
When objects other than land became valuable, property law concerning these 
objects also developed. Many existing property rules could be adapted, maintaining 
the original structure and coherence. The law of property reached maturity much 
earlier than other legal areas, and for a long time was regarded to be the most 
important area of private law. Particularly in relation to the law of contract, proper-
ty law took a more important position for many centuries. The influences of this 
historical development can still be seen today. The fact that the French Civil Code 
deals with contract law in a book titled ‘Different ways to acquire ownership’ is 
possibly the best example.4 However, with the rise of contract law in the nineteenth 
century and this field of private law taking an equally important position next to the 
law of property, the influences of one area on the other have created a dynamic 
 
1 Van Erp 2006a, p. 1043-1044. 
2 So also Füller 2006, p. 2. 
3 See, e.g., Terrat 1904, p. 335. 
4 In French, Des différentes manières dont on acquiert la propriété. 
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system of interaction.5 For example, in the German Civil Code, contract law and 
property law are given equal status and the interaction between contract and 
property has led to the recognition of new property rights. Nevertheless, under the 
influence of German scholarship in particular, contract law and property law have 
been held strictly separate, not only in respect of the effects of the legal relations 
these areas of law govern, but also in the study of contract and property law.6 Prop-
erty law is above all a field of system and doctrine, which will only upon careful 
examination show its underlying principles and concepts. 
1.1. Personal Rights and Property Rights 
The difference between the law of obligations and the law of property is best 
viewed in terms of the legal relations that are dealt with by these respective fields of 
law. The law of obligations, in particular its subspecies contract law, concerns itself 
with personal rights. Contractual rights concern legal relations entered into by two 
or more parties that only bind those parties who have agreed to the terms of the 
legal relation.7 This basic principle of contract law is known as privity of contract. 
When a third party interferes with a personal right, the holder of that personal right 
must resort to the law of obligations to act against such interference.8 Typically, the 
law of obligations will provide a remedy in tort law. 
Opposed to these personal rights are those legal relations governed by the law 
of property. These legal relations are not only made between two or more persons, 
but also affect third parties in respect of an object.9 It is the link to an object 
combined with this third-party effect that is characteristic of property rights. As a 
basic principle of property law, these legal relations, typically known as property 
rights, have effect against third parties by their nature.10 
When the object is transferred, property rights in respect of that object will 
transfer as well.11 Also when the object falls into the hands of a third party, the 
property rights will remain resting on the object, enabling the right-holder to act 
against this third party. In property law theory this third-party effect is commonly 
known as the right to follow or droit de suite. Furthermore, when a property right is 
created in respect to an object, the holder of that property right as a creditor will be 
in a privileged position, compared with other creditors of the same debtor. This 
effect is known in property law theory as the right of preference or droit de 
préférence. In other words, entitlement to a property right allows its holder to act not 
 
5 On the equal position of contract law and the law of property, see Motive III 1888, p. 1-3. 
6 Exceptions include, inter alia, Rank-Berenschot 1992, Reid 1997b, Rutgers 1999, Von Bar & 
Drobnig 2002, and Van Erp 2004b, Füller 2006. 
7 Moreover, in the other area of the law of obligations, the law of tort, only personal relations 
arise. However, in respect to these relations, no party agreement is required. 
8 See Van Laarhoven 2005, p. 48 et seq. 
9 Reid 1997b, p. 226-227. 
10 I.e. not because the parties have expressed their desire to have third party effect, but through 
the existence of the property right. 
11 However, physical control over the object can be retained by making use of the concept of 
possession. 
 3 
Chapter 1 
only against the person with whom he created the property right, but also against 
third parties interfering with his rights. In contrast with acting upon interference of 
a personal right, the holder of a property right may use property law to act against 
an interfering third party.12 
In order for parties to grant third-party effect to their legal relation they must 
submit their relation to the law of property and for this a price must be paid. Parties 
can elect the third-party effect, but only if they comply with the rules set out by 
property law. In property law, therefore, party autonomy is limited in exchange for 
third-party effect. When parties choose to settle for a personal right, property law 
cannot impose these limits on party autonomy and in principle the parties are free 
to decide on what they want.13 In contract law, there is party autonomy, only the 
parties to the contract, and not third parties, are bound by the terms of that 
contract.14 
The other area of the law of obligations, the law of tort, also deals with 
personal rights. In contrast with contract law, legal relations in the law of tort come 
into existence upon the occurrence of a factual situation, usually where one party 
damages another party or the interests of another party. The relation that comes 
into existence is a personal relation in respect to the person causing the damage and 
will entitle the victim to compensation.15 
The difference between personal rights and property rights is therefore 
directly related to the separation between the law of obligations and the law of 
property. The law of contract and the law of property are therefore different from 
each other, especially in respect of the content of the rights that they govern. Under 
the influence of German legal thinking and because of the fundamentally varying 
effects of personal and property rights, most legal systems uphold a separation 
between these two areas of law.16 
Nevertheless there is also a close relationship between contract law and 
property law, especially when considered from the perspective of property law. In 
order for a property right to come into existence, parties must enter into an agree-
ment that first of all will constitute personal rights. When the requirements of 
property law have been fulfilled, the personal right will become a property right 
and will be governed by property law. Another example is the transfer of a property 
right from one party to another. In order for a transfer to succeed an agreement 
between two parties is needed. Depending on the system of property law the agree-
 
12 English law forms an exception to this where also in property law the remedies in the law of 
obligations must be used to protect a property right. Typically in case of movable objects this 
is the tort of conversion. See Swadling 2000a, p. 218-219, Bridge 2002, p. 47 et seq. 
13 Reid 1997b, p. 228. 
14 Also in contract law, parties can be bound more than just by the limits of the law. In case of 
specific contracts such as lease of an immovable or a labour contract, contract law imposes 
formalities and certain content upon these legal relations as well. See, inter alia, Atiyah 1979, 
Trebilcock 1993, Hofer 2001, Farnsworth 2006, p. 918-919. 
15 Van Dam 2006, p. 3 et seq. 
16 Füller 2006, p. 10-13. However, in English law the law of torts is used to protect property 
rights, creating a strong link between the two areas of law. However, also in English law the 
law of tort creates only personal relations. See Chapter 6 English Law. 
 4 
Introduction 
ment as such will transfer the property right or property law will impose additional 
criteria that must be fulfilled before the property right transfers.17 
Furthermore, in most legal systems the separation between the law of obliga-
tions and the law of property also results in legal relations that do not clearly fall 
into either of these areas of law. An example of such a right is the right of lease. In 
many legal systems, especially civil law systems, the right of lease is a personal 
right binding only the lessor and lessee. However, as a means of protection for 
lessees, these systems have adopted a rule, albeit mostly with regard to land and 
buildings, of ‘sale does not break a lease’.18 Under this provision, a lessee who is 
confronted with an owner who transfers his property right to another person will 
continue to be a lessee, but now with a new lessor. The right of the lease therefore 
has limited third-party effect because it binds the new owner to the terms of the 
lease agreement between the lessee and the principal lessor.19 
In every legal system where lease is a personal right, the relation between the 
law of obligations, to which lease belongs in those systems, and the law of property, 
where the right of lease may seem to belong, is being discussed.20 However, by 
making use of doctrinal arguments, such as the separation between the law of 
obligations and the law of property, the contractual nature of lease is upheld and 
the limited third-party effect of a lease is considered an exception.21 
Many legal systems are therefore confronted with a tension between the law of 
obligations and the law of property. Depending on the legal system, the law of 
property will be, to a greater or lesser degree, influenced by the law of obligations, 
in particular by contract law. The discussion on the influence of contract law, in 
particular if the acceptance of a quasi-property right is the result, will return in each 
legal system that is discussed in this study.22 
1.2. Property Law 
The law of property, or the law of things as it is sometimes called, deals with legal 
relations between persons in respect of objects (or things).23 These legal relations, or 
better, property rights, exist with regard to tangible objects – corporeal movable 
objects or corporeal immovable objects –, and intangible objects, or incorporeal 
objects such as claims.  
 
17 See, on different systems of transfer, in this chapter; 4. Terminology, see also Van Vliet 2000. 
18 Art. 1749 CC, Para. 566 BGB, Art. 7:226 BW. 
19 See Westrik 2001. 
20 Even in English law where a lease is a property right, the right originates as a personal right. 
See Chapter 6; 2.2. Leases of Land. 
21 On the place of lease in French, German and Dutch law, see Chapter 3; 4.6. Lease, Chapter 4; 
4.4. Lease of Immovable Objects, and Chapter 5; 4.3. Lease of Immovable Objects. 
22 See Chapter 3; 4. Borderline Cases in French Property Law, Chapter 4; 4. Borderline Cases in 
German Property Law, and Chapter 5; 4. Borderline Cases in Dutch Property Law. In respect 
to English law, because of the different nature of the English legal system, the discussion on 
the borderline between personal rights and property rights is included in the discussion of 
property rights. See in particular Chapter 6; 4. A Numerus Clausus in English Property Law. 
23 See, e.g., Van der Merwe & De Waal 1993, Swadling 2007, p. 220. 
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The law of property provides rules on property rights in respect of these 
objects, including their creation, exercise, execution, termination and other forms of 
destruction. Because of the third-party effect of the rights the law of property deals 
with, these rules cannot usually – different from other areas of private law – be 
simply deviated from by party agreement between the parties, in contrast with 
other areas of private law. 
1.2.1. Principles of Property Law 
Although property law can be studied from its technical rules, and these rules can 
be compared between one country and another, this will not provide a complete 
overview of the law of property. Although many property law systems use the 
same technical rules for the same purposes, the application of these rules to a 
certain problem may differ from system to system. Property law as a doctrinally 
coherent system is governed by a set of principles, according to which any type of 
property can be expressed. When the comparison is taken to this general level of 
principles, it becomes possible to place these technical rules into a context, allowing 
a better and more complete comparative overview.24 
The basic principles of property law are the principle of numerus clausus and 
the principle of transparency, which can be further divided into the principle of 
specificity and the principle of publicity.25 The principle of specificity determines to 
what extent the object on which a property right is created must be specified. In 
many legal systems the rules on specificity are under pressure by developments in 
the field of security rights in respect of claims, where creditors are demanding 
property security rights in respect of future claims. Future claims are objects of 
property law that cannot be identified yet, as they do not exist. Many systems face 
difficulties accepting property rights in respect of these non-existing claims.  
The other element of the principle of transparency is the principle of publicity. 
In property law, because of the effect of property rights in respect of third parties, 
information is vital.26 Therefore, many legal systems demand registration of a 
property right in a register that is publicly accessible so that third parties may find 
out about the existence of a property rights’ existence. In respect of highly valuable 
objects, such as land and valuable movable objects such as aircraft, trains and ships, 
registration is almost always required.27 
Although the principle of transparency is very important to property law, the 
principle of numerus clausus is the principle that decides on the applicability of the 
law of property, and therefore also on the applicability of the transparency 
principle. This study therefore concentrates on the principle of numerus clausus as 
the gateway to property law. 
 
24 In the same sense see Van Erp 2006a, p. 1050, Van Erp 2006b, p. 13 et seq., Michaels 2006a,  
p. 364 et seq. 
25 Van Erp 2006b, p. 14-16. On principles, fundamental principles and model rules see DCFR 
Interim Outline 2008, Nos. 10-11, p. 8-9. 
26 Van Erp 2006b, p. 15. 
27 Van Erp 2006b, p. 14-15. 
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1.2.2. Numerus Clausus of Property Rights 
The principle of numerus clausus of property rights, or numerus clausus for short, 
refers to the idea that a system of property law imposes limitations on private 
parties that want to create property rights.28 After its literal meaning, in many legal 
systems the term numerus clausus in property law refers to a closed list of property 
rights.  
Given its importance to society as a whole, many legal systems provide rules 
on property law through legislation.29 In countries as France, Germany and the 
Netherlands, a separate part in the Civil Code deals with the law of property. When 
these systems adhere to the principle of numerus clausus this means that in principle 
only those property rights that are allowed by the Civil Codes especially are 
recognised as property rights.30 As a result parties can only create property rights 
that fulfil the criteria set by this legislation, leaving a limited freedom or no freedom 
at all to shape the content of their property relations. 
The origin of the idea of numerus clausus can be found in the debates held after 
the French Revolution. In France, where the feudal system of landholding had been 
abolished, the legal system returned to a Roman-law inspired law of property in 
which, in contrast to the period before the Revolution, there was a separation 
between the law of obligations and the law of property.31 In order to express the 
new property law system, the new French legislature wanted to provide an 
overview in the Civil Code of those property rights that from now on would be 
recognised.32 
However, the real discussion on the closed system of property rights as a 
principle of property law and therefore a part of property law theory originates in 
nineteenth-century German legal thinking.33 The German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BGB) adopted Von Savigny’s theory on Vermögensrecht, within which property law 
and the law of obligations form separate and distinctive parts of the law.34 In the 
law of property as a separate area of law, because of its foundations taken from 
Roman law, the most extensive property right was a unitary and absolute right of 
ownership. All other property rights were considered rights lesser than the right of 
ownership but still with third-party effect.  
Because of this effect, and to protect the newly created unitary and absolute 
right of ownership, the Civil Code limited the number, but also the content, of 
property rights. In doctrinal terms this idea of limitation of property rights or Typen-
gebundenheit can be expressed with two different terms that have become commonly 
 
28 The term ‘private parties’ refers also to public legal entities acting as a party in private law. 
29 See Smits 2002, p. 249-252, Van Erp 2006b, p. 5-7. 
30 Although in some legal systems property rights are also created through special legislation. 
See, e.g., Chapter 3; 3.4. Emphyteusis, and Chapter 4; 3.3. Superficies. 
31 Pothier 1772, p. 1 et seq., Laurent 1878, p. 92-93, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 67, Gordley 1994,  
p. 459 et seq. 
32 See the statement made by Treilhard in Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du code civil 11, 
p. 33. 
33 Wiegand 1987, p. 630 et seq. 
34 Von Savigny 1981, Paras. 52-57, Wiegand 1987, p. 631, Füller 2006, p. 8 et seq. 
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accepted in explaining the principle of numerus clausus; the limitation on the 
number of rights has become known as Typenzwang and the limitation on the 
content of the rights as Typenfixierung.35 
Strongly connected to the separation between the law of obligations and the 
law of property, and the resulting distinction between property rights and personal 
rights, the principle of numerus clausus provides a filter to decide whether the law of 
property applies to a certain legal relation. Depending on the legal system there are 
different ways of describing the numerus clausus. When the principle of numerus 
clausus has found expression in the form of legislation, in particular as a part of the 
Civil Code, from which parties may not deviate, we could speak of a rule of numerus 
clausus. However, there are also legal systems in which the principle has not found 
expression as a formal rule. In some legal systems, for example, there is no Civil 
Code, and another source of law has a more important position than general legis-
lation. In these legal systems the principle of numerus clausus also finds expression, 
usually through a decision of a court of law.36 
Finally, there are also legal systems in the world that explicitly adhere to an 
open system of property rights, known as numerus apertus. These systems do not 
have a rule of numerus clausus, but nevertheless impose limitations on parties when 
it comes to the creation of new, as yet unknown, property rights.37 
1.3. European Private Law 
Comparing property law systems based on one of the principles of property law is 
more and more relevant from the perspective of the development of a European 
private law. For many years already the European Union has been active in the field 
of private law, the law of contract in particular. Since 2001 the European Commis-
sion has been working on a more coherent contract law in the form of a research 
project that might result in a complete revision of the existing contract law acquis, 
including general aspects of contract law.38  
As part of the preparation for this research project, the Commission published 
a study on property law and tort law and how they relate to contract law. The 
objective of this study was to investigate how far harmonisation of contract law 
would have effects on the law of property.39 As a result the researchers concluded 
that a harmonised contract law would certainly affect areas of property law. These 
 
35 The term Tipizität is also used instead of Typengebundenheid, see Giuffrè 1992, Rainer 1995,  
p. 415 et seq., Wiegand 1987, p. 633, Rey 1991, p. 71-75. 
36 See, e.g., the English case National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, HL at 1247-
1248 per Lord Wilberforce. 
37 In other words, these systems might not have a rule of numerus clausus, but still adhere to the 
principle by imposing limitations on private parties in the creation of new property rights. 
Such systems include South African law and Spanish law. South African law will return in 
the discussion in Chapter 7; 3.8. A Legal System Without a Numerus Clausus: South African 
Law. 
38 Action plan 2001, COM(2001) 98, Smits 2006. See Chapter 8; 2.1.3. European Commission 
Initiatives for Future Legislation. 
39 See Von Bar & Drobnig 2002. 
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areas of property law include the rules on transfer of property rights, property 
security rights in respect of movable objects and rules on trusts.  
Furthermore, the European Union has also taken several initiatives in the field 
of property law itself. These initiatives include Directives on stolen cultural objects, 
combatting late payments, and on financial collateral arrangements, as well as the 
Regulation on Insolvency proceedings.40 Possible future initiatives of the Commis-
sion include the creation of a European property security right in respect of land, 
the right of Euro-mortgage.41 Until now there has not been a general measure of 
European law harmonising the law of property. The fragmented approach of 
present European legislation leads to fundamental issues of national property law 
which sometimes cannot be completely resolved.42  
With the work of the European Commission on the creation of a European 
private law, the work on comparative property law becomes more important, 
especially in order to see the effects of European integration on the national prop-
erty law systems. In respect of the fundamental principles of property law, not 
much comparative research has been conducted.43 There is, for instance, no general 
agreement on the possibility of finding a common core in property law, nor is there 
agreement on the question of harmonisation of property law.44 Furthermore, the 
relation between national property law and European law as well as property law 
as part of the law in the European Internal Market has often been neglected.45 Only 
in respect of property security rights in respect of movable objects has research 
shown that national property law systems are subject to the law of the Internal 
Market.46 
In the study and development of a European private law, the law of property 
has not always been given the attention it deserves. Fundamental questions of 
property law have been left aside, sometimes due to a preconception of incompati-
bility. The current developments in European contract law and their possible effect 
on private law in the European Union enable property lawyers to look into 
fundamental questions of property law.47 The principle of numerus clausus as the 
gatekeeper of property law is one of these fundamental principles that deserve 
 
40 Directive 93/7/EEC of the Council on of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects 
unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State, Directive 2000/35 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial 
transactions, Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 June 
2002 on financial collateral arrangements, and Council Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May on 
insolvency proceedings. On these European Union initiatives see Chapter 8; 2.1.3. European 
Commission Initiatives for Future Legislation. 
41 See Green Paper Mortgage Credit in the EU COM(2005) 237 final, p. 13-14. 
42 See, inter alia, Van Erp 2004c, p. 533 et seq., Van Erp 2005, p. 252 et seq., Van Erp 2006b. 
43 An exception is the work of Van Erp, see Van Erp 2006b, p. 12-14, Van Erp 2008. 
44 See, on the general conception of property law, Gordley 2006a, p. 49-50. On harmonisation, 
see Kieninger 2004, p. 647 et seq., Rank 2006, p. 201 et seq. 
45 However, see Smits 2002, p. 245 et seq., Van Erp 2006b. 
46 See Kieninger 1996a, Kieninger 1996b, Rutgers 1999, Roth 1999. 
47 When fundamental questions of contract law are considered, fundamental questions of 
property law might be included as well. On the discussion of fundamental elements of 
contract law, see Schuze 2005, p. 25-27. 
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much more attention, even more in the light of the development of European 
private law. 
2. Legal Systems 
There are various different property law systems in the European Union. Each of 
the Member States has a separate and distinct property law system and some even 
use more than one system.48 Dealing with all property law systems of the EU is 
therefore almost impossible.49 In a study on one of the fundamental principles of 
property law a choice must be made between legal systems. 
In the debate on European private law the distinction between civil law and 
common law systems remains one of the central issues. In particular through the 
work of Legrand, who argues that no common ground can be found between civil 
law and common law because of a fundamental difference in the approaches taken 
by these legal traditions, the differences between civil law and common law might 
seem larger than ever.50  
However, work on comparative property law has already shown that common 
ground in the law of property can be found.51 When it comes to fundamental prin-
ciples such as the principle of numerus clausus, not much attention has been given to 
the search for such a common core.52 A study on the principle of numerus clausus 
should therefore at least include a legal system from the civil law and common law 
tradition.  
Furthermore, even within traditions many differences exist; there is not one 
common law or civil law system. As a guidance to choose from the many legal 
systems in the world, in the light of the debate on European private law, a focus on 
European legal systems seems justified. Within these European legal systems two 
systems, French and German law, have been very influential. The Civil Codes 
drafted in these countries have influenced Civil Codes throughout the mainland of 
Europe, including, for instance, the law of the Netherlands which has been influ-
enced by both. When it comes to common law systems, English law, as the mother 
of all common law systems, has been immensely influential.  
 
48 English law uses the law of real property or land law and the law on personal property or 
personal property law. See Chapter 6; 1.1. Terminology. 
49 There is only one study on property law in the Member States of the European Union. See 
Von Bar (ed.) Sachenrecht in Europa, Schriften zum Internationalen Privatrecht und zur 
Rechtsvergleichung, (Osnabrück, 2000), volumes 1-4. 
50 Legrand 1996a, p. 779 et seq., Legrand 1996b, p. 52 et seq., Legrand 1997, p. 44 et seq., Legrand 
1999, p. 1053 et seq. On the role of Legrand in comparative law and other criticism see 
Michaels 2006a, p. 340-341, Dannemann 2006, p. 389. 
51 See, inter alia, Van Vliet 2000, p. 201 et seq., Kieninger 2004, p. 647 et seq., Gordley 2006a, p. 49-
50. 
52 However, see Reid 1997b, Van Erp 2003b, Struycken 2007. 
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2.1. Civil Law: French, German and Dutch Law 
In respect of the division between civil law and common law systems, civil law 
systems are in the vast majority in the European Union.53 Although these civil law 
systems differ from each other, they share a common basis in the influence of 
Roman law.54 Western European legal systems, such as French and German law, 
have had an enormous influence on other European legal systems, including those 
in Eastern Europe. In particular, as a result of the codes of private law in France and 
in Germany, and the Roman law basis of these codes, many other legal systems 
have adopted aspects of Roman law.55 
The Civil Codes of France and Germany were introduced 100 years apart. 
During the period between the introduction of the French Code civil (CC) and the 
German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) new insights on the law of property were 
developed. In particular under pressure from the German scholar Von Savigny, the 
German BGB adheres to a much stricter separation between the law of obligations 
and the law of property than does the French Civil Code.56 
The development of property law from the French to the German Civil Code 
shows the development of what has been named the classical system of property 
law, a system of property law strictly separated from the law of obligations in 
which legal certainty is the most important value.57 Under the heading of legal 
certainty, property relations can only exist when it is clear on which object the 
property relation is created and third parties can know about its existence. In the 
case of immovables this requires registration, in the case of movables it requires 
possession by the right-holder. Although other areas of law continued to develop, 
the classical model of property law as it was formed in French and German law has 
remained the same throughout most of the twentieth century. Only recently were 
changes made in both German and French law.58  
The classical model of property law also prevailed in countries influenced by 
the French and German legal systems. Dutch law, from 1838 onwards, used a 
French-inspired Civil Code and therefore also the French system of property law. 
Changes inspired by German law were made in 1992, when a large part of the new 
Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) came into effect, including the relevant parts on 
property law. In the new Dutch Civil Code a stronger influence of German law can 
be seen in a stricter separation between the law of obligations and the law of 
property as well as a limitation of the law of property, in particular the right of 
ownership, to corporeal objects.59  
 
53 Hondius 1998, p. 9, but also other distinctions have been made. See inter alia Zweigert & Kötz 
1998, p. 63 et seq. 
54 On the common basis in Roman law see Chapter 2, Zwalve 2003, p. 23 et seq  
55 Zwalve 2003, p. 36-42, 43-47,Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 85 et seq., 143 et seq. 
56 See Von Savigny 1981. 
57 On the classical system of property law see Van Erp 2008, forthcoming. 
58 See Chapter 3; 1. Introduction, and Chapter 4; 3.4. Expectation Rights. 
59 See Chapter 5; 1. Introduction. 
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The classical model used in German law, therefore also influenced the classical 
model of Dutch law, which now combines the historical influence of French law and 
modern concepts of Dutch law with the new influence of German law. From the 
perspective of civil law systems, Dutch law therefore offers a middle ground 
between French and German law, but at the same time offers a complication 
because of various, often very traditional, choices that were made in the new Civil 
Code of 1992. 
The civil law part of this book will deal with French, German and Dutch law. 
Only occasionally influences from other civil law jurisdictions will be mentioned. 
The focus on these three countries enables a comparison of the fundamental con-
cepts of property law, the principle of numerus clausus in particular, as well as the 
content of the closed list of property rights and its deviations. 
2.2. Common Law: English Law 
The common law tradition is in a minority in the European Union. In fact, only 
England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Ireland are common law systems at the 
moment.60 However, English law also has influence in other parts of the European 
Union in countries such as Malta, Cyprus and Scotland. These systems are mixed 
traditions, combining civil law and common law, but remain heavily influenced by 
English law. 
In this study the term common law is used to describe the legal system that 
has developed in England since 1066.61 Common law, and its parallel system of 
equity, underwent its own development, only occasionally under the influence of a 
certain aspect of the continental Roman law.62 The result of this development is that, 
compared with civil law, common law uses different solutions to similar problems. 
These different solutions include other concepts of property law, but also different 
legal techniques. From a civil law point of view, the development of land law and 
personal property law and the separate development of common law and equity 
until the end of the nineteenth century create a fragmented system of property law.  
One of the clearest distinguishing factors between common law and civil law 
countries in respect of property law is the feudal system of land holding. Where, in 
civil law systems, the feudal system was abolished as a result of the French 
Revolution, it remained in force in England.63 Civil law systems, with the drafting of 
the various Civil Codes, returned to Roman-law based concepts such as a unitary 
and absolute right of ownership. In English law feudal concepts such as fees and 
estates remain, although without an actual feudal system today. 
 
60 Other examples are the Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey. See Van Erp 2006a, p. 1058-
1059. 
61 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 182 et seq., Pierre 1997, p. 243 et seq., Van Caenegem 1988a, p. 3-14. 
62 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 181, Stein 1992, p. 1591. See also Gauthier 1996, Reimann 1993, 
Zimmermann 2002a. See further Chapter 6; 1.1. Terminology. 
63 See Van Erp 2008, forthcoming. 
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A discussion of English law will therefore show the problems comparative 
property lawyers face in resolving fundamental distinctions, based on the contrast 
between Roman law and feudal principles. 
2.3. South African Law as a Comparative Factor 
In the debate on comparative property law and the sometimes sharp distinctions 
between common law and civil law, a third legal tradition may offer useful 
insights.64 The law of South Africa, which is confronted with civil law and common 
law every day, offers such a third tradition. South Africa is a mixed legal system 
that combines Roman-Dutch civil law with English common law, exactly the legal 
traditions followed by the countries mentioned above. Being a mixed legal system 
means that South African law recognises concepts specific to English law, such as 
trusts, but refuses to recognise equity.65 Fitting trusts into a property law system 
without equity requires some fundamental decisions to resolve conflicts, mainly in 
relation to the ownership of the trust objects and the rights of beneficiaries.66 In 
cases like that of trusts, South African law must find solutions for conflicts between 
common law and civil law concepts on a frequent basis. Possibly these solutions 
offered by South African law can offer insights and be used as a basis for a 
European private law.67 
However, South African law is not a European legal system and, although the 
solutions it provides are highly relevant in the debate on European private law, 
South African law will only be dealt with as a comparative factor. When the differ-
ences between civil law and common law have become clear, South African law can 
play its role in helping to find a middle ground.68 The content of the South African 
system of property rights, however, will be left aside.  
3. Methodology 
The distinction between personal rights and property rights, in civil law systems, 
can be traced back to Roman law. However, this distinction is also recognised by the 
common law. In common law the distinction also has historical origins, but they are 
different from those in the civil law.69 Furthermore, the abolition of the feudal 
system in the civil law systems as a result of the French Revolution and its con-
tinued existence in England shows the different historical origins of these systems of 
property law.70 
Property law systems develop on their own, not necessarily logically, some-
times as a reaction to an event or a certain unwanted situation. Without knowing 
 
64 See Michaels 2006a, p. 367-369. 
65 On the law of trusts in South African law see De Waal 2000, p. 439 et seq. 
66 See Honoré et al. 2003. 
67 Smits 1999. 
68 See Chapter 7; 3.8. A Legal System Without Numerus Clausus: South African Law. 
69 See Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 6-7, Simpson 1986, p. 25 et seq., Holdsworth 1927, p. 11 et seq. 
70 Critically on the results of the French Revolution see Gordley 1994, p. 459 et seq. 
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the historical origins of a legal system it is difficult to explain why ownership in 
France is such an absolute right, why German law has two types of rights of hy-
pothec on immovable objects, why Dutch law continues to struggle with trusts and 
transfers of ownership for security purposes, and why in English law a lease is not 
really realty, but nevertheless a property right. A discussion and comparison of 
modern property law systems without taking into account the historical develop-
ment of legal systems is therefore almost impossible in respect of property law.71  
As this study will show, it is striking that, although there are many differ-
ences, there are, even with a different historical basis, also many similarities and 
similar approaches between these systems. In the light of the debate on European 
private law looking for a common ground between French, German, Dutch and 
English law, while taking into account the diversity between legal systems could 
provide helpful results.72 This common basis could contribute to the discussion on 
the development of a European property law.  
In order to find these common grounds, a different look at property law will 
be needed.73 Property law concepts that are functionally equivalent, in other words, 
concepts that respond, although they are different concepts, to the same problem, 
shall be grouped as much as possible.74 In doing so respect can be maintained for 
the differences between the concepts in different legal systems, but at the same time 
bringing them under the same heading.75 As an example, there is no need to 
distinguish servitudes on land in civil law systems from easements in English law. 
The result is an analysis of the system of property rights in French, German, Dutch 
and English law, expressed in terms that are as neutral as possible. Based on this 
comparative system, proposals can be made to move towards a European property 
law. The method used to come to such proposals must consequently be historical-
comparative. 
4. Terminology 
In the course of the discussion on the property law systems of France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and England, various terms of property law will be used. Some of 
these are so general that they should be explained here rather than in the respective 
chapters on the particular legal systems. 
This study will speak of ‘legal relations’ whenever possible.76 The term ‘legal 
relation’ is used to mean any relation between two or more persons with an effect in 
law. When two parties agree on something, their legal relation will usually be a 
contract and the rights these parties will receive from this legal relation will be 
personal rights. Consequently, if parties agree on something in respect to an object 
and this legal relation falls within the system of property law, when formalities 
 
71 Van Erp 2003a, p. 394 et seq. 
72 Dannemann 2006, p. 391-394. 
73 On the functional method and looking functionally at legal systems see Michaels 2006a. 
74 Michaels 2006a, p. 356-359. 
75 Michaels 2006a, p. 364-365. 
76 See Ginossar 1960, Zenati 1981, Sagaert 2005b. 
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have been fulfilled, the legal relation will be a property relation and the rights 
arising from it will be property rights. The term legal relation is therefore intended 
to be a term preceding the phase and the question which right, whether personal or 
proprietary, arises. Furthermore, the term ‘legal relation’ emphasises the connection 
between the law of obligations and the law of property and makes it possible to 
approach numerus clausus as the principle that decides which legal relation is 
granted access to property law and therefore will have third-party effect. 
Another term that is used throughout the following chapters is the term 
‘possession’. Depending on the legal system in which the term is used, possession 
refers to a factual situation in which a person has factual power over an object for 
himself or on behalf of another, or to a legal situation in which the person with the 
strongest right of possession holds the best title in an object.  
In civil law systems there are two approaches to possession. French and Dutch 
law reserve the term possession for the person having factual power over an object 
for himself. When a person has factual power over an object, but not for himself, 
French and Dutch law use the term ‘detention’ .77  
German law uses the concept of possession for both of these factual situations. 
When a person has factual power over an object for himself, German law speaks of 
Eigenbesitz. When a person has factual power over an object for another, German 
law speaks of Fremdbesitz.78  
The difference in approaches towards possession is relevant in respect of the 
actions a possessor may take to protect his possession. These possessory actions are, 
in French and Dutch law, only open to a possessor and not to a detentor, but in 
German law also to a Fremdbesitzer. The result is a complicated discussion in 
Germany on the proprietary status of certain legal relations that in French and 
Dutch law only award detention.79 
The terms ‘possession’ and ‘detention’ should not be confused with the term 
‘holding’. Holding a property right refers to the entitlement to that property right, 
not to the factual power over the object on which the property right is created. The 
term ‘right-holder’ therefore refers to that person entitled to a property right. 
Another term that is used throughout the study is ‘the system of transfer’ or 
‘transfer system’. French, German, Dutch and English law all use different require-
ments for the transfer of a property right in respect of an object to another person. 
Mostly these requirements are also used for the creation of property rights.  
In terms of transfer systems there are two major distinctions. A consensual 
system allows immediate property effects, the transfer of a property right, from a 
contract concluded between a buyer and a seller. A tradition system requires, 
besides a valid contract underlying the transfer, an additional act in the law of 
property for the transfer to take effect. 
A second distinction is between abstract and causal transfer systems. A causal 
system requires a valid contract to transfer a property right in respect of an object, 
 
77 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 101, Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 123, p. 107-
108. 
78 Wieling 2001, p. 43. 
79 See Chapter 4; 4.3. Entitlement to Possession Through the Law of Obligations. 
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not only at the moment of transfer, but also after that. When the contract underlying 
the transfer is for some reason void or avoided, because of the causal system, the 
transfer will be void as well. In an abstract system of transfer, a valid agreement is 
needed to effect the transfer, but once the transfer has taken place, invalidity of the 
agreement in contract law will, in most circumstances, have no effect on the transfer 
of the property right anymore.80 
A final terminological distinction that is made is that of land registration 
systems. In terms of land registration systems, there are two models. A negative 
model, as used by French and Dutch law, is one in which a public register is kept of 
all transactions in respect of immovable objects by registering the deeds underlying 
these transactions. However, the registrar merely registers the deeds and does not 
check their contents, apart from some procedural requirements. A positive model, 
as used in German and in English law, is a system in which a public register is kept 
of all transactions concluded in respect to immovable objects, in which data taken 
from deeds is registered after the validity of this data has been checked. These 
systems, in one way or another, guarantee the correct content of the register.81 The 
distinction between these two models of registration systems is needed because of 
the work of the European Commission on mortgage credit markets in Europe. In 
order to promote cross-border transactions in immovable property, systems for 
registration of security rights are becoming more and more integrated. Moreover, a 
property security right in respect of immovable objects, the existence of which can 
be proven from a document provided by a positive register, might possibly be 
introduced in the future.82 
5. Searching for a Numerus Clausus 
This study will examine one of the principles of property law, the principle of 
numerus clausus, and the expressions of this principle in the legal systems of France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and England. In the discussion on these legal systems, 
not only the existence of the numerus clausus but also its content will be central. 
These property law systems are under increasing pressure from the law of 
contract in which party autonomy is used to achieve similar results as can be 
achieved in property law, or even to achieve results that cannot be achieved in 
property law, but still bind third parties. As a result several legal systems have been 
confronted with new property rights or adapted versions of already existing 
property rights, which they have accepted and included in the law of property.83 
Furthermore, because of the increased integration of national legal systems in 
the Internal Market of the European Union, these four legal systems are also subject 
to influence from each other. Due to the increasing economic and political, as well 
 
80 On these distinctions see Van Vliet 2000, Cámara-Lapuente 2005, p. 808-809. 
81 On these distinctions see Cámara-Lapuente 2005, p. 809 et seq. 
82 On the Euro-mortgage see Chapter 8; 2.3. European Commission Initiatives for Future 
Legislation. 
83 See e.g. Rey 1991, p. 54 et seq., Fesevur 1992, p. 13-15, Kerridge 2000, p. 533 et seq., Wiegand 
1987, p. 640-641, Van Erp 2003b, Reid 1997b, p. 229, De Waal 2000, p. 439 et seq. 
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as legal, links between these legal systems, they are increasingly confronted with 
choices made in other jurisdictions. One example is the recognition of property 
rights created in another legal system and the legal economic and legal political 
choices connected to these rights and their recognition.84 
Finally, also because of further market integration, the European Union has 
taken and is taking several legislative initiatives in which it introduces new 
property rights. These new rights include the security interest and the transfer of 
title under the Financial Collateral Arrangement Directive, as well as a legislative 
instrument introducing a Euro-mortgage which might be proposed in the near 
future.85 
The classical model of property law is therefore under more pressure than 
ever. In order to understand this pressure and to propose a method to deal with it, 
this book is divided into three parts. First, the civil law will be looked at. Because of 
the civil law systems’ shared heritage in Roman law, Chapter 2 examines the 
development of property rights, starting from Roman law, in the civil law. More-
over, as the theory of numerus clausus is most developed in civil law systems, this 
Chapter on the development of property rights will also explore the origins of the 
numerus clausus principle. After that, Chapter 3 will deal with French law, Chapter 4 
with German law and Chapter 5 with Dutch law.  
Each of these chapters will examine which property rights the legal system 
recognises and for which purpose these property rights are used. Furthermore, each 
chapter will devote attention to the distinction between the law of obligations and 
the law of property and those legal relations that do not fall into either of these 
areas of private law. 
The second section, Chapter 6, will deal with English law. This section will 
also examine the law of property, but will follow the distinction between land law 
and personal property law. Chapter 6 will discuss whether the numerus clausus 
principle can also be found in English law and what its place is in that legal system. 
The third section comprises a comparative analysis of French, German, Dutch 
and English law in Chapter 7. In this analysis the content of the property law system 
of these countries will be compared as well as the place of the numerus clausus. An 
overview is provided of the system of property rights in these legal systems, and 
the theory of numerus clausus is revisited to see what are the arguments for its 
existence and whether these arguments can still be maintained.  
The final chapter, Chapter 8, will discuss the influence on the national systems 
of property law that result from the impact of private international law and 
European law, more specifically the law of the European Union. This Chapter will 
raise the question whether national property law really is only national property 
law today, when seen from the perspective of European integration. The findings of 
this thesis lead to a negative answer. Property law systems now function together in 
a system of European property law. When a European property law is formed, the 
 
84 On this, see Chapter 8. 
85 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial 
collateral arrangements, Green Paper Mortgage Credit in the EU COM(2005) 237 final, p. 13-
14. See Chapter 8; 2.3. European Commission Initiatives for Future Legislation. 
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principle of numerus clausus will need to take centre stage. At the end of Chapter 8, 
therefore, a proposal is made for a European property law in which numerus clausus 
is a constitutive element. 
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Chapter 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
1. Introduction 
The legal systems of France, Germany and the Netherlands share a common basis in 
Roman law. Not only historical Roman law, the law from the formative period of 
Roman law until the codifications of Justinian, but also the Roman law that was 
rediscovered and received into the legal systems of the territories that are now these 
nation states.1 In the period between the original, historical Roman law and the 
rediscovered and adapted form of Roman law, society had continued to develop 
and had started to use different legal concepts taken from customary law. Applying 
Roman law when it was rediscovered was sometimes difficult, as it had to be 
adapted to the new situations in society. The feudal system of landholding had 
come into existence between the fall of the Roman Empire and the rediscovery of 
Roman law. In this system both the feudal lord and tenant held a strong property 
right in the same land at the same time. It was not very simple to reincorporate 
principles such as the Roman unitary concept of ownership, dominium.2 
This study searches for the existence of the principle of numerus clausus in 
French, German, Dutch and English law. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, a distinc-
tion can be made between a principle of numerus clausus and a rule of numerus 
clausus. As mentioned in Chapter 1, and as will be further elaborated in Chapter 4 
on German law, the doctrinal theory on the rule of numerus clausus finds its origin in 
the German debate on the separation between the law of obligations and the law of 
property.3 Moreover, there is also a strong influence from the French Civil Code. 
During the drafting process of the French Civil Code some of the drafters expressed 
their opinion that there was a closed list of property rights in French law and that 
parties were not free any longer to create new property rights.4 The origins of the 
idea that there are limitations on parties in the creation of property rights, or the 
 
1 I.e., when the Ius Commune applied. On the term Ius Commune see Nève 1995, p. 3 et seq. 
2 More will be stated about this below in 4.3. Ownership.  
3 See Chapter 1; 1.2.2. Numerus Clausus of Property Rights, and Chapter 4; 1. Introduction. 
4 See Chapter 3; 5. A Numerus Clausus in French Property Law. 
 20 
The Development of Property Rights 
principle of numerus clausus, might therefore be older than the drafting of the 
German Civil Code. 
Projecting the rule of numerus clausus to a period before these Civil Codes 
would not answer the question of the doctrinal origins of this rule of property law, 
but would require that period to be explained in terms of later legal theory. 
However, the idea of limiting the available property rights, especially the ideas 
contained in the principle of numerus clausus, was not new for German lawyers in the 
nineteenth century.5 Private parties have been limited in the possibility to create 
new property rights from Roman times onwards. Although the reasons for these 
limitations in Roman law might have been different from the modern day reasons 
for numerus clausus, these reasons should be placed in the time period in which they 
were used and, in that perspective, remain of value.6  
Central to this Chapter is therefore not the possible existence of a rule of 
numerus clausus of property rights. Instead the Chapter will focus on the question of 
how property rights developed and whether, in the legal system in which they 
functioned, limitations were imposed on the number and content of these rights. 
When discussing these limitations, the Chapter will search for numerus clausus as a 
principle of property law.7 
The development of property rights, including the content of property rights, 
forms a common basis for the civil law systems discussed in the next three 
Chapters. This Chapter will provide an overview of the common historical basis as 
well as lay foundations for the discussion on the nature of the modern civil law 
systems of France, Germany and the Netherlands.8 This Chapter will also show that 
this common basis not only concerns the limitation of the number of property 
rights, but that these civil law systems to a very large extent have also incorporated 
the same property rights, subjected to the same criteria as developed in historical 
Roman law. In the discussion below on property rights in the modern civil law 
systems of France, Germany and the Netherlands, explicit reference will be made 
back to this Chapter to underline the historical basis. 
Because the term Roman law is imprecise regarding the exact period it 
concerns, and Roman law differed in content depending on the period under 
consideration, a distinction is made between historical and learned Roman law. The 
term learned Roman law is used to describe the received Roman law at the time of 
 
5 On the distinction between the rule and the principle of numerus clausus see Chapter 1; 1.2.2. 
Numerus Clausus of Property Rights, and Chapter 7; 1.3.2. Numerus Clausus as a Principle or as 
a Rule? 
6 However, see Lokin 2003, p. 273. On Lokin’s view on the origins of the numerus clausus see 
Chapter 7; 1.3.3. Historical Origins of Numerus Clausus. See also in this Chapter; 2.5. A 
Numerus Clausus in (Pre-) Classical Roman Law? 
7 Numerus clausus as a principle of property law limits party autonomy regarding the creation 
of property rights, both existing and new rights. Searching for a principle of numerus clausus 
does not include the search for an absolutely closed list of property rights, which is only one 
of the ways in which the principle of numerus clausus can be expressed. See Van Erp 2006b,  
p. 12 et seq., Van Erp 2008, forthcoming. 
8 See Chapter 7; 1.1. Property Law in Development. 
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the Ius Commune.9 The term historical Roman law is used as a general term for the 
law that applied at the time the Roman Republic, Principate and Empire actually 
existed. In historical Roman law a further distinction is made between the period 
before codification, especially pre-classical and classical Roman law, and the period 
after codification when the Corpus Iuris Civilis was adopted under the authority of 
Emperor Justinian.10 The (pre-) classical period, as it will be referred to, concerns the 
formative period of Roman law from the Late Republic (250 BC) until the end of the 
second century AD. It should be emphasised that it is not the intention of this study 
to provide an extensive overview of Roman law. The objective of this Chapter is 
merely to see which property rights existed at what time and in which system. Was 
this (1) a system of unlimited freedom for parties to create property rights? or (2) a 
system in which parties were limited to create new rights? Because of the casuistic 
nature of Roman law, which was mainly developed by learned writers describing 
factual cases and by deriving general rules from these cases, a summary will be 
provided at the end of each section. After the discussion of Roman law, this Chapter 
will deal with the Ius Commune, which was the time in which Roman law was 
rediscovered and applied to feudal property law and when the law of the Roman 
Catholic Church, canon law, became more influential, forming the basis of many 
theoretical property law problems that still exist today. Finally, this Chapter will 
deal with the development away from the Roman-law inspired Ius Commune 
through the works of the Humanists and the natural law school, as well as the 
abolition of the feudal system, at least in France, as a result of the French Revolu-
tion.11 It was the abolition of the feudal system that would eventually lead to the 
adoption of the French Civil Code, reinstating parts of the (pre-)classical Roman 
concept of ‘unitary’ ownership as well as (pre-)classical Roman property rights 
other than ownership.12 
2. (Pre-) Classical Roman Law 
2.1. Introduction 
A general discussion of the development of property law in the period in Roman 
law before Justinian’s codifications remains somewhat difficult as this period com-
prises at least three generally recognised sub-periods; pre-classical law, classical law 
and post-classical or vulgar law. This Chapter combines pre-classical and classical 
Roman law and seeks to discover what types of property rights were developed in 
this period and how these rights functioned. From this perspective, the (pre-) 
classical Roman law, where the Roman legal system was at its most untainted and 
 
9 See below; 4. The Ius Commune. 
10 This code is the Corpus Iuris Civilis, made under the authority of Emperor Justinian. See 
below; 3. Codified Roman Law – The Corpus Iuris Civilis. 
11 The different legal systems and the way in which historical legal systems are incorporated are 
dealt with in the respective Chapters. 
12 At the time of the French Revolution there was already work on drafts for a Civil Code in 
Austria and Prussia. 
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extensive form, is the most interesting.13 After the period of classical Roman law the 
concepts that were developed in a clear way and that had become distinct from 
other concepts, became, mostly due to economic circumstances, unclear and 
blurred. It was only in the codification made under the authority of Emperor 
Justinian that classical Roman law principles were restored.14 
Furthermore, a distinction can be made between the pre-codification period 
and the codification period which can be explained from the point of view of the 
numerus clausus. The codification that was ordered by Emperor Justinian is usually 
regarded as the first codification of law in history.15 As the intention of Justinian 
was to codify the law and give this codification exclusive force of law, the property 
rights contained in this codification may be regarded as the only property rights 
that could be created.16 In respect to limitations on private parties concerning the 
creation of property rights, and given the nature of Justinian’s codification, it could 
be held that a rule of numerus clausus was established.17 However up to the time of 
codification the law was un-codified and it was a matter for practice and the writers 
of authority to include and recognise new property rights.18 
After discussing some general principles, this Chapter will first discuss the 
concept of ownership, after which attention will be paid to various property rights 
other than ownership. Finally, when the contents of the property rights – ownership 
and property rights other than ownership – have been examined, the system of 
property rights will be examined. 
2.2. General Principles of (Pre-) Classical Roman Law 
Before examining the concept of ownership and the various other property rights it 
is important to deal with some general principles first. Roman law was based on 
actions more than on rights.19 The Romans did not occupy themselves with the 
question of who had a certain right, but rather with who had a certain actio or action 
to protect a certain legal position. The actio was a type of remedy that could be 
invoked before a judge, legal officer or magistrate. Besides actions there were also 
interdicts, the difference being one of origin. Because of this system of actions it was 
unnecessary to provide a general definition of the right of ownership, the question 
in Roman law would not have been who had ownership but who had an actio 
protecting ownership.  
 
13 Nicholas 1962, p. 34, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 4-5. 
14 See below; 3. Codified Roman Law – The Corpus Iuris Civilis.  
15 Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 61-64. It should be noted that there had been previous law 
collections. 
16 Zwalve 2003, p. 103, see below; 3.2. General Principles of the Corpus Iuris Civilis. 
17 See below; 3.5. A Numerus Clausus in the Corpus Iuris Civilis? 
18 See, inter alia, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 97, Johnston 1999, p 69, Watson 1968, p 176-180, Giuffrè 
1992, p. 203 et seq. However, it should be noted that the existence of a numerus clausus in pre-
codification times is debatable. It is clear that these writers attempted to categorise new 
situations into existing property rights. 
19 On this see, inter alia, Van den Bergh 1988, p. 33-34.  
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The modern distinction between personal rights and property rights, that is 
usually held to have been adhered to by Roman law as well, therefore was 
addressed by the question of against which person or persons a certain actio could 
be initiated. A property relation would be recognised if the actio worked against 
everyone, whereas a personal relation would be characterised by an actio only 
available between the parties. In this respect the term proprietary action or actio in 
rem can be used. 
In Roman law it is important to classify the objects of property law.20 The 
concept of res is of importance. In ancient Roman law, when society was primarily 
based on agriculture, a distinction was made between those objects required for, 
especially, agriculture, the res mancipi, and those not relevant to such purposes, the 
res nec mancipi.21 This distinction was important, especially in relation to the ways in 
which ownership of these objects could be transferred. Res mancipi could be 
transferred by mancipatio, which was a formal way to transfer ownership, whereas 
res nec mancipi were transferred by traditio, which was a more informal way to 
transfer ownership.22 The reason for this distinction becomes clear when the res 
mancipi are examined. The contents of what can be res mancipi are listed by Gaius in 
his Institutes and comprise slaves, beasts of burden (oxen, horses, mules and 
donkeys), Italic land, houses on Italic land and rustic praedial servitudes.23 These 
objects were the most important elements in Roman life at that time and therefore 
these important elements could only be transferred with the utmost formality. 
The procedure of mancipatio was one of these formal procedures. Mancipatio, 
which is described by Gaius, exists in a ritual enacted before five witnesses, where 
the res mancipi is exchanged for some symbolic amount or quantity of value in 
bronze.24 The procedure of in iure cessio was also used, where both parties would 
come before the praetor and the claimant would state that an object was his, whereas 
the defendant would remain silent and the praetor would then adjudicate the res 
mancipi to the claimant by addictio.25 The traditio was the least formal procedure and 
was used to transfer res nec mancipi. On delivery, if based on a valid cause, the object 
 
20 See, inter alia, Watson 1968, Sohm 1931, Schulz 1992, Nicholas 1962, Borkowski 1997. 
21 On this distinction and its possible origin see Van den Bergh 1988, p. 9, Borkowski 1997,  
p. 156, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 94-95, Giuffrè 1992, p. 121, Nicholas 1962, p. 106, Kaser & 
Knütel 2003, p. 120, and G. Inst. 2.14a. 
22 Moreover, these objects could also be transferred by in iure cessio. Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 94, 
118-120, Borkowski 1997, p. 155-156. 
23 G. Inst. 2.14a. The part regarding the beast of burden has been much debated. The list 
provided by Gaius as examples seems to have been the full list. When, for example, elephants 
became beast of burden, they were not regarded as res mancipi. Borkowski 1997, p. 156, 
Watson 1968, p. 17-20. 
24 Although it should be noted that the symbolic value could be replaced by the actual purchase 
price, thus transforming the mancipatio into a sale transaction. Watson 1968, p. 16-20, 
Borkowski 1997, p. 200-202, Nicholas 1962, p. 116, Thomas 1976, p. 152-155. 
25 Watson 1968, p. 20-21, Borkowski 1997, p. 202, Nicholas 1962, p. 116, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 74, 
Thomas 1976, p. 155-157. More will be stated on this mode of transfer in the part on 
servitudes. 
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would pass to a new owner.26 The method of transfer of ownership by traditio was 
considered the most standard form to transfer ownership and would eventually 
remain as the principal method of transfer. 
Finally, the distinction between Roman citizens and Roman objects of 
property, and people from the rest of the world and other objects of property 
should be explained. In Roman law, Roman citizens were the only persons who 
could acquire Roman objects under what is known as a Quiritian title. This title, or 
the right to the actio protecting ownership, was the paramount entitlement to an 
object. People who were not Roman citizens were not capable of this ownership and 
were forced to make do with a lesser form. Land outside Italy was not covered by 
the Roman civil law and therefore, under the law that applied to these areas of land, 
the Ius Gentium, all land outside of Italy was owned by the State. It could therefore 
not be owned by Quiritian title or any other title.  
The Roman distinction between Quiritian ownership and lesser forms of 
ownership was the result of a distinction between ius civile, which applied to Roman 
citizens only, and ius gentium, which applied to the whole territory of the Republic, 
Principate and Empire respectively. This distinction followed from the general 
system of Roman law where the ius civile was restricted to Roman citizens. 
2.3. Ownership 
Although Roman law did not provide a precise definition of the concept of owner-
ship, it was already regarded as the paramount entitlement to an object, and this 
does not mean that Roman ownership cannot be defined.27 In fact, throughout later 
history attempts have been made to do so.28 Especially in (pre-) classical Roman 
law, it was difficult to describe the owner of an object.29 In terms of a definition, 
with Roman law looking at actions rather than at rights, the person with ownership 
was a Roman person who had an object acquired through a Roman legal process to 
whom the action of vindication belonged.30  
Originally, Roman society had been organised around families with the pater 
familias or head of the family as the one owned everything. In these ancient times, 
the ownership of the pater familias was protected by the procedure of legis actio 
sacramento in rem. This was a formal procedure, which is considered to date from the 
time of the law of XII Tables, one of the oldest Roman written laws. In this legal 
procedure each of the parties would claim that a certain object was his.31 It was for 
 
26 Or, on iusta causa. Nicholas 1962, p. 117, Watson 1968, p. 61-62, Pool 1995, p. 46 et seq., Mayer-
Maly 1999, p. 74, Thomas 1976, p. 179-183. 
27 Thomas 1976, p. 133, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 60-61, Van der Merwe 1996, p. 364, Carey Miller 
1998, p. 145-148, Nicholas 1962, p. 153, Watson 1968, p. 92, Zwalve 2003, p. 109. 
28 For an overview see Schrage 1996. 
29 Carey Miller 1998, p. 45-46. 
30 Regardless under which procedure this vindication was granted, as will be shown in this 
section. Thomas 1976, p. 133, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 108-109. 
31 Or the words meum esse aio. G. Inst. 4.16., the XII Tables date from 450 B.C., Thomas 1976,  
p. 33. Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 130, Kaser 1964, p. 7-8, Sohm 1931, p. 311. 
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the judge in the procedure to decide which of the parties had the best right and who 
was therefore considered owner. 32 This specific procedure has given rise to a theory 
by Kaser that in ancient times the Romans used a concept of relative ownership, 
since both were able to claim ownership to the object in the procedure.33 However, 
several other authors claim that the use of the word ‘mine’, a party claiming a 
certain object was his, makes it possible to speak of an absolute concept of owner-
ship and contradicts this assumption.34 Although Kaser’s theory is interesting and 
would enable a better comparison with modern English law, where an ‘owner’ is 
looked at as that person having the best right to an object, the majority of authors 
reject his views.35 
The legis actio sacramento in rem disappeared in the later law and so did the 
position of the pater familias.36 In pre-classical law the procedure per sponsionem 
replaced the ancient legis actio procedure, although it was still strongly based on it.37 
This procedure was used to decide whether the plaintiff was owner or not by the 
formula petitoria or rei vindicatio, or vindicatio for short. This formula already existed 
at the time of the legis actio procedure but, in pre-classical law, it became the 
remaining procedure for vindication.38 The formula petitoria went as follows: 
Let Titius be judge. If it appears that the object which is the subject of the action is 
Aulus Agerius’s by the law of the Quirites, and if that object shall not be restored to 
Aulus Agerius in response to the judge’s decision, for as much as that object shall be 
worth, for so much in money let the judge condemn Numerius Negidius to Aulus 
Agerius. If it does not appear, let him absolve.39 
 
32 Not only the concept of meum esse (mine) has been debated but also the question whether a 
judge in this procedure had to appoint one person as the owner where it could have been 
possible that neither really was. See, inter alia, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 62, Ankum & Pool 1989 
and Kaser 1964. 
33 The approach is very similar to the concept of relativity of title in English law. Kaser 1964,  
p. 5 et seq. and Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 108-110, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 62-63. On English law 
see Chapter 6; 3.1. Title / Ownership. 
34 These words are meum esse. Kaser 1964, contra Watson 1968, p. 91-96 and Mayer-Maly 1999,  
p. 62. 
35 Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 108, Watson 1968, p. 92. An interesting parallel could be drawn to 
English law that also uses the concept of the better right to an object. In civil law systems it is 
agued that this approach is contrary to the absolute and unitary concept of ownership since it 
would allow multiple degrees of possible ownership. That this makes sense is only proved by 
the Roman-based concept of duplex dominium, which will be dealt with below in 4.3. Owner-
ship. 
36 Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 109, Kaser 1964, p. 10. 
37 Kaser 1964, p. 10, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 63. 
38 Although the application of the action was still restricted to specific cases, usually connected 
with possession. Watson 1968, p. 96-98, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 63-64, Feenstra 1990, p. 40-42. 
39 G. Inst. 4.91-93: ‘Titius iudex esto. Si paret hominem Stichum quo de agitur ex iure Quiritum 
Auli Agerri esse neque is home arbitrio iudicis restituetur, quanda ea res erit, tantam 
pecunium iudex Numerium Negidium Auolo Agerio condemnato. Si non paret absolvito’. 
English version cited by Birks 1985, p. 5, note 19. Translation by O. Lenel, Edictum Perpetuum 
3 ed (1927) 185-186. Latin text and German translation cited by Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 63. 
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The development of the actions protecting ownership gradually led to a better 
differentiation of terminology and, from the beginning of (pre-) classical Roman 
law, the concepts of dominium and proprietas were used to describe the position of 
ownership. This does not mean, however, that these concepts became defined; they 
still denoted that person who had the best right.40 In other words, dominium became 
the term used for the ultimate entitlement to an object above which there was no 
other.41 In this respect it could be stated that in Roman law the concept of ownership 
was therefore absolute.42 
The vindicatio allowed the owner to assert his ownership in case of inter-
ference, but he could also initiate a specific actio claiming that his ownership had not 
been burdened. The owner would have to do so in case someone argued he had a 
property right other than ownership on the property of that owner. This actio, the 
actio negatoria, allowed the dominus, or the owner, to claim that he could freely enjoy 
his right and if necessary claim that any disturbance to his property should be 
removed.43  
In addition to dominium there were other forms of ownership recognised in 
(pre-) classical Roman law. First, as stated above, the Romans distinguished 
between Romans and non-Romans. This distinction was especially important in the 
law of property since only Romans were able to have dominium. In this respect, the 
concept of dominium was the most extensive right held by a Roman person.44 
Peregrini, foreigners, could not own ex iure Quiritium.45 However the Romans 
did recognise a form of ownership of Italic land and objects in Italy for foreigners, 
usually named peregrine ownership.46 A peregrine owner would not have dominium 
ex iure Quiritium, but was awarded an actio comparable to the vindicatio in order to 
protect his position. Moreover, since land outside Italy was not covered by the ius 
civile, which was the law applying to Romans in Italy, it was not possible for any 
person to acquire dominium of so such land. The explanation for this distinction is 
one of Roman State organisation. Provincial land was governed and therefore 
‘owned’ by the populus and, in later imperial times, by the Emperor, under the ius 
gentium.47 This form of State ownership prevented peregrini or Quirites from having 
dominium. Nevertheless, Roman law did offer a solution. Similar to peregrine 
ownership, Romans were granted actions similar to those protecting the ownership 
of land in Italy to protect their position in respect of land outside Italy. 
In short, for a Roman person to acquire dominium over an object the acquisition 
of dominium must be have been recognised by the ius civile, and in case of any other 
 
40 Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 109. 
41 Thomas 1976, p. 134. 
42 Birks 1985, p. 1 et seq., Honoré 1961, p. 107, Van den Bergh 1988, contra Kaser 1964, p. 5 et seq. 
43 Feenstra 1990, p. 90-91, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 171. 
44 Also known as ownership under Quiritary title or dominium ex iure Quiritium, Spruit 2003,  
p. 168, Thomas 1976, p. 135. On the concept commercium see Mayer-Maly 2003, p. 1 et seq.  
45 Thomas 1976, p. 135, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 110-111. 
46 Not much is known about peregrine ownership, but there is clear evidence of its existence. 
See Borkowski 1997, p. 156, Thomas 1976, p. 135, Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 228. 
47 Thomas 1976, p. 135-135. The distinction gradually lost its meaning through law reforms and 
was eventually abolished by Justinian. 
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form of ownership by the ius gentium.48 For a peregrine owner the requirement was 
that he acquired ownership through a method recognised by the ius gentium. 
Ownership could be acquired by one of the three procedures described above; 
the mancipatio, in iure cessio, or traditio, depending on the nature of the object. 
Additionally, the right of ownership could be acquired through usucapio, which 
required uninterrupted possession of an object for a certain number of years.49 As 
well as uninterrupted possession the requirements included good faith, bona fides, of 
the possessor.50 This method of prescriptive acquisition was already recognised in 
early Roman law, it is usually held to originate in the XII Tables, and formed one of 
the most important elements in the development of another additional form of 
ownership in (pre-) classical Roman law.  
Until the usucapio was completed, the holder of the object was merely a 
possessor and therefore only protected by the interdicts available to possession.51 
These interdicts, although very useful, worked only against immediate disposses-
sors and not against the original owner using a vindicatio.52 This was especially a 
problem when a res mancipi was transferred using the wrong method. The deliveree 
would become a possessor, and not owner, and would only acquire dominium once 
the period of prescription had expired. Until that time, the deliveror, who usually 
was the owner, could vindicate the object. In the late Republic, when the distinction 
between the various objects became less important, the praetor, the main legal 
magistrate, intervened to prevent these unwanted situations from occurring by 
offering the possessor protection through the creation of a separate actio to vindicate 
possession.53  
The actio the praetor granted was named the actio Publiciana. It offered an actio 
to possessors in usucapio that very much resembled the vindicatio. In this action a 
iudex, which was a Roman judge, was to assume that the possessor had already 
possessed the object for the relevant period and therefore was like a fictitious 
owner.54 In this way the possessor acquired such a strong position that only the real 
dominus could defeat him in court. In effect, therefore, an additional type of owner-
ship was created, known as praetorian ownership. 
 
48 Important is that the object itself must also be capable of being subject of private ownership. 
In Roman law some objects could be reserved either for the State or for the gods. Borkowski 
1997, p. 157. 
49 The periods of uninterrupted possession that were required differed from movable to 
immovable and were changed, usually made longer, as Roman law developed. Borkowski 
1997, p. 203, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 124, Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 229, Nicholas 1962, 
p. 122. 
50 The full set of requirements for usucaption were res habilis, titulus, fides, possessio and tempus, 
Feenstra 1990, p. 70-78, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 156, Watson 1968, p. 21-23. Servitudes could, 
at one time, also be capable of usucaption. 
51 The word interdict is deliberately chosen, since the possibilities for a possessor in court were 
not named actions. See, inter alia, Borkowski 1997, p. 159, Thomas 1976, p. 143. 
52 Nicholas 1962, p. 125. 
53 Nicholas 1962, p. 125, Borkowski 1997, p. 158-159,Thomas 1976, p. 136-137, Mayer-Maly 1999, 
p. 64-65, Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 228-232, Ankum & Pool 1989, p. 5, Birks 1985, p. 29, 
Sohm 1931, p. 284-285. 
54 Thomas 1976, 149, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 135-136. 
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However, there were situations where the Publician possessor wanted to be 
protected from the original owner as well, especially in case of a transfer of 
ownership through the wrong method. In the case of sale of a res mancipi, where the 
object was delivered by traditio, in other words, by the wrong procedure, the praetor 
went even further and created another type of ownership called bonitary 
ownership.55 Bonitary ownership was seen as a species of the general praetorian 
ownership created by the actio Publiciana. The ownership that was created offered 
the bonitary owner, who was the actual possessor of the object, actions that enabled 
him to assert his right over anybody else, including against the original owner.56 
These actions comprised a possibility for the bonitary owner to plead his case 
against the original owner and prove that he had acquired the property by sale.57  
Roman law therefore recognised, apart from Quiritian and peregrine owner-
ship, also a praetorian ownership.58 However, the existence of these separate forms 
of ownership does not mean that ownership was considered very lightly. 
Ownership was considered the ultimate legal entitlement; the form seemed only to 
depend on the circumstances.59  
The right of ownership could be shared between two or more persons, co-
ownership has been possible since (pre-) classical Roman law.60 In a co-ownership 
regime, each person would have an indivisible share in the whole object over which 
other property rights could be created.61 When the object as a whole was to be 
alienated, all owners would have to act together, or at least all other owners had to 
give one of the owners permission to act.62 In order to prevent one owner from 
acting on behalf of the property in co-ownership, each of the owners could, in 
limited cases, initiate an actio to stop this one owner or order a separation of the 
ownership.63 A fragmentation of ownership in which each co-owner held a separate 
 
55 Although it seems commonly accepted that a sale of a res mancipi by traditio is the first 
instance in which bonitary ownership was recognised. Ankum and Pool argue otherwise. 
Ankum & Pool 1989, p. 38. 
56 Borkowski 1997, p. 159, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 135. 
57 Or, the exceptio rei vindicatae et traditae. Thomas 1976, p. 136, it is proven that the Romans saw 
this position as more than just a protected possessor. Ankum & Pool 1989, p. 38. The concept 
of bonitary ownership has been compared to the German Anwartschaftsrechte that are 
recognised in case of a sale and transfer under reservation of ownership clause. See Chapter 
4; 3.4. Expectation Rights. 
58 The distinction between praetorian and bonitary ownership is not made by every author. See, 
inter alia, Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 228-332, Borkowski 1997, p. 158-160. 
59 Thomas 1976, p. 134, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 137 et seq. 
60 Comunio pro indiviso, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 145, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 65, Kaser 1975, p. 272. 
61 The German word Bruchteil seems more appropriate. On the terminology on indivisible 
shares see Lawson and Rudden 2002, p. 92-93. D. 17.2.83, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 147, Kaser 
1975, p. 272. 
62 Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 147, Lawson and Rudden 2002, p. 92-93, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 116. 
63 The actio communi dividundo and the actio familiae erciscundae. Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 116, 
Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 147. 
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and fragmented right of ownership was not held to be possible. In this respect 
Roman ownership, regardless of the type, was also unitary.64 
2.4. Other Property Rights 
In Roman law, ownership was not the only property right that was recognised. In 
addition, rights over another person’s object could be created. However, it was not 
possible to create property rights over one’s own objects on behalf of oneself. 
Although originally some property rights – in particular, the rustic praedial 
servitudes that were mentioned above and will be further dealt with below – were 
considered res mancipi, which has led to some theories on these rights being a part of 
the right of ownership, it is commonly accepted that besides the types of dominium 
dealt with above, several property rights other than ownership existed.65 
The Romans themselves, however, did not consider this question since they 
did not concern themselves with rights but rather with actions. Once more, Roman 
law would have looked at which actions protected which situations. Taking this 
into account and in order to understand Roman law in the best possible way, 
Roman law scholarship also uses the term ‘right’ to describe what, in later times 
have been called iura in re aliena.66  
(Pre-) classical Roman law used a functional categorisation for these rights in 
which they distinguished praedial servitudes, personal servitudes and security 
rights.67 The praedial servitudes were, according to their function, divided into 
rustic praedial servitudes, iura praediorum rusticorum, and urban praedial servitudes, 
iura praediorum urbanorum.68 
The rights of servitude originate from the practice where two people held 
adjoining lands and one person needed rights over the other person’s land in order 
to perform a certain function. These functions could, for instance, include a right of 
passage for persons, water or cattle. Based on factual situations, the (pre-) classical 
jurists derived several general criteria for servitudes. The first of these, the criterion 
of vicinitas of two pieces of land, followed from an analysis of the fact that 
servitudes, for example, the right to walk over a neighbour’s land or construct a 
sewer, could only exist when two pieces of land were neighbouring or very close to 
each other.69 
 
64 This is different in English law. See Chapter 6; 1.2. Common Law and Equity. However there 
are similarities to the French rules governing co-ownership. See Chapter 3; 2.2. Co-Owner-
ship including Apartments. 
65 Giuffrè 1992, p. 121, Kaser 1964, p. 7, contra Watson 1968, p. 92-96. 
66 Although also the term iura in re is used. See, inter alia, Thomas 1976, p. 195, Zwalve 2003,  
p. 106, Carey Miller 1998, p. 151, Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 214, Nicholas 1962, p. 141. 
67 It should be noted that the term personal servitudes most likely dates from after the classical 
Roman era. However, for means of systematisation and some likeness of treatment the term 
personal servitude is also used when describing classical law. Thomas 1976, p. 202, Bund 
1956, p. 163 et seq.  
68 G. Inst. 2.14, Gordon & Robinson 1988, p. 127-131, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 137, Nicholas 
1962, p. 143, Carey Miller 1998, p. 96. 
69 Feenstra 1990, p. 87. 
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Secondly, a servitude could not exist on one’s own object. Since a servitude 
was, like other property rights other than ownership, considered a burden on the 
ownership of the land over which it ran, the concurrence of the ownership of such 
land and the burden of the servitude would result in the burden ceasing to exist. 
Following this reasoning, the maxim nulli res sua servit applied to all servitudes.70 
This maxim also includes the impossibility that a right to a servitude would come 
into the same hands as the right of ownership over which the right of servitude 
extended. Upon acquisition of the servitude by such an owner, the servitude would 
mix with the right of ownership and cease to exist.71  
Thirdly, from (pre-) classical times the rule existed that servitudes could not be 
possessed. This was relevant for the question of accessibility of possessory 
interdicts. Except for the servitudes that were considered res mancipi, as is set out 
below, servitudes were incorporeal objects and therefore not capable of posses-
sion.72 However, it should be noted that this rule no longer applied in Justinian’s 
time and that already before the codification the enjoyment of a servitude became 
protected by actions comparable to the possessory interdicts.73 
Fourthly, (pre-) classical jurists derived a rule that servitudes must be 
beneficial in a material sense. The piece of land to which the servitude belonged 
should benefit from the existence of the servitude, or, as phrased in the Roman 
maxim, that it was of utilitas fundi.74 An important addition to this rule came with 
the requirement that the abovementioned benefits should be permanent or should 
have a permanent reason to exist, known as a perpetua causa.75  
In relation to the absolute notion of ownership, the Romans used the rule that 
a servitude must be exercised reasonably.76 This rule suggests that the Romans 
realised that servitudes imposed burdens on the ownership of those over whose 
land the right of servitude ran. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the requirement servitus in faciendo 
consistere nequit resulted in the impossibility for a servitude to contain an active or, 
in terms of modern law, positive duty.77 This requirement formed a strong limita-
tion on the creation of servitudes. Under this rule, an owner of a piece of land over 
which a right of servitude was created would have to tolerate the servitude but 
could not be forced to do something. The only duty of this owner was to make sure 
the holder of the servitude was able to exercise his right. However, there were 
exceptions to this rule. One exception to this maxim was the servitude of oneris 
 
70 D. 7.6.5, D. 8.2.26, Thomas 1976, p. 196, Borkowski 1997, p. 170, Feenstra 1990, p. 88. 
71 G. Inst. 2.30, Gordon & Robinson 1988, p. 134-135, D. 8.6.1, Borkowski 1997, p. 170. 
72 This was prohibited by the lex Scribonia, but this was later again allowed. Borkowski 1997,  
p. 170, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 100, Kaser 1971, p. 444-445. 
73 Allowing the possession of servitudes also opened the way to the acquisition by usucapio. 
Borkowski 1997, p. 170, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 100. 
74 D. 8.1.8, D. 8.1.15pr., Feenstra 1990, p. 87, Thomas 1976, p. 196. 
75 D. 8.2.28, Feenstra 1990, p. 87. 
76 D. 8.1.9, Borkowski 1997, p. 171. On the absolute nature of Roman ownership see Kaser 1964, 
Feenstra 1979, Feenstra 1976, Birks 1985. 
77 D. 8.1.15.1, Feenstra 1990, p. 88, Borkowski 1997, p. 171, Kaser 1971, p. 443, Giuffrè 1992,  
p. 41-42. 
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ferrendi or the right of support, where the owner of a certain building was obliged to 
support a neighbouring building.78 In particular this last rule showed that (pre-) 
classical Roman lawyers were aware of the effects a property right had on the right 
of ownership.79 The absolute content of the right of ownership, or the fact that it was 
the most extensive entitlement to an object, included the full enjoyment of 
ownership. However, the existence of other property rights burdened this freedom 
and therefore Roman law was very careful to introduce new property relations.80 
As mentioned above, with respect to praedial servitudes a distinction was 
made between rustic and urban servitudes. The development of these servitudes 
shows that the development of Roman property law was through adaptation of the 
law because of practical needs. The existence of a principle of numerus clausus of 
property rights in (pre-) classical Roman property law is therefore hard to 
illustrate.81 However, several attempts to prove the existence of the principle have 
been made. In particular, Guarino and Bund succeed, by making use of texts from 
the Digests, proving the existence of a closed system of property rights.82 It should 
be noted that the development of this closed system meant that every now and then 
new property rights were recognised by the jurists, but that parties themselves were 
limited by the set of actions that was available to them. On the other side, because of 
the possibility of extending the list of actions, some authors have held that a 
numerus clausus did not exist.83 Before dealing with this controversy, an overview of 
the recognised property rights should be given. 
The distinction made in (pre-) classical Roman law between rustic and urban 
praedial servitudes was one of functionality, referring to agricultural or city-related 
needs.84 However, the distinction is not as clear as it might seem and seems to have 
been developed by practice.85 The term praedial is used to show that the rights 
created are attached to the land and are there by virtue of ownership of the land.86 
The distinction is especially important to distinguish these types of servitudes from 
personal servitudes, which will be dealt with below. 
 
78 D. 8.5.6.2, D. 8.2.33. The owner of the building that needed support could demand security 
for in case of damage arising from non-support of his building, the cautio damni infecti. See, 
Feenstra 1990, p. 88, Borkowski 1997, p. 171, Watson 1968, p. 198-201. 
79 Schulz 1956, p. 153 et seq.  
80 Or, once more, proprietary actions protecting a specific legal relation. On the relevance of the 
difference between rights and actions see above; 1. Introduction. 
81 The proof of existence of a numerus clausus of property rights becomes easy when the nature 
of the codifications is considered. Justinian intended to codify the law, anything not 
contained in the codifications therefore lost force of law. See, inter alia, Lokin & Zwalve 1992, 
P. 63-64, note 51. On the numerus clausus of property rights in Roman law see below; 2.5. A 
Numerus Clausus in (Pre-) Classical Roman Law? 
82 Guarino 2001, p. 497, Bund 1956, p. 159. 
83 Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 176, Giuffrè 1992, p. 203 et seq., Rainer 1995, p. 415 et seq. 
84 Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 175.  
85 The result of this is that not all text are in line with each other. Some servitudes are 
considered urban by some where they are considered rustic by others. See, inter alia, Thomas 
1976, p. 196, Bund 1956, p. 158-159. 
86 Also the term iura praediorum is sometimes used. Kaser 1971, p. 440. D. 8.4.1.1, Borkowski 
1997, p. 171, Bund 1956, p. 160. 
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Amongst the rustic servitudes were the four classic servitudes; passage of 
persons, known as iter, driving of cattle, known as actus, way for vehicles, known as 
via, and of watershed or waterway, known as aquae ductus. These were considered 
res mancipi and could therefore only be transferred by mancipatio.87 All other 
servitudes were incorporeal res nec mancipi and could therefore be transferred by the 
slightly less formal in iure cessio.88 
It is clear that these property rights are the oldest recognised rights, already 
present in ancient Roman law. In (pre-) classical times, the category of rustic 
servitudes had been extended with the rights to draw water, aquae haustus, the right 
to channel excess water, aquam immittere, the right to water cattle on the land of a 
neighbour, pecoris ad aquam appellendi, the right to let cattle graze on the neighbour’s 
land, pascendi, the right to burn lime, calcis coquendae, and the right to dig for clay, 
known as harenae fodiendae.89 In other words, when a practice arose of using land in 
a certain way and with that the needs for a proprietary action to protect the rights 
granted on the land of another, new servitudes would be recognised.  
When Roman society departed from the traditional agricultural model 
towards a more urban model with more people living together in a small area, the 
category of urban praedial servitudes developed beside the rustic praedial servi-
tudes. Servitudes in this category include; the rights to construct a sewer, cloaca, to 
see the sky or light through the neighbour’s land, lumen, the right to see the sky, 
prospectus, the right to have a wall overhang onto a neighbour’s land, proiciendi and 
protegendive, to let water drip onto a neighbour’s land, stillicidium, to let water flow 
onto a neighbour’s land, flumen, to have a higher building tolerated, altius tollendi, 
and the right of support by another building, oneris ferendi.90 
The last servitude, oneris ferendi, as was already mentioned, takes an excep-
tional position amongst the servitudes. The burden this servitude imposes is 
positive in that it allows for the support of a building, especially buildings con-
structed in such a way that a building could only remain standing if the supporting 
building is maintained.91 The exceptional position of this servitude was that it 
violated the general rule of servitudes that a servitude may not impose an active or 
 
87 See D. 8.3.30, D. Cicero pro Caecina 26.74, D. 8.3.8, D. 43.20.8 respectively. As taken from 
Watson 1968, p. 176, G. Inst. 2.17, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 175. 
88 G. Inst. 2.14a, although mancipatio would also have been possible. Kaser & Knütel 2003, 
Thomas 1976, p. 200., p. 175-176. Although some doubts exist whether the other rustic 
servitudes were also considered as res mancipi, see, inter alia, Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 74. 
89 D. 8.3.30; 18.1.40.1, D. 8.3.29; 39.3.2.10, D. 43.20.1.18, D. 8.3.4, D. 8.3.6.1; 8.3.5.1 and D. 8.3.1.1; 
8.3.5.1. See Watson 1968, p. 176 et seq., 195, Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 74, Bund 1956, p. 183, Kaser 
1971, p. 442, Jörs, Kunkel & Wenger 1987, p. 183-184, Giuffrè 1992, p. 184. It goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis to provide a full overview of all rights of servitude that existed in classical 
Roman law. It is important to see that with the increased needs in society the legal system 
responded with the recognition of new types of servitudes. 
90 D 8.3.5.1, D. 8.2.16; D. 8.2.16; 8.2.7, D 8.5.17pr; 8.2.2, D. 39.3.1.17, D. 39.3.1.17, D. 8.2.2, D. 
8.5.6.2; 8.2.33, respectively. See Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 137, Watson 1968, p. 176, 194 et seq., 
Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 74, Thomas 1976, p. 197-198, Honsell 1997, p. 67-69, Borkowski 1997,  
p. 172, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 97-98. 
91 As mentioned above, the holder of the servitude could demand security from the holder of 
the servient land for possible future damage under the cautio damni infecti. 
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positive duty.92 The right to support another building does impose a positive duty 
but seems nevertheless to have been accepted as a valid servitude.93 
A second type of servitude existed in the form of personal servitudes. These 
servitudes were not attached to a piece of land, but rather to the person holding the 
right.94 A person therefore held these servitudes not in his capacity as owner of a 
piece of land. The category of personal servitudes comprised several property 
relations. First, there was the right to use a certain object and to take the fruits it 
produces, known as ususfructus.95 This right of usufruct, as it is named in modern 
law, was a strictly personal right, meaning that it was held by a person not in his 
capacity as the owner of land, but connected to that person holding it, the 
usufructuary. The right would therefore exist until the person holding it died.96 
Initially only land could be subject of a usufruct, but afterwards usufructs over 
movable objects also became accepted. At the end of the (pre-) classical Roman era a 
usufruct could be created over all of a person’s assets.97  
One of the strict requirements for a usufruct was that the object over which the 
right existed must remain unimpaired. This requirement restricted the usufruc-
tuary’s right to alter the object under usufruct; this meant that if the object was 
changed the ususfructus would cease to exist.98 However, the fruits that came from 
the object over which the usufruct existed could be used or even sold by the usu-
fructuary.99 The result of this was that the usufructuary was not an owner or even a 
 
92 D. 8.1.15.1. There are some authors who also include other urban praedial servitudes 
amongst the positive duties, but they seem, in this respect, to hold a minority position. See, 
inter alia, Thomas 1976, p. 197-198, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 98, Borkowski 1997, p. 171, Honsell 
1997, p. 68, Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 74, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 138, Giuffrè 1992, p. 41-42. 
93 See also D. 8.5.6.2; 8.5.6.3 where it is attempted to connect the duty to the object (res) rather 
than to the person holding it. See also Thomas 1976, p. 198, note 26. More will be stated about 
this exception below in 2.5. A Numerus Clausus in (Pre-) Classical Roman Law? 
94 D. 8.1.1. There is a discussion whether personal servitudes were already recognised in (pre-) 
classical Roman law. The general opinion seems to be that they were. It is clear that the right 
of ususfructus existed, but whether the rights was already categorised as a personal servitude 
remains subject for debate. See, inter alia, Bund 1956, Watson 1968, p. 203 et seq., contra Mayer-
Maly 1999, p. 98-99. 
95 Although the origin of the right itself has been much debated. A definition is provided in D. 
7.1.1., see, inter alia, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 98-99, Kaser 1971, p. 447 et seq. Also an elaborate 
discussion can be held on the exact meaning of a fruit in classical Roman law, but that is 
beyond the scope of this study. On this see Graziadei 2002a, p. 122 et seq. 
96 A person could return the usufruct during his lifetime but could never transfer the right 
itself. Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 140-141, Watson 1968, p. 207, Bund 1956, p. 167-168, Giuffrè 
1992, p. 153. 
97 Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 141, Kaser 1971, p. 449-450, contra Watson 1968, p. 207-210, 211, 
Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 74-75. 
98 Watson 1968, p. 207, Borkowski 1997, p. 174-175, Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 74-76, Kaser 1971,  
p. 450-451. 
99 Kaser 1971, p. 450-451. 
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possessor, instead the holder of a usufruct was considered to have the enjoyment of 
the property.100 
Granting enjoyment to another person would deprive the owner of most of his 
powers connected to his ownership. Usufruct was therefore already very early 
considered as a property relation that would, once created, leave almost nothing of 
the ownership of the dominus.101 
The requirement to keep and maintain the objects under usufruct could lead to 
problems, especially when a usufruct was extended over someone’s full set of 
assets. If an object could not be kept or was used up through normal use of the 
object, the right of usufruct could not exist. To solve this the concept of quasi-usus-
fructus was created. The quasi-usufruct was not really a property right other than 
ownership, but rather a transfer of ownership. In a quasi-usufruct the usufructuary 
would become owner of the objects instead of mere right-holder, but was required 
to give security for the objects he acquired.102 The security would ensure the original 
owner of the value of the objects when the quasi-usufruct came to an end. 
Closely connected to ususfructus was the right of use, known as usus, which 
included the mere right to use a certain object. A person holding the right of usus 
would only be entitled to the use, but not to the fruits of, a certain object. In (pre-) 
classical Roman law this right included the later rights of habitatio, usus of a house or 
lodging and of operae servorum vel animalium, right to the services of a slave or 
animal.103 The rules on the usus were identical to those of the usufruct.104 
As stated above there were general rules applicable to servitudes and these 
rules applied to all servitudes, including personal servitudes, but with some excep-
tions.105 One exception should be mentioned in respect of the rule against pos-
session of servitudes. The possession of a personal servitude was possible, which 
created the possibility to receive a personal servitude through usucapio.106 Further-
more, it was also possible to acquire a personal servitude through a legacy, which 
was not possible for praedial servitudes.107 However, in late classical Roman law it 
also became possible to acquire praedial servitudes through usucapio.108 
 
100 In other words he was the detentor, Kaser 1971, p. 451. It was the enjoyment of the right of 
usufruct that could be shared. D. 7.1.13.3, D. 33.2.31.,Borkowski 1997, p. 174-176, Kaser 1971, 
p. 450. 
101 This situation has been described as nuda proprietas. Kaser 1971, p. 448, Borkowski 1997p. 177-
178, Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 75. 
102 D. 7.5.2.1 J. Inst. 2.4.2, security would be given by the cautio usufructuaria. Kaser 1971, p. 543-
544, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 183, Guarino 2001, p. 735-737. 
103 D. 7.8, D. 7.7., although some discussion is held on whether these rights were recognised as 
such already in classical Roman law. The leading opinion seems to be that they were 
included in the right of usus. Watson 1968, p. 220-221, Bund 1956, p. 167, Thomas 1976, p. 207-
208, Kaser 1971, p. 454. 
104 D. 7.8.1.1., although it is held that a right of usus could not be shared Bund 1956, p. 167-168, 
Kaser 1971, p. 454. 
105 Exceptions include the servitude oneris ferendi that constitutes a positive duty Borkowski 
1997, p. 170. 
106 Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 100-101. 
107 Kaser 1971, p. 454, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 100, Borkowski 1997, p. 179. 
108 Borkowski 1997, p. 179. 
 35 
Chapter 2 
Since all servitudes were considered incorporeal rights, these could not be 
created by traditio.109 Except for the original four rustic praedial servitudes that were 
considered res mancipi, all other servitudes would be created through in iure cessio. 
The res mancipi servitudes required a mancipatio or in iure cessio for their creation.110 
In order to create servitudes on provincial land, in alignment with the right of 
ownership of such land, separate rules existed: a servitude on provincial land could 
be created by pactiones et stipulationes.111 
The rights of servitude received protection under the ius civile through actions 
comparable to the protection of the right of ownership. As dominium became 
protected by the action of vindicatio, servitudes were granted protection through a 
special type of vindicatio, the vindicatio servitutis or the actio confessoria.112 The 
ususfructus had its own action to protect the holder of the right, known as the 
vindicatio ususfructus.113 Furthermore the praetor offered specific protection when 
necessary, especially in cases where the enjoyment of a servitude was restricted.114  
The approach towards servitudes, including their creation and protection, is 
therefore very similar to the approach taken towards ownership. It is therefore 
understandable that it has been argued that servitudes were considered a part of 
ownership granted to someone else instead of separate rights. However, although 
the development of property rights might have originally led to this conclusion, it 
can no longer be maintained in (pre-) classical Roman law.115 
In addition to the servitudes, there were also two other rights that entitled one 
to the usage of another’s objects. These rights were not property rights, but personal 
rights. Because of their development they are classified as property rights. As 
described in the beginning of this Chapter, Roman law distinguished between land 
in Italy, which was capable of being subject of ownership under the ius civile, and 
land outside Italy, where only a right comparable to ownership could be held but 
not dominium itself. Originally, on land outside Italy, a right of ager vectigalis could 
be recognised.116 This right would entitle a person to hold land for a limited period 
of time or forever in exchange for a payment of a ground rent or vectigal.117 The 
central authority of the pertinent province awarded this right.118 The person having 
 
109 Thomas 1976, p. 200, Borkowski 1997, p. 178-179, Kaser 1971, p. 443-444. 
110 Kaser 1971, p. 433-444, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 100. 
111 G. Inst. 2.3.1 Feenstra 1990, p. 88, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 139. 
112 It should be noted that the term actio confessoria dates from the time of Justinian. In classical 
Roman law the term vindicatio servitutis was used, Thomas 1976, p. 198. D. 7.6.5.6; 8.5.2pr., 
Kaser 1971, p. 446-447, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 101. 
113 Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 101. 
114 But this was not under the ius civile but under the law of praetor, the ius honorarium. These 
actions allowed by the praetor where possessory interdicts that also came to the unlawful 
possessor. The owner himself could always assert an action against the existence of a 
servitude: the actio negatoria. Kaser 1971, p. 447. 
115 Watson 1968, p. 176, Kaser 1971, p. 440, Jörs, Kunkel & Wenger 1987, p. 182-183. 
116 Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 102, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 184, Thomas 1976, p. 135, Kaser 1971,  
p. 455-456, Borkowski 1997, p. 182-183. Cf. J. Inst. 3.24.3. 
117 Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 78, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 102, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 187-185, Kaser 
1971, p. 455, Borkowski 1997, p. 182-183. 
118 Kaser 1971, p. 455. 
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the right of ager vectigalis would be protected by possessory interdict and possibly, 
in late classical law, also an action comparable to the vindicatio would have been 
available.119  
The right of ager vectigalis was based on the relation of locatio conductio or the 
temporary contract of hire.120 Its origins are therefore in the law of obligations as a 
personal right. However, through the protection of the right with possessory 
interdicts as well as an action comparable to the vindicatio, the right entered the law 
of property. The ius in agro vectigali gave a right to land that in principle could be 
acquired, apart from establishment, by prescription donation and sale.121 
Besides the ager vectigalis, (pre-) classical Roman law recognised the right, for 
payment of a fee, to have a building on empty municipal land.122 This right, that is 
very comparable to the ager vectigalis, allowed the holder to erect a building on, 
initially, land outside of Italy.123 In late (pre-) classical Roman law it was possible to 
create this right in respect of private property as well, either empty or already with 
a building on it.124 Like the right of ager vectigalis, the relationship of the holder of 
the right and the actual owner was similar to the relation in a locatio conductio, 
although not the same.125 The right was usually concluded for an indefinite time, 
but it was possible to agree on a limited time as well.126 This right, which is known 
as the right of superficies, is also very similar to the right of habitatio.127 It remains 
doubtful whether this right was already a property right in (pre-) classical Roman 
law, but it certainly gave its holder the right to have a building on the land of 
another. 
 
119 Named the actio in rem vectigalis by some. See D. 6.3.1.1, Kaser 1971, p. 455, Mayer-Maly 1991, 
p. 78, Guarino 2001, p. 744-746. 
120 Kaser 1971, p. 455, Guarino 2001, p. 745, Borkowski 1997, 281 et seq. Because of the interrela-
tion with the contract of hire it has been doubted whether, in classical Roman law, the ager 
vectigalis, which forms the basis for the later right of emphyteusis, was a property right. On this 
see, inter alia, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 102, Guarino 2001, p. 746-747, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 184 
and the literature mentioned there. 
121 Guarino 2001, p. 745-746, Kaser 1971, p. 455, Vogt 1950, p. 73. 
122 Where the right was on land outside of Italy the payment would be vectigalis, however 
payment for a right in respect of municipal land was called solarium. Rainer 1989, p. 329, 331. 
Kaser 1971, p. 456, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 185, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 103, Mayer-Maly 1991, 
p. 79, Borkowski 1997, p. 183. 
123 Vogt 1950, p. 64 et seq., Guarino 2001, p. 740 et seq. 
124 The controversy about the possibility of such a right in respect of private land and therefore 
under the ius civile is great. On the possibility see, inter alia, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 185, Kaser 
1971, p. 456, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 103, Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 79, Guarino 2001, p. 740, Kaden 
1951, p. 607 et seq., Rainer 1989, p. 329, contra Vogt 1950, p. 64 et seq. 
125 Although it is generally held that this right originated from the relation of a locatio conductio, 
Giuffrè 1992, p. 175-176, Guarino 2001, p. 741, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 145-146. 
126 Kaser 1971, p. 456. 
127 Both give right to the use of a building, the difference is in the content of the rights. Where 
the habitatio gives the usage of a building for a limited period only, the right of superficies 
gives the right of usage for an unlimited period. 
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This right was remarkable because Roman law used the principle of superficies 
solo cedit or that whatever is attached to the land is part of it.128 The result of this rule 
is that all buildings on the land are considered to be part of the land and therefore to 
be part of the ownership of the land.129 Since (pre-) classical Roman law used a 
unitary concept of ownership, it was impossible for the owner of a house and the 
owner of a piece of land to have ownership over the same object at the same time. 
Although the right of superficies did not provide its holder with a right of 
ownership of a building, it did entitle him to have a building on the land of another. 
The right of superficies came under protection of the praetor by the introduction of 
the interdictum de superficiebus.130 This interdict that was structured along the lines of 
the possessory interdict allowed the holder of the right of superficies to protect his 
right against persons who interfered with his right.131 With this interdict the 
position of superficies worked against everyone who interfered with it and therefore 
acquired property characteristics. The right of superficies could originally be 
acquired through heritage, however, like the right of ager vectigalis, acquisition 
through sale and donation was recognised later.132 
Apart from the right to use another’s objects or the obligation to tolerate the 
use by another person of your own objects, there were also rights that were not 
intended to provide use but to secure the performance of a certain debt.133 In Roman 
law it was very common for one person to provide personal security for another.134 
This form of personal security meant that the creditors of a person, in case this 
person could not pay his debt, could attempt to get the money from the man who 
gave the personal security. These forms of personal security were contractual agree-
ments with no other effect than between the parties and will therefore not be dealt 
with.135 However, there were also agreements that had effects against everyone and 
therefore should be placed in the area of property law.  
Roman law adhered to the rule of paritas creditorum, or the rule that all credi-
tors are equal. However, most creditors did not want to run the risk of losing their 
invested money because of having to share their claim with other creditors. Instead, 
when the debtor could not pay, creditors wanted to have access to their object 
 
128 Cf. J. Inst. 2.1.29, D. 41.1.7.10, see, inter alia, Van Vliet 2002a, p. 67, Rainer 1989, p. 328-329, 
Guarino 2001, p. 741, Thomas 1976, p. 210. 
129 In property law this rule is also known as the principle of accession. 
130 The origin of this interdict in (pre-) classical Roman law has been debated, on this see, inter 
alia, Vogt 1950, p. 86 et seq., Kaser 1971, p. 456, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 185, Guarino 2001,  
p. 742-743, Rainer 1989, p. 344. 
131 The possessory interdict referred to is the interdict of uti possidetis. Kaser & Knütel 2003,  
p. 185, Kaser 1971, p. 456, Guarino 2001, p. 742, Giuffrè 1992, p. 178-179. 
132 Although, some controversy about this remains. See Vogt 1950, p. 73 and Kaser & Knütel 
2003, p. 185. 
133 On this difference see, inter alia, Bund 1956, p. 156, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 146, Nicholas 
1962, p. 149. That is not to say that right to use cannot be used for security purposes. What is 
intended is that the rights which will be discussed are specifically intended to provide 
security, regardless of what is the content of the given security. 
134 Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 186, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 84-85, Nicholas 1962, p. 149-150. 
135 These rights are therefore in the law of obligations. See Thomas 1976, p. 334 et seq. for a good 
overview of personal security rights in Roman law. 
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before the other creditors were dealt with. In order to break with the principle of 
paritas creditorum, (pre-) classical Roman law used several security devices. 
Originally, if a person needed a large amount of money he would, upon 
agreement, transfer his dominium of a certain object to another in exchange for, 
usually, money. Depending on the type of object over which the person wanted to 
transfer ownership, the procedure was the mancipatio or the in iure cessio.136 In the 
agreement that led to the transfer of ownership, the parties would agree that once 
the debt was paid to the creditor, the creditor would return the ownership of the 
object. Transferring ownership of the object deprived the original owner of his 
property right. The agreement was therefore based on mutual trust and was called 
fiducia. Two forms of fiducia existed, one where a friend would not so much be 
creditor but manager, the fiducia cum amico contracta, and one where the transfer of 
ownership was strictly for security purposes, the fiducia cum creditore contracta.137 
The latter form was more widely used, and this last type of fiducia became the main 
form of security in early Roman law. It had some undesired consequences, however. 
To start with, the ownership of the object would be transferred to the creditor, 
leaving the debtor at most as a detentor of the object.138 For the enjoyment of the 
object this did not pose a serious problem since the fiducia would be created by 
mancipatio or in iure cessio that did not, in contrast with the traditio, require the 
transfer of possession of the object. The debtor, albeit as a holder, remained able to 
use and enjoy the property.  
However, without the right of ownership the debtor could not act against 
interference with the object. It was for the creditor, who was now the owner of the 
object, to initiate a vindicatio or a possessory interdict in order to protect the object 
serving as security.139 In terms of ownership, all the powers were now with the 
creditor, who could do with the object whatever he wanted. In order to protect the 
debtor, Roman law held that the ownership of the creditor was subject to the 
condition that it had to be returned to the debtor once the debt had been paid. 
Furthermore, the creditor was also under the obligation to make sure the object was 
protected and he was explicitly prohibited to transfer the ownership to someone 
else.140 
The condition under which the creditor must return the object to the debtor 
was formed through a personal relation following from the agreement between 
 
136 Res mancipi could only be transferred by mancipatio, res nec mancipi would be transferred by in 
iure cessio. Of course, the creditor would not become owner if the debtor was not an owner 
himself. Nicholas 1962, p. 151, Feenstra 1990, p. 102. 
137 G. Inst. 2.60, Feenstra 1990, p. 100-101, Kaser 1971, p. 462, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 86, Zwalve 
2003, p. 485-486, Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 62. The fiducia cum amico contracta lead to the 
development of commodatum. On this development see, inter alia, Thomas 1976, p. 274 et seq., 
Noordraven 1999, p. 1 et seq. 
138 Detentor or holder was the only position left after the original owner had transferred his 
ownership. On the concept of detention see Chapter 1; 4. Terminology. 
139 Thomas 1976, p. 330-331, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 187-188, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 85-86. 
140 This included the transfer of ownership by sale. This obligation took as long as the debtor 
kept repaying the debt, if the debtor would not pay the agreement (pactum fiduciae) could 
provide for the power to sell the object. Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 188. 
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these two parties. This personal relation only gave the debtor a personal action 
known as actio fiduciae against the creditor. Success of the actio for the debtor 
brought infamy with it for the creditor.141 The actio fiduciae also allowed the debtor 
to claim the return of the ownership after the debt had been paid. However, in no 
event could the creditor be forced to return the property by mancipatio or in iure 
cessio, instead the debtor would have a claim for compensation, because of the 
Roman law principle of condemnatio pecunia.142 In the event that the creditor had 
transferred the ownership to a third person, the creditor could be forced to pay 
compensation as well.143  
Creating a security right through a transfer of ownership had disadvantages 
for the debtor. These disadvantages included the risk of losing the object transferred 
as security and only receiving compensation in return, even when the object given 
as security was higher in value than the value of the outstanding debt. In many 
situations the ownership of a more valuable property was transferred, regardless of 
the amount of money that was lent. The transfer of ownership for security purposes 
provided effective protection for the creditor. The reason to create the security 
interest, for a certain creditor to gain a preferred position in relation to the other 
creditors, was therefore achieved. As a result of the transfer of ownership, the 
debtor could no longer create a second security on the same object.144  
In early (pre-) classical Roman law the fiducia was the only type of security that 
was recognised to have property law consequences. Initially the creditor was subject 
to strict requirements that had to be imposed through the security agreement or 
pactum fiduciae. This agreement specifically included the powers of the creditor in 
case of non-payment. However, over time, as the use of the security agreement was 
standardised, the right to sell the object became presumed to have been included in 
the transaction.145 The debtor would then be entitled to the surplus of the sale, if 
any, for which he could also initiate the actio fiduciae.146 
Although early (pre-) classical Roman law may originally have required it, the 
creation of a fiducia did not require a transfer of factual power. This development 
strengthened the position of the debtor somewhat because he would continue to 
have power over the object himself and the creditor would have to take action to 
gain factual control over the object.147 In the system of (pre-) classical Roman law, 
the possession of the debtor offered an advantage to the debtor as he could receive 
the right of ownership back by usucapio after the debt had been paid. To strengthen 
the position of the debtor in the absence of a voluntary return by the creditor, a 
 
141 A situation that had serious consequences under ius civile as well, for instance the prohibition 
to exercise a public function. Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 188, 101. 
142 Feenstra 1990, p. 102. 
143 I.e., the actio fiduciae could only been initiated after the debt had been paid. Feenstra 1990,  
p. 102.  
144 This last element formed a guarantee that he had a strong position for the creditor, and 
would not be rivalled by another security owner. 
145 Feenstra 1990, p. 103, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 194-195. 
146 The surplus was called the superfluum. Feenstra 1990, p. 103, Kaser 1971, p. 461-462. 
147 Feenstra 1990, p. 104-105. 
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usucapio ex fiducia was possible after a period of one year.148 However, although this 
improved the position of the debtor, the inconvenience of not being able to create a 
second security on the same object remained. 
From the middle of the first century BC, next to fiducia another, more informal, 
form of security developed as well. Instead of transferring ownership to a creditor 
to give security for the payment of a loan, a separate property right was created on 
behalf of the creditor, while the debtor remained the owner of the object. Initially, 
factual power would be transferred to the creditor, but later the right could also be 
established without such a transfer.149 The creditor would receive a right of pignus 
or pledge that came under praetorian protection.150 However, the agreement, and 
therefore the right of pledge, could not come into existence without the claim of the 
creditor towards the debtor.151 By analogy of the actio fiduciae, the debtor was 
awarded a personal action called the actio pigneraticia (in personam) with which the 
debtor could claim compensation when the object was not returned properly.152  
As in the case of a fiducia, the pledge would be created by agreement. Up to 
the period of (pre-) classical Roman law, the position of the debtor in a pignus was 
similar to the position of the debtor in a fiducia, with the difference being that pledge 
would more be used for property of a lesser value.153 The main difference between 
the two was that for the creation of a pledge no specific formalities were required, a 
simple agreement would suffice.154  
The availability of only a personal actio restricted the creditor considerably, in 
particular when a third party interfered with the object under pledge. Therefore, in 
(pre-) classical Roman law, the pignus agreement became protected by proprietary 
actions, enabling the creditor to react against third parties if needed. In case a pignus 
had been created with the transfer of possession, the creditor became entitled to use 
the possessory interdicts to protect his right.155 Nevertheless, there were many 
situations where the creditor did not have factual power. As stated above, a pledge 
without the transfer of possession could also be created. For instance, there could be 
 
148 This special form of usucaption required the completion of a time period of one year, 
regardless whether the object was immovable or movable and regardless of bona fides. G. Inst. 
2.59, Feenstra 1990, p. 105, Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 62, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 86. 
149 Feenstra 1990, p. 108. 
150 The term pignus (general) is not at all clear. First, it includes both the object of, and the 
relationship between, the debtor and the creditor. Secondly, it is also used to describe the 
type of security right under which both the right of hypotheca and the right of pignus (specific) 
are. For a good overview see Kaser 1971, p. 458-459 and Feenstra 1990, p. 106-107. 
151 This principle of accessority made that the right of pignus and the claim could not exist apart 
from each other. If the claim would cease to exist, so would the right and vice versa. Kaser & 
Knütel 2003, p. 190, Mayer-Maly 1991, p. 63, Honsell 1997, p. 72, Kaser 1971, p. 465. 
152 Feenstra 1990, p. 109.  
153 The procedures of mancipatio or in iure cessio would not be used. Feenstra 1990, p. 105, 109, 
Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 189. 
154 Unlike the procedures of mancipatio or in iure cessio that were required with a fiducia. 
155 Feenstra 1990, p. 113-114. The possibility to use possessory interdicts in situation where it is 
not clear that the possessor also holds a property right, has led to discussion in modern law 
on the nature of possession. See Chapter 4; 4.3. Entitlement to Possession Through the Law of 
Obligations. 
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a situation where the factual power of the main object of the pledge had been 
transferred, and for security of the payment the debtor would pledge objects he 
brought onto the land to work on the land.156 These objects could not be given into 
possession to the creditor, as the debtor needed them to earn money for the 
repayment of the debt. (Pre-) classical Roman law allowed this but entitled the 
creditor, when the debtor would not pay, to use the interdictum Salvianum, an 
interdict that would award the creditor possession of the objects.157 However the 
interdict would only work against the debtor and not apply to a third party taking 
possession of the objects.158 
Besides the interdictum Salvianum the creditor could also use the actio Serviana. 
With this action the creditor could act against a third party who had taken 
possession of the objects.159 The creditor could try and claim the objects back into his 
possession comparable to a vindicatio of an owner.160 If a creditor was able to prove 
that there was a right of pledge created on the property and that he was entitled to 
payment of the debt and the debt had not yet been paid, he would be able to recover 
the object over which the right of pledge had been created, even if the object had 
been passed to third parties.161 
The actio Serviana, the interdict Salvianum and the possessory interdicts were 
available to a creditor in a situation where a right of pledge had been validly 
created. Initially, Roman law did not concern itself with differences between 
movable and immovable property.162 Pignus was such an informal and flexible right 
to create and it therefore won in popularity over the strict and formal fiducia.163 
Soon, a pledge could also be created on land and other types of immovable 
property.  
Confusingly, the pignus relationship existed both in situations where posses-
sion had been transferred as well as when it had not been. In order to avoid 
confusion, different terminology was occasionally used. Already in (pre-) classical 
Roman law, the term hypotheca was used to describe the relationship where 
possession was not transferred and the term pignus was reserved for a pledge that 
 
156 The ivecta, illata et importa. Feenstra 1990, p. 114, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 189, Thomas 1976,  
p. 333. 
157 Feenstra 1990, p. 114-115, Nicholas 1962, p. 152, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 195. 
158 Nicholas 1962, p. 152. 
159 Who, for instance, had bought the objects from the debtor. Feenstra 1990, p. 115. 
160 J. Inst. 4.6.7. The action has also been referred to as actio pigneraticia in rem or vindicatio 
pignoris. See, inter alia, Feenstra 1990, p. 116, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 196. 
161 It should be emphasised that, like the vindicatio, the actio Serviana could not force another 
person to hand over the object itself, but could force that person to pay compensation in the 
form of the litis aestimatio. The result would usually have been the return of the object to 
avoid the payment of such compensation. Against the vindicatio of the owner the pledgee, 
who had taken possession of the object, would have an exceptio rei pignori datae. On this topic 
see, inter alia, Feenstra 1990, p. 117 and Wacke 1998, p. 190. Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 196, Kaser 
1971, p. 472-473. 
162 Far more important was the distinction between res mancipi and res nec mancipi. 
163 Feenstra 1990, p. 105, Thomas 1976, p. 333. 
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did include a transfer of possession.164 In case of a hypotheca the actio Serviana would 
be called actio hypothecaria, but would be the same in content.165 
The content of a pignus or hypotheca is determined by agreement in which a 
creditor promises to hold a right in respect of the object other than ownership, 
which the creditor, if necessary, can enforce against everyone. In this agreement 
specific arrangements could be made about the repayment of the debt. When a 
certain object would produce fruits and the creditor would have factual power over 
the object, an agreement could be made that the fruits would be used to repay the 
interest, if a payment of interest was agreed on, or the debt itself.166 Instead of using 
the fruits to pay the interest or to repay the loan, it could also be agreed that the 
creditor would be entitled to the fruits for the duration of the agreement.167 
Furthermore, the agreement would cover what would happen if the debtor 
would not pay the debt. One agreement, known as lex commissoria, was the 
agreement that the creditor was entitled to keep the object under pledge in case of 
non-performance by the debtor. However, the lex commissoria was generally 
considered unfair and creditors would abuse their powers as pledgee to acquire the 
objects. It has been argued that in ancient Roman law the object would fall into the 
set of assets and debts of the creditor under such an arrangement. Later, but still 
before the (pre-) classical Roman law period, the parties would agree on the power 
to sell the object if the debtor would not pay.168 In (pre-) classical Roman law the 
power to sell was, although the creditor was not the owner, presumed to be 
included in the agreement of pignus, and thus ended the use of the lex commissoria.169 
Comparable to the power to sell in a fiducia relation, the debtor would be entitled to 
what was left of the proceeds of sale after the debt had been repaid, also known as 
the superfluum.170 
Finally, a pledge could also be created on incorporeal objects. In order to 
decide which incorporeal object could be subject to a pledge, (pre-) classical Roman 
law would consider whether the object was capable of being sold. If the answer was 
 
164 At least, this seems to be the leading opinion. The terminology was also used the other way 
around. Also the Romans differed in opinion about the distinction. Marcian D. 20.1.5.1 writes 
that the only difference between pignus and hypotheca is the sound of the words, whereas 
Ulpinian D. 13.7.9.2 writes that pignus is a situation where possession is transferred and 
hypotheca is the term used when this is not the case. Feenstra 1990, p. 106-107, Kaser 1971,  
p. 462-463, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 188-189, Thomas 1976, p. 332, Nicholas 1962, p. 152. 
165 The term pignus also remained in use to describe both hypotheca and pignus in the narrow 
sense as a possessory pledge. 
166 In the latter case, the debt would eventually cease to exist and therefore so would the right of 
pignus. The end of the claim is also referred to as amortisation. Feenstra 1990, p. 112. 
167 This is the antichresis, a term received from Greek but also used in Roman law. Feenstra 1990, 
p. 112. 
168 Feenstra 1990, p. 110, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 194, contra Wacke 1998, p. 168 et seq. 
169 The lex commissoria became prohibited under Constantine. C. 8.34.3, Thomas 1976, p. 331. 
Only with Imperial permission could the creditor be entitled to include the object in his set of 
assets. On the power to sell see D. 20.5.7.1, Feenstra 1990, p. 111, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 194-
195, Kaser 1971, p. 470-471, contra Wacke 1998, p. 176. 
170 Feenstra 1990, p. 111, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 195, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 91. 
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positive a pledge could be created.171 This would not only include claims, but later 
also praedial servitudes, but only urban servitudes, as well as personal servitudes, 
superficies and, at an even later stage, after the (pre-) classical period, also 
emphyteusis and pignus.172 Now that a pledge could be created on such a wide 
variety of objects, parties soon tried to create a general pledge covering all of 
another’s assets.173  
2.5. A Numerus Clausus in (Pre-) Classical Roman Law? 
Taking the above into consideration together with the already mentioned caveat that 
the doctrine behind the rule of numerus clausus is of a later date than Roman law 
itself, it is difficult to discuss the existence of numerus clausus in Roman law. 
However, by limiting the principle of numerus clausus to the general idea that a legal 
system imposes restrictions on private parties in the creation of property relations, 
useful insights can be derived from (pre-) classical Roman law. 
Because of the formal system of law, a person who wanted to achieve 
something in law was always required to fulfil certain requirements. Whether this 
was to create a contract or to establish a property right, the law would prescribe 
formalities. In this respect Roman law itself formed a closed system in which parties 
were not free to create their own legal relationships, whether protected with a 
personal or a proprietary claim.174 However, because (pre-) classical Roman 
property law continued to develop itself and kept granting new actions and 
interdicts, right until the end of the (pre-) classical Roman era, it cannot be stated 
with certainty that this development had actually been completed. Nevertheless, in 
respect of numerus clausus it is clear that it was not for private persons to create new 
relations with third-party effect, it was for the magistrates to recognise a relation by 
protecting it with a new or existing property action or interdict that could be 
initiated against third parties.  
The question whether the list of Roman property relations was closed or not is 
less relevant in the discussion on the existence of the principle of numerus clausus. 
Also in modern law it is possible for lawmakers to include new property rights 
within an existing closed system. What seems to be clear is that the concept of 
property relations used by the (pre-) classical Romans was very wide. As a result 
parties were relatively free to create their own relations as long as they remained 
within the boundaries set by the jurists. The servitudes form an excellent example. 
As long as the relationship fulfilled the criteria of vicinitas, nulli res sua servit, utilitas 
fundi, perpetua causa and servitus in faciendo consistere non potest, parties could 
 
171 D. 20.1.10, Kaser 1971, p. 465. 
172 D. 20.1.9.1, D. 20.1.11.3 (rustic servitudes), D. 20.1.11.2 (usufruct). It has been argued that 
servitudes could only be pledge in times of Justinian, on this see Mayer-Maly 1985, p. 173 et 
seq. In general Kaser 1971, p. 465, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 87, Thomas 1976, p. 332. 
173 Feenstra 1990, p. 121-122. 
174 For a good overview of the Roman law of obligations in English see Nicholas 1962, 
Borkowski 1997 or Thomas 1976. Also see Kaser 1971, Kaser & Knütel 2003 and Mayer-Maly 
1991 for an overview in German, and Guarino 2001 for an overview in Italian. 
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attempt to create new relations that would be protected under recognition by the 
praetor with the vindicatio servitutis.175  
An additional argument supporting the limitation on private parties in the 
creation of new property relations can be found in the concept of dominium. The 
absolute concept of ownership as the most extensive entitlement a person could 
have in respect of an object could only work if the legal system exercised caution 
with the recognition of new actions and interdicts affecting the free use of this 
ownership.176 As a result legal historians refer to the relations protected with a 
proprietary action different from vindicatio that were used to protect and enforce a 
right in respect of one’s own object as property rights other than ownership on 
another person’s object. These property rights in respect of another’s object are 
known in Latin as iura in re aliena. 
It is with the actions that protect these rights that, in my opinion, the numerus 
clausus of property rights is concerned, even though, in this respect, it is better to 
use the term numerus clausus of property actions. The difference between actions 
and rights is not so fundamental as it seems, as the availability of actions certainly 
had an effect on the content of the relations protected by those actions as well. In 
order to stay within the scope of availability of a certain action, in late (pre-) classi-
cal Roman law, property relations became standardised.177 A counter argument 
could be that, if actions and rights can be interchanged in this way, then in terms of 
numerus clausus the search should not be for new relations, but for new actions. 
Regarding this line of reasoning, it is clear that it was not possible in (pre-) classical 
Roman law to create new actions, as the power to do so was with the jurists and the 
praetor, not with private parties themselves. 
However, the similarity between actions and rights does not go that far and 
does not need to be taken that far. It is not for parties, and has never been, to decide 
on the actions available to them. The available actions have always been a part of 
the public side of the system of law, where not parties but the State makes choices 
on the available remedies. The actions in Roman law, like modern day remedies, 
protected relations, even though the focus of the whole legal system was on actions. 
An action in Roman law therefore gave access to a legal relation.178 In this respect 
Roman law adhered to a Typengebundenheid, meaning that new relation would have 
to fall under the existing scope of protection of the recognised actions, otherwise it 
could be excluded.179 
 
175 See Lenel 1927, p. 191-194. 
176 Schulz 1956, p. 143-144. 
177 This could be described as a standardisation of property rights in the sense of a reflection of 
the principle of numerus clausus. This view finds support in Guarino 2001, p. 497, Giuffrè 
1992, p. 199, 203, Van der Merwe & De Waal 1993, p. 38, Sohm 1931, p. 322-323, Schulz 1956, 
p. 155, Birks 1985, p. 4, Jörs, Kunkel & Wenger 1987, p. 183, Kaser 1971, p. 440, Kaser 1975,  
p. 248, Rainer 1995, p. 415 et seq., but contra Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 176 and Watson 1968,  
p. 176-179. 
178 In modern law this is the other way around: it is the legal relation that grants access to an 
action. 
179 Giuffrè 1992, p. 203, Rainer 1995, p. 415 et seq., Zwalve 2003, p. 103. 
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The system of law and the fact that law was created by the jurists and not by a 
modern-type legislator might lead to the conclusion that, by standardising the 
available actions related to the content of the property relations and the 
standardising effect this had on the content of these property relations, the principle 
of numerus clausus was effectively adhered to.180 
2.6. Summary 
(Pre-) classical Roman law recognised several forms of ownership. Because of the 
distinction between res mancipi and res nec mancipi and the distinction between the 
Quirites and the Peregrini, Roman citizens were the only persons who could have 
dominium ex iure Quiritium and bonitary ownership. However, peregrine ownership 
could be combined with some form of praetorian ownership. Important to note is 
that praetorian ownership offered protection against all but the dominus ex iure 
Quiritium, or bare owner, whereas bonitary ownership, as a species of praetorian 
ownership, was even able to defeat the bare owner.181 
Besides the forms of ownership, (pre-) classical Roman law also recognised 
relations to property other than ownership. These relations that were protected by 
specific actions not only created rights and duties between the persons establishing 
them, but also had effect against third parties. It is for this reason that these 
relations are dealt with in property law. Because of the strict system of available 
actions that (pre-) classical Roman law used, the number and type of relations with 
regard to which proprietary actions were available were fixed. The principle of 
numerus clausus was therefore already adhered to in (pre-) classical Roman law. 
3. Codified Roman Law – The Corpus Iuris Civilis 
3.1. Introduction 
The abstract level of legal science was visible in the many writings by the jurists of 
(pre-) classical Roman law, even through the case-by-case approach. However, in 
the period that followed (pre-) classical Roman law, the system and the coherent set 
of rules developed by these jurists were mostly lost due to the pressure of economic 
development. The clear distinction between concepts that had been made became 
blurred and practical solutions often prevailed over general theory.182  
 
180 However, in terms of a rule of numerus clausus and the doctrinal foundations of the modern 
day concept of property law, it cannot be held a numerus clausus existed. In respect of the 
standardisation of rights a parallel to modern law can be made, especially to the landmark 
contributions of Rudden on the numerus clausus of property rights from an economic point of 
view, Rudden 1987 and Rudden 1994, and the contributions of several American authors 
about the standardisation of property rights in common law jurisdictions, Merrill & Smith 
2000 and Hansmann & Kraakman 2002. See Chapter 7; 3. Numerus Clausus in Property Law 
Systems in Europe. 
181 See, inter alia, Guarino 2001, p. 690 et seq. 
182 See Nicholas 1962, p. 12-13, 36-38, Kaser 1975, p. 238, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 6-7. 
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This development, known as the vulgarisation of Roman law, became even 
stronger when in AD 395 Emperor Constantine left the Roman Empire to be divided 
amongst his two sons. From this moment, the Roman Empire was divided into an 
Eastern and a Western Empire, each of which underwent a separate development.183 
Although officially each legislative decision was also valid for the other part of the 
empire, the Eastern Roman Empire eventually prevailed as the most powerful.184 
Whereas in the Western Roman Empire the vulgarisation of the law continued, 
in the Eastern Roman Empire vulgarisation came to a halt with the renewed study 
of (pre-) classical Roman law. In this period lawyers were once again educated in 
the writings of the (pre-) classical Roman jurists. Although the (pre-) classical 
Roman law was studied again, lawyers had considerable difficulties with the vast 
amount of material. Furthermore, it was not always possible to find authentic texts 
from the (pre-) classical period.185 Attempts had already been made to compile an 
authoritative collection of existing writing, but it was not until Emperor Theodosius 
that an attempt was made at an official compilation with the authority of law.186 
It was in this renewed school of thought that Justinian, adopted son of 
Emperor Justin, received his education.187 Justinian, when he became emperor, 
would change the law completely by making a codification of law that would 
incorporate the (pre-) classical concepts. It would be the work that was conducted 
under the authority of Emperor Justinian that would change Roman law forever 
and was to continue to form a source of inspiration for lawmakers until today.  
Justinian’s work started with a collection of imperial constitutions intended to 
be complete and exclusive, thereby replacing any previous constitutions.188 Soon 
Justinian ordered his advisor Tribonian and a commission of skilled jurists to create 
an authoritive collection of legal literature also. In this collection, known as the 
Digests of Justinian, the work of the (pre-) classical jurists was revisited. If there 
were contradictions or when daily practice had changed, Tribonian and his 
commission would correct the text.189 These two works, together with the Institutes, 
which was a textbook to train new jurists, would form the collection named the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis.190 For the first time in history, through the work of Justinian, 
 
183 For an overview see, inter alia, Nicholas 1962, p. 12 et seq., Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 56 et seq. 
and Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 8 et seq. 
184 Since both emperors together held the imperium, the ownership of and power over the whole 
territory, was also known as the consortium imperii. Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 57-58, Nicholas 
1962, p. 13-14. 
185 Nicholas 1962, p. 37. 
186 Earlier attempts include the Codex Gregorianus and the Codex Hermogenianus. The final result 
was the Codex Theodosianus. Nicholas 1962, p. 38, Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 61-63. 
187 Nicholas 1962, p. 37-39, Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 58-59. 
188 The Codex Justinianus Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 63, Nicholas 1962, p. 39. 
189 These are called interpolations. Nicholas 1962, p. 40-41, Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 65-72. 
190 The Corpus Iuris Civilis has been influential in many legal systems, its influence will be dealt 
with in each specific Chapter. The received form of the Corpus Iuris Civilis would also include 
the Novellae Constitutiones, an additional set of Imperial constitutions, not all by Justinian 
himself. 
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there was a workable collection of law that could survive in the late days of the 
Roman Empire 
3.2. General Principles of the Corpus Iuris Civilis 
Although Justinian was educated in a legal school that studied (pre-) classical 
Roman law, not every aspect of this legal system was incorporated in his Corpus 
Iuris Civilis. The vulgar period had caused most of the sharp (pre-) classical 
distinctions between legal concepts to disappear and some of the newly arisen 
situations and concepts were considered very useful and were therefore included.  
In (pre-) classical Roman law, the distinction between res mancipi and res nec 
mancipi was one of the cornerstones of the system. This was especially the case since 
ownership of res mancipi could not be transferred by traditio, but with the praetorian 
protection for the person receiving a res mancipi by traditio, the distinction had 
become unnecessary.191 Justinian therefore consistently had the term mancipatio 
replaced with traditio, in effect abolishing the distinction between res mancipi and res 
nec mancipi.192 
Before Justinian, non-Italic land had become subject to taxation, thereby 
removing the distinction between Italic and non-Italic land of the (pre-) classical 
Roman law. Justinian therefore also officially abolished this distinction.193 As a 
result it was no longer necessary to recognise the multiple types of ‘ownership’ of 
(pre-) classical Roman law, most types of object could now be fully owned by all 
people living on Roman territory.194 
The system of actions remained, the question of who was owner or who had a 
certain servitude would still be answered in terms of who had the relevant action or 
interdict at his disposal. Many of the actions that were used in the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis were taken from the (pre-) classical Roman law, although some of them were 
extended or altered to fit new demands. 
3.3. Ownership 
Vulgar law is best characterised by its lack of distinction between ownership and 
possession. (Pre-) classical Roman law made a sharp distinction between these two 
concepts, protecting ownership with an actio and possession with interdicts. Instead, 
vulgar law used the terms proprietas, dominium and possidere as synonyms.195 
 
191 Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 120-121, Nicholas 1962, p. 106, Feenstra 1990, p. 54. 
192 C. 7.31.1.5, Van Vliet 2000, p. 171, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 121, Nicholas 1962, p. 106, Feenstra 
1990, p. 55. This mechanical substitution of terminology has led to many problems in respect 
to inter alia the transfer system. 
193 Thereby treating non-Italic land as if it was Italic Land, J. Inst. 2.1.40, Kaser 1975, p. 240, 
Feenstra 1990, 77. 
194 Exceptions were, inter alia, the res publica, publicly held objects, and the res divini iuris, objects 
held for religious purposes usually by the church, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 119-120, Kaser 
1975, p. 242.  
195 Kaser 1975, p. 261, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 140. 
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Furthermore, the distinction between ownership and the rights derived from 
ownership was, to a considerable extent, also lost.196 Justinian returned to the (pre-) 
classical concepts and the sharp distinction between ownership, possession and the 
property rights other than ownership, the iura in re aliena.  
With the return to the (pre-) classical concepts and the departure from some of 
the (pre-) classical distinctions, there was only one unitary and absolute dominium 
that almost everybody could have on almost everything.197 The vindicatio protected 
dominium, and was available against all potential claimants.198 However, the content 
of the right of ownership remained undefined, to be filled in on case-to-case base.199 
As in (pre-) classical Roman law the open concept of ownership was more a matter 
of entitlement. In order for a person to have access to a vindicatio that person had to 
provide evidence of his entitlement to the object.200 A vindicatio could not be 
initiated against a person who was entitled to hold a certain object under him 
because of an agreement of sale or lease. Only if the actual owner could prove his 
entitlement would he be able to vindicate the object.  
In (pre-) classical Roman law the applicability of this action had been limited, 
only resulting in financial compensation, but not in an enforcement of the actual 
return of the object. Moreover, the procedure of vindicatio had been connected to 
possession of the other party, which further limited its application. Justinian 
extended and improved the scope of the vindicatio to include most cases.201 The most 
important change was the effect of the action; instead of compensation, the result of 
a successful action would be the return of the object to the original owner.202 
With these changes, Justinian strengthened the (pre-) classical concept of 
ownership and simplified the method of transfer. Delivery by traditio, replacing the 
old methods of mancipatio and in iure cessio, had become the principal form of 
transferring property rights.203 For a traditio to work the parties needed to have the 
legal capacity to act, the object had to be capable of being subject of ownership and 
the transferor had to be owner himself.204 Furthermore, as in (pre-) classical law, 
there needed to be a valid title or iusta causa, an intention of the parties to transfer 
ownership, and the transfer of possession.205 The intention to transfer could be 
 
196 Or the iura in re aliena. Kaser 1975, p. 262. 
197 Only those persons and object excluded from private ownership remained outside. C. 7.25.1, 
Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 140. 
198 J. Inst. 4.6.15, Carey Miller 1998, p. 45. 
199 Nicholas 1962, p. 153-154, Carey Miller 1998, p. 47-48. 
200 Carey Miller 1998, p. 46. 
201 Justinian removed the link with possession and therefore enabled a wider application of the 
vindicatio. After these modifications, the vindicatio could also be initiated against a detentor. 
Feenstra 1990, p. 41-42, Kaser 1975, p. 293-294. 
202 Although this method of vindication dates from the post-classical era, Justinian included it in 
his Corpus Iuris. J. Inst. 4.6.17, Feenstra 1990, p. 42-43. 
203 Carey Miller 1998, p. 51, Feenstra 1990, p. 55-57. 
204 Carey Miller 1998, p. 52-53, G. Inst. 2.10. G, Inst. 2.11, G. Inst. 2.19, G. Inst. 2.20. 
205 The meaning of the concept of iusta causa has been very controversial and has been equated 
with the intention to transfer. For a good overview of the discussion see Pool 1995, p. 46 et 
seq., Van Vliet 2000, p. 169 et seq. and Gordon 1989, p. 123 et seq. Feenstra 1990, p. 57-60, 
Nicholas 1962, p. 112-115, Kaser 1975, p. 259-261, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 153. 
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enough to transfer ownership, which resulted in the constructive forms of delivery 
that are still known in modern law.206 
Ownership could still be acquired through prescription, although some 
alterations to the rules on prescription were made.207 In (pre-) classical law the 
periods for usucaption in Italy had been one year for movable objects and two years 
for immovable objects. Justinian made usucapio only available for movable objects, 
with a lapsing period of three years.208 For immovable objects Justinian used the 
concept that had before been restricted to prescription of land outside of Italy, the 
longi temporis praescriptio or long-term possession.209 With the same requirements as 
in case of usucapio, ownership of immovable objects could be acquired after ten 
years or twenty years depending on whether the actual owner was domiciled in the 
same or in another province.210 Furthermore, Justinian introduced a new form of 
prescription. Usucapio and long-term possession required a iusta causa. When a 
person possessing land was not in good faith, the iusta causa would be missing and 
no ownership could be acquired. This third form of prescription entitled a person to 
acquire dominium over a certain object without iusta causa after thirty years of 
possession through very long-term possession or longissimi temporis praescriptio.211 
The rules on prescription remained very relevant because Justinian allowed 
the actio Publiciana to remain in his Corpus Iuris Civilis. A person who would in time 
acquire ownership through usucapio or long-term possession and who was in good 
faith would therefore remain protected by the Publician action against third parties 
during the period of prescription.212 Praetorian ownership therefore remained as a 
result of maintaining the Publician action. 
Finally, the concept of co-ownership also survived. In vulgar law co-owner-
ship had been regarded as a functional fragmentation of ownership, but as Justinian 
had restored the (pre-) classical unitary and absolute concept of ownership, so only 
the (pre-) classical co-ownership in indivisible shares remained in the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis.213 To protect the co-owners Justinian enlarged the application of the actio 
communi dividundo with which the co-owners could prevent one of the co-owners 
who attempted to interfere with the object of co-ownership or, if such a person had 
 
206 J. Inst. 2.1.44, Carey Miller 1998, p. 53. The forms of delivery fall outside the scope of this 
study. For a good overview see Van Vliet 2000, p. 52 et seq. 
207 J. Inst. 2.6.pr., Carey Miller 1998, p. 55 et seq., Kaser 1975, p. 296, Feenstra 1990, p. 78, Guarino 
2001, p. 695-696. 
208 J. Inst. 2.6.pr. Feenstra 1990, p. 78, Carey Miller 1998, p. 55 et seq. 
209 J. Inst. 2.6.pr. Although originally a form of limitation, by the time of Justinian it had become 
a form of acquisitive prescription. Nicholas 1962, p. 128, Feenstra 1990, p. 78, Carey Miller 
1998, p. 55 et seq., Guarino 2001, p. 690. 
210 J. Inst. 2.6.pr. Carey Miller 1998, p. 56, Gordon 1989, p. 123-135. 
211 Although the term longissimi temporis praescriptio dates from the commentators, it is 
commonly used to describe the Justinian use of the very long term possession as well. C. 
7.39.8.1, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 158, Feenstra 1990, p. 78, Nicholas 1962, p. 128-129, Kaser & 
Wubbe 1971, p. 125, Guarino 2001, p. 699. 
212 Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 135, Feenstra 1990, p. 44-46, Nicholas 1962, p. 126-128. 
213 D. 8.2.27.1, Kaser 1975, p. 272, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 145-148. 
 50 
The Development of Property Rights 
already done so, restore the object to its original situation.214 By assuming that each 
owner held the full right of ownership but with the value of an indivisible share in 
the property, the unitary concept of ownership remained.215 
3.4. Other Property Rights 
In vulgar law the distinction between dominium and the iura in re aliena had dis-
appeared and some iura in re aliena were considered types of ownership. Justinian 
restored the (pre-) classical Roman demarcation between these concepts and dealt 
with iura in re aliena separately.216 These rights became the rights in respect of 
another’s object categorised according to the (pre-) classical distinction in right to 
use and security rights.217  
Although the rustic praedial servitudes had lost some of their earlier 
importance, the division between rustic and urban praedial servitudes remained in 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis.218 Also personal servitudes were now officially included in 
the category of servitudes.219 Justinian re-introduced the rules from (pre-) classical 
Roman law, which applied to all servitudes.220 These rules formed the framework 
within which servitudes could be created. First, the dominant and servient land 
should be in the vicinitas of each other.221 Secondly, it was not possible to have a 
servitude on your own property, as was established by the rule of nulli res sua 
servit.222 Thirdly, the servitude must be beneficial for the object and not to the 
person holding the object. In other words, the servitude should have utilitas fundi.223 
Fourthly, the servitude should be beneficial to the dominant land continuously, or 
should have a perpetua causa.224 Finally, the servitude could not constitute a positive 
duty. This rule of servitus in faciendo consistere nequit, which had some exceptions, 
formed the largest restriction on the content of the rights of servitude.225 
 
214 Apart from this action, a co-owner could also use the actio familiae erciscundae (inheritance) 
and the actio finium regundorum (land) to stop the co-ownership and divide the object among 
the co-owners. Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 148, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 116-117, Mayer-Maly 
1999, p. 66, Borkowski 1997, p. 293. 
215 See, inter alia, Guarino 2001, p. 524. 
216 Kaser 1975, p. 248, 298 et seq. Although the vulgar law period will mostly be left aside, some 
aspects of it will be dealt with together with the specific property rights. 
217 Although the res mancipi – res nec mancipi distinction was no longer made. 
218 Bund 1956, p. 216. 
219 Also the action protecting the servitudes became one and the same, the actio confessoria. Kaser 
1975, p. 305, Bund 1956, p. 218-219. 
220 See above; 2.4. Other Property Rights, Feenstra 1990, p. 86-87. 
221 D. 8.3.5.1, D. 8.3.7.1, Feenstra 1990, p. 87, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 138. 
222 D. 8.2.26, D. 8.6.1, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 138, Feenstra 1990, p. 88, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 96, 
Borkowski 1997, p. 170. 
223 D. 8.1.8pr., Feenstra 1990, p. 87, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 138, Borkowski 1997, p. 170, see note 
74. 
224 D. 8.2.28, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 138, Feenstra 1990, p. 87. 
225 D. 8.1.15.1, Feenstra 1990, p. 88, Borkowski 1997, p. 171, Giuffrè 1992, p. 41-42, Mayer-Maly 
1999, p. 95-96. 
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Originally, the first four rustic praedial servitudes could only be acquired by a 
mancipatio and therefore had been res mancipi. Other servitudes could be established 
by in iure cessio. However, since both methods of transfer had disappeared from the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis, another method of creation was necessary. Analogous applica-
tion of the tradition was problematic due to the requirement of delivery. Already in 
(pre-) classical Roman law it had been possible to create a servitude by pactiones et 
stipulationes, or, in other words, by a free agreement, pact or formal stipulation.226 As 
a general rule Justinian allowed all servitudes to be created by pact and 
stipulation.227 Moreover, it had not been possible to possess a servitude.228 Justinian 
included all servitudes in his renewed rules on prescription so that servitudes could 
also be acquired through long-term prescription.229 
A servitude would be created if the legal relation complied with the 
abovementioned criteria. In order to protect the servitude the (pre-) classical action 
of vindicatio servitutis was available which became known as the actio confessoria in 
Justinian’s law.230 With this action a claimant could establish that the servitude did 
in fact exist, as well as attempt to restore the situation as if he would have been able 
to enjoy the servitude. The actio confessoria was a property action and could there-
fore be initiated against third parties.231 The owner of the servient land, in his turn, 
could initiate the actio negatoria, an action that, like the actio confessoria, resembled 
the vindicatio. With this action the owner could establish that there was no servitude 
as well as restore the situation to where he would have been able to enjoy his right 
of ownership. The actio negatoria could only be initiated against those who claimed 
to have a servitude.232 
Through the collection of (pre-) classical Roman writings in the Digest, which 
formed the major part of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, all property rights existing from 
(pre-) classical Roman law were reinstated. In respect to servitudes, praedial 
servitudes remained in force and continued to be divided into rustic and urban 
praedial servitudes. In respect to personal servitudes, the law of Justinian made a 
larger contribution to the development of property rights, by clearly stating which 
rights were to belong to this category. In (pre-) classical Roman law the relation 
between the right of usufruct and the right of ownership had been much debated.233 
 
226 Although contractual in nature, these came under praetorian protection. Borkowski 1997,  
p. 179, Feenstra 1990, p. 88-89, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 138-139, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 100-101. 
227 It has even been suggested that in Justinian law the formal stipulation was even no longer 
required, however the official text uses pacts and stipulations, J. Inst. 2.3.4, Feenstra 1990,  
p. 88-89, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 101, Kaser 1975, p. 304. 
228 Borkowski 1997, p. 170. 
229 Since these servitudes belonged to the land on which they were established. C. 7.33.12.4, 
Feenstra 1990, p. 89, Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 139, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 100-101. 
230 D. 8.5.2pr., D. 7.6.5.6, Feenstra 1990, p. 90, Kaser 1975, p. 305, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 101. 
231 Feenstra 1990, p. 90. 
232 There is a difference with the medieval Romanists who also allowed the initiation of the actio 
negatoria against those who disturbed the holder in the enjoyment of the object. Feenstra 1990, 
p. 91. 
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Justinian established that personal servitudes, although derived from dominium, 
were a separate class of property rights and included the rights of ususfructus, usus, 
habitatio and operae servorum vel animalium.234 
The right of usufruct, and the other personal servitudes, continued to take a 
special place in the system of servitudes. Although now clearly property relations, 
the rights remained property rights in respect to persons and not in respect to 
persons in their capacity as owners. Personal servitudes would therefore terminate 
on a specific moment or, certainly, because of the connection to a person as holder 
of the right, on the death of the usufructuary.235 Moreover, the usufruct could only 
be vested in perishable objects or objects that were not consumed through use. Like 
in (pre-) classical Roman law, a quasi-usufruct could be established in which the 
usufructuary would actually become owner of the objects and would give security 
for their value.236 In effect, this made it possible to have a right of usufruct on all 
types of property. The vindicatio ususfructus, the action that has protected the holder 
of a usufruct in (pre-) classical Roman law, became, with the changes made by 
Justinian, included in the wide actio confessoria and disappeared as a separate 
actio.237 Of course, an owner could also use the actio negatoria to claim the non-
existence of a personal servitude.238 
In the system of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, other rights granting the use of another 
person’s objects were also included. In (pre-) classical law there had been a develop-
ment to allow a private person, in exchange for payment, to hold land outside Italy 
through a right of ager vectigalis.239 Already in (pre-) classical Roman law a debate 
arose on the nature of this right, in particular whether it was a sale or a letting or 
hiring, on which no real final answer was provided.240 Although many of these situ-
ations dealt with State-owned land and therefore public rights, many of the persons 
who held public land on behalf of the State sub-let it to private persons, creating a 
private relationship. At first only these specific relations, but in time all relations 
whereby land was used in exchange for payment, became known as emphyteusis.241  
The development of the emphyteusis in vulgar law is highly relevant. The ius 
ager vectigalis became, especially in the West, considered as a part of the right of 
ownership. This inclusion, which is in line with the functional division of ownership 
in vulgar Roman law, resulted in the conclusion that both the actual owner and the 
person having the right of ager vectigalis enjoyed ownership, including the possibili-
ty to initiate a vindicatio.242 In essence this right was still a contract and the contract 
 
234 J. Inst. 2.4.1, Thomas 1976, p. 202-208, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 175, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 98-
100, Carey Miller 1998, p. 66-67. 
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237 J. Inst. 4.6.2, Feenstra 1990, p. 95, Mayer-Maly 1999, p. 101, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 178, 182.  
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D. 7.1.13.2, Johnston 1989, p. 155. 
239 See above; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
240 Thomas 1976, p. 209, Kaser 1975, p. 310-311. 
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itself was known as contractus emphyteuticarius, until Emperor Zeno settled the de-
bate on the nature of the right and stated in a constitutio that emphyteusis was a right 
sui generis.243 Justinian had emphyteusis included in his Corpus Iuris and allowed it to 
be created by contract or by legacy. In Justinian’s system the right of emphyteusis 
came under protection of an actio in rem comparable to the vindicatio.244 However, 
instead of awarding the holder of the right a right of ownership, this right remained 
with the original owner who would not be able to interfere with the object. As long 
as the ground rent was paid, the holder would have a ius in re aliena.245 
Finally, the right of superficies was also recognised as a separate property 
right.246 In vulgar law the right of superficies, like emphyteusis, had been part of the 
functional concept of ownership. Justinian also changed this and restored the (pre-) 
classical law distinction. The person having the superficies was protected by the 
interdict de superficiebus but superficies itself was now recognised as a separate ius in 
re with a corresponding actio.247 This action, like the action connected to the right of 
emphyteusis, resembled the vindicatio and could be used as long as the payment for 
the right, known as solarium, was paid.248 Superficies was specifically intended to 
provide a right to the person having a building on the land of another. By operation 
of the rule of superficies solo cedit, the owner of the land became owner of the build-
ings erected on it. The creation of a superficies would break with this rule in that it 
would give the superficarius not a right of ownership but a property right in the 
house that could itself serve as an object for the establishment of other property 
rights.249 
Like in (pre-) classical law, the Corpus Iuris Civilis included, next to property 
relations granting rights to use, property relations to provide security, usually for a 
loan. In (pre-) classical law these rights had been the fiducia cum creditore, the pignus 
and the hypotheca.250 The fiduciary transfer had, as was stated above, become 
obsolete due to the development of the other security rights. Now, under the 
reforms of Justinian, the fiduciary transfer of ownership disappeared completely.251 
Therefore pignus and hypotheca remained the only available property security rights. 
Where in (pre-) classical Roman law these rights had been the same, Justinian made 
 
243 Emperor Zeno (474-491 AD). C. 4.66.1, J. Inst. 3.2.3, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 185, Thomas 1976, 
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249 D. 43.18.1.9, Carey Miller 1998, p. 74-75. 
250 See above; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
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a distinction.252 Hypotheca was used for non-possessory security and pignus was 
used in cases where possession had been transferred.253 
Already in very late (pre-) classical Roman law there had been some develop-
ments, which caused the pignus and hypotheca of Justinian to be slightly different 
from those of (pre-) classical Roman law. Through interference of the legislature 
some legal hypothecs had come into existence. These hypothecs were property 
relations not created through agreement between the parties but by operation of 
law. Examples of situations in which a legal hypothec arose were the case where a 
guardian bought something for his ward with the ward’s money, and the general 
hypothec of the taxation authority on someone’s assets. In both cases a hypothec 
would come into existence by operation of law either for the ward on the specific 
property or for the taxation authority on everything a certain person owned.254  
The legal hypothec of the tax authority especially posed the legal system with 
a serious problem. A general hypothec covers all assets, including rights and debts. 
The inclusion of rights and debts into the right of hypothec was achieved because 
hypothecs were now non-possessory security relations. As a result the actio Serviana, 
the action that protected the relationship, would also be applicable to these specific 
types of object.255 However it was of no use if the creditor became entitled to a debt 
himself. Instead an actio utilis in personam was created with which the creditor could 
act against the debtor of his former debtor.256 
The rules on the creation of the rights of pledge and hypothec stayed the same. 
In order to create such a right, an agreement, an object capable of being subject of 
pledge or hypothec and ownership of that object was required.257 In cases where a 
pledge or hypothec came into existence by operation of law, an agreement was not 
necessary. 
When a debtor could not pay his debt the creditor would have the authority to 
sell the object over which the security right was created. The agreement that the 
creditor would be entitled to keep the object for himself in case of non-performance 
by the debtor, known as the lex commissoria, had been prohibited since Emperor 
Constantine and remained prohibited by Justinian.258 If no buyer could be found the 
creditor could, with imperial permission, receive the ownership of the object.259 Any 
surplus to the sale or the value of the object would have to be paid to the debtor.260 
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3.5. A Numerus Clausus in the Corpus Iuris Civilis? 
Zwalve argues that because of the nature of Justinian’s codification, Justinian 
intended to codify the law and give it exclusive force, a closed system of property 
rights existed.261 The result of this exclusivity was that all other existing sources of 
law became invalid with the introduction of the separate parts of the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis. In other words, only those relations that were recognised by the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis as property relations were granted a proprietary action. In this respect the 
principle of numerus clausus took, as in (pre-) classical Roman law, the form of a 
numerus clausus of property actions.262 
A closed system of actions did not automatically prevent parties from entering 
into new types of property relations. As in (pre-) classical Roman law a proprietary 
action could be awarded when a legal relation could be brought under the criteria 
provided by law. This was especially true for servitudes. As long as the require-
ments for servitudes were fulfilled the relation would be protected with the actio 
confessoria.263 
At the foundation of the system of the Corpus Iuris Civilis remained, as in (pre-) 
classical Roman law, the distinction between personal and proprietary actions. Only 
proprietary actions could be initiated against third parties. In the law of Justinian 
the difference between personal and property relations was made by legislation and 
from this point of view not only the principle but also the rule of numerus clausus 
applied, albeit with respect to property actions and not property rights. 
The difference between actions and rights is relevant. The principle of 
restricting the number of property relations in respect of the burden they imposed 
on the unitary and absolute concept of ownership, therefore ensuring legal certainty 
for third parties, was already present in (pre-) classical Roman law. Like in modern 
law, the principle of numerus clausus itself was not written down in legislation, but 
nevertheless applied in practice. However due to the codification in the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis this principle found expression as a rule of numerus clausus of property 
actions, where there had only been a principle of numerus clausus of property actions 
in (pre-) classical Roman law. Whether this means there was also a rule of numerus 
clausus in respect of property relations remains, as in (pre-) classical Roman law, 
difficult to determine.264 In any case, standardisation of property actions by 
legislation must have had effect on the contents of the legal relations entered into, to 
make them fit within these actions.265 
 
261 Zwalve 2003, p. 103. Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 2, 80 et seq., Varga 1991, p. 35 et seq. On codifi-
cation ideas in general see Hart 1970, p. 158 et seq. 
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263 See above; 3.4. Other Property Rights. 
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265 The same Typizität or Typengebundenheid as in classical Roman law. See above; 2.5. A Numerus 
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3.6. Summary 
Justinian restored and incorporated the clear distinctions of (pre-) classical Roman 
law in his Corpus Iuris Civilis. These include the distinction between ownership and 
possession, but also between ownership and rights lesser than ownership. These 
iura in re aliena, as they have been named later, are property rights because they 
were protected with at least one proprietary action. Because of the exclusive 
codification that was made under Emperor Justinian, the only available property 
actions were those mentioned in the code. Property relations that meet the criteria 
for one of these actions were recognised as property rights because of the third-
party effect the actions provided to the holders of these rights. Nevertheless, there 
was a limited freedom for parties to shape their legal relations. 
The principle of numerus clausus did apply, not only to ensure that the unitary 
and absolute concept of ownership was not burdened too much, but also in the fact 
that no other property actions could be created. In this sense even a rule of numerus 
clausus of property actions existed. 
4. The Ius Commune 
4.1. Introduction 
The downfall of the Western Roman Empire came with the Germanic conquest at 
the end of the fifth century.266 In the Roman Empire as it had evolved, the whole 
population had become subject to Roman law. However, under Germanic law 
principles, persons were governed by their law of birth.267 Depending on the origin 
of a person a different law would apply, therefore, Roman law would only apply to 
the Roman citizens and their descendants. To the Germanic tribes, specific 
Germanic laws, which were mainly customary laws, would apply.  
The end of the Western Roman Empire led to the disappearance of the State 
institutions and the end of the Roman tradition of the study of law.268 Emperor 
Justinian had introduced his Corpus Iuris Civilis in the Eastern Roman Empire, 
which had halted the vulgarisation of law in the East, but the vulgarisation of law in 
the West continued and eventually led to the decline of Roman law in general. The 
central administration vanished and society returned to agriculture.269 
Apart from the remains of vulgar Roman law and Germanic customary law 
there were two other relevant sources of law. In the year 800 Charlemagne had 
himself crowned Emperor in Rome by the Pope, uniting different kingdoms under 
his reign. With the papal blessing he announced that he, as Emperor, had the power 
to make legislation in his empire.270 The law of the Church, which was strongly 
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based on Roman law, became a source of law in the Carolingian Empire. The law of 
the Roman Catholic Church, which is also known as canon law, primarily dealt with 
the organisation and dealings of the Church, but there were certain principles that 
also heavily influenced and changed the Roman private law.271 
The other source of law was the customary law that came with the system of 
landholding. The decline of the Roman Empire and the lack of a central government 
led to a situation of anarchy in which the common man was not sure of his 
possessions or his life.272 In exchange for protection of a neighbouring lord, the 
common person would take an oath of fidelity, which obliged him to go to war in 
the service of this lord. These relations between common men and lords are known 
as feudal relations, and these became the principal method for landholding.273 
The Frankish kings would, in exchange for services in combat, grant parts of 
their land to warriors. These warriors in their turn would grant part of their land to 
persons who were faithful to them.274 Persons who had received land in exchange 
for a payment of services or money became known as vassals.275 In this form the 
feudal system and its principles spread through Europe and became an additional, 
but very important, source of law. 
However, it was not until the end of the eleventh century that Roman law was 
properly reintroduced. In Italy, technically, Roman law had never lost the force of 
law. Under the personality principle of Germanic law, Roman law remained 
applicable to the former Roman citizens and even served as a subsidiary source of 
law when Germanic customary law could not provide an answer. When more and 
more people moved to other territories, the population became mixed. At one 
moment there could be more than twenty different laws applicable in the same 
square kilometre. Disputes became hard to settle. Therefore, the personality 
principle slowly made way for the territoriality principle, under which law would 
apply to a certain region regardless of the origin of the citizens.276  
At the end of the eleventh century the Corpus Iuris Civilis was rediscovered 
and studied again. The level of legal culture rose with the establishment of law 
schools and a university in Bologna. The rediscovery and synthesis of Roman law 
took most of the twelfth century and would lead to a system of learned Roman 
law.277 However, Germanic customary law remained the principal source of law, 
supplemented by feudal law, canon law and, now, the rediscovered Roman law. 
The renewed study of Roman law therefore required a method to adapt the Roman 
law to current times. 
This adaptation came with the school of the Glossators who, in Bologna, 
would add a comment, or gloss, to the text of the Corpus Iuris Civilis to explain its 
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meaning. The Glossators succeeded in rediscovering most of the Corpus Iuris Civilis 
and to reintroduce it as a subsidiary source of law. The end of the school of 
Glossators came with the creation of a standard collection of Glosses by Accursius, 
the Glossa Ordinaria.278 In the next centuries this collection of glosses more than the 
text of the Corpus Iuris Civilis itself, would become the primary source of Roman-
based law.279 
The successors of the Glossators went further and attempted to apply the 
rediscovered Roman law in their society. These Post-Glossators or Commentators 
attempted, with the use of specific methods of interpretation, to apply Roman law 
to their current time.280 In this sense the Post-Glossators differed from the 
thirteenth-century Glossators who had sought to explain the texts. The new learned 
law could also be applied to the study of non-Roman law such as Germanic 
customary law and feudal law. These non-Roman laws, which were particular to 
each region, were also known as ius proprium.281 The ius proprium became a specific 
part of the study of the Post-Glossators.282 
The third school that studied Roman law was the school of the Humanists. 
Inspired by the renaissance of antiquity the Humanists rejected the approach of the 
Commentators and corrected many historically incorrect interpretations from both 
the Glossators and the Commentators.283 The result of this approach was that study 
of Roman law lost contact with practice and became more and more an academic 
discipline.284 The Humanists, based in France, called their method mos gallicus to 
oppose themselves to the Commentators, whose method had become known as mos 
italicus.285 The Humanist school of thought remained in force until the seventeenth 
century when it was replaced by the study of natural law.286 
4.1.1. Sources of Law: Problems with the Ius Proprium 
The four sources of law remained in force throughout the whole period, but the 
differences in the nature of these laws require some explanations:  
First, Roman law as it was received throughout Europe spread through its 
study at the universities, first in Italy, but later also in the rest of Europe. The result 
was that received Roman law and the addition made to it by the study of learned 
scholars, became a common law of the continent of Europe.  
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Second, the same can be held for the law of the Roman Catholic Church. 
Together with the rise of the study of Roman law came the study of canon law, 
which also led to several compilations and subsequent glosses and commentaries on 
the compilations.287 In order to write these glosses and commentaries the canon law 
scholars used the terminology of the learned Roman law. Furthermore, the Church 
explicitly lived under Roman law, by which it meant the original Corpus Iuris Civilis, 
as applicable to ecclesiastical matters.288 The Church was an influential institution, 
which had spread throughout Europe, and through its influence not only learned 
Roman law, but also learned canon law became a true European law. 
Third, in the second half of the twelfth century, feudal customary rules were 
collected in what came to be known as the Libri Feudorum.289 The collection of 
customary law became accepted as a good collection of customary law throughout 
Europe and was even included in the medieval version of the Corpus Iuris Civilis.290 
However, the Libri Feudorum never became as authoritative as Roman law and 
canon law. 
These three sources of law applied throughout continental Europe and 
therefore together became known as the Ius Commune, the common law of Europe. 
However, the ius proprium, which was the customary law that differed from place to 
place, should not be disregarded. This law was known as the ius proprium in order 
to contrast it with the Ius Commune.291 As a result of the primary nature of the ius 
proprium there was no real common law of Europe. In legal practice, the application 
of the ius proprium resulted in a merely subsidiary application of the Ius Commune.292 
Although it did not have exclusive force of law, clever scholarship in the 
twelfth century made for a strict interpretation of customary law so that the Ius 
Commune had room to apply and develop, not only in scholarship, but also in 
practice.293 Furthermore, the lawyers who used and interpreted the ius proprium had 
received legal training based on the Ius Commune. Most applications and inter-
pretations were therefore consistent with Roman law principles.294 
Because of this dual system, the structure of this Section 4.1.1 is different from 
that of the Sections on Roman law in this Chapter. The local customary law, in so far 
as it is relevant for modern law in the selected legal systems, will be dealt with in 
the Chapters dealing with modern law respectively. This Chapter will deal with the 
learned law or Ius Commune. Because this law was common to the continent of 
Europe and because so many modern legal systems have been inspired by 
principles and rules following from the sources of the Ius Commune, it is worth 
looking at the Ius Commune property law. Due to the hierarchy of sources and the 
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possible existence of property rights in local customary law that would take 
preference over Roman law principles as part of the Ius Commune, this part will not 
examine the possible existence of a principle of numerus clausus and its application.  
4.2. General Principles of the Ius Commune 
The renewal of the interest in Roman law, especially in Justinian’s Corpus Iuris 
Civilis, led to several schools of thought. The Glossators attempted to explain the 
Corpus Iuris, which sometimes confronted them with serious problems, mostly due 
to changes in society.295 In order to explain the text the Glossators wrote a gloss at 
the side of the text that would explain the problem and, if possible, cross-reference 
to another section. Although Justinian’s intention had been to avoid any contra-
dictions in his text, many were left. These contradictions forced the Glossators to 
come up with solutions.296 One of these solutions was the use of a technique named 
distinctio. With this technique, it was be possible to provide several meanings for the 
same word.297 
The study of Roman law also influenced the study of the other sources of law. 
The concepts of Roman law were applied to feudal law with the result that in this 
area customary law became described in Roman law terminology. The Roman 
system of actions was now applied to the feudal relation, which led to serious 
problems concerning the classification of the position of the vassal and the question 
of which action would be available.  
Furthermore, the academic study of Roman law, as opposed to its application 
in practice, led to a critical view of the subject matter. Academics posed the question 
of whether there was perhaps a causa that was at the foundation of a certain actio 
awarded by Roman law.298 In other words, these academics searched for a reason 
why a certain action would be available. This search for a causa eventually led to the 
rise of the concept of ‘right’ that is used in civil law today. However, even though 
the Glossators already paid attention to the idea of a causa behind an action, this 
change in approach occurred gradually.299 
Finally an important distinction was made between corporeal and incorporeal 
objects. Although this distinction was not new, it had been used by Gaius as well, it 
 
295 See below; 4.3. Ownership. 
296 This is the reason for the interpolations in the texts, e.g. the replacement of mancipatio and in 
iure cessio with the tradition, Van Caenegem 1988b, p. 49. 
297 Van Caenegem 1988b, p. 49. 
298 Feenstra 1979, p. 10. 
299 There has been a large debate on the origin of the concept of subjective right, started by 
Villey, see, inter alia, Coing 1962, p. 38 et seq., Schrage 1977, p. 1 et seq., Feenstra 1979, p. 1 et 
seq., Schrage 1996, p. 55-56 for an overview of this debate. For an extensive overview from a 
procedural point of view see Kriechbaum 1996, p. 144 et seq. This subject will be dealt with 
below in 4.4. Other Property Rights. 
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gained importance in relation to the concept of ownership.300 In the renewed study 
of Roman law, ownership had become restricted to corporeal objects.301  
4.3. Ownership 
The study of Roman law allowed the Glossators to understand the concept of 
dominium in the context of Roman law. Already at the end of the twelfth century, the 
concept of dominium was used to interpret the Libri Feudorum.302 Interpreting feudal 
law in Roman terminology allowed the Glossators to use the Libri Feudorum, besides 
the Corpus Iuris, in teaching.303 This new method posed for them a problem con-
cerning the relationship between the lord and the vassal in feudal law. In order to 
solve this, the Glossators looked at the debate on the status of the person having an 
emphyteusis in Roman law.304 In the Eastern Roman Empire, emphyteusis had been a 
right sui generis.305 However, in the Western Roman Empire emphyteusis was 
considered a right of ownership.306 Furthermore, there are texts in the Corpus Iuris 
that suggest and underline the relation with dominium, especially in granting the 
holder of an emphyteusis an actio in rem utilis.307 
With these concepts of ownership and emphyteusis in mind, the Glossators 
derived the principle that the vassal would have dominium utile whereas the feudal 
lord would have dominium directum.308 Corresponding to these types of ownership 
there would be a vindicatio directa or vindicatio utile.309 This view, which was 
criticised already at that time, resulted in the generally accepted opinion that the 
holder of an emphyteusis, the holder of a superficies and the long-term lessor also held 
dominium utile.310 Furthermore the term was used for the person who would become 
owner through usucapio.311 
 
300 G. Inst. 2, 12, Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 119. 
301 At least, ownership in the narrow sense of the word, see below; 4.3. Ownership. 
302 Feenstra 1976, p. 265, Feenstra 1974, p. 215 et seq. 
303 Feenstra argues that the Glossator who first included the Libri feudorum in teaching was 
Pillius Feenstra 1974, p. 221, Feenstra 1976, p. 265. However, the discussion is wider, see Van 
der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 235-243 for a good overview. 
304 See above; 2.4. Other Property Rights and 3.4. Other Property Rights. 
305 See above; 3.4. Other Property Rights. 
306 Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 234-235, Zwalve 2003, p. 112-113. 
307 C. 11.62.2; C. 11.62.4; C. 11.70.4; C. 11.68.2pr.; C. 11.62.12.1, as quoted by Van der Walt & 
Kleyn 1989, p. 234-235. See also Feenstra 1976, p. 265-266. 
308 See Gloss Libertates on C. 11.62.11.1, Spruit & Feenstra 1987, p. 273-274. Feenstra 1976, p. 266, 
Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 235-236, Zwalve 2003, p. 112-113, Lévy & Castaldo 2002,  
p. 386-387, 398 Stein 1999, p. 63, Lange 1997, p. 90. 
309 Kriechbaum 1996, p. 232. 
310 Van der Walt 1986, p. 308, Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 236, 241, Zwalve 2003, p. 113, 
Feenstra 1976, p. 267, Van den Bergh 1988, p. 45, Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 386-387, see 
Kriechbaum 1996, p. 232 et seq. for a detailed overview. 
311 Such a person would have had the actio Publiciana at his disposal in Roman law and would 
have held praetorian or bonitary ownership. Coing 1962, p. 41. See above; 2.3. Ownership. 
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A problem would arise if a vassal had dominium utile in respect to his lord, but 
sub-infeudated his property to another vassal.312 The Glossa Ordinaria and most 
Glossators answered that only the latter vassal would have dominium utile leaving 
the original vassal with nothing.313 This shows that, although a division of the 
concept of ownership was held possible, the ownership itself could not be divided. 
Furthermore there were two different conceptions of ownership. Dominium in a 
wide sense included ownership on all corporeal and incorporeal objects. Dominium 
in a narrow sense of the word was a species of the wider concept and was restricted 
to corporeal objects. It was in the narrow category that the distinction between 
dominium directum and utile was made.314 
Although this duplex dominium was recognised, there still was no definition of 
ownership.315 The successors of the Glossators continued and extended the work 
and succeeded in deriving a definition of ownership.316 The work of the Post-
Glossators was academic in nature and they paid more attention to law outside 
Roman law as well.317 They wrote commentaries on the Corpus Iuris in which they 
built on the works of the Glossators.318 The Post-Glossators also used the two 
different conceptions of ownership of the Glossators.  
In one of the famous commentaries of Bartolus de Saxoferrato, a definition of 
dominium is provided.319 Bartolus considered ownership as: 
The right in a corporeal object to have…perfectly at one’s disposal, unless it is for-
bidden by law.320 
In another commentary Bartolus also included incorporeal objects into his definition 
of dominium.321 However, this definition did not mean that Bartolus only recognised 
one type of ownership. Instead, he recognised three types; dominium directum, 
dominium utile and quasi-dominium.322 The recognition of these three types should be 
read together with his definition of ownership as a right perfectly at one’s dis-
 
312 I.e., if a vassal would, in his turn, give land in feudal tenure to others, who are known as sub-
vassals. 
313 This opinion was not held by all scholars, from the period of the Post-Glossators it became 
accepted that both vassal and sub-vassal would have dominium utile. Feenstra 1976, p. 266-
267. 
314 Coing 1953, p. 349-350, Coing 1985, p. 291. 
315 Although at the time of the Glossators some authors under the influences of canon scholar-
ship attempted to define ownership. Kriechbaum 1996, p. 375 et seq., Schrage 1977, p. 38 et seq. 
316 Van Caenegem 1988b, p. 52. 
317 Van Caenegem 1988b, p. 53. 
318 Zwalve 2003, p. 36. 
319 Commentary on D. 41.2.17, Schrage 1996, p. 43. 
320 … ius in re corporali perfecte disponendi nisi lege prohibeatur, quote and translation from Schrage 
1996, p. 43. 
321 Commentary on D. 41.2.17, Schrage 1996, p. 44, Van den Bergh 1988, p. 44 et seq. 
322 Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 242-243. 
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posal.323 Bartolus considered his definition of ownership to be applicable to all three 
types of ownership.324 
Like the Glossators, Bartolus reserved the dominium directum for the feudal 
lord. He awarded dominium utile to the vassal, the holder of the right of emphyteusis, 
the holder of the right of superficies and the long-term possessor.325 The third type of 
ownership was reserved for people who were on their way to becoming owner 
through prescription. This type of ownership was based on the Roman actio 
Publiciana which protected a possessor who, in the future, would acquire ownership 
through usucapio.326 Although this third type was not as widely accepted as the 
other two, Bartolus’ definition of ownership has become very influential in later 
writings about the right of ownership.327  
The end of the feudal system of landholding came with the decline of the 
school of the Post-Glossators. This is not to say that feudalism no longer existed, but 
more that because of developments in society the place of feudal relations became 
less explicit. The new school of legal thought became the Humanist school of 
Roman law. The Humanists were inspired by the renaissance of antiquity and they 
returned to the (pre-) classical Roman concepts. In doing so they rejected the work 
and approaches of the Glossators and Post-Glossators as vulgar or non-Roman.328 
This new approach included the general rejection of the division between 
dominium directum and dominium utile.329 Instead most Humanists preferred the 
distinction between dominium plenum and dominium minus plenum.330 The true 
dominium in the Roman sense of the word remained with the person having the 
dominium plenum, staying closer to what the Humanists considered to be the true 
Roman ownership. The person who had this dominium plenum would have the 
object perfectly at his disposal.331 Dominium minus plenum consisted of other 
property rights other than ownership.332  
However, in certain cases, as for example in respect of a right of emphyteusis, 
the question remained who was the actual owner. The Glossators and Post-
Glossators had awarded the true dominium to the person with the ultimate 
entitlement, which they named dominium directum. However, in some cases, the 
 
323 Which refers to the words perfecte disponendi, see Feenstra 1976, p. 255. 
324 Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 242. 
325 Other instances where dominium utile was awarded also existed. See Coing 1953, p. 361, Van 
der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 242 and the sources quoted there. 
326 See above; 2.3. Ownership, Feenstra 1989, p. 113. 
327 Which included the writings of his student Baldus, Feenstra 1978, p. 112, Feenstra 1989,  
p. 113, Schrage 1996, p. 44, Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 243. 
328 Van Caenegem 1988b, p. 55. 
329 Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 243 et seq. 
330 Or dominium (ex iure Quiritium) and in bonis esse, see Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 244, 
Feenstra 1978, p. 221-222. 
331 However, the meaning of perfecte disponendi might have been slightly different from the Post-
Glossators. Feenstra 1978, p. 223, Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 244-245. 
332 This distinction is made by Molina, Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 244, Feenstra 1978, p. 222-
223. 
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Humanists awarded the true ownership to, in terms of the Glossators and Post-
Glossators, the person with the dominium utile.333 
4.4. Other Property Rights 
Modern law usually makes a clear distinction between ownership on the one hand 
and property rights other than ownership on the other. It should be recalled that 
Roman law did not made such a clear distinction.334 Subsequently, each of the 
schools of renewed Roman study included some of the Roman property rights and 
new feudal property rights into their various concepts of dominium. The discussion 
and the question whether property rights are distinct from the right of ownership or 
whether perhaps ownership is a property right came with the search for a causa 
behind an actio in rem. 
The Glossators were the first to deal with these questions. The concepts of 
ownership the Glossators used were not very clear and only a general distinction 
was made between dominium directum and dominium utile. However, no definition of 
dominium was provided.335 Schrage and Nörr argue that in the discussion in canon 
law a subjective notion of a ‘right’ of ownership was created.336 Schrage argues that, 
because of the debate on ownership of the Franciscan friars, this notion had to be 
dealt with. Franciscan friars, under the oath they had taken, were not allowed to 
have any ownership. Consequently, a debate arose on who would have the owner-
ship instead.337 Schrage shows that the writers Bonaventura, Bonagratia and 
Bartolus answered the problem by looking at the rights the friars would have to 
give up and which rights the friars would continue to have.338 Only after these ques-
tions were answered was the possible action considered.339 
Hostiensis, in his Summa Aurea, used a concept of ius that can be understood as 
a ‘subjective’ right.340 Furthermore Nörr argues that with the technique of distinctio 
the Glossa Ordinaria uses the same notion of right.341 He emphasises that the result of 
the findings of Hostiensis is not that there was no other concept of right than the 
‘subjective’ right. To the contrary, the Glossators and Canonists still used many 
concepts of rights.342 However, the foundations for a later distinction had been laid.  
Even though the Glossators were the first to deal with the question of the causa 
behind the actio in rem and though they came close to the use of the concept ius in re 
as a property right, most of them considered dominium, and not any other right, to 
be at the basis of the actio in rem. Also, the wide definition of dominium allowed 
 
333 Van der Walt & Kleyn 1989, p. 244. 
334 De Waal 1992, p. 568, Feenstra 1976, p. 260-261, Feenstra 1979, p. 6. 
335 Feenstra 1979, p. 10. 
336 Schrage 1977, p. 39 et seq., Schrage 1996, p. 55-58, Nörr 1992, p. 193 et seq. 
337 Save for the ownership of one tunica, Schrage 1996, p. 56. 
338 Schrage 1977, p. 45-54 (Bonaventura), p. 57-61 (Bonagratia), p. 66-69 (Bartolus). 
339 Schrage 1977, p. 69. 
340 Nörr 1992, p. 193, 200-202, Lange 1997, p. 102 et seq. 
341 Nörr 1992, p. 202-204. 
342 Nörr 1992, p. 203. 
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incorporeal objects to be part of the right of ownership. The Roman iura in re aliena 
had been considered as incorporeal objects from the reception of Roman law and 
could therefore be included in the definition of ownership.343 However, the search 
for and description of the ius in re by the Glossators would allow the Post-
Glossators to develop a category of rights that they would oppose to ius personale.344 
The Post-Glossator Baldus was the first to provide a list of iura in re or, as he 
named them, iura realia. Besides the three types of ownership Bartolus described, 
Baldus mentions; the right of succession, ius hereditatis, the rights of servitude, iura 
servitutum realium et personalium, and the right of pledge, hypotheca or pignus.345 This 
set of iura realia became generally accepted among the Post-Glossators.346 
It was not until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that scholars made a 
distinction between property rights and personal rights along the same lines as the 
modern legal distinction.347 Feenstra emphasises the importance of the work of 
Apel, who proposed to make this distinction the foundation of the whole private 
law system.348 Donellus made the distinction between dominium and iura in re aliena, 
rights other than ownership.349 In the Humanist school of thought, with its rejection 
of a split ownership, Donellus concluded that the holder of an emphyteusis could not 
have ownership. Apart from the right of emphyteusis, Donellus considered as iura in 
rebus alienis the right of superficies, the ius bonae fidei possessoris, and ius pignoris. 
Feenstra also argues that Donellus considered those rights as imminutio of the rights 
of the owner.350 However, others also concerned themselves with the subject, 
although not as much as Apel and Donellus did. 
A well-known exception is Heinrich Hahn, who derived five property rights 
from five corresponding actions in Roman law.351 The rights he derived were; 
dominium, pignus, servitus, possessio and hereditas. Feenstra has shown that this 
enumeration, which is known as Hahn’s Pentarchy, was not the first of its kind but 
a selection of the various rights that were recognised at that time.352 Even though 
Hahn might not have been the first author to make an enumeration of property 
 
343 Coing 1985, p. 291.  
344 Feenstra 1989, p. 112, Feenstra 1979, p. 15 et seq. 
345 Feenstra 1979, p. 14, Feenstra 1989, p. 113. 
346 Although Baldus did not distinguish ownership from other property rights, other Post-
Glossators did, though none came as far as the modern day distinction. Feenstra 1989, p. 113. 
347 Feenstra 1989, p. 114, Feenstra 1979, p. 16-17. 
348 Although the distinction between personal rights and property rights was not new; it had 
been used before in Canon law, Coing 1985, p. 341, Feenstra 1979, p. 17 et seq., Feenstra 1989, 
p. 114 et seq., Feenstra 1982, p. 107. 
349 Feenstra 1979, p. 26, Feenstra 1989, p. 115. 
350 Feenstra 1989, p. 115. 
351 The dissertation is called De jure rerum et juris in re speciebus, Hahn’s enumeration of five 
property rights, also known as Hahn’s Pentarchy, gained special importance in the 
Netherlands because of an article by Meijers in 1907, Meijers 1907, p. 271 et seq., Feenstra 
1982, p. 110. 
352 Feenstra 1982, p. 107 et seq., especially 113 et seq. 
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rights, his work is a representation of the general works of his time.353 It was Hahn’s 
Pentarchy that would influence several European Civil Codes.354 
In other words, the renewed study of Roman law led to the search for rights 
behind the actions that were taken from Roman law. The result of this was not only 
a concept of a right as opposed to an action, but also a further division in personal 
rights and property rights. Although the development of property rights is visible 
through the centuries in which the Ius Commune applied, the content of most of the 
property rights remained Roman in nature.355 Even more, those rights that were not 
of Roman origin were fitted into the Roman law system when needed.  
Fitting non-Roman rights into the Roman system of property relations was not 
only needed for the relation of the vassal and the lord, which became a type of 
ownership next to the right of emphyteusis, but also with other customary rights.356 
These rights were considered incorporeal objects and were interpreted along the 
lines of servitudes in Roman law. The result of this approach was that some of the 
strict rules on servitudes were relaxed in order to fit these rights into the system.357 
The advantage of the inclusion of these non-Roman rights in the Roman system was 
that the methods of creation and protection were the same as for the Roman 
servitudes. As a result, these rights were all protected with the actio confessoria.358 
The classification of the various Roman property rights differed as well. Partly 
under the influence of the other sources of law in the Ius Commune, especially the 
influence of feudal law on the rights of emphyteusis and superficies that were now 
seen as parts of the right of ownership, a fragmented system resulted. The right of 
ownership was recognised but not in its Roman unitary and absolute form. Only 
from the fifteenth century on, through the works of Apel and Donellus, were 
property rights seen as different from personal rights and the right of ownership 
was considered distinct from the other property rights.359  
4.5. Summary 
The renewed study of Roman law led to the development of modern concepts of 
ownership and property rights other than ownership, or iura in re aliena. The con-
cept of dominium as it was defined by Bartolus, although he might not necessarily 
have been the first, gained influence and resulted in a breach with the Roman 
 
353 Feenstra also mentions Donellus, Giphanius, Spiegel, Calvinus and Mynsinger, who in their 
turn based their work on Apel, Feenstra 1982, p. 114-115. 
354 The Austrian ABGB, but also the Dutch BW. It was especially Meijers who argued that 
Hahn’s division was the basis for Article 584 of the Old Dutch Civil Code, Meijers 1907, p. 271 
et seq. On the influence of Hahn’s Pentarchy see Feenstra 1982, p. 118. 
355 The work on this is not only of the Humanists, but certainly also of the Glossators and Post-
Glossators. 
356 Coing 1985, p. 310-311, 342. 
357 On the rules applying to servitudes see above; 2.4. Other Property Rights. Coing 1985, p. 311 
et seq. 
358 Coing 1985, p. 347. 
359 However, Feenstra emphasises that the work of Donellus was not generally accepted in his 
time, Feenstra 1989, p. 117. 
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unitary concept of ownership.360 Dominium could be understood in a wider sense, 
including incorporeal objects, but also in a narrow sense, only including corporeal 
objects. Under the influence of feudal law especially, a division into dominium direc-
tum, utile and quasi dominium was made. Only after the Post-Glossators started to 
use the concept of iura realia, could a distinction of property rights with the right of 
ownership be made. In the works of Apel in the fifteenth century a clear contrast 
with personal rights was provided. Donellus then made clear that there was to be a 
distinction between ownership and rights other than ownership. This opened the 
way for an investigation into what property rights could be included in the list of 
rights other than ownership. Of the many authors that searched for the available 
property rights, Hahn gained the most fame with his Pentarchy of property rights. 
5. Natural Law and the French Revolution 
5.1. Introduction 
Now that a new system of private law had been developed, based on the study of 
Roman law, other schools of thought could develop. Under the influence of the 
work of Grotius, a new school of thought developed that did not base its reasoning 
on the Corpus Iuris Civilis but on reason, ratio, instead. This school of thought, 
known as the natural law school, had formed part of the study of canon law until 
the seventeenth century.361 Natural law focused on reason as opposed to the Roman 
texts to find authority for law, and it became very influential, especially in the 
Netherlands where it formed the basis for the Roman-Dutch law.362  
In 1625 the Dutchman Hugo de Groot, or Grotius, published a book that firmly 
founded the natural law school of thought.363 He argued that although Roman law 
was very useful, the fundamental legal values came from reason and not from the 
Roman law texts. The justification for the use of Roman law principles was therefore 
that they formed an excellent example of written reason.364 These ideas gradually 
spread through Europe and caused a controversy with the practitioners of the Ius 
Commune.365 Since the Glossators, the authority of the Roman law had not been 
questioned and practitioners of the Ius Commune saw these fundamental values in 
 
360 Kriechbaum suggests that Ockham might have been the first, although is definition was less 
technical than Bartolus’ definition. Kriechbaum 1996, p. 375 et seq., Villey has also suggested 
this in his works, on the latter see Schrage 1977, Coing 1953, p. 348 et seq. 
361 Zwalve 2003, p. 79, 64. 
362 On Roman-Dutch law, that still applies in South Africa today see Chapter 7; 3.8. A Legal 
System Without a Numerus Clausus: South African Law. 
363 The book is De iure belli ac pacis. Grotius is considered by many to be the founder of the 
modern Natural Law School, see, inter alia, Zwalve 2003, p. 79 and Zimmermann 1992, p. 26 et 
seq. 
364 Koschaker 1995, p. 242. 
365 Zwalve 2003, p. 80. 
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the text of the Corpus Iuris itself.366 Natural law, although not strong enough to 
abolish Roman law, questioned its validity.367 
In practice, Ius Commune was applied with all its practical deviations from 
Roman law, but natural law thinking took over in the work of learned writers. 
Although natural law scholars had returned to some of the Roman concepts, the 
feudal system and canon law were still very influential. However, feudal relations 
were not the same as they had been at the time of the Glossators and Post-
Glossators. From the end of the fifteenth century feudal relations became economic 
in nature. Lords were interested in receiving a yearly sum of money from their 
vassals instead of services.368 Furthermore, not all land was held in feudal tenure 
anymore. These free lands, also known as allodial lands, conflicted with the rule 
nulle terre sans seigneur, or no land without a feudal lord, that had applied in the 
ages before.369 Most lands remained under feudal relations, especially because the 
absolutists kings adhered to the old rules for granting entitlements to land.370 
Although payment of money instead of services was an improvement on the system 
as it had been before, the feudal relations remained.  
Now that natural law had become a learned law, it gained authority in legal 
theory, and it caused a departure from Roman law principles for the first time in 
history. At the same time, however, the feudal organisation continued to exist in 
practice, leaving vassals under feudal tenure having to respect the many feudal 
privileges of their lords.371 These feudal privileges and feudal rights could lead to 
heavy burdens for the vassals. The oppression of vassals by the feudal lords 
combined with these burdening feudal rights led to discontent that would even-
tually start a revolution, which in many ways formed the climax of the development 
towards a unitary concept of ownership and the application of the natural law 
school’s ideas in practice.372 
The revolution originated in France where the lower class, known as the Third 
Estate, objected to the way in which they were treated. The Third Estate feared a 
conspiracy by the aristocrats, that is, the feudal lords, and the king against them.373 
In Paris increased oppression against the Third Estate by both the aristocrats and 
the king led to the fall of the Bastille on 14 July 1789.374 In the rest of France, peas-
ants, usually vassals, refused to render taxes and other feudal payments, stormed 
castles and burned the documents on which their feudal obligations rested.375 The 
bourgeoisie of Paris elected a National Assembly which the king was forced to 
 
366 Koschaker 1995, p. 243. 
367 Wieacker 1995, p. 227 et seq. 
368 However, also old feudal duties remained in existence, Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 408. 
369 Instead the rule became nul seigneur sans titre, Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 409. 
370 Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 409. 
371 E.g., hunting rights, Ketelaar 1978, p. 16. 
372 In the past the importance of the French Revolution itself has been overestimated. See, inter 
alia, Van den Bergh 1988, p. 51 et seq., Palmer 1959, p. 482, Gordley 1994, p. 459 et seq. 
373 Palmer focuses on the idea of a feeling of aristocratic conspiracy amongst the Third Estate as 
a method to understand the whole French Revolution. Palmer 1959, p. 483 et seq. 
374 Palmer 1959, p. 483. 
375 Palmer 1959, p. 483-484. 
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recognise. This National Assembly took over control of the city of Paris and issued 
decrees to save what could be saved in the chaos that had resulted from the 
beginning of the Revolution. On the night of the 4th of August 1789, the National 
Assembly abolished the feudal system.376 However, according to the Decree, some 
feudal rights remained that could only be abolished in exchange for compensation. 
It was not until 1792 that the remaining privileges and the right to compensation 
were abolished.377 
From a legal point of view, the French Revolution marked the turning point 
from the fragmented system which applied at the time of the Ius Commune towards 
a unitary system of law and of ownership in particular.378 In this unitary system the 
sources of law, but also the concepts of law, would become clearer. The right of 
ownership would become unitary once more. 
5.2. General Principles 
This Chapter has shown that since the (pre-) classical Roman jurists there have been 
several schools of thought, each of which had their influence on the development of 
property rights.379 To the schools that developed during the time the Ius Commune 
applied, this final section adds the natural law school.380 As mentioned above, the 
formal study of law became that of the natural law school of thought. This caused a 
separation between the reality of society and legal theory. With the increased unrest 
in society, in particular amongst the Third Estate, it was eventually the combination 
of this unrest with the various schools of thought that led to the French Revolution.  
After the French Revolution various schools of thought remained and new 
schools were even created. However, the period up to the French Revolution was 
highly relevant in the formation of modern law.381 It was as a result of this Revolu-
tion that the system of property law in Europe was thoroughly reformed. This 
reform meant the end of the feudal system and introduced a system that would 
form the basis of most modern codes of civil law.382 The basis for this reform was 
found in the writings of the Humanists, scholars who focused on universal human 
qualities to determine right and wrong, and from that perspective derived rules of 
law, and who succeeded in questioning the Roman law basis of the law and the 
 
376 The official decree dates a week later: Decree of 11 August 1789 Abolishing the Feudal 
System. 
377 This was done on the 10th August 1792. More will be stated about the abolition of the feudal 
system below in 5.3. Ownership. Palmer 1970, p. 41-42, Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 431. 
378 This general unitary nature especially refers to the application of provisions of property law 
to immovable and movable objects alike. Until the French Revolution, the feudal system had 
governed immovable objects, whereas movable objects were not included. 
379 See above; 2. (Pre-) Classical Roman Law, Codified Roman Law – The Corpus Iuris Civilis, and 
The Ius Commune. 
380 The other schools are those of the Glossators and Post-Glossators. See above; 4. The Ius 
Commune. 
381 See below; 5.3. Ownership. 
382 See, inter alia, Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 156 et seq., Stein 1999, p. 104 et seq. 
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status of Roman law in general.383 From the work of the Humanists, under the 
influence of the works of Grotius, the natural law school followed. The discussions 
of the natural law scholars, although diverse in nature, opened the way for new 
ideas and the influence of different concepts. The system of Roman law, as it had 
been received in the Ius Commune, had not allowed external influences, for instance, 
concepts of freedom and unburdened rights, to have effect on the basic concepts of 
the system.384  
The desire for a codified civil law is one of the other results of the French 
Revolution. In the various grievances that the French population brought to Paris at 
the beginning of the Revolution, many asked for a clear codification of the law. For 
the common person it had become increasingly difficult to understand what law 
applied to him or her. Many cases were complicated by the fact that customary law, 
Roman law and feudal law could all apply.385 The changes in the property law 
system, including the right of ownership and the available property rights, that 
were made as a result of these grievances created legal certainty and formed the 
basis on which the Civil Codes could be built. 
5.3. Ownership 
5.3.1. Natural Law School 
The right of ownership, although still Roman in origin, had been subject to 
alterations because of the influences of feudal law, canon law, and customary law. 
The legal scholars of the Ius Commune had altered the right of ownership in such a 
way that the absolute and unitary concept of dominium in Roman law no longer 
existed. Furthermore, because of the influences of the feudal system as the principal 
form of landholding, it was possible that a vassal would have dominium utile in 
relation to his lord, who had dominium directum, and, at the same time, dominium 
directum in relation to his own vassals in case of sub-infeudation.386 
The natural law school rejected this approach to ownership, but retained some 
of its duplex nature.387 Nevertheless, the natural law school established a unitary 
concept of ownership that was distinct from the other property rights.388 The ideas 
of the natural law school were not new; natural law existed from the beginning of 
ancient law.389 The Catholic Church had continued to use natural law. However, 
because of the general application of Roman law as a secondary source of law in the 
 
383 Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 443, Zwalve 2003, p. 81. On the Humanist school see above; 4.1. 
Introduction. 
384 Instead, it could be held that the system of Roman law had its influences on external factors, 
such as feudal law. On these influences see Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 443, Zwalve 2003,  
p. 115-116. 
385 Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 156 et seq. 
386 Although originally the Glossators opposed to this idea, see above; 4.3. Ownership. 
387 Van den Bergh 1988, p. 37. 
388 Van den Bergh 1988, p. 37. 
389 Wieacker 1995, p. 205. 
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Ius Commune, there had been no place for natural law.390 In canon law, natural law 
theories on ownership had been current since the fifteenth century.391 In respect to 
the ownership of the Franciscan Friars, who were not allowed to have any personal 
belongings, a unitary concept of ownership was developed.392 These theories on 
ownership also influenced the Spanish theologians and jurists of the sixteenth 
century.393 In all circumstances, natural law remained connected to the law of the 
Church. 
It is in this context that Grotius wrote his works, ‘On the Law of War and 
Peace’ and ‘An Introduction to Dutch Law’.394 Grotius distinguished between ius in 
rem, which he named beheering, and ius in personam sive creditum, which he named 
inschuld.395 The ius in rem he divided into ius possessionis, which he named bezitsrecht, 
and ius dominii vel quasi, which he named eigendom. The last concept denotes 
ownership, which Grotius further divides into complete ownership and incomplete 
ownership.396 Complete ownership means a man is entitled ‘to do with an object 
and to his advantage, anything he pleases which is not forbidden by the law’.397 ‘In-
complete ownership is when there is something missing from this full capacity’.398 
With this distinction Grotius mentions the terms dominium plenum and dominium 
minus plenum that were also used by Donellus.399  
Grotius’ concept of full ownership is complete because it awards the absolute 
power over an object. This natural law approach, focusing on the powers of the 
owner rather than on the exact contents of the right of ownership, dates back to 
Aristotle and was commonly used by the canonical, natural law scholars in the time 
of the Glossators and Post-Glossators.400 This conception of the right of ownership 
found its way into the works of the natural law scholars of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, including Grotius and Pufendorf.401 
Incomplete ownership, formulated by Grotius in a negative sense, describes 
other property rights such as servitudes, usufruct and emphyteusis, all of which he 
 
390 Wieacker 1995, p. 206-207. 
391 The theories of, inter alia, Ockham and Luther, see Wieacker 1995, p. 208-209. 
392 The discussion on the Franciscan Friars has also been relevant in relation to the notion of a 
subjective right and the distinction between ownership and property rights other than 
ownership. See Van den Bergh 1988, p. 37 et seq. 
393 Which included, inter alia, Molina, Van den Bergh 1988, p. 37-38, Feenstra 1976, p. 270. 
394 De iure belli ac pacis and Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid, Feenstra 1976, p. 270-271. 
395 Or ius reale and ius personale. Feenstra 1976, p. 271, Feenstra 1978, p. 230. 
396 Feenstra 1978, p. 231, Feenstra 1989, p. 121. Full or complete ownership is where someone can 
do with an object as he wishes, within the limits of the law. 
397 ‘Volle is den eigendom waer door iemand met de zake alles mag doen nae sijn geliefte ende 
t’sijnen bate dat by de wetten onverboden is’, De Groot 1926, Book II.3.10, p. 34, Feenstra 
1989, p. 119, Feenstra 1978, p. 231. 
398 ‘Gebrecklicke waer aen iet, om zulcs alles to moghen doen, ontbreect’, De Groot 1926, Book 
II.3.11, p. 34, Feenstra 1989, p. 119, Feenstra 1978, p. 231. 
399 Feenstra 1978, p. 231. 
400 Zwalve 2003, p. 115-116. 
401 This approach to the right of ownership would become very influential in the modern 
codifications, see, inter alia, article 544 CC. Zwalve 2003, p. 115-116. 
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calls gerechtigheid or, as it has later been translated, iura in re aliena.402 Grotius 
explains what he means by incomplete ownership when he describes the situation 
in which a person has a servitude. In such a case Grotius states that both the owner 
of the dominant land and the owner of the right of servitude have incomplete 
ownership. However, the person having the ‘greater part’ of the ownership is the 
actual owner; the other has a gerechtigheid and is therefore not the owner.403 
On who would have the greater part of the right of ownership Grotius states 
in his Inleidinge:  
However, to determine which is the greater, which is the lesser share, regard is often 
paid more to the value than to present profit. Thus, in the case of land held upon 
hereditary lease the name of owner is given to the person who receives the rent, and 
who has the right of reversion by virtue of his upper-ownership, and not to the tenant 
who nevertheless derives the greatest profit from the land.404 
It seems that Grotius moved towards a unitary and absolute concept of ownership, 
which he distinguished from rights other than ownership. These rights other than 
ownership are derived from the right of ownership itself. In this respect Grotius 
refers to these as incomplete ownership. However, he is not as consistent as it seems 
at first sight. Feenstra, in his many writings about the work of Grotius, has put 
forward that in one of the editions Grotius mentioned the term dominium utile as a 
note in the margin when he dealt with a specific form of incomplete ownership.405 
5.3.2. The French Revolution 
In practice the distinction between the different ownership of the lord and the 
vassal remained. Only in the case of allodial lands was there only one type of 
ownership at the same time.406 Furthermore, at the same time many feudal rights 
and privileges existed that were attached to the feudal relation. In the theory that 
remained from the scholars of the Ius Commune, the dominium utile or dominium 
minus plenum, which belonged to the vassal, included the feudal relation and 
emphyteusis.407 These rights and privileges could be connected to the land on which 
 
402 More will be stated about gerechtigheden in the next section. The translation to iura in re aliena 
is not his own. Feenstra 1989, p. 120-121. 
403 Feenstra 1989, p. 119, Feenstra 1978, p. 232-233. 
404 ‘Doch om the vinden het meerder ende minder deel zietmen dickmael meer op de waerde als 
op de baet. Ende daerom noemt men eighenaar van erfpacht-land dien die den erfpacht 
beurt, ende die ’t recht heeft van verval van wegen sijn opper-eigendom: ende niet den 
erfpachter die nochtans de meeste baet heeft van ’t land‘, De Groot 1926, book II.33.1, 
Feenstra 1989, p. 120 notes 61 and 62. 
405 Although Grotius seems to have deliberately wanted to avoid the structure of the duplex 
dominium. Feenstra 1978, p. 233, Feenstra 1979, p. 26, Feenstra 1989, p. 121. 
406 Although the existence of the monarchy complicated the situation. In some theories, the King 
was also considered as owner of the land, on the basis of which he attempted to raise taxes. 
Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 409 et seq. 
407 Ketelaar 1978, p. 16 et seq. 
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the vassal was living and which he had inherited, or they could be personal because 
of the vassal’s relation to the lord.  
Vassals, especially peasants, had long protested against these feudal rights, 
including taxes they had to pay, and wanted their land to be free from these 
burdens.408 These grievances were recorded in the cahiers de doléances and taken to 
the meeting of the Estates General in Paris. There the peasants, belonging to the 
Third Estate, were not allowed to sit with the other social classes.409 After weeks of 
negotiations the Third Estate, with some followers from the other classes, left the 
Estates General and established the National Assembly, which they said was the 
true representative organ of all French people.410 The National Assembly negotiated 
with the king and eventually rejected his proposals, which led to the storming of the 
Bastille in Paris on 14 July 1789. This event created a revolt in the whole of France 
and the Revolution became a popular movement where previously it had only been 
an affair for influential lawyers and writers.411  
As noted above, on 4 August 1789, followed by the Decree of 11 August 1789, 
the National Assembly ‘abolished’ the feudal system.412 The National Assembly 
declared in the first article of the Decree: 
The National Assembly hereby completely abolishes the feudal system. It decrees that, 
among the existing rights and dues, both feudal and censuel, all those originating in or 
representing real or personal serfdom shall be abolished without indemnification. All 
other dues are declared redeemable, the terms and mode of redemption to be fixed by 
the National Assembly. Those of the said dues which are not extinguished by this 
decree shall continue to be collected until indemnification shall take place.413 
The distinction between feudal rights that were abolished without compensation 
and those that remained until compensation had been paid had been created by the 
Decree but was left to be ‘fixed by the National Assembly’. The rights which were 
abolished included serfdom, exclusive hunting rights, most tithes, manorial court 
rights and pecuniary privileges.414 In order to create a system of compensation for 
the remaining rights, a special committee, the Comité de féodalité, was established.415 
 
408 Palmer 1959, p. 482. 
409 Palmer 1959, p. 480. 
410 Palmer 1959, p. 480-481. 
411 Palmer 1959, p. 482. 
412 ‘L’Assemblée Nationale détruit entièrement le régime féodal’, Ketelaar 1978, p. 16, Palmer 
1970, p. 42, Lokin & Zwalve 1992, p. 158, Chabas 1994, No. 1299, p. 12. 
413 ‘L’Assemblée Nationale détruit entièrement le régime féodal et décrète que tous les droits et 
devoirs, tant féodaux que censuels, ceux que tiennent à la mainmorte réelle ou personnelle et 
à la servitude personnelle et ceux qui les représentent, sont abolis sans indemnité; tous les 
autres sont déclarés rachetables et les prix et le mode de rachat seront fixés par l’Assemblée 
Nationale. Ceux desdits droits qui ne sent pas supprimés continueront néanmoins à être 
perçus jusqu’au remboursement’. Decree of 11 August 1789 Abolishing the Feudal System, 
Article I. English translation from H. Robinson, ed., Readings in European History, vol. 2 
(Boston, 1906), p. 404-409, French text from Ketelaar 1978, p. 16. 
414 Decree of 11 August 1789 Abolishing the Feudal System, Arts. III, IV, V, IX and XI, Lévy & 
Castaldo 2002, p. 433. 
415 Ketelaar 1978, p. 16. 
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The Comité dealt with the distinction between abolished rights and redeemable 
rights and distinguished, based on origin, between personal rights and property 
rights.416 The personal rights were considered to have their basis in the feudal struc-
ture and fell in the category la féodalité dominante. Property rights were considered 
rights that had been created by agreement between the lord and the vassal and were 
therefore féodalité contractante.417  
The category of féodalité dominante was abolished without compensation. The 
category of féodalité contractante was redeemable. However, when it could be estab-
lished that the right originated in feudal oppression, it could be abolished without 
compensation. A Decree of 3 May 1790 organised the ‘sale’ of these rights. The 
result was very unsatisfactory since the prices were high and the proof demanded 
was often impossible to provide.418 On 25 August 1792 the burden of proof was 
shifted from the formal vassals to the lords. The maxim of nulle terre sans seigneur 
was abolished and all land was considered allodial unless proven otherwise.419  
In a final Decree of 17 July 1793 the National Assembly abolished all 
remaining feudal rights without a right of compensation. Only normal, non-feudal, 
property relations were to remain.420 With these three Decrees the National 
Assembly had eventually effectively abolished the feudal system. All land was now 
officially considered free and without feudal burdens. The situation before the 
Revolution now became referred to as the ancien régime.  
Compared with the situation before the ancien régime the true ownership was 
now with the vassal who before had always used and benefited from the land under 
feudal obligations. However, until the late seventeenth century the majority of 
opinions still considered dominium directum to be the actual ownership.421 The result 
of the French Revolution was that now dominium utile remained as the only form of 
ownership.422 When a non-feudal right had been established on that ownership, it 
could not be ownership and must consequently be another property right.  
5.4. Other Property Rights 
5.4.1. Natural Law School 
Although Grotius was not the first to distinguish property rights other than owners-
hip from the right of ownership itself, he has been very influential. In the theory of 
Grotius these rights were incomplete ownership, specifically gerechtigheden. These 
gerechtigheden included the property rights which had been recognised throughout 
 
416 Droits personnels and droits réels, Ketelaar 1978, p. 18, Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 432. 
417 Ketelaar 1978, p. 18, Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 432 et seq. 
418 Sometimes the price was up to 50 times the annual rent. Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 433-434. 
419 Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 434, Ketelaar 1978, p. 18. 
420 Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 434, Ketelaar 1978, p. 19. 
421 Compare Grotius who awarded the dominus directum actual ownership where the holder of 
an emphyteusis, which he referred to as holder of the dominium utile, would have a gerechtig-
heid. 
422 See, inter alia, Chabas 1994, No. 1299, p. 12. 
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the Ius Commune. Grotius invented a general term for property rights other than 
servitudes. This term, tocht, includes usufruct, emphyteusis and feudal tenure.423 In 
fact, the term tocht was further divided into lijftocht, meaning usufruct, and erftocht, 
including emphyteusis and feudal tenure.424 
Although Grotius was clearly a natural lawyer, he followed the contents of the 
Roman rights. He distinguishes urban praedial servitudes, which he named huis-
dienstbaerheden, and rustic praedial servitudes, which he named velddienstbaerheden, 
and gives examples for each of them, although he does not state that he uses a 
limited list of examples.425 However, from these examples general requirements for 
servitudes can be deducted, as was done with the servitudes in Roman law.426 In 
case of tocht, Grotius also follows the Roman law Ius Commune categorisation and 
systematisation.427 
In the final part of the property law section of his Inleidinge, Grotius deals with 
privileged rights and pledge, which he named onderzettinge.428 He recognised that 
these rights can come into existence either by agreement or by operation of law, 
recognising the legal hypothecs from Roman law. Furthermore, he also recognised 
the possessory and non-possessory pledge, though not using the distinction 
between the terms pledge and hypothec.429 However, in between the parts on tocht 
mentioned already and the part on onderzettinge, Grotius deals with other property 
rights included in his definition of tocht.430 These include tithes and use, which he 
translates as ius decimarum and usus. Furthermore he also deals with the right to tax 
and the right of superficies, which he translates as census and ius superficiarum.431 The 
works of Grotius show that natural law leaned very much on Roman law as far as 
substance was concerned. The system as such, although not new in content, is 
clearly formulated, making it different from the attempts made before.432 By 
 
423 De Groot 1926, Book II.38.5, ‘Tocht is een gerechtheid om de vruchten van eens anders zaeck 
te trecken zonder des zaecks vermindering’ Tocht is a right to take the fruits of another’s 
object without impairing the object itself. Feenstra 1989, p. 121 note 71 (Translation by 
Feenstra). 
424 Personal tocht and hereditary tocht (own translation), Feenstra 1978, p. 234. 
425 De Groot 1926, Book II.34, p. 93 ‘Wy sullen tot naerder verklaringhe de gebruickelickste 
huisdienstbaerheden vermanen …’ (In order to explain we shall mention the most common 
servitudes). 
426 The rules on the creation and loss of servitudes also explain some general requirements. De 
Groot 1926, Book II.36-37, p. 96-97. 
427 De Groot 1926, Book II.38 et seq, p. 97 et seq. 
428 De Groot 1926, Book II.48, p. 116-119. 
429 De Groot 1926, Book II.48.26, p. 118-119. 
430 De Groot 1926, Book II.44-47, p. 111-116. 
431 De Groot 1926, Book II.46, p. 114. 
432 Feenstra has emphasised that the system was not as clear as it seems at first sight. When 
dealing with the contracts of pignus and emphyteusis Grotius refers back to the property law 
aspects of these contracts as incomplete ownership, the term he earlier substituted with 
gerechtigheid Feenstra 1989, p. 122, note 77, in this article Feenstra corrects his earlier state-
ments about the system of Grotius. The text Feenstra refers to is De Groot 1926, Book III.8.2, 
p. 140. 
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following the earlier distinction by Donellus between dominium and iura in re aliena 
the fundamental distinction eventually found its way into modern law.433 
5.4.2. The French Revolution 
In feudal relations the distinction between dominium directum and dominium utile 
remained, although some changes in the feudal system improved the position of the 
vassal. The French Revolution abolished the feudal system and, later, the feudal 
rights and privileges that were once connected to the abolished feudal relations. 
However, the abolition of feudal rights did not take effect against property relations 
which were not feudal in origin. Each of the Decrees abolishing feudal rights was 
strictly limited to feudal rights only.434  
Other property rights, such as tithes and ground rent, had feudal characteris-
tics and posed a problem to the legislature. These rights provided a substantial 
income to either the clergy or the owners of large properties, both represented in the 
legislative assembly.435 However, based on the same principle that had abandoned 
feudal rights, each property right that had a feudal character would be abolished, 
either with or without compensation.436 In principle all property rights with a feudal 
character would be abolished without compensation, only those rights which 
served a purpose for society, such as the ecclesiastical tithes, would continue to 
exist, but could, in exchange for a certain payment, be abolished.437  
Many of these rights from the ancien régime remained in existence until the 
twentieth century and courts have been confronted with them long after the French 
Revolution.438 These rights were considered property rights sui generis without any 
feudal origin. What remained were the Roman property rights to use and for 
security.439 Natural law influences remained and property rights were distinguished 
from the right of ownership. The system as it had been created by the French 
Revolution with a unitary and absolute concept of ownership and property rights 
other than ownership would form the basis for many civil law systems.440 
 
433 Grotius’ system had a larger impact on private law than did Donellus’ because of the 
influence his writings have had in the 18th and 19th century. Feenstra 1989, p. 122. 
434 Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 431 et seq. 
435 Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 434-137. 
436 Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 435. 
437 This on the condition that State and Church were separated and that, in fact, these rights 
were private rights and no longer public rights. Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 435. 
438 Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 436-437. See e.g. Req. 13 February 1834, D.P. 1834.I.218, S.1834.I.205. 
On this case see Chapter 3; 3. Other Property Rights, and in that same chapter; 5 A Numerus 
Clausus in French Property Law. 
439 On this distinction see above; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
440 The German system is based on the same fundamental distinction, but differs in its 
conception of property rights as part of the right of ownership. In German law property 
rights exist besides the right of ownership and burden it, but do not form part of the right of 
ownership itself. See Chapter 4; 3. Other Property Rights and Chapter 7; 2.2. Of Ways to 
Create a Lesser Property Right. 
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5.5. A Numerus Clausus after the French Revolution? 
The achievements of the French Revolution in the area of property law are very 
important. However, at the same time the French Revolution should also be seen as 
a result of discussions in the preceding centuries.441 Not only did the Revolution 
lead to the abolition of the duplex dominium, it also created a system of property 
rights. The Comité de féodalité dealt with all feudal property rights and most other 
property rights as well, since it had to decide which rights were feudal and which 
were not. Furthermore, the legislative assembly had to deal with other property 
rights with feudal characteristics which had to be abolished. The natural law works 
of Grotius and Pufendorf, but also other natural law scholars as Pothier and Domat, 
were used to create a new legal system. These developments ended in the draft of 
the Code Napoléon, which would eventually form the Code Civil.442 
As far as the Roman property rights were concerned, Roman law requirements 
applied to them as much as possible.443 Therefore, the same reasoning with respect 
to a numerus clausus in Roman law applied to Roman-law inspired property rights 
after the Revolution.444 However, there were other property rights, which originated 
in the French customary law and those remaining non-feudal rights as well. Even 
more, after the Revolution, law in Europe no longer formed a Ius Commune. Instead, 
each country created its own law, usually with its own Civil Code.445 The question 
of a numerus clausus of property rights therefore became a question that could only 
be answered from country to country. 
Various new schools of legal thought, usually nationally orientated, now dealt 
exclusively with national legal problems and no longer founded their reasoning 
solely on Roman law or the Ius Commune. However, each of these schools at-
tempted, with a codification, to prevent a return to the ancien régime, when nobody 
had known exactly what rights existed or on which objects they could not exist. The 
codifications of law also firmly re-established the difference between personal rights 
and property rights and only those rights the Civil Codes mentioned as property 
rights could be property rights.446  
 
441 On the influences of Natural law on the theories developed in the French Revolution see Van 
den Bergh 1988, p. 51 et seq. 
442 On this development see Chapter 3; 1. Introduction. 
443 E.g. a servitude not being a positive obligation and the requirement of two lands in each 
other’s vicinity. 
444 On the relevance of Roman law for the principle of numerus clausus see above; 2.5. A Numerus 
Clausus in (Pre-) Classical Roman Law? 
445 On the development of the codifications in the 18th and 19th Centuries see Lokin & Zwalve 
2001, p. 161 et seq., 213 et seq., Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 98 et seq., 143 et seq. 
446 Or property rights mentioned in another codification of law besides the general private law 
codification. On this rule of numerus clausus see Chapter 7; 1.3.2. Numerus Clausus as a 
Principle or a Rule? 
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5.6. Summary 
The common development of property rights in civil law systems ends with the 
French Revolution, after which property law became a national affair. Natural law 
was the final school from the period common to civil law systems to have a major 
effect on modern legal systems. It clarified the distinction between personal rights 
and property rights and, within the latter category, the distinction between owner-
ship and rights other than ownership. However, many historical property rights 
and property-like rights that existed in the ancien régime complicated this system. 
The French Revolution abolished, together with the abolition of the feudal system, 
some of these rights, but many remained in existence. In order to replace the old 
structure of landholding, the concept of ownership as a unitary and absolute con-
cept was established, based on the natural law theory of Grotius and Pufendorf.447 
Property rights other than ownership were established as rights taken from the 
right of ownership itself, burdening it for the duration that they are held by 
someone else. 
6. Conclusion 
6.1. General Summary 
Chapter 1 mentioned the distinction between personal rights and property rights as 
the basis for the private law systems in both common law and civil law.448 This 
second Chapter shows that, in respect to civil law systems, this distinction is a result 
of the historical development of property rights.449 The Roman law system did not 
use a concept of ‘right’, instead it adhered to a concept of action. These actions 
protected specific relations between people and were either personal or property 
actions. 
Based on this system of actions, the Roman jurists created criteria to establish 
which action would apply to which situation. In (pre-) classical Roman law, the 
action protecting the rights of ownership was the rei vindicatio. Although initially 
this action did not, in fact, vindicate the object, it had the same effect because of the 
obligation of payment of compensation it imposed on an unlawful acquirer.450 
 
447 Van der Bergh remarks that many authors have argued that the concept of ownership the 
French Revolution created was actually a restoration of the Roman concept of ownership. He 
states that this is incorrect and this Chapter underlines this thesis: The concept of ownership 
after the French Revolution was influenced by many discussions during the Ius Commune 
period. There are, of course, still many influences from Roman law in the modern day 
concept of ownership. Van den Bergh 1988, p. 47-56. 
448 See Chapter 1; 1.1. Personal Rights and Property Rights.  
449 On the common law origin of this distinction in real and personal actions see Chapter 6; 1.3. 
Personal Property Law and Land Law. 
450 In the same sense in modern English law the tort of conversion allows for damages to be paid 
in case a third party interferes with the possession of a chattel. See Bridge 2002, p. 52-56. 
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Based on the action protecting ownership there were actions protecting other 
property relations; servitude, usufruct, emphyteusis, superficies, pledge and hypothec.  
The property relations and the system of actions in which they originated were 
received at the time of the Glossators and Post-Glossators into a system that would 
be known as the Ius Commune. Between the application of Roman law and the 
beginning of the Ius Commune, the system of landholding had become a feudal 
system with a different set of laws that soon also belonged to the Ius Commune. 
Furthermore, other sources of law which had not existed in the Roman law period 
were very influential. The legal scholars who received the Roman law into their law 
adapted some general concepts, including the right of ownership. However, they 
generally applied Roman law concepts to all other sources of law, including 
customary law.  
The distinction between dominium directum and dominium utile, and all the 
property relations that were included in this distinction, remained accepted until 
the Humanist and natural law school movement. The natural law scholars 
questioned the Roman origins of the Ius Commune distinction since, in Roman law, 
there had been only one owner, although there had been several types of ownership 
available depending on the object of ownership. Furthermore, the natural law 
school, like the Glossators and Post-Glossators, searched for ‘rights’ instead of 
actions, but also attempted to create a system of these rights, which they thought 
was at the foundation of the system of actions. 
Before the natural law scholars, the search for a right behind a Roman action 
had already started. The Glossators, the first scholars of Roman law, had searched 
for a right behind an action. The Post-Glossators who followed them did the same. 
The late Post-Glossators or Commentators and the natural law scholars continued 
the search and formed theories on which property rights were built. However, the 
distinction between personal rights and property rights is an invention of the 
Humanist and natural law schools, although it might not have found many 
followers at that time.  
The work of the natural law school has had its implications in the study of 
law. Roman law, as the exclusive authority of law, was challenged and the system 
of private law was subsequently revised and refined. The system of Grotius in 
particular would be very influential. He proposed a distinction between personal 
rights and property rights at the basis of the system of private law. Furthermore, 
Grotius proposed an almost unitary concept of ownership, in any case distinct from 
property rights derived from ownership. However, it would not be until the French 
Revolution that the actual distinction between dominium directum and utile was 
abolished. Where, in the works of Grotius, the dominium directum remained to 
prevail, after the French Revolution the only ownership was the former dominium 
utile of the vassal.451 In other legal systems the distinction between dominium 
 
451 Some Humanists also put this emphasis on the dominium utile, see above; 4.3. Ownership. 
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directum and dominium utile remained in force, but would be abolished in the next 
century as well.452 
A property relation has effect against everyone and therefore infringes on the 
relations of others. It is because of this effect that property relations have been given 
much attention since the time of (pre-) classical Roman law. The most eminent 
property relation is ownership. In Roman law ownership was the paramount 
entitlement to an object. Although multiple types of ownership were recognised, 
mainly depending on the object of ownership, there could be only one owner of 
each type at a time.453 Furthermore, the position of ownership was considered as 
such that the impairment of it should be minimised in order to provide full enjoy-
ment of property. In other words, there was a unitary-like and absolute concept of 
ownership. 
The alterations made by the Glossators and their successors to the Roman-law 
inspired right of ownership abandoned its unitary and absolute nature. Instead, a 
duplex dominium was created under which several people could have ownership of 
the same object at the same time. Ownership therefore became fragmented and 
relative. The feudal system provides a good illustration of duplex dominium.454 The 
feudal lord would have dominium directum whereas the vassal would have dominium 
utile. The ownership of the vassal could also be directum in respect of the relation to 
a sub-vassal in case of sub-infeudation. It was eventually as a result of the French 
Revolution that the feudal system was abolished and that a return was made to a 
unitary and absolute ownership.  
6.2. Conclusion 
The right of ownership remained important throughout the development of prop-
erty law. Property rights other than the right of ownership were limited in number 
and content in order to protect the right of ownership. In Roman law this resulted in 
a limitation of situations in which a proprietary action would apply. By stating 
criteria for each property action Roman law limited the effect of property relations 
on the right of ownership and, at the same time, created clarity as to which property 
relations existed.455  
I have argued that, with this limitation of the system of actions, a principle of 
numerus clausus of property actions existed which had immediate effect on the 
content of property relations. Especially when the Corpus Iuris Civilis was adopted, 
the available actions became exclusively those mentioned in a codification of law. 
Accepting a closed system of property actions explains how, once the Glossators 
started searching for rights behind the proprietary actions, a closed system of rights 
resulted. However, that is not to say that in times of the application of the Ius 
 
452 E.g., in Germany where a series of very influential articles by Thibaut focused on the un-
Roman nature of the duplex dominium. Thibaut 1817a, p. 23 et seq., Thibaut 1817b, p. 67 et seq. 
453 See above; 2.6. Summary. 
454 However, the duplex dominium also existed in other situations, such as with the rights of 
emphyteusis and ususfructus. 
455 Although not all people had access to legal documents describing these property actions. 
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Commune there was a closed list of property rights. Apart from Roman law, the Ius 
Commune comprised feudal law and canon law, all of which applied as secondary 
sources of law next to the ius proprium, the local customary law. 
Coing has argued that the system of requirements from Roman law was 
consistently applied to customary and feudal property rights as well.456 This opens 
the possibility for the existence of a numerus clausus of property rights in the Ius 
Commune as a whole, but because of the diverse nature of customary law and the 
various methods in which that customary law allowed for the creation of property 
rights, such a conclusion cannot be made for the full set of possibly available 
property rights.  
The natural law scholars dealt with the right of ownership and rights other 
than ownership. In this respect Grotius followed the Humanists Apel and Donellus 
in their distinction between personal rights and property rights and between 
ownership and rights other than ownership. Although many ideas and influences in 
natural law were new, many natural law scholars accepted concepts from Roman 
law as a basis for their ideas. However, in the legal theory of the natural law schol-
ars, Roman, feudal, canon and customary law and consequently property rights 
following from these sources remained in existence.  
The French Revolution and the consequent abolition of the feudal system 
clarified the distinction between property rights and personal rights and opened the 
way for the major Civil Codes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
abolition of feudal rights and the renewed discussion on which property rights 
remained and which requirements applied to these property rights once more took 
the specific nature of property rights into account. The conception of unitary and 
absolute ownership and the freedom to enjoy such a right of ownership eventually 
resulted in a limitation of the available property rights that would limit this 
freedom. 
The development of property rights other than the right of ownership shows a 
parallel with the development of the right of ownership itself. In times when the 
concept of ownership was unitary and absolute, the legal system restricted the 
existing property rights in order to limit the effects these rights had on the right of 
ownership. In times when the concept of ownership was fragmented and relative, 
many other property rights came into existence and the classification of these rights 
as a part of the right of ownership was very common. When, because of the French 
Revolution, a unitary and absolute concept of ownership was re-established, once 
again the property rights were considered different from the paramount right of 
ownership and parties were limited in the property relations they could create. 
This historical relation between the right of ownership and other property 
rights is still relevant today.457 The system that resulted from the development of 
property rights forms the foundations on which each national civil law system built 
its property law. Because of the third-party effect as well as the potential limitation 
 
456 Coing 1962, p. 311 et seq. 
457 See Chapter 7; 1.3. Considering Numerus Clausus. 
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on the right of ownership, the number and content of property rights remain 
limited, in the same way as property rights have been limited throughout history. 
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Chapter 3 
FRENCH LAW 
1. Introduction 
Since the introduction of the French Civil Code in 1804, the French legal system has 
been one of the most influential legal systems in Europe.1 This was not only because 
it was one of the first civil codes and because of the expansion of the territory of 
France under Napoléon Bonaparte, but also because of its contents.2 Before the 
French Civil Code was drafted, the system of private law in France was fragmented 
and different laws applied in different areas. Even when, after the French Revolu-
tion, Revolutionary legislators passed law after law abolishing the situation as it 
had been in the period before the Revolution, the ancien régime, the legal system 
remained fragmented. 
In times when the original Roman law applied, most of France had been part 
of Roman territory. During and after the fall of the Western Roman Empire, 
Germanic tribes conquered large parts of France.3 Emperor Justinian attempted to 
unify the old Roman Empire but was unable to reconquer the territories further 
from Rome, with the result that the Corpus Iuris Civilis did not apply even in the 
regions of France that had been within the Roman Empire. In the south of France, 
an earlier codification, the Codex Theodosianus, applied.4 However, the influence of 
the Corpus Iuris was substantial. Even the introduction of Germanic codifications, 
for example, the Breviarum Alaricianum, did not resist the eventual renascence of the 
study and partial applicability of Roman law.  
At the time of the Ius Commune, under influence from the Italian school of the 
Glossators, the Corpus Iuris Civilis became the subject of study in the south of 
 
1 Most literature referred to in this chapter will be French literature. However, if an English 
source was available I have tried to mention it where possible. 
2 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 74. The influence of the Civil Code has recently been subject to 
examination on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the French Civil Code in 2004. See 
Chirac 2004. 
3 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 75. 
4 Zwalve 2003, p. 37. 
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France.5 The Corpus Iuris Civilis gained force and would soon replace the Germanic 
codes as a source of law, not because it had been forced on the territory, as had been 
the case in Italy, but because it became a custom of French lawyers to invoke the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis.6 In this respect, Roman law was customary law in the south of 
France. In the north of France, Roman law was mostly absent. There, local Germanic 
customary law applied.7 Nevertheless, the study of Roman law also gradually 
filtered through to the north, but, unlike the south, it never wholly replaced the 
Germanic customary laws.8 
In short, French law was mainly composed of customary law. In the south the 
customary law included the written Corpus Iuris Civilis, whereas the northern 
customs consisted mainly of unwritten Germanic law.9 Because of this difference, 
the south became known as the region with the written laws, the pays de droit écrit, 
and the north as the region with the unwritten customary law, the pays de droit 
coutumier.10 The nature of customary law was therefore different across France. 
However, at the same time Roman law remained, as it had before, a unifying factor, 
as Roman law would be invoked where customary law, whether it was written or 
unwritten, could not or did not provide an answer.11 
In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the north of France had broken apart in 
many different territories, each with their own customary laws. The result was that 
a judge in a court could no longer automatically know the exact content of the 
customary law, leading to a situation of legal uncertainty.12 In 1454, in an attempt to 
solve this uncertainty, King Charles VII ordered the recording of the customary 
laws in order to achieve an overview of the different laws of his territory. In other 
countries the renewed application of Roman law pushed customary law into the 
background, but in France, although the drafting of the written customary laws 
took longer than expected, the body of texts that eventually resulted would resist 
the reception of Roman law.13 
 
5 Zwalve 2003, p. 37. On these developments in general see Chapter 2. 
6 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 75, Zwalve 2003, p. 37, 150. 
7 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 75. 
8 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 75, Zwalve 2003, p. 38. 
9 Zwalve 2003, p. 38, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 88. 
10 Zwalve 2003, p. 38, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 75. The distinction is not only one of textbooks: 
Portalis, one of the members of the Drafting committee of the Code Civil (C.civ) uses the 
terminology to explain the situation in the South regarding property rights in respect of 
rivers and other waters. See Loi relative à la Propriété, présentée le 26 nivose au Corps législatif, par 
les conseillers d’état Portalis, Berlier et Pelet (de la Lozère), chargés d’en soutenir la discussion, in: 
Recueil des lois composant le code civil, Livre Deuxième. Des Biens et des différent Modi-
fications de la Propriété, 1804, p, 61. See also Demolombe 1870, p. 418. 
11 This method is different from the Bartolistic method where customary law was to be inter-
preted as narrow as possible in order to make way for the application of Roman law, see 
Chapter 2; 4.4. Other Property Rights. Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 76. 
12 In order to solve this a procedure known as enquête par tube could be followed in which the 
judge would ask a number of local inhabitants to explain the substance of the customary rule. 
See Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 76. 
13 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 76-77. 
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One of the most famous collections of customary law was the collection of 
Paris, known as the Coutume de Paris, which was published in 1510.14 Of all the 
collections of written customary law, the Coutume de Paris would become the most 
influential and would soon be applied everywhere in cases where the local custom-
ary law would not provide an answer.15 The Coutume de Paris therefore acquired 
subsidiary force of law and provided a basis for a common law of France. Because 
the Coutume de Paris was French customary law it would be applied before the 
rediscovered Roman law.16 It is in this way that the reception of Roman law in 
France was different from other countries.17 However, questions concerning con-
tract law and property law would usually be left to Roman law under the Coutume.18 
French law prior to the French Revolution therefore offered a mixed picture of 
written law in the south, which comprised Roman law from before the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis, written law in the north, which comprised Germanic customary law and the 
Coutume de Paris, and rediscovered Roman law as a secondary or tertiary source of 
law. In contrast with other countries, especially Germany, where Roman law would 
become the unifying force, the subsidiary force of the Coutume de Paris would form 
the basis for the idea of a common French private law.19 
The French Revolution was the turning point in the unification of the law of 
France. When, as a result of the Revolution, the feudal system was abolished, many 
other laws and regulations were also closely examined and, if necessary, 
abolished.20 Following the new ideas on freedom of the individual and equality for 
all, the new French legislature was very effective in abolishing almost anything in 
respect to property rights that had to do with the ancien régime.21 With respect to 
property law, anything that could be linked to the feudal system was fiercely 
opposed and abolished. For example, under the feudal system, only the lawful heir 
of a feudal fee had been able to receive land by inheritance, and other family 
members would be left without any part of the inheritance.22 As a reaction against 
this rule, the power to donate objects, whether on death by last will, or inter vivos by 
contractual donation in direct line, was abolished. As a result, by operation of the 
standard rules, each family member became heir and each heir would acquire his or 
her share of the objects of a deceased instead of only the one having the feudal fee.23 
These, sometimes very radical, changes of law would result in system that became 
known as intermediary law or droit intermédiaire.  
 
14 The version was revised and extended in 1580, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 77, Zwalve 2003,  
p. 41, 150. 
15 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 77-78. 
16 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 78. 
17 On German law see Chapter 4; 1. Introduction.  
18 Zwalve 2003, p. 41-42. 
19 On German law see Chapter 4; 1. Introduction. 
20 See Decree of 11 August 1789 Abolishing the Feudal System, in general on the creation of the French 
Civil Code see Halpérin 1992, p 19 et seq. 
21 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 80-81, Zwalve 2003, p. 84. 
22 I.e., these other family members were not recognised as legal heirs. 
23 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 81. 
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During the period of the intermediary law, the work on a code of law for the 
entire population of France continued. In 1793 Cambacérès presented a first draft 
for a Civil Code for France that was immediately rejected. A second proposal was 
made in 1794 but was rejected as well. Cambacérès produced a final draft in 1796 
that was still under consideration when Napoléon Bonaparte came to power in 
1799.24 Napoléon did not stop the legislative process, and established a commission 
of only four persons that would submit a draft for a French Civil Code. In this 
commission there were two representatives from the pays de droit coutumier, 
Tronchet and Bigot de Préameneu, and two representatives from the pays de droit 
écrit, Maleville and the very influential chairman, Portalis.25 
Despite the philosophical ideas on individuality, freedom, equality, and 
enlightenment that were strongly advocated during the Revolution, the property 
law part of the new Civil Code is very traditional.26 The commission based its ideas 
on property law on the work of Pothier from the eighteenth century. Pothier, who 
was an expert in both Roman law and French customary law, developed his ideas 
on ownership and property law mainly based on the Roman system.27 This system 
of property law included the fundamental distinction between property rights and 
personal rights, which Pothier called iura in rem and iura ad rem.28 The first 
concerned the right to an object, whereas the latter concerned the right to a 
performance by another person.29 
It is this system of two different concepts of rights that would also be at the 
foundation of the French Civil Code. However, although the law of obligations and 
the law of property are considered separate areas of French private law, a very strict 
separation between the law of property and the law of obligations was not imposed, 
as would later be used in the German Civil Code.30 Although the French code is 
based on these two Roman-law inspired types of rights, the influence of Germanic 
customary law, which mixed the two types of rights, can be seen in the fact that 
personal rights and therefore the law of obligations facilitate property law and do 
not form a distinct area of law. In other words, in terms of facilitation of property 
law, a personal relation is seen as a right to acquire or create a property right. 
Another term used for personal rights in French law is therefore droit de créance.31  
In the French Civil Code party autonomy would, contrary to the law of 
property, become the starting point of the law of obligations, in particular the law of 
contract.32 The law of property and the law of obligations deal with different types 
of rights, and these areas of law are dealt with in two different books to express the 
new system of private law and to prevent a return to the feudal system, in which 
 
24 Gordley 1994, p. 486-487, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 82. 
25 Gordley 1994, p. 487, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 82. On Portalis see Derine 1955, p. 53 et seq. 
26 See Gordley 1994, p. 459 et seq., Bürge 1991, p. 85 et seq. 
27 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 79. 
28 Or in French the droit réel and the droit personnel. Pothier 1772, p. 1 et seq., Laurent 1878, p. 92-
93. 
29 Laurent 1878, p. 92, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 87, Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 36-40. 
30 See also Chapter 4; 1. Introduction. 
31 Laurent 1878, p. 93, Zwalve 2003, p. 150, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 88-89. 
32 Art. 1134 C.civ, see Hervieu 1981, p. 31-32, Bürge 1991, p. 3, 64. 
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the law of contract and property had been mixed.33 The law of property and the law 
of obligations are therefore separated to some extent in French law, but the system 
is mixed in comparison with the later German Civil Code.34  
In French law, therefore, there remains a strong link between these two areas 
of law. Perhaps the best example of this is provided by the system of transfer of 
property rights. After the entry into force of the Civil Code, French law adhered to a 
consensual system of transfer.35 The result is that, leaving some exceptions aside, a 
property right in respect of an object is transferred by the conclusion of a contract. 
At the outset of the system no other requirements than the conclusion of a contract 
are necessary for an effective transfer.36 
After some severe complications, the work of the commission resulted in the 
Code civil des Français (C.civ) composed of three books.37 After an initial preliminary 
book or Livre préliminaire, the first book deals, with the law of persons. The second 
book deals with the law of property. The third book, which is titled ‘Of ways to 
acquire ownership’ or Des différentes manières dont on acquiert la propriété, deals with 
the law of obligations, but also certain aspects of property law, such as prescrip-
tion.38 
The spirit of the Revolution can be seen throughout the French Civil Code.39 In 
the law of obligations, although created to serve the law of property, the starting 
point became the freedom of contract in which only limitations by law are allowed 
insofar as they are absolutely necessary. Article 6 of the Civil Code (C.civ) provides 
in this respect:40  
 
33 See Hervieu 1981, p. 22, Sagaert 2005b, p. 987-989. 
34 On the German Civil Code see Chapter 4; 1. Introduction. 
35 Art. 1138 C.civ. On consensual transfer systems see Van Vliet 2000, p. 73 et seq., Zweigert & 
Kötz 1998, p. 92. 
36 In case of a transfer of a property right in respect of an immovable object, registration 
requirements must be fulfilled. Zwalve 2003, p. 151. In later codifications, especially German 
law, the separation between the law of contract and the law of property is expressed through 
the adoption of an abstract tradition system of transfer in which a contract is nothing more 
than the initiating act of a transfer, but without immediate effect in property law. See Van 
Vliet 2000, p. 31 et seq. 
37 The Code civil was introduced by 36 separate laws on 31 March 1804. On the complications 
during the draft see Gordley 1994, p. 488-489, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 82-84, Hervieu 1981, 
p. 27 et seq. 
38 Moreover, there are also aspects of family law still in the Third Book of the French Civil 
Code. The French word propriété has two meanings. First, the term could be used for objects 
of property rights, as is done in the title of the third book of the French Civil code. Second the 
term also denotes the right of ownership. In this study the French term propriété will be used 
to describe the right of ownership. See, inter alia, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 91, Terré & Simler 
1998, p. 63 et seq. Furthermore, after the reforms of property law in March 2006 the Code civil 
now also includes a fourth book dealing with security rights.  
39 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 67, for a more critical view see Gordley 1994, p. 459 et seq. 
40 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 94. Henceforth, all references to the French Civil Code will take the 
abbreviations ‘C.civ’. 
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Laws and statutes that are of public order or morality may not be deviated from by 
agreement between private parties.41 
Different from the law of contract, in the law of property the starting point is not 
party autonomy, but limitations on parties in the creation of property rights. Con-
cepts of property law are therefore defined by the Civil Code and only leave room 
for party autonomy where the legislator specifically intended this. In respect to 
property rights French law recognises a unitary concept of ownership as well as 
several property rights other than ownership.42 On the right of ownership, Article 
543 C.civ states: 
On an object one may have a right of ownership, a mere right of enjoyment or only a 
right of servitude.43 
Since its introduction in 1804, the Civil Code has been subject to many additions 
and alterations by both legislation and case law. Moreover, in certain areas of law, 
case law has completely taken over from the statutory provisions.44 In respect to 
property law there had not been many legislative amendments until 23 March 2006, 
when the French government reformed the law on securities, both personal and 
proprietary rights.45 A commission of several influential French property lawyers, 
headed by Professor Grimaldi, prepared this reform. Moreover, in 2006 and 2007 
the French legislature also reformed aspects of property law in a reform of the law 
of succession, which mostly concerned the provisions on co-ownership, and the law 
of trusts, known in French as fiducie, which directly affect the right of ownership. 
Generally, before the security law reform, French property security law was 
fragmented over different sources. Parts of it were in the Civil Code, parts in the 
commercial code, and parts were even developed through case law. The reform was 
intended to end this fragmentation and provide a clear statutory framework of 
security rights.46 Furthermore, the part in the Civil Code dealing with security rights 
had never been reformed since its introduction in 1804.47 However, the working 
method of the French government is very interesting for a civil law system. Instead 
of following a full legislative procedure, the French government took the prepar-
atory work by the Grimaldi group and published an adapted version of the pro-
posals as an Ordonnance, taking effect immediately.48 The Ordonnance changed the 
 
41 Art. 6 C.civ, ‘On ne peut déroger, par des conventions particulières, aux lois que intéressent 
l’ordre public et les bonnes mœurs’. 
42 See Crocq 1995, p. 192, Bertrel 1994, p. 751-754, Patault 1989, p. 15, 85-86. 
43 Art. 543 C.civ will be dealt with elaborately below in 3. Other Property Rights. Art. 543 C.civ, 
‘On peut avoir sur les biens, ou in droit de propriété, ou un simple droit de jouissance, ou 
seulement des services foncier à prétendre’. 
44 E.g. the law of delict or tort, Arts. 1382-1386 C.civ. See Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 90. 
45 Ordonnance No. 2006-346 du 23 Mars 2006 relative aux sûretés, JORF 24 March 2006. 
46 Legeais 2006a, p. 320-321. 
47 Legeais 2006a, p. 321. 
48 Ordonnance No. 2006-346 du 23 Mars 2006 relative aux sûretés, JORF 24 March 2006. For the 
Grimaldi report, Grimaldi et al. 2003. 
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last part of the Civil Code completely and both re-introduced old property security 
rights and introduced new ones. 
In addition to the security law reform, on 23 June 2006 the French government 
promulgated a law amending the law of succession, which entered into force on 1 
January 2007.49 Although this law does not directly deal with property law, the 
provisions on co-ownership were changed to suit the new law of succession. 
Finally, on 21 February 2007 a law was promulgated introducing a trust-like device, 
fiducie, into French law.50 Originally, the fiducie had been part of the proposals of the 
Grimaldi commission working on reforms of security rights, but the Ordonnance had 
not adopted this specific proposal.51 Instead, after a parliamentary initiative, the law 
introducing the fiducie was finally adopted.52 Although the fiducie is a contract, it has 
various consequences in property law as it limits the powers of the owner over his 
object.53 The adoption of the fiducie in French law is remarkable because French law 
had before mostly resisted all trust-like relations. 
This chapter will deal first with the right of ownership and the developments 
to which this right has been subject from the introduction of the Civil Code. 
Revolutionary ideas, but especially also the influence of customary law, will become 
apparent. Secondly, this chapter will deal with property rights other than the right 
of ownership, known as limited property rights. As this Chapter will show, Article 
543 C.civ is not as exhaustive as it seems. Furthermore, the development of French 
private law has also resulted in the recognition of legal relations that are not 
recognised as property rights as such, but which closely resemble property relations 
nonetheless. These relations will be examined as well.54 Finally, the system of 
property rights in French law will be examined to see whether French law adheres 
to a rule of numerus clausus of property rights.55 
2. The Right of Ownership 
The concept of ownership in French law finds its basis in one of the most funda-
mental debates of the eighteenth century. The French Revolution, which caused the 
abolition of the fragmented ownership from the ancien régime, gave rise to a new or 
at least renewed theory on a unitary approach to ownership.56 Until this renewed 
conception of ownership was introduced there were effectively two regimes dealing 
with ownership. One regime, feudal in nature, dealt with ownership of immovable 
 
49 Loi No. 2006-728 du 23 juin 2006, JORF 24 June 2006. 
50 Loi No. 2007-211 du 19 février 2007, JORF 21 February 2007. 
51 Grimaldi et al. 2003. On the reason for this see Crocq 2007, p. 1-2. See also below; 2.3. Security 
Ownership. 
52 Senateur M. Philippe Marini, Text No. 178 (2004-2005) deposited at the Senate on 8 February 
2005. See <http://www.senat.fr/dossierleg/ppl04-178.html>. 
53 See in general Legeais 2006a, p. 510-511. 
54 One example of such a legal relation is the right of lease. On these special types of legal rela-
tions see below; 4. Borderline Cases in French Property Law. On the right of lease specifically 
see below; 4.6. Lease. 
55 See below; 5. A Numerus Clausus in French Property Law? 
56 See, inter alia, Libchaber 2004, p. 305, Crocq 1995, p. 64 et seq. 
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objects, the other regime, non-feudal in nature, dealt with ownership of movable 
objects.57 The changes made after the French Revolution resulted in an approach to 
ownership that applies to both immovable and movable objects. 
The Civil Code does not define the object that can be subject of a property 
right, but it does make a general distinction. A thing, known in French as a chose, 
can be the object of a property right. In legal French, the object of property rights is 
known as a bien, which can be either immovable or movable.58 The distinction 
between chose and bien is complicated and has in the last few decades become the 
subject of serious criticism.59 As Libchaber describes, a chose is a thing in real life, a 
bien is a thing in law.60 It is a person’s biens, the description of objects in law, that 
form the content of that person’s patrimony, the set of objects and debts of a person, 
patrimoine in French, best described as the set of assets and debts a person has.61 
The concept of bien is divided into immovables, in French known as immeubles, 
and movables, meubles. Furthermore, the distinction is complicated by the inclusion 
of rights.62 In French legal scholarship a property right in respect of an immovable is 
considered an immovable object by itself.63 Moreover, a personal right that entitles 
to an immovable property rights is also an immovable object itself. Consequently, a 
property right in respect of a movable is a movable object itself.64 Finally, personal 
rights can be also characterised as a bien, in as far as they entitle the holder of the 
right to performance by another person.65 This includes the recognition of what is 
known as incorporeal movables.66 Furthermore, French law recognises groups of 
objects, which as a group can be the subject of a property right. Such a group can be 
known as a fonds de commerce, or the set of assets of a company. A fonds de commerce 
 
57 On the feudal system of land holding see Chapter 2; 4.1. Introduction. Terré & Simler 1998,  
p, 65, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 109-110, Patault 1983, p. 217-218. 
58 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 12 et seq., Carbonnier 2000, p. 84-86.  
59 See Carbonnier 2000, p. 80, but especially Libchaber 2004, p. 323 et seq. 
60 Libchaber states: ‘… autant les choses sont du côté du monde réel, autant les biens sont du côté du 
droit’, Libchaber 2004, p. 324. 
61 On the concept of patrimony in French property law see Carbonnier 2000, p. 3 et seq. The 
translation of patrimoine into patrimony is not uncontroversial. In English property law, the 
term patrimony is almost unknown. In the rest of this chapter, and this book, the term 
patrimony is used to include the set of objects (assets) and debts of a person. English lawyers 
sometimes also use the term ‘estate’ for this. However, estate also refers to the proprietary 
entitlement to land – e.g., an estate in fee simple – and should therefore be avoided to prevent 
confusion. 
62 Arts. 516, 517 and 527 C.civ, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 26 et seq. For a short overview of the 
various immovable and movable objects in French law see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 18 et seq. 
63 Art. 526 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 13. 
64 Art. 529 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 13. 
65 This is a droit de créance, Art. 529 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 12-13, 36-37. 
66 The term incorporeal movable seems a contradiction, but is, because of the wide and tech-
nical legal meaning of the concept of bien, possible. The prime example is the fonds de 
commerce, which is a set of assets of a company, but also intellectual property rights. Conse-
quently, but exceptionally, an incorporeal immovable is can also exist. See Malaurie & Aynès 
2005, p. 29, 33-35. 
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can comprise immovable and movable but also incorporeal objects and is particu-
larly used as the subject of a property security right.67  
Because certain parts of French property law only apply to immovables, as 
some parts only apply to movables, the categorisation of objects remains important. 
These different parts include rules on transfer and the creation of limited property 
rights.68 However, as was stated above, the right of ownership applies to both 
immovable and movable objects, corporeal and incorporeal. The main reason for 
making a distinction between immovables and movables is historical. When the 
Civil Code was drafted, land was the principal type of object, because it represented 
the most important form of wealth. Therefore, the Civil Code is to a large extent 
centred around rules on immovable objects. However, in the development of 
society in the two centuries since the introduction of the Civil Code, movable objects 
have become just as much, and even more, important. Furthermore, developments 
in the past decades have also shown an increasing number of incorporeal objects 
becoming of great value.69 
French law adheres to a unitary concept of ownership. However, for the 
purposes of discussion, a distinction can be made between normal ownership, co-
ownership, which in French law includes the entitlement to apartments, and 
security ownership. It should be emphasised that, in theory, because the concept of 
ownership is unitary, the right remains the same, regardless of its application. 
However, due to the substantial differences between the law applying to a normal 
owner, the owner of an apartment, and the owner of a security, these concepts are 
dealt with in separate paragraphs. The question of whether ownership remains one 
unitary right that can be applied to all situations, including apartment ownership 
and security ownership, will be returned to at the end of this chapter.70 
2.1. Ownership 
The right of ownership in French law is mainly a private law concept, but is also 
dealt with as a fundamental right. Approaching the right of ownership as a funda-
mental right, especially as a constitutional concept, ensures that everyone is capable 
of owning objects. As a result of the French Revolution the right of ownership there-
fore became seen as a fundamental right, especially a non-feudal right, suitable for 
everyone to have.71 This right did not only find its basis in the Civil Code, but, in a 
 
67 See below; 3.5. Pledge. 
68 On limited property rights see below; 3. Other Property Rights, see Chabas 1994, No. 1292,  
p. 8. 
69 In general on this development see Libchaber 2004, p. 297 et seq., in particular p. 329-350, see 
also Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 35-39, 105, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 18-19, 27-29, Chabas 1994, 
Nos. 1301 et seq., p. 12 et seq. The draftsmen of the Civil Code worked with the maxim res 
mobilis, res vilis, which is often referred to in French legal literature. 
70 See, inter alia, Crocq 1995, p. 192-196. See below; 5. A Numerus Clausus in French Property 
Law? 
71 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 65, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 109 et seq., Libchaber 2004, p. 352, 
Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 37, Chabas 1994, p. 87, Baudry-Lacantinerie & Chauveau 
1905, p. 13, Portalis 1844, p. 209 et seq. 
 92 
French Law 
constitutional form, also in the 1789 Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen, or 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, which states in Article 2:  
The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible 
rights of man. These rights are liberty, ownership, security, and resistance to oppres-
sion.72 
The declaration further specifies the right of ownership in Article 17: 
Since the right of ownership is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived 
thereof except when necessary for public purposes, that have been determined 
according to law, shall clearly demand it, but only on condition that the owner shall 
have been equitably indemnified.73 
The focus on expropriation, which is the taking of ownership by the state, has led to 
debate in France on the constitutional nature of the right of ownership. It has been 
argued that the right of ownership is not just a right dealt with by private law, but is 
by its nature so important that it deserves constitutional protection. In 1982 the 
Conseil Constitutionnel confirmed this view, based on Articles 2 and 17 of the 
Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen, and upheld the constitutional status 
of the right of ownership as a fundamental right in French law.74 
Although the constitutional concept of ownership is very important, the vast 
majority of the rules on ownership are dealt with in the Civil Code. First and fore-
most the right of ownership is a private law right and only in relation to the 
protection of that right against state interference is the constitutional concept rele-
vant. The Civil Code defines the right of ownership in French law in Article 544 
C.civ:  
Ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of an object in the most absolute manner, 
provided that one does not use it in a manner prohibited by law or regulation.75 
Of all the property rights a person can have in an object, the right of ownership is 
considered to be the most complete. This completeness of the right is not only 
emphasised by the words the ‘most absolute manner’ in Article 544 C.civ, but also 
forms the starting point from which French legal scholarship considers the right of 
 
72 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, 26 August 1789. Article 2: ‘Le but de toute 
association politique est la conservation des droits naturels et imprescriptibles de l’homme. 
Ces droits sont la liberté, la propriété, la sûreté et la résistance à l’oppression’. 
73 Art. 17: ‘La propriété étant un droit inviolable et sacré, nul ne peut en être privé, si ce n’est 
lorsque la nécessité publique, légalement constatée, l’exige évidemment, et sous la condition 
d’une juste et préalable indemnité’, see, inter alia, Crocq 1995, p. 70. 
74 Or caractère fondamental, Cons. Const. 16 January 1982 JCP 82.II.19788. See Malaurie & Aynès 
2005, p. 112-114, Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 36. 
75 Art. 544 C.civ, ‘La propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus 
absolue, pourvu qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règlements’. 
Translation slightly adapted from Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 86. 
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ownership.76 The right of ownership as defined by the Civil Code reflects aspects of 
the definition of Bartolus who stated ownership was ‘the right in a corporeal thing 
to have … perfectly at one’s disposal, unless it is forbidden by law’.77 The drafters of 
the definition of ownership in Article 544 C.civ aimed to emphasise the unitary 
concept of ownership. Especially at the time of drafting the code, a unitary right of 
ownership made it clear that the new Civil Code rejected fragmented ownership. 
Furthermore, a unitary right of ownership in the new Civil Code also gave the 
message that France rejected the feudal system that had been abolished during the 
Revolution.78 
At a later stage, in particular at the end of the nineteenth century, the part of 
the definition of ownership referring to the exercise powers ‘in the most absolute 
manner’, came to be interpreted as if ownership was an almost unlimited property 
right, especially in respect to the powers of the owner.79 Demolombe, for instance, 
argued that the powers of the owner were so absolute that an owner could not be 
restricted in any other way than by law. According to him, these absolute powers 
included the power to do with the object under ownership whatever the owner 
desired, including the destruction of the object itself, subject to the limits imposed 
by law.80 This ‘liberal’ approach to property law, the right of ownership in particu-
lar, as it was advocated at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the 
twentieth century played an important role in the creation of the modern doctrinal 
conception of the right of ownership in French property law.81 
Modern French legal scholarship recognises three elements of the right of 
ownership; the right to use, usus, the right to enjoy, particularly the fruits, fruc 
tus, and the right of disposal, abusus. This division, which is derived from the 
Glossators, continues to be used to explain the content of the right of ownership and 
to define property rights other than ownership.82 Furthermore, it is also these three 
elements that should be read in the definition of Article 544. The right of ownership 
is the right to use, to enjoy, and the right to dispose of the object under ownership 
 
76 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 40 (le droit le plus complet), Chabas 1994, No. 1294, p. 9 (Le droit réel le 
plus parfait), Atias 2005, p. 53 (La propriété, par définition, c’est tout), Jourdain, Marty & 
Raynaud 1995, p. 32 (L’expression juridique suprême). 
77 See Chapter 2; 4.3. Ownership, Schrage 1996, p. 43, Carbonnier 2000, p. 128, 133-134, Terré & 
Simler 1998, p. 64, 93. For a critical review of the true Roman origins of the definition of Art. 
544 C.civ see Derine 1955, p. 32 et seq., and a review of Article 625 of the Old Dutch Civil 
Code see Van den Bergh 1988, p. 39-50. 
78 It is in this way that the words ‘in the most absolute manner’ or de la manière la plus absolue 
should be read. See Huc 1893, p. 96-97, Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 46, Patault 1983, 
p. 220-221. On the absolute nature of the right of ownership in French law see, inter, alia Terré 
& Simler 1998, p. 65, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 109 et seq. 
79 Zachariae, Massé & Vergé 1855, p. 55 et seq., Aubry, Rau, Falcimaigne & Gault 1897, p. 255-
256, Baudry-Lacantinerie & Chauveau 1905, p. 152, Demolombe 1870, p. 462 et seq.. On these 
authors see also Bürge 1991, p. 29, 42-43, 55, Crocq 1995, p. 68 et seq.  
80 Demolombe 1870, p. 464-466, see critically Derine 1955, p. 153-155. See also Pothier 1772,  
p. 103. 
81 See, inter alia, Patault 1983, p. 221-237.  
82 See below; 3. Other Property Rights. Vareilles-Sommières 1905, 448 et seq., Jourdain, Marty & 
Raynaud 1995, p. 46. 
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as well as the right of ownership itself.83 The right to dispose includes the possibility 
for the owner to separate parts of his ownership, corresponding to these three 
elements, to another person in the form of a property right other than ownership, 
for example, a right of usufruct that includes the right to use and to take the fruits of 
an object.84 
Moreover, French legal scholarship approaches the right of ownership, apart 
from its constitutional status as a fundamental right, by distinguishing three major 
characteristics. First, the right of ownership is absolute, which should first and fore-
most be seen as a rejection of the feudal system with its fragmented and therefore 
relative, non-absolute, concept of ownership.85 Another explanation of the absolute 
nature of the right of ownership can be found in the intention of the drafters to 
distinguish the right of ownership from the other property rights they recognised.86 
In the system of the French Civil Code the method to create property rights other 
than ownership makes use of the right of ownership as a source from which these 
rights are derived. Because these rights are more restricted in content than the right 
of ownership, the right of ownership is absolute in the sense of it being the most 
extensive property right available.87 
Next to the rejection of fragmented ownership and the distinction of the right 
of ownership from the other property rights, the absoluteness of the right can also 
be seen in the unlimited powers of the owner, unlimited at least in principle.88 How-
ever, the last part of Article 544 C.civ allows for the limitation of the powers of the 
owner. This includes limitations that the drafters of the Civil Code, although influ-
enced by the natural law doctrine of unlimited powers of the owner, had foreseen, 
but also limitations that have been imposed, particularly by case law, in the course 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.89 At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, partly under the influence of natural law theories, the ‘liberal’ view of law 
was that the individual was considered highly important. In respect of the right of 
ownership this resulted in a rejection of restrictions on individual ownership. These 
were seen as an infringement of this basic principle of individual freedom.90 How-
ever, in the second half of the nineteenth century the French legislature, but also the 
courts, started to impose general restrictions on the powers of the owner. In order to 
 
83 Demolombe 1870, No. 543, p. 462, Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 47, Terré & Simler 
1998, p. 93-98, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 119-121, Carbonnier 2000, p. 128-131, Chabas 1994, 
p. 84-85. 
84 Art. 543 C.civ, see below; 3. Other Property Rights. 
85 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 107, Carbonnier 2000, p. 129, critically see Derine 1955, p. 42-43. 
86 Derine 1955, p. 42-43. 
87 See below; 3. Other Property Rights. 
88 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 108, Crocq 1995, p. 77. 
89 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 108-109, Chabas 1994, p. 87 et seq. Chabas uses the term sovereignty of 
the owner in this respect. However, the importance of the second part of Article 544 C.civ 
should not be underestimated. Also in 1804 the drafters of the Civil Code knew and foresaw 
many exceptions to the sovereignty of the owner. Pothier 1772, p. 14, Portalis 1844, p. 219, see 
Portalis in Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du code civil 11, p. 116-117. For an 
overview see Derine 1955, p. 15-18, 40-43, 90 et seq., Patault 1989, p. 273-275. 
90 Chabas 1994, p. 88, critically see Derine 1955, p. 14, 67 et seq. 
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achieve this the courts used the doctrine of abuse of rights, known in French as abus 
de droit.91 The abuse of rights jurisprudence is particularly relevant in the area of the 
law between neighbours. Damage caused by an act of the owner through use, 
enjoyment or disposal, with the intention to disadvantage another without any 
benefit for the object of the owner would now constitute an abuse of the right of 
ownership and would lead to the obligation to remove or stop the disturbance to 
the third party and pay damages.92 Finally, the owner himself can also impose limi-
tations on his powers. An owner is entitled to limit his powers through the creation 
of a property right, taking part of his right of ownership and transferring this to 
another person in the form of a property right other than ownership, or by the 
conclusion of a contract, agreeing not to exercise a certain power for a certain time.93  
The second characteristic of the right of ownership is that it is an exclusive 
right. Exclusivity indicates that only the owner is entitled to use, enjoy or dispose of 
his ownership and that the right has an effect erga omnes, because the owner can 
exclude anyone from his right to use, enjoy or dispose of his object.94 In two 
situations the powers of the owner are less exclusive. First, when certain powers 
have been temporarily transferred to another by way of a property right other than 
ownership.95 Secondly, when the right of ownership has been transferred under 
condition or the owner transfers ownership under condition that the owner will not 
have the full set of exclusive powers.96 
The third characteristic is that the right of ownership is a perpetual right.97 The 
right of ownership is intended to last as long as the object on which it is created 
exists.98 Because the right of ownership is unitary and absolute, a temporary type of 
ownership would be in violation of these principles.99 Furthermore, the right of 
ownership will remain in existence even when the owner does not use his right. 
This does not only follow from Article 2 of the Declaration of Rights of Man and the 
Citizen mentioned above, but also from case law of the Cour de cassation. 
 
91 Req. 3 August 1915, D.P. 1917. 1. 79, Cass. 20 January 1964, D. 1964. 518, but also Cass. 30 
October 1972, Bull. civ. III, No. 576, Chabas 1994, p. 89, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 108-109, 
Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 95, Crocq 1995, p. 77. It should be emphasised that the doctrine of 
abuse of rights was not new, but merely became applied more after 1855. On this develop-
ment see Derine 1955, p. 178 et seq. 
92 The abuse of the right of ownership is a specific category of abuse of right, see Req. 3 August 
1915, D.P. 1917. 1. 79, Carbonnier 2000, 272-273. 
93 Crocq 1995, p. 77-78, on the creation of property rights see below; 3. Other Property Rights 
and 4.2. Real Obligations. 
94 Chabas 1994, p. 84, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 131, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 109. 
95 A démembrement du droit de propriété, see Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 131, Chabas 1994, p. 32. In 
the same sense see Van Erp 2006b, p. 16-17. 
96 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 110-112. 
97 Chabas 1994, p. 103, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 133 et seq., Terré & Simler 1998, p. 114, 
Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 59 et seq. 
98 Chabas 1994, p. 103-104. 
99 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 133-134, see also Chabas 1994, p. 106 et seq. 
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In French law, the Civil Code stipulates that all actions, including the action of 
vindication that protects the right of ownership cease to exist after thirty years.100 
However, in 1905 the Cour de cassation held that the claim protecting the right of 
ownership could not cease to exist, because this would violate the principle of 
perpetuity of the right of ownership.101 As a result the rules on prescription remain 
valid, but no longer apply to the action of vindication of ownership. 
These three basic characteristics of the right of ownership form the foundation 
of the system of property law. Parties are able to deviate from these general charac-
teristics only to a very limited extent. Two of these possibilities to deviate, clauses of 
non-transferability and clauses of conditional transfer, affect the content of the right 
of ownership in such a way that they need to be described briefly here.  
First, through the use of a non-transferability clause the powers of an owner 
can be limited. Such a clause can be made in a contract of transfer as well as in a last 
will.102 These clauses impose limitations in respect of the power of disposal of the 
owner and can include a prohibition to transfer in general, as well as a prohibition 
to transfer partially, or to create other property rights. The validity of such a clause 
has been problematic. For a long time it was held that a non-transferability clause 
would violate the general principle of French property law stipulated in Article 537 
C.civ:  
Private individuals have the freedom to dispose of objects that belong to them, subject 
to the modifications established by legislation ...103 
It is precisely because of this, that the Civil Code of 1804 did not provide rules on 
non-transferability clauses.104 Also the courts, still having in mind the ancien régime, 
where non-transferability had been one of the main elements of the feudal system, 
were very reluctant to allow the use of these clauses. Many courts therefore refused 
to accept the validity of a non-transferability clause, particularly because these 
clauses were usually made perpetual.105 
Based on decisions of the French courts, parties searched for possibilities to 
include valid non-transferability clauses in their contracts and wills. In 1858 the 
Cour de cassation recognised the validity of a non-transferability clause when the 
 
100 Art. 2262 C.civ states ‘Toutes les actions, tant réelles que personnelles, sont prescrites par 
trente ans, sans que celui qui allègue cette prescription soit obligé d’en rapporter un titre ou 
qu’on puisse lui opposer l’exception déduite de la mauvaise foi’, Malaurie & Aynès 2005,  
p. 133. 
101 Req. 12 July 1905, D.P. 1907. 1. 141, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 133-134, Chabas 1994, p. 105, 
364 et seq., critically see Carbonnier 2000, p. 143-144. 
102 Carbonnier 2000, p. 161-163, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 99. Inalienability can result from the law 
or from judgements, this section deals with the question whether inalienability can also result 
from agreement. 
103 Art. 537 C.civ states ‘Les particuliers ont la libre disposition des biens qui leur appartiennent, 
sous les modifications établies par les lois …’, see also Terré & Simler 1998, p. 98-99, Malaurie 
& Aynès 2005, p. 14. 
104 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 100. 
105 See, inter alia, Civ., 6 June 1853, D. 1. 191, on perpetuity issues see Req. 20 May 1879, D.P. 79. 1. 
431, on the former case see Huc 1893, p. 107, on the latter see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 101. 
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effect of the clause was limited in time, in other words it was not made perpetually, 
and the clause was inserted in the interest of the persons who made it.106 This 
interest can be both on the side of the transferor as well as the transferee, and even 
the interest of a third party might justify the validity of a clause.107 From that 
moment on, non-transferability clauses were accepted in French law, but not until 
1971 did the legislature include provisions in the Civil Code affirming this case 
law.108  
The starting point remains that a non-transferability clause is invalid because 
it violates the characteristics of the right of ownership and the principle of free 
circulation of objects in France, but it can be allowed if the clause is made for a 
limited period and pursues a legitimate and serious aim. Article 900-1 C.civ, which 
was introduced by the 1971 legislation, therefore states:  
Non-transferability clauses concerning an object donated or bequeathed are valid only 
where they are temporary and justified by a serious and legitimate aim. Even in that 
case, a donee or legatee may be judicially authorised to dispose of the object if the aim 
which justified the clause has disappeared or if it happens that a more important 
interest so requires.109 
The effect of a valid non-transferability clause is that the owner is limited in his 
power of disposal. This can include the prohibition to transfer the right of owner-
ship, but also in the prohibition to create a property right in respect of the object, 
particularly a property security right.110 However, the effect of a transfer of owner-
ship of an object on which a non-transferability claim was validly created is 
debated.111 
It is clear that the effect of a valid non-transferability clause in operation 
should be that a transfer that contravenes the clause is considered void. Further-
more, French legal scholarship agrees that only that person in whose interest the 
clause was made should be able to invoke the voidance.112 The debate centres on the 
question of how this voidance is achieved. Carbonnier works around the central 
 
106 Civ., 20 April 1858, D.P. 58. 1. 154, S. 58. 1. 589. 
107 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 102. Civ., 18 March 1903, D.P. 1905. 1. 126, S. 1905. 1. 513. 
108 Loi No. 71-526 du 3 juillet 1971 which inserted Art. 900-1 C.civ. 
109 Art. 900-1 C.civ states ‘Les clauses d’inaliénabilité affectant un bien donné ou légué ne sont 
valables que si elles sont temporaires et justifiées par un intérêt sérieux et légitime. Même 
dans ce cas, le donataire ou le légataire peut être judiciairement autorisé à disposer du bien si 
l’intérêt qui avait justifié la clause a disparu ou s’il advient qu’un intérêt plus important 
l’exige’, see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 100 et seq., Carbonnier 2000, p. 148 et seq., Jourdain, Marty 
& Raynaud 1995, p. 75 et seq. Furthermore, the Cour de cassation has held that a stipulation 
made for life is temporary, see Civ., 8 January 1975, JCP 1976, II, 18240. 
110 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 103. However, a property security right coming into operation by 
force of law and not by agreement between parties will be able to exist since such a security 
right comes into existence and exists regardless of the power to dispose of the owner. See 
Carbonnier 2000, p. 162-163. 
111 See Carbonnier 2000, p. 151-153, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 103-105, Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 
1995, p. 75-77, Crocq 1995, p. 200-201. 
112 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 104-105, Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 75-76. 
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question by stating that case law declares the transfer void.113 Terré and Simler 
discuss two possibilities; either the clause leads to legal incapacity of the owner, but 
this cannot be achieved by contract, or the ownership is transferred without the 
power of disposal, the abusus, by analogy of the creation of limited property 
rights.114 Jourdain states that the non-transferability clause limits the power of dis-
posal of the owner.115 This latter approach is also followed by Crocq and also Terré 
and Simler end up with this solution and could therefore be considered as the 
leading opinion.116 
Secondly, the right of ownership can also be transferred under condition.117 
Such a condition can be twofold. First, the transfer can be a transfer made under a 
resolutive condition. Such a transfer is only effective until the condition occurs, after 
which the ownership returns to the original owner.118 Secondly, the transfer can also 
be a transfer under condition of suspension. This type only takes effect as a transfer 
of ownership once the condition has occurred.119 
In French law a transfer under condition always results in a situation whereby 
one party becomes an owner under resolutive condition and the other party an 
owner under condition of suspension.120 Therefore, the transfer of ownership under 
condition creates, at least until the moment the condition is fulfilled, a temporary 
fragmentation of the right of ownership.121 However, the right of ownership in 
French law is unitary and absolute and cannot, in principle, be fragmented.122 The 
result is that the owner under resolutive condition has the right of ownership with 
all its characteristics; usus, fructus and abusus.123 However, the owner under 
condition of suspension also has a right of ownership, but this ownership, until the 
condition is fulfilled, lacks the characteristics of usus and fructus. The owner under 
condition of suspension, as well as the owner under resolutive condition, will have 
the power to sell and transfer the ownership, abusus, to another person.124 The 
ownership under condition of suspension exists, but cannot be used until the condi-
tion is fulfilled.125 However, the transfer has already taken effect, and the fulfilment 
of the condition will not cause another transfer to occur. Instead, the conditional 
 
113 Carbonnier 2000, p. 152. 
114 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 103-104. Against the démembrement see Crocq 1995, p. 172. On the 
creation of property rights see below; 3. Other Property Rights. 
115 Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 75-76. 
116 Crocq 1995, p. 166, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 104. 
117 Arts. 1168 et seq. C.civ. 
118 Arts. 1181 and 1182 C.civ. 
119 Arts. 1183 and 1184 C.civ, Carbonnier 2000, p. 148-149, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 110-111. 
120 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 111, Crocq 1995, p. 194. 
121 Or when it becomes clear the condition can no longer be fulfilled, e.g. the cancellation of an 
event. Terré & Simler 1998, p. 112. 
122 After all, a fragmentation of ownership as it existed in the ancien régime was rejected with the 
definition of Article 544 C.civ. 
123 An owner under resolutive condition can only dispose of the object within the same limits, 
i.e., under the same resolutive condition, as the one to which he is subject himself. Terré & 
Simler 1998, p. 112. 
124 Art. 1180 C.civ. 
125 Art. 1181 C.civ, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 195-197. 
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right of one of the parties will grow into the full right of ownership by fulfilment of 
the condition.126 
When the condition is fulfilled, the owner under condition of suspension will 
become owner with retroactive effect. The owner under condition of suspension is 
considered to have been the owner from the moment of transfer. The owner under 
resolutive condition loses his ownership with retroactive effect at the same moment 
and is considered never to have had ownership. The situation of fragmented 
ownership therefore ends and, because of the retroactive effect, is presumed never 
to have taken place.127 A similar situation occurs when it becomes clear that the 
condition cannot be fulfilled. In that case the owner under resolutive condition 
becomes the definitive owner and the owner under condition of suspension will be 
considered never to have held a right of ownership.128 Again, the legal system 
assumes that fragmented ownership has never existed.129 
2.2. Co-Ownership including Apartments 
The concept of co-ownership or indivision in French law is subject to so many 
additional rules compared with the normal concept of ownership that it deserves to 
be dealt with in a separate section.130 The term indivision covers a situation where 
there is more than one person exercising a property right in respect of the same 
object and to the idea that these rights cannot be completely separated. The concept 
of indivision is very wide and applies also to all objects of property rights; immova-
ble, movable, but also personal and property rights.131 For the purposes of clarity, 
insofar as indivision concerns the right of ownership, the term co-ownership will be 
used here.  
The difficulty with co-ownership is that a co-owner is also considered to be an 
owner in the sense of the right of ownership under Article 544 C.civ. The right of a 
co-owner is absolute and meant to last forever, perpetual, but is, because of the 
reason for its existence, less exclusive than the normal right of ownership. Because 
the right of ownership cannot be fragmented, a co-owner will not own a specific 
part but rather will have a share in a community.132 The shares together, the com-
munity as a whole, will comprise the full ownership in the normal sense of Article 
544 C.civ. The shares will entitle their holder to a share in this right of ownership. In 
a double abstraction, the rights to the share itself are owned in turn. In other words, 
a co-owner is a person owning a share in a right of ownership on an object or set of 
 
126 This is the effet déclaratif or declarative effect.  
127 Art. 1179 C.civ, see Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 196, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 112-113, 
Carbonnier 2000, p. 149-150. 
128 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 196. 
129 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 112-113. 
130 It has been argued that the concept of co-ownership is so much different from the concept of 
ownership that it deserves to be dealt with as a separate property right, see Atias 2005, p. 116-
117 and carefully Bayard-Jammes 2003, p. 345-347. 
131 Atias 2005, p. 117. The terms indivision and copropriété are used in a different sense depending 
on the author using them. See, inter alia, Carbonnier 2000, p. 145, Chabas 1994, p. 35. 
132 Chabas 1994, p. 35, Carbonnier 2000, p. 144-145. 
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objects. Consequently, now that ownership of a share in the community of objects 
can be held, the share of the co-owner can be the subject of a transfer or creation of 
another property right in the same way as any object under ownership.133 
Co-ownership therefore brings a tension to the unitary and exclusive nature of 
the right of ownership, especially in the light of the fragmented ownership in the 
ancien régime. Originally, the Civil Code did not deal with co-ownership except in 
very exceptional cases.134 In Article 815 of the Civil Code of 1804 the legislator 
stated: 
No one may be compelled to remain in a situation of co-ownership; and a separation 
may always be induced, taking prohibitions and conventions into account. It is 
possible to delay the separation for a limited period: such an agreement is not binding 
for longer than five years, but it can be renewed.135 
Co-ownership was considered a deviation from the normal right of ownership and 
therefore limited in its application. Furthermore, through the provision in Article 
883 C.civ, the division would have retroactive effect, resulting in a situation where 
the co-ownership never existed.136 In this respect the same technique is applied as in 
case of a transfer of ownership under condition, where also a temporary fragmen-
tation of ownership results, but is nevertheless allowed, because it is only tempo-
rary.137 
Besides the co-ownership arising from Article 815 C.civ, which provides rules 
for a general situation of co-ownership, the Civil Code also recognised a form of co-
ownership in Article 1873 C.civ, which was a specific type of co-ownership that 
came into operation by agreement between parties.138 
However, under pressure from practice, the courts and, especially, the legisla-
ture interfered.139 Through the statutory reforms the rules on co-ownership were 
amended and completed with a set of more elaborate rules. After these reforms, 
which took place in 1976, there were two substantial regimes of co-ownership, the 
co-ownership governed by law in Articles 815 and following, and the co-ownership 
arising from agreement in Article 1873 and following.140 Furthermore, in 2006, when 
the law of succession was thoroughly reformed, the Articles on co-ownership were 
 
133 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 402. 
134 Chabas 1994, p. 36, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 202, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 392. 
135 Art. 815 Old C.civ as quoted by Chabas 1994, p. 36. See also Terré & Simler 1998, p. 395. ‘Nul 
ne peut être contraint à demeurer dans l’indivision; et le partage peut toujours être provoqué, 
nonobstant prohibitions et conventions contraires. On peut cependant convenir de suspendre 
le partage pendant un temps limité: cette convention ne peut être obligatoire au-delà de cinq 
ans; mais elle peut être renouvelée’. 
136 Chabas 1994, p. 36, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 413-414. 
137 On conditional transfers of ownership see above; 2.1. Ownership. 
138 See Atias 2005, p. 119, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 424. 
139 Loi No. 76-1286 du 31 décembre 1976, later corrected by a law in 1978, Loi No. 78-627 du 10 
juin 1978. See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 395-396, Chabas 1994, p. 37, Malaurie & Aynès 2005,  
p. 202-203. 
140 Or the régime legale (Arts. 815 et seq. C.civ) and the convention d’indivision (Arts. 1873 et seq. 
C.civ), Chabas 1994, p. 37, Atias 2005, p. 118-119. 
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also dealt with.141 In substance the 2006 reforms, which entered into force on 1 
January 2007, simplified the rules of co-ownership but did not change their content 
to any great extent.142 
Article 815 C.civ and following provide a general set of rules for situations of 
co-ownership. The reformed Article 815 C.civ states:143  
No one may be compelled to remain in a situation of co-ownership; and a separation 
may always be induced, unless it was order to remain by judgement or agreement.144 
The new set of rules that were introduced in 1976 provide a regime in which, 
although co-ownership is still seen as an exception to the normal type of ownership, 
either by law or through agreement, a situation of co-ownership can be created.145 
Furthermore these new regulations included rules on the preservation, administra-
tion and transfer of the object under co-ownership.146 As a general rule the co-
owners each have the right to use and enjoy, usus and fructus, the object under co-
ownership, but because of the nature of their relation must share the object between 
them.147 The co-owners are also bound to each other in respect of the transfer of 
certain objects from the community. Each co-owner who wishes to sell and transfer 
his rights in an object under co-ownership must give notice of the details of the 
transaction to the other co-owners.148 The other co-owners have a right of pre-
emption, or droit de préemption, which allows them to decide within a month to buy 
the object themselves instead of allowing the co-owner to sell and transfer. When 
the other co-owners use their right of pre-emption, the co-owner will have to co-
operate in this transaction.149 If no notification is made, the co-owners will continue 
to have an action to nullify the transaction for a period of five years.150 When no 
right of pre-emption has been exercised or when only one of the co-owners exercises 
his right of pre-emption, the object or money received from the transaction will 
become part of the community of co-owners through substitution.151 
A situation of co-ownership will normally arise when two or more persons 
enter into an agreement and the Civil Code specifically accommodates such agree-
ments.152 A co-ownership agreement must be made in writing before it will have 
 
141 Loi No. 2006-728 du 23 juin 2006. 
142 See Delmas Saint-Hilaire 2007, p. 40-48, Blanchard 2006, p. 28. 
143 Before the reform Art. 815 CC contained an extra sentence dealing with the temporary nature 
of a co-ownership regime and the role of party agreement in this. 
144 Art. 815 C.civ, ‘Nul ne peut être contraint à demeurer dans l’indivision et le partage peut être 
toujours provoqué, à moins qu’il n’y ait été sursis par jugement ou convention’. 
145 Art. 815-1 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 397-398. 
146 Arts. 815-2 and 815-3 C.civ, Chabas 1994, p. 40-41, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 210-213. 
147 Art. 815-9 C.civ, Chabas 1994, p. 42, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 205, 209, Terré & Simler 1998, 
p. 415-416. 
148 Art. 815-14 C.civ. 
149 Art. 815-14 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 403. 
150 Art. 815-16 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 403. 
151 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 402-403, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 203-204. 
152 Arts. 815-1 and 1873-2 C.civ, see Chabas 1994, p. 44, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 201. 
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any effect in property law.153 Even though the agreement results in the creation of 
several co-ownership rights, the agreement itself remains subjected to the law of 
obligations. In the system of the Civil Code, the general provisions of co-ownership 
apply, but under Article 815-1 C.civ parties may decide otherwise in their agree-
ment.154 The best example of this is provided by Article 1873-2 C.civ, which allows 
the co-owners to remain in co-ownership even when one of the co-owners would 
like to leave the community of co-owners, which would normally bring the co-
ownership regime to an end.155 
Although Article 815 C.civ no longer provides a maximum duration, Article 
1873-3 C.civ provides that an agreement of co-ownership is either made for a 
limited duration, which cannot be longer than five years, after which it must be 
renewed, or is made for an unlimited duration.156 However in the latter situation a 
separation of the objects may be requested at any time.157 
Furthermore the parties may appoint one or several administrators, gérants, 
who, on their behalf, will take care of the objects under co-ownership.158 In the 
agreement, the co-owners may award the administrator certain powers. These 
powers are constructed through the technique of a mandate and create rights and 
obligations on the side of the administrator. Rights include general conservation 
and administration of the object under co-ownership, duties include the duty to 
inform the other co-owners.159 However, for important decisions, for example, the 
sale and transfer of one of the objects under co-ownership, unanimity of the co-
owners remains required.160 
Apart from an agreement, a situation of co-ownership can also arise by 
operation of law.161 The Civil Code mentions several situations of co-ownership, 
known as forced co-ownership or, in French, indivision forcée.162 In respect of forced 
co-ownership the Civil Code especially deals with the situation of a wall that is co-
owned by two neighbours because the wall is placed exactly on the border between 
them.163 Other situations can also give rise to a situation of forced co-ownership.164 
Because a situation of forced co-ownership arises from a factual situation, usually 
 
153 It is a contrat solennel, Paris 22 March 1989, D. 1989. I.R. 123. See Chabas 1994, p. 45. 
154 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 423-425, Carbonnier 2000, p. 147, Chabas 1994, p. 44. 
155 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 424-425. 
156 Art. 1873-3 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 426. 
157 This rule distinguishes the convention d’indivision from a situation of forced co-ownership that 
lasts forever. 
158 Art. 1873-5 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 427, Chabas 1994, p. 45. 
159 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 429-430. 
160 Art. 1873-8 C.civ, Chabas 1994, p. 45. 
161 When the division is temporary, it is possible that the co-ownership regime will fall under 
Art. 815 C.civ as a type of coincidental co-ownership. An example is a co-ownership of object 
between the heirs in the law of succession. When the co-ownership regime is not temporary a 
forced co-ownership arises that escapes application of Art. 815 C.civ. 
162 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 201, Carbonnier 2000, p. 145. 
163 Arts. 653-670 C.civ. Particularly in case of a wall co-ownership is presumed, see Art. 653 
C.civ, Chabas 1994, p. 47. 
164 This includes trees and other buildings between neighbours, but also a co-ownership of 
apartments. Chabas 1994, p. 47-48, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 436. 
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with two pieces of land, forced co-ownership is, contrary to normal types of co-
ownership, intended to last for a long time, sometimes even forever.  
Most situations of forced co-ownership actually concern the law of neighbours 
and solve problems between them. However, one specific type of forced co-owner-
ship, the co-ownership of apartments, results in such a special situation that it must 
be dealt with separately.165 Co-ownership of apartments combines a forced co-
ownership of common parts of a building with an exclusive ownership of private 
parts of a building.166 
The Civil Code of 1804 did not contain any rules on co-ownership of apart-
ments and could therefore not form the basis for the co-ownership of apartments as 
it exists today. Only one Article, 664 C.civ, dealt with the division of costs for 
construction and reparation in situations of forced co-ownership, which was also 
used in those very exceptional circumstances where a co-ownership of apartments 
was needed.167 However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the courts were 
confronted with an increasing demand for rules on co-ownership of apartments, 
which had not existed at the time of drafting of the Civil Code.168 Due to this 
demand, in 1938 the legislature interfered, abolishing Article 664 C.civ and intro-
ducing a twofold regime.169 First, the legislation created a possibility to establish a 
construction association.170 The construction association, as a legal person, could 
have a piece of land in ownership and could construct a building on it, to which the 
shareholders in the association would be entitled.171 The construction association 
legislation was reformed in 1971 to suit the practical application for which the 
construction association had come to be used.172 These uses included the construc-
tion association established by a commercial developer, could then sell the apart-
ments in a co-ownership regime created after construction.173 Secondly, whereas the 
co-ownership of apartments had been a normal type of co-ownership, the 1938 
legislation introduced a double-ownership regime in which a right of co-ownership 
of the common parts of the building was combined with a normal right of owner-
ship for the private part of the building.174 Furthermore, the creation of a co-owner-
 
165 See in general Terré & Simler 1998, p. 435 et seq., Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 219 et seq., Atias 
2005, p. 253 et seq. 
166 See Cass. 21 November 1955, J.C.P. 1955. II. 9004, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 435-436. 
167 This was Art. 664 C.civ. These exceptional circumstances existed in the cities of Grenoble and 
Rennes, see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 437, Chabas 1994, p. 53. 
168 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 436-437. This was due to the lack of houses after the destructions of 
the First World War. 
169 Loi du 28 juin 1938, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 437, Terré & Simler 1998, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, 
p. 219-220, Chabas 1994, p. 53. 
170 Or société de construction. 
171 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 437-438, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 220. 
172 Loi No. 71-579 du 16 juillet 1971, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 440. 
173 In this way the construction-association was not used for what it was intended in 1938, but 
merely as a vehicle to achieve a simplified building process after which a division could be 
made. See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 440. 
174 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 438. 
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ship of apartments would have to be combined with a general agreement creating 
an association of co-owners that could represent the co-owners.175 
Even though it improved the legal situation in which co-ownership of apart-
ments could be created, the 1938 legislation left room for much improvement. One 
of the most important problems with the 1938 regime was that unanimity was 
required to reach a decision between co-owners. In 1965 the legislature therefore 
interfered again and updated the co-ownership of apartments regime, replacing the 
1938 rules on co-ownership.176 The new regime left much more party autonomy to 
the co-owners to create an association of co-owners and transfer powers to that 
association.177 Finally, after some fine-tuning in the 1980s and 1990s, the law of co-
ownership of apartments became widely used.178 
After all these reforms, the co-ownership of apartments has become structured 
in a complex way. It combines a right of co-ownership on common parts of a build-
ing with a right of normal ownership on private parts of a building, together with 
membership of an association as well as with an agreement between the parties 
known as a regulation.179 In fact, a building is separated into common parts and 
private parts and these parts are allocated to the various co-owners. These common 
parts will be in a situation of forced co-ownership to which each of the parties will 
have a share proportional to their contribution.180 Depending on the regulation 
made by the co-owners the parts that are not used exclusively are considered 
common.181 
The co-owners are obliged to make regulations defining their relations.182 The 
regulations constitute a special type of multi-party agreement that will not only 
have effect between the parties but will also have effect against those who contract 
with the co-owners, for instance, lessees and holders of security rights.183 Because of 
this limited third-party effect of the regulations, the parties must remain within the 
legal framework provided for them. Notwithstanding the other agreements the co-
owners make, the regulations have to deal with which parts are common and which 
are private and how they will use the object under co-ownership, the administration 
of the object and the way in which they will deal with maintenance and reparation 
of the common parts.184 
 
175 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 438, Chabas 1994, p. 54-55. 
176 Loi No. 65-557 du 10 juillet 1965, modified by Loi No. 66-1006 du 28 décembre 1966, Terré & 
Simler 1998, p. 439, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 220-222, Chabas 1994, p. 56. 
177 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 439, Chabas 1994, p. 54-55, 63. 
178 Loi No. 85-1470 du 31 décembre 1985, Décret No. 86-768 du 9 juin 1986 and Loi No. 94-624 du 
21 juillet 1994, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 439, Chabas 1994, p. 55. 
179 Art. 10 Loi du 10 juillet 1965, Chabas 1994, p. 63, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 221-222. 
180 Art. 1 Loi du 10 juillet 1965, the shares are not defined and can be dealt with by the regula-
tion. In a forced co-ownership shares are known as millièmes or tantièmes, Malaurie & Aynès 
2005, p. 222, 224, Chabas 1994, p. 57. 
181 Civ., 25 March 1966, Bull. Civ. I. 195, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 222-223, Chabas 1994, p. 61. 
182 Art. 10 Loi du 10 juillet 1965, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 232-233. 
183 Art. 13 Loi du 10 juillet 1965, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 232-233. 
184 Art. 8 Loi du 10 juillet 1965, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 233. 
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Furthermore, the co-owners, by nature of their community, form an associa-
tion or syndicat.185 This association is used to administer the common parts of the 
object under co-ownership. Within this association the co-owners must meet at least 
once a year to decide, by a majority or unanimously depending on the decision they 
are making, on the administration and management of the common parts.186 With 
regard to the management the co-owners appoint a manager, or syndic, who, with a 
mandate from the co-owners, manages the day-to-day business of the association in 
general.187 This manager can be one of the co-owners, but can also be a third party 
paid by the association. Finally, in very complicated co-ownership regimes, a 
certain part of the co-owners may also form a council or conseil syndicat which will 
support the manager in the day-to-day affairs and function as an intermediary 
between the manager and the general association of co-owners.188 
With its complex composition the right of co-ownership of apartments is a 
unique combination of rights.189 Its exact legal nature has been the subject of debate 
in the past and varied from a dualistic approach, combining normal ownership with 
co-ownership, to a unitary approach.190 The unitary approach that considers the 
entitlement to apartments as a special type of co-ownership may be considered the 
leading opinion.191 In this view, the exclusive part of the right of co-ownership of 
apartments should be seen as an exclusive right to use the air of a certain space 
between the walls, ceiling and floor, which are, in their turn, co-owned.192 
2.3. Security Ownership 
The right of ownership is not only used as the paramount entitlement to use and 
enjoy an object, the usus and fructus, but can also be used as security for a certain 
performance by a debtor. In this respect the owner makes use of his power of 
disposal of the right, the element of abusus, to limit the powers of the creditor.193 The 
use of the right of ownership for security purposes can be twofold. First the right of 
ownership can be retained and only transferred upon the performance by the debt-
or, usually the payment of a sum of money. Secondly, the right of ownership can be 
transferred to serve as security for the performance by the debtor, usually also pay-
ment of a sum of money, and will only be retransferred upon such repayment. 
 
185 Art. 14 Loi du 10 juillet 1965, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 234-235, Chabas 1994, p. 63. 
186 Arts. 24-26 Loi du 10 juillet 1965, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 237-238. 
187 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 238-240, Chabas 1994, p. 65. 
188 Art. 21 Loi du 10 juillet 1965, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 239-240. 
189 I.e., a combination of the right of ownership and a right of co-ownership. The right to an 
apartment constitutes a bien immeuble, see Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 231-232. 
190 For an overview see Chabas 1994, p. 59-61, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 231-232, Terré & Simler 
1998, p. 451-454. 
191 Chabas 1994, p. 59, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 243-244, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 453, Crocq 
1995, p. 80-81. 
192 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 231-232, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 521-523. For a similar characterisa-
tion of the right of apartment in Dutch law see Van Velten 1989. 
193 On the various elements of the right of ownership in French law see above; 2.1. Ownership. 
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The use of the right of ownership as a security right in French law is com-
plex.194 The drafters of the Civil Code opted for a unitary concept of ownership and 
did not foresee this method of using the right of ownership. Part of this structural 
problem is caused by the general distinction made between principal and accessory 
property rights.195 The right of ownership is perceived as a principal property right, 
whereas security rights are considered accessory rights. The structure of property 
law in the Civil Code therefore did not include any provisions on security rights 
and only deals with principal property rights.196 Nevertheless, over time, the Cour de 
cassation has recognised some security elements in the right of ownership as well. 
Furthermore, in the 2006 reform of the Civil Code, some of this case law was specifi-
cally affirmed by the legislature and included in the Civil Code.197 Furthermore, in 
2007, the introduction of the fiducie that can also be used for purposes of security 
added another security element to the right of ownership.198 
The reservation of the right of ownership until the payment of a sum of 
money, usually a purchase price, is known as a clause de réserve de propriété or reser-
vation of ownership clause.199 Until March 2006, the Civil Code did not explicitly 
mention the possibility of a reservation of ownership.200 The French Commercial 
Code recognised the validity and effectiveness of a reservation of ownership in 
cases of bankruptcy in Articles 121 and 122 of a statute of 25 January 1985.201 How-
ever, long before that statutory recognition, French practice had already developed 
and recognised the use of the reservation clause.202 In French law, ownership of a 
movable object as well as of an immovable object is transferred by the mere 
conclusion of a contract.203 This transfer system is known as a consensual transfer 
system and should be distinguished from the transfer systems in Germany and the 
Netherlands which follow a traditio model, where besides a contract an act in 
property law is also required to transfer ownership of an object. In French law, the 
 
194 Piedelièvre 2004, p. 187-191, Witz 1981, p. 41 et seq., 141-143, Legeais 1996, p. 326-330. 
195 See, inter alia, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 40-41, Crocq 1995, p. 59, 87, Simler & Delebecque 2004,  
p. 308-309. On the distinction see below; 3. Other Property Rights. 
196 I.e., Art. 543 C.civ only mentions the rights of ownership, usufruct and servitude. Other 
property security rights are dealt with by the Civil Code, but not in the second book dealing 
specifically with property law.  
197 Ordonnance No. 2006-346 du 23 mars 2006 relative aux sûretés, JORF 24 mars 2006. Par-
ticularly Art. 13 of the Ordonnance, which establishes the accessory character of a reservation 
of ownership clause. 
198 However, see Crocq who has a very critical view on the introduction of the fiducie in French 
law Crocq 2007, p. 1 et seq. 
199 Legeais 1996, p. 331 et seq., Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 583 et seq., Campana 2001a, p. 3, 
Crocq 2006, p. 23-25. 
200 This was changed by Article 13 of the Ordonnance of 23 mars 2006, which inserted Arts. 
2367-2372 into the Civil Code. 
201 Which have now become Art L. 621-122 and L. 621-124 of the French Commercial Code. 
202 See Cass. Req. 17 July 1895, D.P. 1896, 57, Cass. Req. 26 October 1938, D.H. 1939, 84. Huc 1893, 
p. 107, Crocq 1995, p. 39-40. 
203 For the transfer of immovable objects additional requirements must be fulfilled in order for 
the transfer to take effect against third parties. In general on the transfer system in French 
property law see Van Vliet 2000, p. 73 et seq. 
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conclusion of a contract of sale makes the ownership pass from the seller to the 
buyer. However, the inclusion of a reservation of ownership clause can suspend this 
property effect until the purchase price has been paid, both in case of movables and 
immovables.204  
Although the reservation of ownership clause was recognised from the 
nineteenth century onwards, its effect has been the subject of much debate.205 The 
Cour de cassation has moved in its jurisprudence from the refusal of effect against 
third parties, in 1895, to the recognition of such effect in 1938. In 1980 the legislature 
interfered and firmly established the effect of the reservation clause against third 
parties, including other creditors of the debtor, in a situation of bankruptcy of the 
debtor.206 From the 1980s onwards, the use of the reservation clause has only 
increased, making it one of the most suitable security devices for a seller.207 
Another interesting debate dealt with the exact legal nature of the reservation 
clause.208 Because of the nature of the French system of transfer of ownership, this 
aspect of the debate is almost purely on contract law. One of the questions in this 
debate is whether the reservation clause is part of the contract of sale. When this 
would be the case, the majority considered that the contract would not exist until 
the fulfilment of the condition.209 This point of view is therefore generally rejected.210 
Another option can be found in the separation of the contract of sale and the 
inclusion of the reservation clause. The reservation clause would then delay the 
obligation to pay the purchase price and, with that, also delay the effect of the con-
tract and the transfer of the right of ownership.211 Or, in other words, the property 
effects of the reservation clause are separated from the contractual effects of the 
contract of sale.212 
Finally, another question can be raised on the accessory nature of the reser-
vation clause. This question is highly relevant because in French law all security 
rights, at least until 2006, were considered accessory rights, which are rights 
depending on the existence of a claim for performance by a debtor, and not princi-
pal property rights.213 Does the right of ownership, the principal property right per 
 
204 Although a reservation clause in case of a sale of immovables is relatively rare. Loi No. 67-3 
du 3 janvier 1967, Piedelièvre 2004, p. 191, Crocq 1995, p. 41. 
205 On the debate see Crocq 1995, p. 38-40. See Cass. Req. 17 July 1895, D.P. 1896, Cass. Req. 26 
October 1938, D.H. 1939, 84. 
206 Loi No. 80-335 du 12 mai 1980, Crocq 1995, p. 39, Legeais 1996, p. 332, Piedelièvre 2004,  
p. 193, Campana 2001a, p. 3-4. Furthermore, the legislator reformed the requirements for a 
reservation clause in 1985 by Loi 85-98 du 25 janvier 1985 and in 1994 by Loi 94-475 du 10 juin 
1994, see Campana 2001a, p. 4 et seq. 
207 Legeais 1996, p. 332, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 585, Dupichot 2007, p. 5 et seq. 
208 Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 584 et seq., Crocq 1995, p. 109 et seq. 
209 Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 585, Crocq 1995, p. 109-110. 
210 See Cass. Com. 1 October 1985, D. 1986, 246. 
211 Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 585, Crocq 1995, p. 115, Campana 2001a, p. 5. It should be 
emphasised that the contract itself is therefore not under a resolutive condition but the clause 
itself. 
212 In the same sense see Crocq 1995, p. 116. 
213 On the distinction between principal and accessory property rights see below; 3. Other Prop-
erty Rights. 
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se, that is retained in a reservation of ownership clause become an accessory right? 
When such a clause is made, the right of ownership of the seller becomes dependent 
on the payment of the purchase price by the buyer. After the buyer has paid the 
purchase price in full, the seller automatically loses his right of ownership and the 
buyer acquires the right of ownership.214 Not surprisingly, in 1988 the Cour de 
cassation decided on the accessory character of the reservation clause.215 However, 
the debate continued and was finally answered by the legislature in the 2006 
security rights reform.216 After the reform Article 2367 C.civ states: 
The ownership of an object can be reserved for security purposes by a reservation of 
ownership clause which suspends the effect of a contract until the complete 
performance of the obligation of the other party. 
The right of ownership which is reserved is accessory to the claim for which it serves 
as security.217 
Furthermore, the 2006 reform also used the occasion to extend the applicability of 
the reservation of ownership clauses. Some modifications had already been made in 
1985 and in 1994 to extend the scope of the reservation clause. However, the 2006 
reform included these extensions in the Civil Code. By way of Article 2370 and 2372 
C.civ the reservation of ownership also includes a possibility for real subrogation.218 
This inclusion creates an extended reservation of ownership, under which the 
reservation clause also envisages a situation in which the object to which the reser-
vation clause applies is incorporated into another object, as well as to the price that 
is received if the object is sold or to the insurance remuneration in case the object is 
destroyed.219 Particularly when the object under reservation of ownership is incor-
porated into another object and that object can still be separated, the right of 
 
214 See Crocq 1995, p. 59-60. 
215 Cass. Com. 15 mars 1988, Bull. Civ. IV, 106, D. 1988, 330. See Campana 2001a, p. 6, Piedelièvre 
2004, p. 191. 
216 See Crocq 2006, p. 23-25. Crocq even considers that the right of security ownership is an 
element of the claim which performance is secured, because, according to him, only the 
fulfilment of that claim can lead to fulfilment of the security arrangement. 
217 Article 2367 C.civ ‘La propriété d’un bien peut être retenue en garantie par l’effet d’une 
clause de réserve de propriété que suspend l’effet translatif d’un contrat jusqu’au complet 
paiement de l’obligation que en constitue la contrepartie. La propriété ainsi réservée est 
l’accessoire de la créance dont elle garantit le paiement’. 
218 Before the reform, this possibility also existed, but was not included in the Civil Code. See the 
report accompanying the Ordonnance of 23 March 2006. Rapport au Président de la 
République relatif à l’ordonnance No. 2006-346 du 23 mars 2006 relative aux sûretés, JORF 24 
mars 2006, Para. 1.2.2.4. Crocq 2006, p. 23-25. 
219 Art. 2370 C.civ ‘L’incorporation d’un meuble faisant l’objet d’une réserve de propriété à un 
autre bien ne fait pas obstacle aux droits du créancier lorsque ces biens peuvent être séparés 
sans subir de dommage’ and Art. 2372 C.civ ‘Le droit de propriété se reporte sur la créance 
du débiteur à l’égard du sous-acquéreur ou sur l’indemnité d’assurance subrogée au bien’. 
The incorporated object had already been recognised in the 1994 legislation and the extension 
to the purchase price had been introduced in 1985, see Campana 2001a, p. 10, Dupichot 2007, 
p. 5 et seq. 
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ownership over that object is not lost.220 Because of the accessory nature of the 
reservation of ownership, the right of ownership of the object will continue to exist 
until the condition that was agreed upon is fulfilled.221 
Secondly, the credit-bail or financial lease agreement is a contract by which a 
financial institution, on the instruction of a person or a company, buys or creates an 
object, movable or immovable, and leases the object to that person or company.222 In 
French law, like in other civil law systems, the right of lease is a personal right 
only.223 Although the financial institution becomes the owner of the object it 
acquired or constructed, through the contract most of the prerogatives of the right 
of ownership are ‘transferred’ to the lessee.224 Furthermore, the contract will contain 
a promise of sale at the end of the lease.225 The lessee will therefore have, if 
specifically agreed upon, the option to buy the object and the end of the lease, but 
may also decide to continue the lease or renounce it without buying and acquiring 
the object.226 
The lease agreement uses the right of ownership for security purposes, but, 
like the reservation of ownership clause, this security application is not the sole 
purpose for the existence of the transaction.227 The reservation of ownership clause 
is part of a sale and the lease agreement is primarily intended for financing 
purposes. However, the right of ownership is used to encourage the debtor to pay. 
Other devices exist which are solely based on the provision of security. French 
legal scholarship therefore distinguishes between these first two types of security 
applications of the right of ownership, the reservation of ownership and financial 
lease agreements, and those which are only intended on the provision of security. 
These latter transactions are known as devices for security purposes.228 
The primary example of this second category is the transfer of ownership for 
security purposes. Until 2006, this technique, known in Roman law as the fiducia 
cum creditore, was unknown to French law as a general security device.229 The 
primary reason for the refusal to accept or recognise such a security rule was found 
 
220 Critically on this subject see Crocq 2006, p. 23-24. 
221 Normally this will be the payment of the purchase price. Furthermore, the right of ownership 
will also cease to exist when the object to which it applies can no longer be separated from 
another object into which it is incorporated. 
222 Also a fonds de commerce can be subject of a credit-bail, Loi No. 86-12 du 6 janvier 1986. See 
Witz 1981, p. 143, Legeais 1996, p. 334, Piedelièvre 2004, p. 193. 
223 However, also in civil law systems leases have some property characteristics. On French law 
see below; 4.6. Lease. 
224 This ‘transfer’ is not a transfer within the meaning of a transfer of ownership or a transfer of 
parts of the right of ownership so that a limited property rights comes into existence. Legeais 
1996, p. 334. 
225 Crocq 1995, p. 43. 
226 Piedelièvre 2004, p. 193. 
227 See, inter alia, Legeais 1996, p. 334-335, Crocq 1995, p. 43-47 and 33-34. 
228 Or transferts de propriété réalises à seule fin de garantie, see Legeais 1996, p. 335, or les 
propriétés-garanties fiduciaires, see Crocq 1995, p. 23. 
229 See Witz 1981, p. 41 et seq., Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 537-538. On the Roman law concept 
of fiducia cum creditore see Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
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in the protection of third parties due to the lack of publicity of such a transfer.230 
Particularly the prohibition of the lex commissoria, as it was known in Roman law, 
known in French law as the pacte commissoire, was used as the primary reason to 
refuse a transfer of ownership for security purposes.231 Under the lex commissoria a 
creditor could be allowed to keep the object serving as security for him in case of 
non-payment of the debt. This practice was already prohibited in Roman law and its 
prohibition was considered one of the defining elements of French law.232 
Nevertheless, French law knows specific situations in which a transfer for 
security purposes is allowed. First, in 1967, the legislature introduced the possibility 
for banks or financial institutions to conclude a contract with another bank or 
financial institution, creating a debt for the first bank or financial institution while at 
the same time securing that debt with a transfer of the claim the bank or financial 
institution had outstanding.233 The agreement would specifically entitle the creditor 
to execute the claims and receive the money in case of non-payment. In case the 
claims needed to be re-transferred to the debtor, the claims could be transferred in 
total by drafting a list.234 In this method of providing security, the right of owner-
ship of claims was used to secure the payment of the debt created by the contract 
between banks and financial institutions.235 
From the very beginning of these transactions the nature of the right of owner-
ship, especially whether the right of ownership was security ownership or normal 
ownership, was debated.236 However, it was not until 1981 that the legislature 
specifically introduced the transfer of claims for security purposes, including the 
effect of such a transfer against third parties.237 This transaction became known as 
cession Dailly, after the name of the law, and enables a debtor, acting in his profes-
sional capacity, to transfer multiple claims with one single list, or to subject multiple 
claims to a right of pledge with one single list.238 The transfer that takes place with 
 
230 On the recognition issues see specifically Witz 1981, p. 203-204. Witz deals with two cases on 
the recognition of respectively a Dutch and a German ownership for security purposes; both 
which were fiercely rejected: Cass. Req. 24 mai 1933, D.H. 1933, 378, Cass. 8 juillet 1969, J.C.P. 
1970, II, 16182. Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 537-538, Witz 1981, p. 204-206. 
231 See, inter alia, Cass. 8 juillet 1969, J.C.P. 1970, II, 16182, Legeais 1996, p. 336. On the lex commis-
soria and its prohibition in Roman law see Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. The 
prohibition of the lex commissoria in the Civil Code, Article 2078 C.civ, was abolished by 
Article 11 of Ordonnance No. 2006-346 du 23 mars 2006. 
232 However, as from 2006 a pacte commissoire has become allowed, see Simler 2006, p. 597-600, 
Legeais 2006a, p. 357-358. 
233 Ordonnance No. 67-838 du 28 septembre 1967, specifically Art. 4 (the Ordonnance was later 
almost fully repealed by Loi No. 81-1 du 2 janvier 1981 (Loi Dailly)), Witz 1981, p. 170-173, 
Crocq 1995, p. 27. 
234 Or a transfer sur bordereau. Article 14, Ordonnance du 28 septembre 1967, Witz 1981, p. 172-
173, Campana 2001b, p. 43. 
235 The Ordonnance itself did not specifically deal with the re-transfer. Witz 1981, p. 173. 
236 See Witz 1981, p. 172. 
237 Now Art. L313-27 Code Monétaire et Financier, Campana 2001b, p. 43, Legeais 2006a, p. 503. 
238 Consumers are excluded from the scope of the transaction. The pledge concerns a nantisse-
ment. Loi No. 81-1 du 2 janvier 1981 facilitant le crédit aux entreprises (Loi Dailly), Art. L313-23 
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the use of the cession Dailly can be made for security purposes in which case it must 
be accompanied by the creation of a debt.239 The transfer can take place between a 
company, or a person acting in his professional capacity, not as a consumer, and a 
bank or financial institution.240 The claims transferred are therefore claims a 
company or a person in his professional capacity has outstanding in the course of 
his business.241 Any rights that are accessory to these claims will transfer with the 
claim, including reservation of ownership clauses and rights of hypothec.242 
The moment the contract of transfer is concluded the transfer takes effect, not 
only between the debtor and creditor, but also against third parties, without any 
other formalities.243 A cession Dailly is therefore not registered and could be seen as 
an undisclosed transaction.244 The result of this lack of registration is that the 
debtors of the claims that have been transferred for security purposes are unaware 
of the transfer. The payment of the claim they have outstanding will therefore be 
made to the creditor of the claim, the debtor of the cession Dailly. In order to solve 
the problem arising from this, that of the creditor receiving the payment of the 
claims that he no longer owns because the ownership of the claim is transferred for 
security purposes, any such payment the debtor of the cession Dailly will receive as a 
mandatory for the creditor. After notification of the transaction to the debtor of the 
transferred claims, payment can only be made to the creditor of the cession Dailly.245 
Furthermore, other transfers for security purposes exist, but usually only in 
case of professional transactions.246 These security transfers include the opérations de 
pension and repurchase agreements. The opération de pension allows a bank or finan-
cial institution to transfer claims or equities to another bank or institution in order 
to obtain an advance of funds.247 The transaction is created by contract and includes 
an agreement on the purchase price as well as the re-purchase price at the end of the 
transaction. The difference between the two purchase prices is the profit for the 
 
Code Monétaire et Financier, Legeais 1996, p. 336, Crocq 1995, p. 27, Campana 2001b, p. 45, 
Legeais 2006a, p. 377. 
239 A transfer for security purposes is known as a transfert (or cession) à titre garantie, see 
Campana 2001b, p. 43, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 541. See Art. L313-24 Code Monétaire et 
Financier. 
240 Crocq 1995, p. 30-31, Campana 2001b, p. 44, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 539-541. 
241 Or créances professionelles, see Campana 2001b, p. 45, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 541-542. 
242 Art. L313-27 Code Monétaire et Financier. Although multiple rights in respect of the same 
claim can also lead to problems, see Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 545. The specific inclusion 
of the right of hypothec enables securitisation devices. On securitisation in general and mort-
gage backed security (MBS) in particular see Nasarre-Aznar 2004, p. 8 et seq. 
243 Art. L313-27 Code Monétaire et Financier, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 542. 
244 Or occulte, see Legeais 1996, p. 336-337. 
245 Art. L313-28 Code Monétaire et Financier, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 542, Campana 2001b, 
p. 46. 
246 Additionally the implementation of Directive 2002/47/EC of 6 June 2002 on Financial 
Collateral arrangements by the Ordonnance No. 2005-171 du 24 février 2005 now Art. L.431-4 
et seq. Code monétaire et financier created a transfer of money and shares between banks and 
large financial institutions for security purposes. See Legeais 2006a, p. 505-507. 
247 Legeais 1996, p. 337, Crocq 1995, p. 31-32, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 538-539, Witz 1981,  
p. 173 et seq. 
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receiving bank or financial institution.248 The legal nature of the opération de pension 
is debatable. Originally it was perceived as an alteration on the right of pledge, but 
it is more and more recognised as a transfer of ownership for security purposes.249 
Furthermore, in Article 1659 C.civ the possibility to create a vente à réméré or a 
re-purchase agreement is mentioned. The re-purchase agreement is a contract of 
sale and at the same time an agreement on an option of re-sale at the end of a certain 
period.250 The re-purchase agreement as such is not a security device but can be 
used for security purposes when the purchase price is a debt.251 In re-purchase 
agreements the general risk is that the object will devaluate during the time the 
contract runs. The re-purchase agreement is not restricted to professional claims 
and can therefore, in theory, also be used by consumers. Perhaps for this reason the 
Cour de cassation has been very careful about recognising the validity of the use of 
Article 1659 C.civ for security purposes. The Cour de cassation has held that the 
security re-purchase agreement is an attempt to avoid the mandatory rules on 
pledge, particularly an attempt to avoid the prohibition of the pacte commissoire, 
which was prohibited until 2006.252 The Cour de cassation has therefore, under the 
regime of the law before the reform, re-qualified the security re-purchase agreement 
as a right of pledge securing a debt.253 
Until 2007, the use of the right of ownership for security purposes was mainly 
restricted to retaining the right until a certain performance took place. Only in 
exceptional and specifically defined situations could ownership be transferred for 
security purposes as well. Nevertheless, for many years several influential academ-
ics have been pleading for the introduction of a general security device allowing a 
transfer of ownership for security purposes known as fiducie.254 Although the 
Grimaldi report, which is at the foundation of the 2006 reforms, proposed the 
introduction of the fiducie, the final 2006 reforms did not include the fiducie.255 The 
reason for this was that at the same time the French government was working, on 
the initiative of Senator Marini, on the general introduction of a transfer of owner-
ship for special purposes, including for security purposes, and it was considered a 
 
248 Crocq 1995, p. 31-32. 
249 See Crocq 1995, p. 31, Witz 1981, p. 175. 
250 Art. 1659 C.civ states ‘la faculté de rachat ou de réméré est un pacte par lequel le vendeur se 
réserve de reprendre la chose cendue, moyennant la restitution du prix principal et le rem-
boursement dont il est parlé à l’article 1673’, see Piedelièvre 2004, p. 189, Legeais 1996, p. 335. 
251 Piedelièvre 2004, p. 189, Legeais 1996, p. 335. 
252 Legeais 1996, p. 336, Piedelièvre 2004, p. 189, Crocq 1995, p. 18. 
253 Cass. 13 janvier 1965, J.C.P., II, 14469. 
254 Most importantly Avant-projet de Loi instituant la Fiducie which was proposed in 1989, 1994 
and most recently again in 2005 by Senator Marini, see Text No. 178 (2004-2005) de M. 
Philippe Marini, déposé au Sénat le 8 février 2005. See, inter alia, Crocq 1995, p. 36-38, Witz 
1981, Crocq 2007, p. 1-2, Kuhn 2007, p. 32. 
255 Grimaldi et al. 2005, p. 14. The French fiducie is often compared to the English trust, on trusts 
see Chapter 6; 1.5. Trust Law. Crocq 1995, p. 36-38, Witz 1981. See also below; 5. A Numerus 
Clausus in French Property Law? Particularly the abolishing of the prohibition on the lex 
commissoria, one of the primary reasons the Cour de cassation refuses to accept foreign security 
trust relations, should be considered. On the refusal of the Cour de cassation see Cass. 8 juillet 
1969, J.C.P. 1970, II, 16182. 
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better improvement of French law for the fiducie to be introduced as a general 
concept and not for security purposes only.256 Subsequently, on 19 February 2007, 
the French legislature adopted an Act that introduced the fiducie, as a general 
concept, into French law.257 
The fiducie, a trust-like device, is dealt with in Article 2011 C.civ: 
The fiducie is the act by which one or more persons transfer objects, rights or securities, 
or a set of objects, rights or securities, present or future, to one or more fiduciaries, who 
will keep the objects separate from their own patrimony, for the benefit of one or more 
beneficiaries.258 
The definition of fiducie in Article 2011 C.civ is very promising and seems to suggest 
that a general trust-like device has been created in French law. However, the 
Ministry of Finance interfered, afraid the fiducie as it was generally formulated by 
Article 2011 C.civ would be used to abuse tax law and the law of succession.259 
Therefore, contrary to the initial proposals, at the last moment the French legislature 
limited the scope of application of the fiducie to legal persons, banks and financial 
institutions.260 Only legal persons may be transferee, and only those institutions 
mentioned in Article L.511-1 of the Code monétaire et financier as financial institutions 
can be a fiduciary. This Article in the Code monétaire et financier states that financial 
institutions are those legal persons that professionally conduct banking opera-
tions.261 In the opinion of the French government, after the 2006 reforms natural 
persons would already have a sufficient choice in property security rights to obtain 
the finance they needed. The law on fiducie could therefore be limited to financial 
institutions that require a lower degree of protection.262 
The fiducie revives the Roman fiducia cum creditore, a transfer of ownership for 
security purposes, and the Roman fiducia cum amico, a transfer of ownership for 
management purposes, whereby a contract, the pactum fiduciae, limited the owner in 
his rights over the object that was transferred.263 Like the Roman law version, the 
fiducie in modern French law comprises a transfer of objects under a contract that 
limits the owner in his powers over the object.264 French law allows parties to use 
 
256 Crocq 2007, p. 1-2. 
257 Loi No. 2007-211 du 19 février 2007, JORF 21 February 2007. 
258 Art. 2011 C.civ, ‘La fiducie est l’opération par laquelle un ou plusieurs constituants trans-
fèrent des biens, des droits ou des sûretés, ou un ensemble de biens, de droits ou de sûretés, 
présents ou futurs, à un ou plusieurs fiduciaires qui, les tenant séparés de leur patrimoine 
propre, agissent dans un but déterminé au profit d’un ou plusieurs bénéficiaires’. 
259 Crocq 2007, p. 2. 
260 Arts. 2014 and 2015 C.civ, De Roux 2007, p. 23-24. 
261 Art. L511-1 Code monétaire et financier states ‘les établissement de crédit sont des personnes 
morales que effectuent à titre de profession habituelle des opérations de banque au sens de 
l’article L.311-1…’. Kuhn 2007, p. 38-39. 
262 De Roux 2007, p. 23-24, Crocq 2007, p. 2. 
263 Kuhn 2007, p. 32. On fiducia cum creditore see Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
264 Art. 2012 C.civ, De Roux 2007, p. 13, 34, Kuhn 2007, p. 43. 
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the fiducie for both security and management purposes, subject to the same rules.265 
However, how this right of ownership is limited is subject to debate. 
When the right of ownership is transferred for security purposes, security 
ownership arises. This is a right of ownership that is different from a standard right 
of ownership, as the right of ownership must be returned to the debtor at the end of 
the security arrangement and the owner is limited in his powers over the object 
under ownership through the security contract. Senator Marini, who made the 
original proposal for the fiducie, stated that this right of ownership was a form of 
modified ownership.266 Senator De Richemont, who was reporter for the proposal in 
the Senate, qualified the right of ownership as propriété dégradée or degraded owner-
ship.267 In stating this Senator De Richemont wanted to make clear that a fiducie does 
not create a démembrement of the right of ownership, but merely contractually limits 
the owner in his power over his own object.268 
This limitation on the right of ownership is twofold. First, the contract of 
fiducie limits the purpose for which the owner may use the object. As the general 
definition of Article 2011 C.civ provides, the instrument creating the fiducie must 
state the purpose for which it is used. A transfer of ownership for security purposes 
will result in limitations on the right to use, to enjoy and to dispose. Furthermore, 
the contract will also impose a duty of care on the owner to preserve the object.269 
Secondly, the ownership of the fiduciary will be limited in time. Article 2018(2) 
C.civ limits the maximum duration of a fiducie to thirty-three years.270 Therefore, the 
transferee will have a right to the ‘remainder’, which enables him to reclaim the 
right of ownership at the end of the fiducie.271 
The security transfer is made for the benefit of a beneficiary, which will usual-
ly be the transferee himself, but could also be another person. The new statute on 
fiducie imposes no limitations on who can be a beneficiary.272 Because the fiducie is a 
contractual relation between a transferee, known as a constituant, and a fiduciary for 
the benefit of a beneficiary, there could be a situation where there are three parties 
to the contract. As stated before, in case of a transfer for security purposes, the 
fiducie relation usually only concerns two parties. However, when a beneficiary is a 
third party, he will have to agree to the terms of the contract. By analogy to the 
provisions on a contract for the benefit of a third party, consent of the beneficiary is 
 
265 However, the use of a fiducie in the law of succession, is in principle excluded. See Dupichot 
2007, p. 5 et seq. 
266 Or propriété modelée, see Exposé des motifs de la proposition de loi n 178, session 2004-2005, p. 5. 
267 De Richemont 2006, p. 11. 
268 De Richemont 2006, p. 11. In agreement with this conclusion see Crocq 1995, p. 204-206. Of a 
different opinion see Grimaldi 1991a, p. 913-917. 
269 See De Richemont 2006, p. 12. 
270 Originally a term of 99 years had been proposed, connected to the duration of legal persons. 
However, the French government considered 33 years to be sufficiently to provide continuity 
to the institution. See De Roux 2007, p. 31, Dupichot 2007, p. 5 et seq. 
271 See Art. 2029 C.civ. In English law the remainder is the right of the holder of a fee simple who 
has granted a lease to the return of the possession of the object at the end of the lease. See 
Chapter 6; 1.1. Terminology. 
272 Art. 2016 C.civ, De Roux 2007, p. 40-41. 
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not needed for the validity of the contract, but will enable revocation of the 
contract.273 Failure to consent will give the transferee the right to revoke the transfer, 
but will not make the fiducie invalid.274 Consequently, once the contract has been 
agreed to by the beneficiary, the terms are set and can no longer be modified, nor 
revoked.275 
If the fiducie does not result in a démembrement of the right of ownership, 
neither the transferee nor the beneficiary will hold a limited property right.276 A 
beneficiary will therefore only have a personal claim on the fiduciary. In order to 
protect the beneficiary, the fiduciary is under a duty to keep the fiducie objects 
separated from his own patrimony.277 This separation is achieved in French law 
through the creation of a new type of patrimony, the patrimoine d’affectation. As a 
result the fiduciary will hold two patrimonies, one for himself and one for the 
fiducie.278 Consequently, the private creditors of the fiduciary will not be able to 
claim from the patrimoine d’affectation, not even in case of insolvency of the 
fiduciary.279 
In order for a fiducie to be created the contract must mention the objects, rights 
or securities that are transferred.280 When these are future objects, rights, or securi-
ties they must be identifiable.281 Furthermore, the contract must mention the 
duration of the transfer, not exceeding thirty-three years, a description of the 
transferee, fiduciary and beneficiary, or provisions that enable identification of a 
beneficiary and the purpose for which the fiducie is created, including the rights and 
duties of the fiduciary.282 These requirements are strict and when any of these are 
missing, the contract will be void.283 Finally, in order for the contract to remain 
valid, when these requirements are fulfilled, the fiducie must be registered within 
one month in a new special register.284  
The fiducie therefore introduces a transfer of ownership for security purposes 
on all objects, but which can only be created by legal persons, banks, and other 
financial institutions. It results in a transfer of ownership whereby security owner-
ship is created. Although security ownership remains a standard right of ownership 
doctrinally, because of the limitations imposed by the contract of fiducie it can 
hardly be treated as such. 
 
273 Art. 1121 C.civ, Cass. Civ. 1er, 19 December 2000, Bull. Civ. I, No. 333, p. 215, De Roux 2007,  
p. 54. 
274 Art. 2028 C.civ. 
275 Art. 2028 C.civ. 
276 However, see Grimaldi who has argued that the right of ownership of a fiduciaire is not a 
normal right of ownership, see Grimaldi 1991a, p. 914-917 and Grimaldi 1991b, p. 975-981. 
Contra see Crocq 1995, p. 189-206. 
277 Art. 2011 C.civ. 
278 De Roux 2007, p. 10. 
279 Art. 2024 C.civ, Kuhn 2007, p. 40-41. 
280 Dupichot 2007, p. 5 et seq. 
281 Art. 2018(1) C.civ. 
282 Arts. 2018(2), 2018(3), 2018(4), 2018(5) and 2018(6) C.civ. 
283 Art. 2018 C.civ. 
284 Arts. 2019 and 2020 C.civ. Kuhn 2007, p. 35. 
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The same reasoning applies to the other type of fiducie, the fiducie gestion, or 
transfer of ownership for management purposes.285 Here not a security but a 
management contract will limit the ownership of the fiduciary. The choice made by 
the legislature to introduce general articles on the fiducie instead of including it as a 
part of the security law reforms, results in general rules on fiducie, regardless of 
whether it is a transfer for security or management purposes. 
In any case, the introduction of the fiducie provides a general framework for 
transfers for specific purposes. Other types of security transfers that existed before 
the introduction of these general rules, such as the cession Dailly, the opérations de 
pension and the vente à réméré, will therefore also fall under these general provisions 
in the Civil Code as much as possible. They are fiducies innommées, in the words of 
Deputy M. Xavier le Roux, member of the Assemblée National.286 
3. Other Property Rights 
In addition to the right of ownership, French law recognises a set of property rights 
other than ownership. These property rights, known as limited property rights, are 
derived from the right of ownership through a method known in French law as 
démembrement.287 Under this method the powers attributed to the right of ownership 
can be divided into specific parts that can be transferred to another person in the 
form of a limited property right.288 This fragmentation of the right of ownership 
does not lead to multiple concepts of ownership but to the creation of a limited 
property right. In other words, the limited property right comprises a fragment of 
the right of ownership.289  
It is important to recognise the division between the right of ownership on the 
one hand and the limited property rights on the other hand. The choice the drafters 
of the Civil Code made for the absolute, unitary and exclusive right of ownership 
results in the recognition of only one type of ownership as the most extensive 
property right.290 Consequently, any other property relation must be different from 
a right of ownership and must be less in content. In the French system, therefore, 
the right of ownership serves as a model for the other property rights, named 
limited property rights.291 
One of the most debated questions in French law is whether or not the list of 
recognised limited property rights is closed. The debate centres on the interpreta-
tion of Article 543 C.civ, which only recognises the right of ownership, the right of 
 
285 On this type of fiducie see below; 4.5. Fiducie. 
286 De Roux 2007, p. 8. 
287 The term démembrement does not translate well into English. The term is best defined as 
fragmentation or subtraction. See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 587-590, Libchaber 2004, p. 356 et 
seq. 
288 Libchaber uses the term découper which best translates as cut, as in cutting a piece from a pie, 
Libchaber 2004, p. 357. 
289 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 587. 
290 Libchaber 2004, p. 352. 
291 Or droit réels. 
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usufruct and the right of servitude as possible property rights.292 In this debate two 
principal arguments are brought forward. First, the Civil Code of 1804, although 
abolishing feudal property rights that had existed before the French Revolution, still 
had party autonomy at its starting point.293 The limitation of this free will in terms 
of private law party autonomy that would be implied in the decision of the French 
legislature to limit the number and content of property rights is difficult for some to 
accept.294  
Secondly, the Cour de cassation has, over time, recognised some additional 
property rights that are not mentioned by Article 543 C.civ. This includes the 
famous case of Caquelard v Lemoine in which the Cour de cassation recognised a 
situation of co-ownership whereby one person was entitled to the use of trees and 
one to the use of bushes on the same land, fragmenting the right of ownership in a 
way not recognised by the system of the Civil Code.295 In this case the Cour de 
cassation stated in respect to the French system of property rights: 
Considering that in law Articles 544, 546 and 552 C.civ. are declarative of the common 
law in respect to the effects of ownership, but are not prohibitive.; – That neither the 
articles, nor any other Statute, excludes the different modifications and forms the 
normal right of ownership may take.296 
French legal scholarship recognises two categories of property rights: principal and 
accessory rights.297 The principal property rights include the right of ownership and 
its démembrements that grant rights of use to third persons. These rights are property 
rights in respect of an object that are created through the method of démembrement, 
and that are dealt with by book 2 of the Civil Code.298 Accessory property rights 
come into existence to secure a claim and are accessory to an agreement creating a 
debt.299 These rights are not dealt with in book 2 but are situated in, the newly 
introduced, book 4 dealing with security rights. Contrary to the principal property 
rights these rights are not specifically created with regard to an object itself, but 
have as their object the value of the asset.300 The latter is also used to justify why the 
 
292 For a discussion on Art. 543 C.civ see below; 5. A Numerus Clausus in French Property Law? 
293 Or pouvoir de la volonté, see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 42, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 90-91, 
Libchaber 2004, p. 355-357. 
294 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 42-43. 
295 Req. 13 February 1834, D.P. 1834.I.218, S.1834.I.205, see, inter alia, Atias 2005, p. 47-50, 
Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 89-90, Hervieu 1981, p. 57-59. 
296 ‘…; – Attendu en droit que les art. 544, 546 et 552 Cod. Civ., sont déclaratifs du droit commun 
relativement à la nature et aux effets de la propriété, mais ne sont pas prohibitifs; – Que ni ces 
articles, ni aucune autre loi, n’excluent les diverses modifications et décompositions dont le 
droit ordinaire de propriété est susceptible’, Req. 13 February 1834, D.P. 1834.I.218, 
S.1834.I.205. For more on this case and the numerus clausus in French property law below in 5. 
A Numerus Clausus in French Property Law? 
297 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 88-89, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 40-41. 
298 This includes the already mentioned Art. 543 C.civ. 
299 I.e., accessory to a créance, see Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 89. 
300 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 89. 
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property security rights, also named accessory property rights, are not mentioned in 
Article 543 C.civ.301 
Whether or not the list of property rights is closed, remains open for debate.302 
The leading opinion seems to suggest that the list is closed, but its proponents are 
forced to recognise that some extensions have been made over time.303 These 
extensions include both legislative as well as judiciary interference. This section will 
deal with the principal property rights apart from the right of ownership and then 
also discuss the accessory property rights. 
3.1. Real Servitudes 
One of the most important limited property rights in French law is the right of 
servitude.304 The right of servitude especially shows the Roman foundations of the 
system of French property law.305 The concept of servitude is dealt with in Article 
637 C.civ, which states: 
A right of servitude is a charge on an immovable object for the use and utility of an 
immovable object of another owner.306 
Originally, the French Civil Code did not speak of a right of servitude but of a 
service foncier, or land service.307 This different terminology was used to avoid the 
use of the term servitude, which was associated with the feudal system.308 However, 
at the same time the drafters of the Civil Code also recognised the Roman-law, non-
feudal, nature of the rights of servitudes and indeed the title dealing with servi-
tudes mentions both terms.309 
A right of servitude in French law can come into existence in three ways. First 
and foremost, a right of servitude can be created by agreement between parties. 
Secondly, a right of servitude can come into existence through operation of law.310 
Operation of law can include special provisions in the Civil Code or other legisla-
tion, but can also include certain factual circumstances described in the Civil 
 
301 Atias 2005, p. 54-55, Legeais 2006a, p. 422. The French property law handbooks each have 
different parts for the principal property rights characterised under the law of things, or droit 
des biens and the law of securities, or droit des sûretés. 
302 See below; 5. A Numerus Clausus in French Property Law? 
303 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 91, Chabas 1994, No. 1287, p. 4-6. See below; 5. A Numerus Clausus 
in French Property Law? 
304 Traditionally the French handbooks, as well as the Civil Code itself, deal with personal ser-
vitudes before they deal with real servitudes. However, for the purposes of general structure 
in this study, real servitudes will be dealt with before personal servitudes. 
305 See Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 326. 
306 Art. 637 C.civ, ‘Une servitude est une charge imposée sur un héritage pour l’usage et l’utilité 
d’un héritage appartenant à un autre propriétaire’. 
307 See the description used in Art. 543 C.civ. 
308 Chabas 1994, p. 425. 
309 Title IV of Book 2 of the Code civil is named ‘Of servitudes or land services’, in French Des 
servitudes ou des services fonciers. 
310 See Chabas 1994, p. 150 et seq., Terré & Simler 1998, p. 656-657. 
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Code.311 Finally, a right of servitude can come into existence through the decision of 
a court.312 Article 637 C.civ provides a general definition of a right of servitude, after 
which the Civil Code deals with special provisions for each type of servitude. 
The definition used by Article 637 C.civ presupposes that several criteria are 
fulfilled. First, there must be a dominant and a servient piece of land, the servient 
land being that which is encumbered with the right of servitude.313 The existence of 
the right of servitude implies a limitation on the right of ownership of the owner of 
the servient land, in other words, a duty to tolerate something from the owner of 
the dominant land or a prohibition to use the servient land of which he is the owner 
in a certain way. It is most important that the right of servitude is created between 
two pieces of land or between the owners or right-holders of two pieces of land. The 
parties creating and using the right of servitude cannot be bound in their personal 
capacity, but only in their capacity as an owner or right-holder to either the 
dominant or servient land.314 Furthermore, the duty on the servient owner cannot be 
positive in nature. This very fundamental principle, known in Roman law as servitus 
in faciendo consistere nequit, is a restriction to prevent an owner from being bound in 
his personal capacity.315 Under French legal scholarship it is the ownership of the 
land that is burdened with the right of servitude and not the owner himself. If a 
servitude contained a positive duty, the owner himself and not the servient land 
would be forced to do something.316 
Secondly, the right of servitude must be created for the benefit of the 
dominant land itself.317 Not the owner personally, but the owner in his capacity as 
an owner must benefit from the existence of the right of servitude.318 It is therefore 
usually held that the right of servitude must have an objective, at least indirect, 
relation to the use of the dominant land. If more than one owner is involved, and 
there is a situation of co-ownership, then each of the co-owners must benefit from 
the existence of the servitude.319 The requirement of benefit therefore restricts the 
possible servitudes that could be created, for instance, excluding rights to hunt or 
pick fruits, which cannot be a created as a right of servitude.320 However, a right of 
servitude with a non-competition clause has been allowed as a valid right of 
servitude benefiting the owner of the dominant land.321 Like the restriction to 
 
311 Some examples will be provided below in this Section. 
312 Art. 639 C.civ. Although the article does not mention the fourth possibility, a servitude 
arising from a court decision was introduced by the Decree of 4 December 1958 and are now 
in the Code de l’urbanisme, Art. L451-1 s., see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 657, 661-662, Atias 2005, 
p. 325. 
313 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 648-649, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 329-330. 
314 Art. 686 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 649, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 330-331. 
315 On the Roman maxim see Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
316 However, accessory to a negative duty, a positive duty can be recognised. 
317 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 331. 
318 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 649-650, Atias 2005, p. 331, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 331-332. 
319 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 653. 
320 See Art. 686 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 650. 
321 Cass. 15 July 187, Bull. Civ. IV, No. 184, D. 1988, II, 360, see Sagaert 2004b, p. 53-54. See 
Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 334-335. However, French law does not, contrary to German law, 
recognise the application of rights of servitude with a non competition clause for security 
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negative duties, with the situation of the ancien régime in mind, the requirement that 
the dominant land must benefit also limits rights of servitude to the land and not to 
persons themselves. For example, a right to hunt does not benefit the land but the 
owner of the land personally, and therefore cannot be a right of servitude. 
Thirdly, the owner of the dominant land must be a different owner from the 
owner of the servient land. Following the Roman maxim nulli res sua servit, the 
combination of the burden over the ownership of the land and the ownership itself 
leads to the destruction of the right of servitude.322 However, this rule is applied in a 
strict sense and does not apply when, for instance, one of the owners only becomes 
co-owner of the other piece of land.323 The requirement of two different owners 
forms part of the minimum requirements for a right of servitude and cannot be 
deviated from except in circumstances prescribed by law or by agreement that only 
takes effect after one of the pieces of land is sold and transferred to another 
owner.324 
Finally, the right of servitude is linked to the ownership of the dominant land. 
French legal scholarship confusingly brings this under the heading of accessority, 
which is also used to explain how a property security right is connected to the claim 
for performance it seeks to secure. These security rights are known as accessory 
property rights. As long as the ownership of the dominant land exists, the right of 
servitude will remain in existence. A right of servitude in French law therefore has a 
perpetual nature.325 The parties can decide on a shorter duration of the servitude by 
agreement, but in the absence of such agreement the servitude will remain in 
existence. In this respect the right of servitude is accessory to the right of ownership, 
but remains a principal property right.326 
The Civil Code provides a very broad definition of a right of servitude. In 
general, it is for the parties to decide on the content of the property right, as long as 
they stay within the limits of the law. Depending on the agreement between the 
parties, the right of servitude will have a specific name such as a servitude of way, 
of water, of view and of restriction.327 As a specific exception to the rules above, 
French law recognises one type of servitude as imposing a positive burden in the 
form of a right of support.328 Any other positive burden will not take the form of a 
property right, but will remain a mere personal right.329 
 
purposes, known in German as Sicherungsdienstbarkeiten. On the German security servitudes 
see Chapter 4; 3.1. Real Servitude. 
322 Art. 705 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 650-651. 
323 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 651. 
324 See Art. 693 C.civ, that creates a servitude de destination du pêre de famille. Terré & Simler 1998, 
p. 651. 
325 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 652, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 338-339. 
326 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 652-653, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 338-339. On principal and 
accessory property rights see above; 3. Other Property Rights. 
327 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 339-340. 
328 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 649, Chabas 1994, p. 429, Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 8-9, 
Atias 2005, p. 332. 
329 See Sagaert 2004b, p. 56-59. 
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It is the content of the agreement between the parties that becomes the content 
of the right of servitude.330 Article 686 C.civ states in this respect: 
Owners may create on their land or in favour of their land such servitudes as seem fit 
to them, provided however that the duties the servitude creates are not imposed on a 
person, nor in favour of a person, but solely on a piece of land and on behalf of a piece 
of land, and provided that these duties are not contrary to public policy’. 
The use and the extent of the servitude is established by the title that creates it; without 
a title, by the rules following this article.331 
The general prohibition of imposing a positive duty is considered to be implied in 
the requirement not to impose a duty on a person but on a piece of land. It is only a 
person who can perform a positive duty and not a piece of land itself.332 The Cour de 
cassation has been strict in maintaining this restriction. For example, a prohibition 
not to build on a piece of land in order to impose a duty to build was rejected as a 
valid right of servitude.333 The reason for this restriction should be seen in historical 
perspective as a general rejection of the personal duties a person would have had to 
perform under the feudal system.334 The restriction of servitudes to negative 
burdens should therefore be seen as the primary restriction of the freedom for the 
parties creating a right of servitude.  
However, a positive duty that is connected to a negative duty, which itself is 
the subject of a right of servitude, can be allowed.335 The distinction between these 
positive duties that are connected, accessoire, to the right of servitude and those who 
are not is a complicated distinction.336 The exceptions that have been allowed 
include a duty of maintenance of a road in the case of a right of servitude of way, 
but also a duty to mine coal for the exercise of an industrial servitude for a 
glassworks company.337 Furthermore, a duty to repair in case of non-performance 
by the owner of the servient land can also become a connected obligation.338 In these 
cases, the otherwise personal obligation does not become part of the right of 
 
330 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 345-346. 
331 Art. 686 C.civ ‘Il est permis aux propriétaires d’établir sur leurs propriétés, ou en faveur de 
leurs propriétés, telles servitudes que bon leur semble, pourvu néanmoins que les services 
établis ne soient imposés ni à la personne, ni en faveur de la personne, mais seulement à un 
fonds et pour un fonds, et pourvu que ces services n’aient d’ailleurs rien de contraire à 
l’ordre public. L’usage et l’étendue des servitudes ainsi établies se règlent par le titre qui les 
constitue; à défaut de titre, par les règles ci-après’. 
332 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 649, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 332-333. 
333 Cass. Civ. 3e, 6 May 1980, Bull. Civ. III, No. 90. It could, however, constitute a valid personal 
right. Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 346. 
334 It is because of this requirement that a right to hunt or a right to fish cannot be subject of a 
right of servitude, i.e. these rights do not benefit the land but benefit the persons living on the 
land. See Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 330, 333-334, Sagaert 2004b, p. 53. 
335 Another term would be an accessory relation between the negative and the positive duty. 
336 On the debate see Sagaert 2004b, p. 56-59, Sagaert 2004a, No. 16. 
337 Req. 22 February 1814, DP 1881, I, 111 and Cass. Civ. 9 January 1901, DP 1901, I, 451, S. 1901, I, 
169. 
338 See Arts. 701 and 697 C.civ, Aberkane 1957, p. 2, 6, Sagaert 2004b, p. 56-57. 
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servitude but will transfer with the right and will have effect against third parties.339 
They are known as qualitative or real obligations.340 
Although the starting point of Article 686 C.civ remains party autonomy, the 
Cour de cassation has also imposed limitations. Besides the requirement that the right 
must concern two different pieces of land between which there must be an objective 
relation, the requirement of ordre public, or public policy, restricts the parties’ free-
dom. In the case of servitudes created by the parties themselves, the Cour de 
cassation has used a wide concept of public policy. In the view of the court, the con-
cept of public policy includes the provisions following Article 686 C.civ that restrict 
the content of servitudes as well as other provisions in and outside of the Civil 
Code.341 Finally, the Cour de cassation has also restricted the content of a servitude 
that takes away all the powers to use and enjoy of the owner.342 However, a right of 
servitudes that takes away only a part of the powers of an owner is a normal 
servitude and thus allowed.343 
A right of servitude takes effect between the parties creating it from the 
moment of agreement. However, for the enforceability against third parties, particu-
larly against those who acquire the servient piece of land, or the land on which the 
burden runs, registration is required.344 Registration is therefore not a requirement 
for the right of servitude to come into existence, but merely for the opposability 
against third parties. 
An interesting application of the general rules on servitudes is the right of 
servitude created by the pater familias.345 When two pieces of land are in the same 
hand, the owner of these two pieces may create a factual situation, in French known 
as the destination du père de famille or purpose of the pater familias, resembling the 
exercise of a right of servitude, for instance, of a waterway or a view.346 The factual 
situation must be visible to the outside world in order to have effect after one of the 
pieces of land is transferred to another owner. When these requirements have been 
fulfilled and the ownership of one of the pieces of land is transferred to another 
person, the effect is the immediate creation of a right of servitude on behalf of the 
new owner. Prior to the separation of the two pieces of land, a right of servitude 
 
339 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 332. 
340 See below; 4.2. Real Obligations. 
341 Examples are the law of neighbours and environmental law, see Malaurie & Aynès 2005,  
p. 346. 
342 Or: a right of servitude may not exclude an owner, see Cass. Civ. 3e, 24 May 2000, Bull. Civ. 
III, No. 113, D. 2001.151, with a note by R. Libchaber. Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 338, 346. 
343 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 346 and Libchaber in his note under Cass. Civ. 3e, 24 May 2000, D. 
2001, 151, p. 153. 
344 The acquirer of the dominant land, i.e. the ownership of land to which the right the servitude 
grants is connected, will usually benefit from the right of servitude also without registration. 
Cass. 27 October 1993, Bull. Civ. IIIème, No. 132, p. 86, contra see Carbonnier 2000, p. 265-266. 
Although, if the acquirer did know of the existence of the right of servitude, he is also bound 
by it, see Cass. Civ. 17 July 1918, DP, 1918.I.71, see Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 339. 
345 See Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 350 et seq. 
346 Art. 692 C.civ, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 350. 
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cannot exist. The requirement of two separate pieces of land with different owners 
resists a right of servitude coming into being.347  
Besides the servitudes created by the parties themselves, a right of servitude in 
French law can also come into existence by operation of law.348 These rights are, to a 
large extent, considered property rights and therefore have effect against third 
parties. However, because they are rights arising by operation of law, registration is 
not required for third party effect.349 French legal scholarship divides these servi-
tudes into two categories; natural and legal servitudes.350  
Natural servitudes are those servitudes that come into existence by force of 
law when a specific factual situation between two pieces of land arises. These 
servitudes primarily deal with a situation in which one owner must allow water 
from another piece of land to run over his land.351 Such a factual situation can occur 
when one of the pieces of land is located higher than the other piece of land. 
Naturally the water from the higher piece of land will flow over the lower piece. 
The owner of the lower piece of land must therefore tolerate the flow of water and 
may not block it.352 A factual situation between two pieces of land may also give rise 
to a right of an owner to oblige another owner to set the boundaries between their 
respective pieces of land.353 Furthermore, each owner is also entitled to enclose his 
land with a fence or wall, which must be tolerated by the other owner.354 Although 
these latter two situations are dealt with under the heading of servitudes, they 
technically do not give rise to the creation of a right of servitude. It is only the 
factual situation that is similar, the two pieces of land neighbouring each other, but 
not the rights arising from it.355  
The second category contains the legal servitudes. These rights of servitude 
come into existence by operation of law and can, in their turn, be divided into two. 
Article 649 C.civ states: 
Rights of servitude created by law are for the public or communal purposes, or for 
private purposes’356 
The legal servitudes for private purposes deal to a large extent with the law of  
co-ownership, particularly common walls and ditches.357 These provisions do not 
 
347 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 352-353. 
348 Or just by one party. A right of servitude can also be created through a last will or testament. 
See Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 345-346. 
349 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 339. 
350 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 192. 
351 Art. 640 C.civ, Cass. Civ. Ier 1 June 1965, Bull. Civ. 1965, I, No. 362, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 656. 
352 Art. 640 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 215-218. 
353 Known as bornage, see Art. 646 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 195-199, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, 
p. 287-288. 
354 Known as clôture, see Art. 647 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 199- 203, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, 
p. 288-289. 
355 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 201. 
356 Art. 649 C.civ, ‘Les servitudes établies par la loi ont pour objet l’utilité publique ou com-
munale, ou l’utilité des particuliers’. 
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create a right of servitude, there is no dominant or servient piece of land and their 
place in the Civil Code is therefore criticised.358 However, four other situations are 
recognised which do create a right of servitude by force of law.359 French legal 
scholarship deals with these situations in the law of neighbours and not the law of 
servitudes.360 They include a duty to keep a distance from the border of the land in 
order to prevent nuisance to a neighbour, a duty to refrain from having drain water 
flow onto the land of a neighbour, a right of view over a neighbours land, and the 
right to a way out from an enclosed piece of land.361 The last servitude is of 
particular interest. When a piece of land is enclosed by other pieces of land so that 
no public space, usually a road, can be reached without going over one of the en-
closing pieces of land, a legal servitude comes into existence enabling the enclosed 
owner to have a way to the public space, subject to payment of compensation.362 
Furthermore, even if there is a way to the public space but this way is not suitable 
for its regular agricultural, industrial or commercial purpose, a legal servitude may 
come into existence.363 Furthermore, the legal servitude does not only apply for a 
right of way for human traffic, but can also come into existence for pipes or 
waterways.364 
Although the legal servitude runs on the land of the neighbour and therefore, 
as a limited property right, burdens the full ownership of that neighbour, the legal 
servitude may only be exercised in relation to its purpose. The way of exercise of 
the servitude, in particular the exact place where it has to be exercised, may either 
be agreed on by the parties themselves or, in case of dispute, by a court decision.365 
Furthermore, continuous use of a legal servitudes can also set the content, for 
example, through the uninterrupted use of a certain path for thirty years, the exact 
location where the legal servitude runs can be determined.366 However, the way to 
the public space must be found in a way that causes the least amount of damage to 
the servient land.367 
Finally, the second type of legal servitudes, those for public purposes, should 
be mentioned. These servitudes are used for those pieces of land that serve a public 
benefit, such as roads or public transmission lines, including electricity or telecom-
 
357 Which includes a wall placed under a natural servitude, Art. 647 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998,  
p. 202-203, 650. 
358 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 650, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 343-344. 
359 This includes section I of chapter II of title IV on servitudes of the Civil Code. Terré & Simler 
1998, p. 203-208. 
360 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 192-194. 
361 Respectively Arts. 674, 675, 681 and 682 C.civ. On the right of view: this right restricts a 
neighbour putting up a wall. See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 206-207. 
362 Art. 682 C.civ. 
363 Originally the text of Art. 682 C.civ only used the agricultural purpose. However, by Loi du 
20 août 1881 the industrial purpose and by Loi du 30 décembre 1967 the commercial purpose 
were added. See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 209. 
364 Cass. 22 November 1937, D. 1938, 62, note M. Voirin. Such lines may also run above the land, 
see Cass. 24 February 1930 DP 1932.1.9. note Besson. 
365 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 211. 
366 Art. 685 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 211. 
367 Art. 683 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 212. 
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munication.368 Apart from two provisions in the Civil Code, these servitudes are 
dealt with by public law regulations.369 Although these rights are dealt with under 
the heading of servitudes, they are considered different from any of the other rights 
of servitude.370 There is no dominant land, but a public legal person who serves in 
this function and, one of the most fundamental principles of the law of servitudes, 
the prohibition of imposing a positive duty, does not apply for legal servitudes for a 
public purpose.371 Nevertheless, these servitudes burden the ownership of the 
owner over whose land the servitude runs, and therefore should be mentioned. 
3.2. Personal Servitudes 
From the perspective of some legal systems the term personal servitude is a contra-
diction in terms. After the abolition of the feudal system, the general idea developed 
that persons were no longer bound by property rights other than in their capacity as 
right-holder of an object on which a property right was created. Because of this the 
rule against positive duties in case of real servitudes is strongly applied. The term 
personal servitude was taken from Roman law without a reference to the feudal 
system and refers to a property right that is held by a person not in his capacity as 
right-holder to an object.372 
The category of personal servitudes contains the right of usufruct and, derived 
from the right of usufruct, rights of use and habitation.373 Different from a right of 
real servitude, which is created on a piece of land on behalf of an owner of that 
land, personal servitudes are created on an object on behalf of a person in his 
personal capacity, in other words, not in the capacity of holder of a property right in 
respect of that object. However, and herein lies the difficulty, personal servitudes 
are property rights and therefore have effect against third parties.374 The result of 
this personal nature is a connection between the property right and the person who 
holds the property right. Therefore in general the maximum duration a personal 
servitude exists is the life of the person on whose behalf the right is created.375  
The right of usufruct is the most important right amongst the personal 
servitudes. It is created either by operation of law, resulting in a legal usufruct, or 
by a private act, usually a gift or a testament.376 Legal usufructs include specific 
situations in the law of succession, which are very common, but also a right of 
 
368 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 234-235, 237, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 363. 
369 Arts. 649 and 650 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 234-235, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 364. 
370 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 238. 
371 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 238-239. 
372 On the Roman law category of personal servitudes see Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights.  
373 Recueil des lois composant le code civil, Livre Deuxième. Des Biens et des différent Modifi-
cations de la Propriété, 1804, p. 117 et seq.  
374 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 254-256, Atias 2005, p. 143. 
375 See Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 252-253, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 591. 
376 Furthermore, a right of usufruct can also be created through acquisitive prescription. 
Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 595, 261, Atias 2005, p. 145. 
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parents over objects owned by their minor children.377 Moreover, there is the right 
of usufruct created by a private party. The right of usufruct is explicitly dealt with 
by the Civil Code, which states in Article 578 C.civ:  
The right of usufruct is the right to use and enjoy an object of another in the same way 
as an owner himself, but on the condition that the substance of the object is pre-
served.378 
A right of usufruct, which finds its basis in Roman law, is a démembrement of the 
right of ownership and comprises the right to use and enjoy, the usus and fructus, of 
the owner.379 Traditionally, the right of usufruct has always been considered not to 
comprise the right of disposal, the abusus, which consequently remains with the 
owner.380 In modern French scholarship, however, the view is also defended that the 
holder of a right of usufruct may dispose of the objects under usufruct in so far as 
this is in line with the purpose for which the objects are to be used.381  
In any case, the right of ownership that remains after a right of usufruct is 
created is deprived of most of its elements. French legal scholarship therefore 
describes the ownership that remains after a right of usufruct has been created as 
bare ownership or nue-propriété.382 Consequently, the right of ownership is not 
complete until the right of usufruct ceases to exist.383 It is of great importance that 
the right of usufruct is temporary. Should the right of usufruct be perpetual, it 
would revive the situation of fragmented ownership from the ancien régime.384 In 
general, a right of usufruct is created for the duration of a person’s life, in case of a 
legal person, for a maximum of thirty years.385 Nevertheless, a specific agreement on 
the duration of a usufruct can be made, but the death of the usufructuary will end 
the usufruct in any case.386 
Although the existence of a right of usufruct is connected to a person, the right 
can be transferred to another person, except if otherwise agreed upon.387 However, 
the existence of the right will remain connected to the person to whom it was 
 
377 See Arts. 767 and 1094 C.civ on the law of succession, as well as Art. 382 C.civ on the legal 
usufruct of parents. Terré & Simler 1998, p. 596. 
378 Article 578 C.civ, ‘L’usufruit est le droit de jouir des choses dont un autre a la propriété, 
comme le propriétaire lui-même, mais à la charge d’en conserver la substance’. 
379 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 250, 256, Vareilles-Sommières 1905, p. 449. Different see 
Carbonnier 2000, No. 104, p. 180-181. 
380 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 607-608, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 256. 
381 Dockès 1995, p. 479 et seq. In respect to the same development in Belgian law see Verbeke 
1999, p. 530 et seq. 
382 Or nue-propriété, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 591. 
383 See Art. 617 C.civ, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 253. 
384 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 253. 
385 Art. 619 C.civ, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 254. 
386 Ch. Réunies, 16 June 1933, DH., 1933.393, see Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 254, Terré & Simler 
1998, p. 630-631. 
387 Art. 595 C.civ, A transfer of a right of usufruct occurs very often in legal practice. Terré & 
Simler 1998, p. 616-617. 
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granted first.388 In this way the original usufructuary and the bare owner remain 
connected, including the liability of the original usufructuary in certain situations.389 
The right of usufruct can be created on all objects, whether movable, immova-
ble, corporeal or incorporeal, as well as on certain sets of objects as an estate or a 
fonds de commerce.390 The Civil Code requires two obligations from the future holder 
of a right of usufruct. First, an inventory of the objects that will be under the right of 
usufruct has to be made.391 Usually this inventory will be part of the document 
creating the right of usufruct, for instance, of a testament or of an agreement. 
Secondly, the holder of a usufruct is forced to appoint a surety for payments the 
usufructuary would have to make pursuant to the compliance with his obliga-
tions.392 When the right of usufruct is created on an immovable object, it will have to 
be registered in order to have effect against third parties who acquire the immova-
ble object.393 One of the most important requirements is duty for the usufructuary to 
preserve the object under usufruct. This requirement restricts the usufructuary in 
his freedom to dispose of the object under usufruct. At the end of the right of 
usufruct, the object must be returned to the bare owner, who will then become full 
owner of it.  
Until the right of usufruct ceases to exist, French legal scholarship considers 
the bare ownership and the usufruct as two distinct property rights that can be 
transferred independent of each other.394 However, at the same time both rights are 
linked to each other through the existence of the right of usufruct. After all, the bare 
owner may expect to become full owner again at the end of the usufruct, which 
includes the return of the object under usufruct.  
The holder of a usufruct is under the obligation to take care of the objects 
under usufruct as a good pater familias, which includes the aforementioned obliga-
tion to maintain the objects. Furthermore this obligation contains the duty to pre-
serve the purpose for which the objects are used.395 The standard of the pater familias 
imposes several obligations on the usufructuary, which include the prevention of 
deterioration of the objects, unless they are destroyed without his fault, and the 
duty to protect the object under usufruct from interference from third parties, 
including a duty to notify the owner when such interference concerns the right of 
ownership itself.396 Furthermore, the usufructuary takes over the obligations of the 
owner in respect of the use and enjoyment of the object. This includes the payment 
 
388 Cass. Civ. 3eme 26 January 1972, D. 1975, p. 22, JCP 1972, éd. G, II, 17104. 
389 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 617. 
390 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 597-598, 600, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 258-259. 
391 Art. 600 C.civ, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 262, Atias 2005, p. 157. 
392 Art. 601 C.civ, Cass. Civ. 5 February 1897, DP 1897, 1, 601, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 262, 
Atias 2005, p. 157. 
393 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 597-598, 645. 
394 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 593-594, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 255, Atias 2005, p. 147. 
395 Art. 601 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 618, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 266-268, Atias 2005,  
p. 150-153. 
396 Arts. 614 and 605 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 620, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 268-269, Atias 
2005, p. 154-155. 
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of taxes, loans and maintenance, but also the costs of a common wall or serious 
repairs.397 However, extraordinary costs are for the account of the owner.398  
The holder of a right of usufruct who fulfils his obligations is entitled to use 
and enjoy the object under usufruct as well as to take the fruits from that object. 
Fruits are those objects that are periodically produced from the object under 
usufruct.399 In this respect French legal scholarship distinguishes between fruits and 
products, the former to which the usufructuary is entitled, the latter are for the bare 
owner. The distinction between fruits and products is made by the criterion of 
objects periodically produced. If an object periodically produces the same kind of 
objects, these are known as fruits.400 An object that is not produced periodically is 
not a fruit but a product. This distinction is subject to alteration by the agreement 
between parties. An object produced by an object under usufruct might be seen as 
product, for instance, branches from trees in a forest, but when periodically cut in 
the course of a business exercised with the right of usufruct, they become fruits, 
regardless of whether they are cut by the bare owner or the holder of the right of 
usufruct.401 
In respect of fruits French legal scholarship distinguishes three types: natural, 
industrial and civil.402 Natural fruits are those objects produced by nature, such as 
fruits from a tree. Industrial fruits are those objects that are produced with the help 
of man, such as a garden or a vineyard.403 Civil fruits are those periodic proceeds 
from an object that are paid by third parties, such as the payment for a lease of the 
object under usufruct. Finally, as the object under usufruct can be movable, immov-
able, corporeal and incorporeal, the fruits the object produces differ depending on 
the nature of the object.404 
The duty to preserve the object under usufruct limits the right to those objects 
that do not perish by their nature.405 The creation of a right of usufruct on those 
objects would result in a situation where the usufructuary would be unable to take 
care of the objects and return them to the owner at the end of the usufruct. After all, 
the abusus, the power of disposal, which includes the power to consume the object, 
has traditionally not been considered to be part of a right of usufruct, but is 
considered to be left with the bare owner.406 However, modern French legal scholar-
ship accepts the possibility for a holder of a right of usufruct to transfer objects.407 
This view focuses on the purpose for which the objects are given in usufruct. When, 
by making use of the objects, for instance, by trading them, the purpose of the 
 
397 Art. 608 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 621. 
398 Art. 609 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 621, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 268. 
399 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 95, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 49-51. 
400 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 95-96, 608-610, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 49-50. 
401 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 96. 
402 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 95, 610, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, 49, 263. 
403 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 95, 610. 
404 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 610-613. 
405 In French known as consomptibles, see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 598, Malaurie & Aynès 2005,  
p. 258-259. 
406 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 598. 
407 Dockès 1995, p. 479 et seq. 
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usufruct can be fulfilled, the power of the holder of the usufruct to transfer objects is 
accepted.408 
However, on objects that perish by their nature, a right of usufruct cannot be 
created. On these objects, French law, following the Roman law example, recognises 
a quasi-usufruct.409 Like in Roman law, a quasi-usufruct in French law is actually a 
transfer of ownership with the duty to return, at the end of the quasi-usufruct, 
similar objects to the original owner.410 In this respect Article 587 C.civ states: 
When a right of usufruct is created on objects which cannot be used without being 
consumed, such as money, grain, liquors, the usufructuary has a right to use them, but 
with the obligation, at the end of the usufruct, to return either objects of the same 
quantity and quality or their value estimated at the date or return.411 
The possibility to create a quasi-usufruct enables parties to include perishable 
objects into their construction. It can therefore be used as a right combined, accesso-
ry, to a normal right of usufruct.412 In such a legal construction, those objects that 
are not perishable fall under the normal right of usufruct, and the perishable objects 
fall under the quasi-usufruct. 
A slightly different but comparable situation can arise when a right of usufruct 
is created on a fonds de commerce. The holder of the right of usufruct will have the 
power to use and enjoy the objects that are not perishable, but will be owner of 
those which are perishable.413 Because of the general nature of a fonds de commerce, 
the right created in it is a normal right of usufruct, preventing the usufructuary 
from disposing of the fonds de commerce itself.414 Any new object entering the fonds de 
commerce will be subject to the right of usufruct, as the right is created on the fonds 
itself, and not on the specific objects. The new object will then substitute the object 
that has left the fonds.415 
Apart from the right of usufruct, the category of personal servitudes also 
includes the rights of use and habitation. These rights very closely resemble the 
right of usufruct, but are less in content.416 They are created and also cease to exist in 
the same way as the right of usufruct, but are not as often used.417 Furthermore, 
these rights are created on behalf of a person intuitu personae, or not in his capacity 
as a right-holder to a property right.  
 
408 It is not entirely clear whether all French property law authors have taken over this view. See, 
e.g., Terré & Simler 1998, p. 598. 
409 See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
410 Zentati 2001, p. 605 et seq. 
411 Art. 587 C.civ, ‘Si l’usufruit comprend des choses dont on ne peut faire usage sans les con-
sommer, comme l’argent, les grains, les liqueurs, l’usufruitier a le droit de s’en servir, mais à 
la charge de rendre, à la fin de l’usufruit, soit des choses de même quantité et qualité soit leur 
valeur estimée à la date de la restitution’. 
412 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 599-601. 
413 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 600-601, Carbonnier 2000, p. 181-182. 
414 Cass. Civ. 13 December 1842, S. 1843, 1, p. 22, see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 601. 
415 Known in French law as subrogation réelle, see, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 600-601. 
416 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 641, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 275. 
417 Art. 625 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 641-642. 
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The right of use does not include a right to take the fruits the object produces, 
except for those fruits that the right-holder and his family need.418 The right of 
habitation is a specific right for a person to live in a house, to use a house, or to use 
a part of a house with their family.419 The articles of the Civil Code on the right of 
usufruct apply to the rights of use and habitation in as much the same way as 
possible.420 However, differences exist. The rights of use and habitation are strictly 
personal and cannot be transferred or leased to another person.421 Because these 
rights cannot be transferred they can also not be made subject of a security property 
right, such as a right of hypothec.422 Finally, the Cour de cassation has, pursuant to 
the impossibility of transferring or burdening these rights, declared these rights 
incapable of seizure.423  
3.3. Superficies 
Like its Roman law equivalent, the right of superficies is a right to have ownership of 
an immovable object on someone else’s land.424 The ownership of an immovable 
object on someone else’s land, without the ownership of that land, is difficult. 
French law adheres to the principle of superficies solo cedit, which results in a 
situation where the person who owns the land owns any immovable object on that 
land.425 In this respect Article 552 C.civ states:  
Ownership of land includes ownership of that what is below or above it. 
An owner may place any plantations or constructions on his land which he deems fit, 
save for exceptions in the title on servitudes. 
He may make any such excavations or constructions under the ground as he deems fit, 
and take from these excavations all products which they provide, save the limitations 
resulting from statutes and regulations on mines, and police statutes and regulations.426 
It is the right of superficies that allows a deviation from this rule, separating the 
ownership of the land from the ownership of the constructions or plants above or 
 
418 Art. 630 C.civ, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 275-276. 
419 Art. 633 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 643, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 277. 
420 See Arts. 625, 626, and 627 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 644. 
421 Arts. 631 and 634 C.civ, Cass. Civ. 3ème 3 January 1978, Bull. Civ. III, No. 3, p. 3, Terré & Simler 
1998, p. 645, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 276. 
422 On the right of hypothec see below; 3.6. Hypothec, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 646. 
423 Cass. Civ. 5 August 1878, DP 1879, 1, p. 75, see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 646. 
424 See, inter alia, Beudant 1938, p. 60, Sagaert 2006, p. 37. 
425 See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 279, Terré & Simler 
1998, p. 714. 
426 Art. 552 C.civ, ‘La propriété du sol emporte la propriété du dessus et du dessous. Le 
propriétaire peut faire au-dessus toutes les plantations et constructions qu’il juge à propos, 
sauf les exceptions établies au titre “Des servitudes ou services fonciers“. Il peut faire au-
dessous toutes les constructions et fouilles qu’il jugera à propos, et tirer de ces fouilles tous 
les produits qu’elles peuvent fournir, sauf les modifications résultant des lois et règlements 
relatifs aux mines, et des lois et règlements de police’. 
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below it.427 Under the ancien régime, the right of superficies was used to allow 
multiple owners of the same object each with a different type of ownership.428 
Patault has shown that under the influence of customary laws especially the Cour de 
cassation continued to apply pre-Revolutionary multiple rights of ownership, or 
propriétés simultanées.429 In particular in a situation where an object is situated on a 
piece of land, the ownership of the land would also comprise the ownership of that 
object.430 With the use of the concept of co-ownership the Cour de cassation managed 
to continue to apply these customary principles.431 The court generally held that the 
owner of such an object would be co-owner, as well as the owner of the land, who 
would also be characterised as a co-owner. Patault shows that only from 1858 
onwards the Cour de cassation abandoned its doctrine of co-ownership and recog-
nised a separate property right enabling the right-holder to have a separate and 
distinct right of ownership from the owner of the land.432 This change in approach 
of the Cour de cassation enabled the use of a singular and unitary concept of owner-
ship, which either rests on the object on the land or on the land itself. It is from this 
perspective that Article 553 C.civ should be read433:  
Any construction, plantations or works on or within a piece of land are presumed to be 
made by the owner, at his expense and in his ownership, if the contrary is not proven; 
Without prejudice to the ownership which a third party has acquired or could acquire 
by prescription, whether of a basement under the building of another, or of any part of 
the building.434 
The right of superficies separates the ownership of an object, known as superficiaire, 
from the ownership of a piece of land on which it is constructed, known as 
tréfonds.435 A right created, usually by agreement, forms the proof that the owner-
ship of the construction, plantation or work is in different hands than the ownership 
of the land.436 In the absence of such an agreement the owner of the land will 
become owner of the constructions placed on his land by a third party through 
application of Article 552 C.civ.437 Therefore, the right of superficies can, although 
 
427 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 279, Chabas 1994, p. 16, Larroumet 2004, p. 439. 
428 See Patault 1989, p. 85-86, 252-254. 
429 On the term propriétés simultanées see Patault 1989, p. 15. Patault 1983, p. 217 et seq. 
430 Or superficies solo cedit, see Art. 552 C.civ. 
431 This includes the application of Art. 815 C.civ to these cases. Patault 1983, p. 224-226, Terré & 
Simler 1998, p. 711. 
432 Civ. 18 May 1858, S. 58.1.661, Patault 1983, p. 234. 
433 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 712-714, Sagaert 2006, p. 37, Bertrel 1994, p. 768. 
434 Art. 553 C.civ, ‘Toutes constructions, plantations et ouvrages sur un terrain ou dans l’inté-
rieur sont présumés faits par le propriétaire à ses frais et lui appartenir, si le contraire n’est 
prouvé; sans préjudice de la propriété qu’un tiers pourrait avoir acquise ou pourrait acquérir 
par prescription soit d’un souterrain sous le bâtiment d’autrui, soit de toute autre partie du 
bâtiment’. 
435 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 710. 
436 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 710-712, Carbonnier 2000, p. 332. 
437 Although reimbursement or compensation must be paid, see Art. 555 C.civ, see Carbonnier 
2000, p. 333-335. 
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this has been debated in the past, be seen as a horizontal démembrement of the right 
of ownership.438 
More complicated has been the classification of a right of superficies created on 
a piece of land where no construction, plantation or work has yet been placed. In 
this respect, the already existing right of ownership of the land could not be subject 
to a démembrement.439 However, a group of authors, in particular Bertrel, see the 
right of superficies as a right to build on the land of another as well as a right of 
ownership on those constructions.440 They consider the right to build as part of the 
right of superficies. The majority of authors seems to follow this view.441 
A right of superficies can be created either by agreement or come into existence 
through prescription.442 Without any other agreement the right of superficies will be 
perpetual.443 Because the right awards the right-holder a right of ownership, in 
principle for an unlimited period, the right cannot cease to exist through the non-
use of the right.444 Furthermore, the right of superficies can be subject to the creation 
of a right of hypothec.445 
The possibility to create a right of superficies by agreement is specifically clear 
in the context of other agreements of which the right of superficies is a result. The 
best illustration is offered by a contract of lease of an immovable object. When an 
owner leases his land to a lessee, who subsequently erects a building or construction 
on that land within his general rights to use the leased land, the lessee will become 
owner of the building or construction for the duration of the lease agreement.446 A 
similar rule applies for a right-holder of a right of emphyteusis.447 In general the 
owner of the land will become owner of the building or construction upon the end 
of the agreement which gave rise to the right of superficies.448 
 
438 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 698, 712-714, interestingly Carbonnier uses the term vertical 
démembrement, see Carbonnier 2000, p. 332. 
439 Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 237-239, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 712-714, on the doctrinal 
discussion on the subject see Bertrel 1994, p. 758-761. 
440 Bertrel 1994, p. 770 et seq., Carbonnier 2000, p. 339-340, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 281, 283. 
441 See Carbonnier 2000, p. 339-340, Larroumet 2004, p. 448-449, different see Bertrel 1994, p. 769 
et seq. 
442 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 714-715. 
443 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 713, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 282, Sagaert 2006, p. 38. 
444 Req. 5 November 1866, DO 1867, 1, 32 and Req. 27 April 1891, DP 1892, 1, p. 219, S. 1891, 1,  
p. 369. Although the decisions are criticised, see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 713, in particular note 
2. On the impossibility to lose a right of ownership through prescription see above; 2.1. 
Ownership. 
445 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 713, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 282-283. 
446 Cass. Civ. 1er 1 December 1964, JCP 1965, éd. G., II, 14213, Bull. Civ. I, No. 535, D. 1965, p. 473. 
See Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 281-282, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 714-715, Bertrel 1994, p. 762-
763. 
447 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 715. On the right of emphyteusis see below; 3.4. Emphyteusis. 
448 See Art. 555 C.civ, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 716-717. 
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3.4. Emphyteusis 
The right of emphyteusis, like the right of superficies, has been connected to frag-
mented ownership that existed under the ancien régime. Under the ancien régime the 
right of emphyteusis, a property right allowing a person to use a piece of land for a 
long duration of time, awarded dominium utile to the right-holder.449 Particularly in 
relation to the feudal system of landholding, in which a person in his personal 
capacity would be bound to a piece of land with the use of the legal construction of 
emphyteusis, the right would often be constructed as a perpetual right.450 With the 
French Revolution and the abolition of the feudal system, all land charges, 
including the emphyteusis were abolished.451  
It is for this reason that the Civil Code does not mention the right of 
emphyteusis in its enumeration of property rights in Article 543 C.civ or in any other 
Article in the Code.452 Nevertheless, the Cour de cassation continued to recognise the 
right of emphyteusis under the name emphytéose or bail emphytéotique, and character-
ised it as a property right in respect of the object of another.453 However, it was not 
until 25 June 1902 that the legislature formally recognised the existence of the right 
of emphyteusis in French law.454 Following the case law of the Cour de cassation the 
legislature introduced a definition in Article 451-1 of the Code rural: 
The right of emphyteusis on immovable objects gives the holder a property right suscep-
tible of a right of hypothec; the right may be transferred or seized according to the 
rules on the seizure of immovable objects. 
The right can be agreed upon for a minimum of 18 years and may not exceed 99 years; 
it may not be tacitly renewed.455 
The right of emphyteusis is created by a contract and may last for a maximum of 
ninety-nine years. In order to avoid confusion with a normal right of lease, the right 
of emphyteusis is explicitly characterised as a property right.456 The proprietary 
 
449 Because of the long duration, the right of emphyteusis is also known as long lease, in French 
bail emphytéotique. On the ancien régime see Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights, Patault 1983, 
p. 218, Patault 1989, p. 167-168. 
450 Patault 1989, p. 169, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 699-700. 
451 In particular by Loi du 17 juillet 1793, see Patault 1989, p. 168-169. On the French Revolution 
see Chapter 2; 5. Natural Law and the French Revolution.  
452 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 700. 
453 Or droit réel immobilier portant sur la chose d’autrui, see Terré & Simler 1998, p. 699-700, Crocq 
1995, p. 200, Cass. Civ. 24 August 1857, DP 1857, I, p. 326, Cass. Civ. 26 January 1864, DP 1864, 
I, 83. 
454 Loi du 25 juin 1902 introduced Art. 937, which later by Décret No. 83-212 du 16 mars 1983 
became Art. 451-1 of the Code rural. See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 700. In the new version of the 
Code rural, which entered into force on 1 January 2008, the Articles dealing with the right of 
emphyteusis remain the same. 
455 Art. 451-1 Code rural, ‘Le bail emphytéotique de biens immeubles confère au preneur un droit 
réel susceptible d’hypothèque; ce droit peut être cédé et saisi dans les formes prescrites pour 
la saisie immobilière. Ce bail doit être consenti pour plus de dix-huit années et ne peut 
dépasser quatre-vingt-dix-neuf ans; il ne peut se prolonger par tacite reconduction’. 
456 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 101-102. 
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nature of the right has been the subject of debate in the past, but leading opinion as 
well as case law and legislation have confirmed its status as a property right.457 
Furthermore, the provision stating that it may not be tacitly renewed is intended to 
force the parties to make an express agreement on the renewal of the right.458 Once 
the right is created it awards the right-holder rights and obligations very similar to 
those of an owner. Like a right of usufruct, the right-holder, or emphyteuticarius, is 
entitled to the use and enjoyment, the usus and fructus, of the object.459 However, 
unlike a holder of a right of usufruct, the holder of a right of emphyteusis is entitled 
to alter the purpose for which the object is used. Furthermore, he is entitled to take 
the fruits and also has the rights to fish or to hunt.460 
Since the Code rural entitles the right-holder to create a right of hypothec and a 
right to transfer the right, the creation of other property rights, such as a right of 
servitude, is also held possible.461 Furthermore, it is, as the Code rural provides, the 
right-holder who takes advantage of the accession of new buildings or constructions 
for the duration of the property right.462 The result of this advantage is that the 
right-holder becomes owner of the constructions, plantings or works, made on the 
object of his right for the duration of the property right through the application of 
the rules on the right of superficies.463 Finally, the right-holder also has a right to 
change the way in which the object is used.464  
Unlike a right of usufruct, the right of emphyteusis is not connected to a person 
in their personal capacity. The right therefore does not cease to exist upon death of 
the right-holder and will continue to exist until the end of the period agreed upon 
or the destruction or expropriation of the object under emphyteusis.465 Furthermore, 
the right can also come to an end by rescission of the contract creating the property 
right.  
Apart from a right of usufruct, the right of emphyteusis resembles a contract of 
lease. Although a normal lease, also of rural areas, only confers personal rights and 
obligations to the right-holder, a right of emphyteusis resembles a lease because it is 
created by contract and confers similar rights and obligations on the right-holder. 
However, beyond those rights and obligations, the holder of a right of emphyteusis 
also holds a right that takes effect against the whole world.  
Like a normal lease agreement, the right of emphyteusis is usually agreed upon 
in exchange for a payment of money, known as canon. Violation of this obligation 
can entitle the owner to rescind the agreement. Furthermore, the holder of a right of 
 
457 See Aubry, Rau & Bartin 1935, Paras. 224bis stating it is a contract, see Beudant 1938, p. 57 
stating it is a property right. For modern references see Carbonnier 2000, p. 296-297, Atias 
2005, 309-311. 
458 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 701. 
459 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 699, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 101, Atias 2005, p. 309. 
460 Art. 451-11 Code rural, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 701. 
461 Art. 451-9 Code rural, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 701. 
462 Art. 451-10 Code rural, see also Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 101, Carbonnier 2000, p. 296-297. 
463 Cass. Req. 22 June 1885, DP 1886, I, p. 268, Cass. Civ. 23 November 1954, Bull. Civ. I, No. 331. 
On the applicability of the right of superficies see above; 3.3. Superficies. 
464 Carbonnier 2000, p. 296. 
465 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 702. 
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emphyteusis is also under the obligation to make repairs to the object. The holder of 
the right will be bound to those obligations by nature of the property right but also 
through the existence of the contract agreed. When the owner manages to rescind 
the contract, the contract and with it the right of emphyteusis, will come to an end.466 
Finally, because the right of emphyteusis is a property right in respect of an 
immovable object, it must be registered in order to have affect against third parties. 
Like a right of servitude, the right will come into existence between the parties at 
the moment of agreement, but for third-party effect registration is required. Conse-
quently, registration is also used in case the right is transferred or made subject of 
the creation of another property right.467 
A special type of emphyteusis is in the bail à construction or construction lease.468 
In 1964 the legislature introduced this special right which was later implemented in 
the Code de la construction et de l’habitation.469 The construction lease is a property 
right imposing a duty on the right-holder to build.470 Like the right of emphyteusis 
the construction lease is created by contract for a minimum duration of eighteen 
years and a maximum duration of ninety-nine years, with the possibility to renew 
the contract.471 The contract will deal with the ownership of the existing buildings as 
well as the buildings that are to be constructed. Without any agreement the right-
holder of the construction lease will become owner of the building he constructed 
until the end of the construction lease agreement.472 The rules on the construction 
lease further resemble those on the right of emphyteusis. This includes the possibility 
to create a right of hypothec or other property rights such as servitudes on the right 
of emphyteusis. The right can be transferred as well as seized, and the object that is 
built may be leased to another party.473  
Differently from any other property right, the construction lease, by its nature, 
imposes a positive duty on the right-holder. When the right-holder does not per-
form his contractual duties, including the positive duty to erect a building, but also 
the payment for the construction lease, the owner is entitled to rescind the contract 
and the construction lease will come to an end.474 In general the end of the contract 
will result in the acquisition of ownership of the buildings erected during the 
 
466 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 702. 
467 Art. 451-13 Code rural, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 701. 
468 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 703-705, Carbonnier 2000, p. 296-297, Atias 2005, p. 179-180. 
469 Loi No. 64-1247 du 16 décembre 1964, now in Arts. L251-1 – L251-9 Code de la construction et de 
l’habitation. 
470 Art. L251-3 Code de la construction et de l’habitation. This article states ‘Le bail à construction 
confère au preneur un droit réel immobilier. Ce droit peut être hypothéqué, de même que les 
constructions édifiées sur le terrain loué; il peut être saisi dans les formes prescrites pour la 
saisie immobilière. Le preneur peut céder tout ou partie de ses droits ou les apporter en 
société. Les cessionnaires ou la société sont tenus des mêmes obligations que le cédant qui en 
reste garant jusqu’à l’achèvement de l’ensemble des constructions que le preneur s’est engagé 
à édifier en application de l’article L. 251-1. Le preneur peut consentir les servitudes passives 
indispensables à la réalisation des constructions prévues au bail’. 
471 Art. L251-1 Code de la construction et de l’habitation, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 703. 
472 Art. L251-2 Code de la construction et de l’habitation, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 705. 
473 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 704-705. See Art. L251-3 Code de la construction et de l’habitation. 
474 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 705. 
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construction lease by the owner of the land. Any property right created on the con-
struction lease will come to an end as well. It is possible that the parties have agreed 
on a compensation or option to purchase for the right-holder of the construction 
lease at the end of the property right. However, if no agreement has been made, 
when the property rights cease to exist, the owner of the land becomes owner of the 
buildings by operation of the rule of Article 552 C.civ.475 
Finally, a modification of the construction lease exists in the bail à réhabilitation 
or rehabilitation lease. This specific type of emphyteusis was introduced in 1990 to 
allow particular parties to renovate old buildings that had fallen into disuse.476 The 
rules for the rehabilitation lease are almost identical to those for the construction 
lease, with the restriction that only companies or social housing institutions can use 
the rehabilitation lease. In general, the rehabilitation lease is a property right that 
can be transferred, seized and be made subject of the creation of another property 
right, for example, a right of hypothec.477 However, restrictions apply on the acquir-
ing party, who must also be involved in social housing or be eligible for social 
housing.478 
3.5. Pledge 
The Ordonnance of 23 March 2006 that reformed the law on security rights includes a 
major reform on the right of pledge.479 Before the reforms, the right of pledge in the 
Civil Code had remained unchanged since the introduction of the Civil Code in 
1804.480 The right of pledge, together with the right of hypothec, belonged to the 
category of accessory property rights or droits réels accessoires. The term accessory 
property right refers to the necessity of a connection, accessority, between these 
property rights and the obligation the performance of which these rights aim to 
secure.481 After the reforms this categorisation of property rights into principal and 
accessory property rights remains intact, but is no longer fully correct. The right of 
pledge is dealt with in Article 2333 of the Civil Code: 
A pledge is an agreement under which a pledgor gives a right to a creditor to be paid 
before his other creditors out of a movable object or a set of movable objects, both 
present and future. 
 
475 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 705. On the application of Art. 552 C.civ see above; 3.3. Superficies. 
476 Art. 11 Loi No. 90-449 du 31 mai 1990, now implemented in Art. L252-1 – L252-4 Code de la 
construction et de l’habitation. 
477 Art. L252-2 1st paragraph Code de la Construction et de l’habitation. 
478 Art. L252-2 2nd paragraph Code de la Construction et de l’habitation. 
479 Ordonnance No. 2006-346 du 23 Mars 2006 relative aux sûretés, JORF 24 March 2006. On the 
ordonnance in general see above; 1. Introduction. 
480 Legeais 2006b, p. 12, Legeais 2006a, p. 349. 
481 Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 5. 
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The claim secured may be present and future; in the last case the claim must be 
determinable.482 
The right of pledge and the way in which it was dealt with in French law has 
always been subject to many divisions. When a right of pledge is created on a cor-
poreal movable object it is known as a gage. A right of pledge on an incorporeal 
object, such as a claim, can also be created, but is named nantissement.483 Finally, a 
pledge can also be held on immovable objects, which always requires a transfer of 
possession. This last right is known as antichrèse.484 After the 2006 reform, the 
antichrèse is dealt with under the right of hypothec.485 Furthermore, although the 
provisions on the right of pledge in the Civil Code did not change, over time several 
specific types of pledge were introduced by special legislation. These special rights 
of pledge include a pledge on cars, a life-rent pledge and a commercial pledge.486 
The provisions of the Civil Code after the reforms continue to recognise the 
classic right of pledge that existed before the reforms, but now also include special 
types. The classic right of pledge is a right that requires a transfer of possession of 
objects from the pledgor to the pledgee. This method of creation is the standard 
method to create a right of pledge. The Civil Code first and foremost provides 
general rules for the classic right of pledge. These general rules also apply, as far as 
possible, to new types of pledge that do not require a transfer of possession. These 
new types were either placed in the Civil Code from special legislation or newly 
created by the 2006 reform.487 
The 2006 reform created a new definition of the classic right of pledge that no 
longer refers to the transfer of possession.488 Before the reform, it was especially the 
reference to the possession of the objects that made the right of pledge into a droit 
réel. Now, with the lack of a reference in this respect, it is held that the new right of 
pledge has lost its caractère réel.489 The result of this loss of proprietary characteristic 
is not that the right of pledge is no longer a security right, but that, in exchange for 
flexibility, the right has lost some of its proprietary characteristics. In the new 
provisions on the right of pledge, flexibility is offered through the possibility to 
hold a right of pledge on a single object, but also on a group of objects, both present 
and future. As long as the objects can be identified, a right of pledge can be created. 
 
482 Art. 2333 C.civ, ‘Le gage est une convention par laquelle le constituant accorde à un créancier 
le droit de se faire payer par préférence à ses autres créanciers sur un bien mobilier ou un 
ensemble de biens mobiliers corporels, présents ou futurs. Les créances garanties peuvent 
être présentes ou futures; dans ce dernier cas, elles doivent être déterminables’. 
483 Before the reforms, this terminology was different. A nantissement was a general term used 
for a situation where by contract a debtor gave an asset to his creditor for security purposes. 
See Legeais 2006a, p. 354. 
484 Art. 2387 C.civ, see Dupichot 2006, p. 26-28, Legeais 2006a, p. 445-447. 
485 See below; 3.6. Hypothec. 
486 Loi 29 décembre 1934, (pledge on cars), Art. 2354 C.civ (life rent pledge) and Art. L521-1 Code 
de Commerce (commercial pledge). See Legeais 2006a, p. 359-361. 
487 Therefore the title in the Civil Code above Art. 2333 C.civ is now Section 1 Droit commun du 
gage (common rules on pledge). 
488 Simler 2006, p. 597 et seq. 
489 Legeais 2006b, p. 12-13, Legeais 2006a, p. 349, 351. 
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This includes the possibility to create a right of pledge on a generic set of objects, 
including the possibility that through an act of the pledgee similar objects replace 
the original objects included in the pledge.490  
To create a classic right of pledge, which will have effect against third parties, 
the agreement underlying it must be in writing and contain a description of the 
obligation it secures and a description of the objects that are given in pledge.491 The 
pledgor must, in principle, be the owner of the objects and possession of the objects 
needs to be transferred to the pledgee.492 When the classic right of pledge is created, 
the pledgee, who will now be in possession of the objects, will be under a duty of 
care over the objects, including a duty to preserve them.493 However, in contrast 
with the duty of care in case of principal property rights, acts of management and 
administration are not required.494 Violation of the duty of care will entitle the 
pledgor to claim restitution of the objects.495 When a pledge is created on generic 
objects the duty of care applies as well, unless the parties exempt it in their agree-
ment. In such a situation the pledgee will become owner of the objects, but will be 
under an obligation to make restitution of similar objects with the same value when 
the obligation secured by the pledge is performed.496 
In exchange for his care of the objects, the pledgee is entitled to the fruits that 
the objects produce.497 This entitlement, which can be excluded by agreement, will 
only apply in case the pledgee is the creditor of the secured obligation. This will 
normally be the situation, but it is possible that the possession of the objects is in the 
hands of another party than the creditor of the obligation.498 When the pledgor is 
unable to perform his obligation, the pledgee will be entitled to realise his right and 
sell the objects.499 This right to sell the objects is the core power of the pledgee. In 
order to sell the objects, the pledgee will have to obtain a court order, but since 2006 
may also sell the objects without judicial intervention. The pledgee will be entitled 
to the proceeds of the sale in order to satisfy his claim on the pledgor.500 Once the 
pledge is realised, the conditions under which the sale takes place will be the 
general rules on enforcement of security rights that cannot be deviated from.501 
Alternatively, the pledgee may approach the court and claim that the objects 
themselves are attributed to him in ownership.502 An expert may be appointed who 
 
490 Legeais 2006a, p. 352. 
491 Art. 2336 C.civ. 
492 Art. 2335 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 353. 
493 Art. 2343 C.civ. However, the requirement of a transfer of possession has been abandoned by 
the 2006 reform; a right of pledge can now also be created without a transfer of possession, 
but with registration of the right instead. 
494 Cass. Com., 12 July 2005, RD bancaire et fin. 2005, 174. Legeais 2006a, p. 354. 
495 Art. 2344 C.civ. 
496 Art. 2344 (1) C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 354. 
497 Art. 2345 C.civ. 
498 Known as a third-party pledge. Legeais 2006a, p. 355. 
499 Art. 2346 C.civ. 
500 Legeais 2006a, p. 355-356. 
501 Art. 2346(2) C.civ. 
502 Art. 2347 C.civ. 
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will establish the value of the objects. When the value of the objects exceeds the 
value of the outstanding claim on the pledgor, the pledgee is obliged to pay the 
surplus value to the pledgor.503 When the court awards the objects to the pledgee, 
the pledgee becomes owner of the objects and the claim will cease to exist to the 
extent that it is covered by the value of the object of the pledge.504 However, in case 
of insolvency of the pledgor, the claim of a pledgee for the objects is usually 
temporarily suspended.505 
The 2006 reform introduced further possibilities for a pledgee to take the 
objects in case of non-performance of the secured obligation. Before the reform the 
pacte commissoire or lex commissoria, as it had been known in Roman law, an agree-
ment between the parties that entitles the pledgee to keep the objects for himself in 
case of non-performance by the pledgor had been strictly prohibited.506 One of the 
main reasons for its prohibition had been the protection of the pledgor.507 However, 
with the 2006 reform the inclusion of a pacte commissoire became expressly allowed. 
Article 2348 C.civ states in this respect: 
Parties may agree, when the right of pledge is created or at a later moment, that in case 
of non-performance of the obligation by the pledgor, the pledgee will become the 
owner of the objects under pledge. 
The value of the objects shall be determined on the day of the transfer by an expert 
designated by agreement or by a court, in the absence of an official quotation of the 
object on a regulated market in the meaning of the monetary and financial code. Any 
clause to the contrary is deemed not to have been written. 
When that value exceeds the value of the secured claim, the difference shall be paid to 
the pledgor or, in case there are more secured creditors, shall be deposited.508 
The requirement of an expert to determine the value of the object is held to protect 
the pledgor sufficiently and replaces the former outright prohibition of these 
clauses.509 This provision allowing the pacte commissoire is part of the general rules 
on pledge and can therefore also be applied to the special types of pledge, unless 
provided otherwise.510 The general introduction of the pacte commissoire into the 
 
503 Art. 2347 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 357. 
504 Cass. Com. 24 January 2006, JCP E 2006, 1753. 
505 Legeais 2006a, p. 357-358. 
506 Legeais 2006a, p. 258. See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
507 Other reasons include the protection of other creditors from objects of a higher value than the 
outstanding claim leaving the patrimony of the debtor when the secured creditor claims these 
for himself. 
508 Art. 2348 C.civ, ‘Il peut être convenu, lors de la constitution du gage ou postérieurement, qu’à 
défaut d’exécution de l’obligation garantie le créancier deviendra propriétaire du bien gagé. 
La valeur du bien est déterminer au jour du transfert par un expert désigné à l’amiable ou 
judiciairement, à défaut de cotation officielle du bien dur un marché organisé au sens du 
code monétaire et financier. Toute clause contraire est réputée non écrite. Lorsque cette 
valeur excède le montant de la dette garantie, la somme égale à la différance est versée au 
débiteur ou, s’il existe d’autres créanciers gagistes, est consignée’. 
509 Legeais 2006a, p. 358. 
510 Art. 2354 C.civ. 
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provisions on pledge introduces a remarkable flexibility in the French law of 
pledge, that has, until now, not been seen in other civil law systems.511  
Apart from the classic right of pledge that requires a transfer of possession, 
French law recognises a non-possessory right of pledge on movable objects. This 
right of pledge is subject to the same rules as the classic right of pledge, but with the 
exception of the requirement for the transfer of possession.512 Because of the lack of 
a transfer of possession, the creation of a non-possessory pledge is invisible to third 
parties. Therefore, in order to have effect against third parties, the right of non-
possessory pledge must be registered.513 
Other differences exist between these and the classic right of pledge. Because 
the possession of the objects remains with the pledgor, the pledgor, and not the 
pledgee, will be under the duty to take care of the objects. Furthermore, if the 
agreement allows it, the pledgor may be entitled to sell and transfer generic objects 
under pledge. When this is allowed, the pledgor is under the obligation to replace 
the generic objects.514 When the right of pledge is realised, other differences are 
apparent. A non-possessory pledge is a less strong security right compared with a 
classic, possessory, right of pledge. In case of a classic pledge the pledgee will have 
a right of retention on the objects by nature of his possession.515 This right allows the 
pledgee to hold on to the objects, even in respect of other creditors, until his claim is 
satisfied. In case of a non-possessory pledge, the pledgee does not have possession 
and therefore also does not have a right of retention. 
French law after the 2006 reform recognises several special types of non-
possessory pledge. These special types include a commercial pledge, a right of 
pledge on objects in storage, and a right of pledge on cars.516 The provisions on 
these special types of pledge are mostly similar to the common rules on pledge in 
the Civil Code and are specified depending on the type. For example, in case of a 
pledge on objects in storage, the pacte commissoire cannot be agreed upon.517 
Finally, a third type of pledge is recognised. This right of pledge, known as a 
nantissement, is a right of pledge on incorporeal objects, usually claims.518 This 
category of objects had hardly been dealt with before the reform and this should be 
seen as one of the principal reasons why a reform of French law in respect of 
pledges was absolutely necessary.519 In Article 2355 the Code Civil states:  
 
511 In the other civil law systems of German and Dutch law the lex commissoria remains 
prohibited. See Chapter 4; 3.6. Pledge and Chapter 5; 3.6. Pledge. 
512 Legeais 2006b, p. 16, Legeais 2006a, p. 362. 
513 See Art. 2337 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 364. 
514 Art. 2342 C.civ. 
515 Art. 2286 C.civ, Legeais 2006b, p. 15, Legeais 2006a, p. 359. On the right of retention in French 
law see below; 4.1. Right of Retention. 
516 Legeais 2006a, p. 265-366. 
517 Art. L527-2 Code de commerce. Legeais 2006a, p. 369. 
518 See in general Stoufflet 2006, p. 19-22. 
519 Legeais 2006a, p. 375. Synvet 2005, p. 64 et seq. 
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The pledge of an incorporeal object is the allocation, in order to secure the performance 
of an obligation, of an incorporeal object or a set of incorporeal objects, present or 
future.520 
This type of pledge mainly applies to claims, but can be created on other rights as 
well.521 Claims, in particular future claims, are a great source of value which, when 
subject of security rights, may provide for increased financing opportunities for 
companies. Before the reform, the pledge on claims had been subject to the general 
rules on classic pledge, making it possible to hold a pledge only over present 
claims.522 
Under the new provisions, the right of pledge is created by an agreement 
which must describe the claims on which it is created.523 When the claim is future, 
the agreement must specify the claim in such a way that it can be anticipated. 
Anticipation can be achieved by stating the name of the debtor, the amount due and 
the moment when the claim must be paid. When a claim cannot be identified in this 
manner, it cannot be the subject of a right of pledge.524 The result of this method of 
creation is that although the right of pledge will exist, the future claim will not. 
Therefore, from the moment the claim is created, the right of pledge will burden 
it.525 The right of pledge is created on the day on which the agreement is signed and 
will have effect against third parties on the same date.526 However, in order to have 
effect against the debtor, especially to force the debtor to pay the claim to the 
pledgee in case of non-performance by the pledgor, notification of the pledge must 
be given to the debtor.527 
Because of the nature of the objects concerned, the realisation of the pledge on 
claims is organised differently. In case of a pledge on claims the pledgee may 
demand payment of the claim to himself by giving notification to the debtors of the 
claims, but may also, by making use of the pacte commissoire, demand assignment of 
the pledged claims to him.528 As with all other rights of pledge, any surplus value 
must be returned to the pledgor.529 Finally, as with the other types of pledge, special 
types of pledge are recognised. These include a pledge of a bank account and a 
pledge of a fonds de commerce.530  
 
520 Art. 2355(1) C.civ, ‘Le nantissement est l’affectation, en garantie d’une obligation, d’un bien 
meuble incorporel ou d’un ensemble de biens meubles incorporels, présents ou futurs’. 
521 Legeais 2006a, p. 375-376. 
522 Legeais 2006a, p. 377. In the law of banking and finance, however, a pledge on future claims 
had already been allowed before the 2006 reform. 
523 Art. 2356 C.civ. 
524 Art. 2356 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 378. 
525 Art. 2357 C.civ. 
526 Art. 2361 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 379. 
527 Arts. 2362 and 2363 C.civ. 
528 Art. 2364 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 380. 
529 Art. 2366 C.civ. 
530 Art. 2360 C.civ (pledge on bank account), Art. L142-1 Code de commerce (pledge on fonds de 
commerce). 
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3.6. Hypothec 
The right of hypothec is a property security right in respect of an immovable 
object.531 In many respects it resembles a right of pledge, in particular a non-
possessory right of pledge, but because of the specific nature of immovable objects, 
a specific property right is recognised. Like the right of pledge, the right of hypothec 
was thoroughly restructured by the 2006 reform on security rights. The right of 
hypothec can be created by agreement, by court decision, or through operation of 
law.532 The right of hypothec in French law is defined in Article 2393 C.civ: 
The right of hypothec is a property right created on immovable objects for the per-
formance of an obligation.  
The right is, by its nature, indivisible and exists on all of the objects under hypothec, on 
each one and on each part of those objects. 
The right of hypothec follows the objects in whatever hands they may pass.533 
The regular type of hypothec, known as conventional hypothec, can be created by 
an owner of an immovable object, usually a piece of land, but can also be created on 
a property right by its holder, such as a bare owner, a holder of a right of usufruct, 
superficies, emphyteusis, and even the holder of a construction lease.534 When the right 
of hypothec is created, the immovable object on which it is created must already 
exist. A hypothec on a future object is in principle not allowed.535 However, three 
exceptions exist to this rule. When a debtor does not have any or sufficient objects to 
secure the claim he may agree to submit all immovable objects that he will acquire 
in the future to the hypothec. A debtor whose object was damaged and deteriorated 
in value may do the same. And finally, a debtor who has a right to build for his own 
benefit on another’s land may subject his right to the building to the right of 
hypothec.536 The agreement creating the right of hypothec must give a description of 
the objects or, in case of the exceptions just mentioned, the future objects.537 The 
right of hypothec is an acte solennel, which requires an agreement to take the form of 
a notarial deed in order to be validly created.538 Furthermore, differently from other 
property rights in French law, the right must be registered in order to come into 
existence.539 
 
531 See Laurent 1878, p. 95, Legeais 2006a, p. 398. 
532 Art. 2395 C.civ. 
533 Art. 2393 C.civ, ‘L’hypothèque est un droit réel sur les immeubles affectés à l’acquittement 
d’une obligation. Elle est, de sa nature, indivisible, et subsiste en entier sur tous les im-
meubles affectés, sur chacun et sur chaque portion de ces immeubles. Elle les suit dans quel-
ques mains qu’il passent’. 
534 Art. 2397 C.civ, Cass. Civ. 12 April 1836, S. 1836, I, 366, Delebecque 2006, p. 29, Legeais 2006a, 
p. 402. 
535 Art. 2419 C.civ. 
536 Art. 2420 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 403. 
537 Art. 2418 C.civ. 
538 Art. 2416 C.civ. 
539 Legeais 2006a, p. 454. 
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The right of hypothec is an accessory right, by which is meant that it cannot 
exist without the obligation it secures. Apart from the object on which the right is 
created, the claim that the right of hypothec seeks to secure must also be identifia-
ble, but does not necessarily have to be in existence.540 Before the reform in 2006, 
French law adhered strictly to the principle of specificity. Therefore, a right of 
hypothec could only exist when it secured a single claim that already existed when 
the right was created. The statutory amendments on hypothec make it possible to 
create a right of hypothec to secure the performance of a future claim or even of 
future claims, as long as these can be identified.541  
By introducing less strict requirements on the specificity of claims, the French 
legislator has opened up the possibility of creating several new types of hypothec. 
First, Article 2422 C.civ provides a further provision on the possibility of securing a 
claim with a right of hypothec: 
A right of hypothec may be used to secure other claims than those mentioned in the 
contract that created the right, provided that this agreement states so explicitly. 
The right-holder may then offer the right as security, up to the value provided for in 
the contract that created the right and specified in article 2423, not only to the original 
creditor, but also to a new creditor, even when the first has not yet been paid.542 
This new type of hypothec, although technically a conventional hypothec, is known 
as a hypothèque rechargeable or rechargeable hypothec.543 It enables a debtor to pro-
vide a right of hypothec to a creditor in order to obtain finance, but it also enables 
the debtor to recharge the right when there is more value in the object under hy-
pothec. Moreover, the right of hypothec can also be recharged when the debtor has 
already paid off some of this loan and the claim the right of hypothec secures has 
decreased in value.544 When recharging the right of hypothec, the debtor can not 
only approach the original creditor, but may also offer the same right of hypothec to 
another creditor.545 In order for this special right to be created a specific notarial 
deed is needed, which must be registered.546 
The rechargeable hypothec cannot be used by everyone and cannot be held on 
all objects. The creation of the right may only be agreed by regular, i.e. non-legal, 
persons on an immovable object that is used as housing, usually a piece of land with 
a house on it.547 Furthermore, the notarial deed creating the right must contain 
information on the duration of the right of hypothec by mentioning the duration of 
 
540 Art. 2421 C.civ. 
541 Art. 2421 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 404-405. 
542 Art. 2422 C.civ, ‘L’hypothèque peut être ultérieurement affectée à la garantie de créances 
autres que celles mentionnées par l’acte constitutif pourvu que celui-ci le prévoie expressé-
ment. Le constituant peut alors l’offrir en garantie, dans la limite de la somme prévue dans 
l’acte constitutif et mentionnée à l’article 2423, non seulement au créancier originaire, mais 
aussi à un nouveau créancier encore que le premier n’ait pas été payé …’. 
543 See, in general, Grimaldi 2006b, p. 33-36. 
544 Legeais 2006a, p. 406. 
545 Legeais 2006a, p. 405-406. 
546 Art. 2422 C.civ. 
547 Art. L313-14 Code de la consommation. 
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registration, a description of the object under hypothec, and, most importantly, the 
maximum value for which the rechargeable right of hypothec is created.548 When 
the right of hypothec is created for an unlimited duration, the debtor may at any 
time terminate the agreement by giving the creditor three-months’ notice. However, 
the right of hypothec will remain in existence for outstanding claims.549 
A second new type of hypothec also falls into the general category of conven-
tional hypothecs and is known as the prêt viager hypothécaire or life-rent hypothec. 
This new type is defined by Article L.314-1 Code de la consommation: 
The life rent hypothec is a contract by which a credit or financial institution provides a 
private person, the debtor, with a loan in the form of a sum of money or periodic 
instalments of money, secured by a right of hypothec on an immovable object used for 
residential purposes of the debtor and the repayment of the loan – the loan and the 
interest – are not claimed until the debtor dies or when the object is conveyed or a 
limited property right is created on the object is made before the debtor dies ...550 
The new provisions on the specificity of the claims that the right of hypothec must 
secure create the possibility that the right of hypothec is created to secure a future 
claim. This type of hypothec cleverly makes use of these new flexible rules and en-
ables the creation of what is also known as a reversed hypothec. Instead of creating 
a claim fully at once, which is also possible, the claim is build up in instalments, 
increasing in value each time an instalment is paid. When the debtor receives all the 
money at once, usually to buy a life-rent scheme from another financial institution, 
the full claim comes into existence at once. Unlike a standard right hypothec, the 
agreement between the debtor and the bank is that the claim will not be repaid until 
the death of the debtor.551 As in the case of a rechargeable hypothec the agreement 
will have to take the form of a notarial deed and must be registered. The deed must 
contain information on the parties, the object concerned, and the maximum value 
for which the right of hypothec is created.552 
These rights of hypothec must be created by notarial deed and require regis-
tration in order to be enforced against third parties. However, even without regis-
tration the right of hypothec is validly created.553 When the right is validly created it 
will create a property right in respect of the right of ownership of the debtor. 
Because the debtor remains the owner of the immovable object under hypothec, the 
debtor continues to enjoy his right of ownership, but is no longer unrestricted. In 
 
548 Art. L313-13-1 Code de la consommation. 
549 Art. 2423 C.civ. 
550 Art. L314-1 Code de la consommation, ‘Le prêt viager hypothécaire est un contrat par lequel un 
établissement de crédit ou un établissement financier consent à une personne physique un 
prêt sous forme d’un capital ou de versements périodiques, garanti par une hypothèque 
constituée sur un bien immobilier de l’emprunteur à usage exclusif d’habitation et dont le 
remboursement – principal et intérêts – ne peut être exigé qu’au décès de l’emprunteur ou 
lors de l’aliénation ou du démembrement de la propriété de l’immeuble hypothéqué s’ils 
surviennent avant le décès …’. 
551 See Legeais 2006a, p. 406-407. Grimaldi 2006b, p. 36-37. 
552 Arts. L314-5 and L314-7 Code de la consommation. 
553 Arts. 2426 et seq. C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 414. 
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any situation the debtor will be under a duty to preserve the value of the object.554 
For example, the debtor may not create a lease on his object for a long period of time 
to another person, as this would seriously decrease the value of the immovable 
object.555 
When the debtor defaults on his loan the creditor, the holder of the right of hy-
pothec, will have the choice to sell the object under hypothec or to claim the object 
for himself through a court order, or through an agreement with the debtor.556 In 
order to start the procedure of executing the right of hypothec, the creditor must 
demand payment from the debtor.557 Although the holder of a right of hypothec has 
a choice between these actions, most of the time the holder will choose to sell the 
object. The holder may then satisfy his claim with the proceeds of the sale.558  
When the object under hypothec is not the principal place of residence of the 
debtor, the right-holder may approach a court to claim the object for himself.559 This 
possibility, which did not exist before the 2006 reform, brings the right of hypothec 
in line with the reforms on the right of pledge.560 As in the case of a right of pledge, 
the court order will transfer the ownership from the debtor to the creditor. The 
value of the object will be determined by agreement or, if necessary by an expert. 
Any surplus value must be paid to the debtor or, in case there are more secured 
creditors, must be deposited.561 
Finally, the 2006 reform has also introduced the pacte commissoire for rights of 
hypothec.562 By such an agreement the debtor and creditor may agree that on non-
performance by the debtor, the creditor shall become owner of the immovable 
object under hypothec without a court order.563 As in the case of acquisition by court 
order, the pacte commissoire will be invalid if the immovable object is the principal 
place of residence of the debtor.564 Also, in the case of acquisition by agreement, the 
value of the object will be determined by the parties themselves, or by an expert.565 
Any surplus value shall be paid to the debtor, or deposited in cases where there are 
more secured creditors.566 
In addition to conventional rights of hypothec, a right of hypothec can also 
come into existence by operation of law or by decision of a court. The first of these 
types of hypothec is known as hypothèque légale or legal hypothec and may arise by 
application of the Civil Code or other specific legislation.567 These specific rights 
 
554 Legeais 2006a, p. 421-422. 
555 Legeais 2006a, p. 422-423. 
556 See Delebecque 2006, p. 29-31. 
557 Cass. Civ. 3ème 23 January 1973, D. 1973, 427, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 257. 
558 Art. 2458 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 424. 
559 Art. 2458 C.civ. 
560 Legeais 2006a, p. 427. 
561 Art. 2460 C.civ. 
562 Art. 2459 C.civ. Delebecque 2006, p. 31-32. 
563 See Legeais 2006a, p. 428-429. 
564 Legeais 2006a, p. 428. 
565 Delebecque 2006, p. 32. 
566 Art. 2460 C.civ. 
567 Legeais 2006a, p. 440. 
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arise in case of marriage, where one spouse will have a right of hypothec on the 
objects of the other, and in case of guardianship, where the person subjected to the 
guardianship has a right of hypothec on the objects of the guardian.568 Other types 
exist as well and include rights of legal hypothec held by the State. For example, the 
tax authority will have a general legal hypothec on the immovable objects of a 
debtor.569 The second of these types of hypothec is known as hypothèque judiciaire or 
judiciary hypothec.570 These rights are of high practical relevance and enable a 
creditor who has obtained judgement against a debtor for payment to claim 
recognition of a right of hypothec on the immovable objects of the debtor through 
the decision of a court. If the court awards the right of hypothec, the creditor may 
register his right in order for it to have effect against third parties. Therefore, the 
judiciary hypothec is used to strengthen a personal claim that has been awarded by 
court decision.571  
Finally, under the 2006 reform, the already mentioned antichrèse or pledge on 
immovable objects has come under the heading of security rights in respect of 
immovable objects in the Civil Code.572 The pledge on immovable objects is not 
often used as it requires a transfer of possession of the immovable object to the 
creditor.573 The right therefore bears characteristics of a right of pledge as well as a 
right of hypothec.574 This special property right, once created, must be registered in 
order to have effect against third parties, and will award its holder with a strong 
security right in respect of an immovable object. As far as possible the general 
provisions on hypothec apply, including the execution of the right.575 
3.7. Priority Rights 
Article 2324 of the Civil Code states:  
A priority right is a right that a creditor of a claim has by the nature of his claim to 
have priority over other creditors, even holders of a right of hypothec.576 
French law has a long tradition of recognising priority rights. Before a reform in 
1955 there were many priority rights, most of which were not registered.577 This 
reform in 1955 reduced the number of priority rights and changed the publicity 
requirements of some of these. In particular those priority rights that can be held 
over an immovable object, were made subject to more publicity requirements. 
 
568 Arts. 2400(1) and (2) C.civ. 
569 Art. 2400(3) C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 441. 
570 Art. 2412 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 442. 
571 Legeais 2006a, p. 442-444. 
572 Art. 2387 C.civ. See also above; 3.5. Pledge. 
573 Legeais 2006a, p. 445-446. 
574 Legeais characterises it as a sûreté mixte, Legeais 2006a, p. 445. 
575 Art. 2388 C.civ. 
576 Art. 2324 C.civ, ‘Le privilège est un droit que la qualité de la créance donne à un créancier 
d’être préféré aux autres créanciers, même hypothécaires’. 
577 Loi du 4 janvier 1955. Legeais 2006a, p. 453. 
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Privilèges or priority rights are special property rights that come into existence 
by operation of law accessory to an existing claim.578 Because of their special nature, 
the acceptance of priority rights in French law is debated, even though the 2006 
reform chose to reintroduce and therefore re-establish these rights.579 When a 
priority right is recognised it will give preference to its holder in violation of the 
rule of paritas creditorum. Contrary to other security rights that deviate from this rule 
that makes all creditors equal, priority rights are not created by agreement and 
sometimes not even registered. 
Two types of priority rights exist. First, there are general priority rights that 
are held on a set of objects.580 Second, there are special priority rights that are held 
on a single object.581 Furthermore, most priority rights are divided between immov-
able and movable objects. The term priority right is therefore a name for a collection 
of rights that may be different in content but each of which gives priority over other 
creditors to its holder. 
The first category of priority rights comprises general priority rights that are 
held on all objects of a debtor. These include a right in respect of claims arising from 
court costs and salaries of the past and present year, but also claims from contribu-
tions made during insolvency proceedings in order to stimulate a fresh start for 
insolvent companies, and claims arising from business with a company under 
observation, which refers to a company that is almost insolvent.582 
All other priority rights are held either on immovable or on movable objects. 
General priority rights in respect of immovable objects are no longer recognised and 
since 2006 have been replaced with rights of legal hypothec.583 General priority 
rights over movables are rare, but include the claim of the tax authorities and social 
security authorities.584 The remaining priority rights are not only dealt with by the 
Civil Code but also by specific legislation. These arise when a seller of an object has 
a claim for payment of the purchase price, the claim of a manager of an apartment 
building for the contributions, or the claim of a lessor of an object for rent.585 
With the 2006 reform most priority rights in respect of immovable objects 
became capable of registration. Priority rights in respect of movable objects, how-
ever, remain undisclosed to third parties.586 Finally, priority rights may come into 
conflict with each other. However, since all priority rights follow directly from the 
Civil Code or other legislation, an order of ranking amongst them may also be 
 
578 Legeais 2006a, p. 451. 
579 See Legeais 2006a, p. 452. 
580 Known as privilèges généraux. Legeais 2006a, p. 453. 
581 Known as privilèges généraux. Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 7, Legeais 2006a, p. 453. 
582 Arts. 2331-1 and 2375-1 C.civ (Court costs), Arts. 2331-4 and 2375-2 C.civ (Salaries), Art. L611-
11 Code de commerce (fresh start contributions) and Arts. L622-17 and L641-13 Code de commerce 
(claims on company under observation). 
583 On these rights of legal hypothec see above; 3.6. Hypothec. 
584 Art. 2331 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 465-468. 
585 See Arts. 2332, 2374 and 2375 C.civ.  
586 Legeais 2006a, p. 453-454. 
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provided for by legislation. Therefore, to solve these conflicts Article 2332 C.civ 
provides an order of ranking.587 
Priority rights are atypical property rights because they are not created by 
agreement and only provide priority to a holder of a claim. Unlike other property 
security rights, priority rights do not entitle the right-holder to sell the object or 
keep it for himself in case of non-performance by the debtor. A priority right only 
entitles its holder to a right of preference or droit de préférence. The right of prefer-
ence entitles its holder to claim the sum or performance due to the debtor before 
other creditors. Depending on the rank of the security rights, the holder entitled to a 
right of preference will even be entitled to claim before other holders of security 
rights that entitle them to a right of preference. The entitlement to preference of a 
priority right is even stronger because its holder may claim payment even before 
the holders of other property security rights. A final difference from other security 
rights is that priority rights are so closely connected to the claim they secure that 
they arise but also cease to exist with that claim. This is in contrast with other 
property security rights, which only come into existence upon agreement between 
the parties and, in case of hypothec, after registration.588 
4. Borderline Cases in French Property Law 
Section 3 of this Chapter deals with those property rights that are explicitly recog-
nised as property rights by legislation. However, there are other legal relations in 
French law that closely resemble property rights. Some of these relations are com-
monly dealt with in property law handbooks, but traditionally are not recognised as 
property rights. The reason for their treatment in property law is that these relations 
have many but not all of the characteristics of a property right. In other words, these 
rights are on the borderline between contract law and property law, but are 
traditionally not dealt with by contract law. 
4.1. Right of Retention 
When one party is under an obligation to do something in order to benefit another 
party, that benefiting party may be entitled to retain possession of an object of the 
first party until the obligation is performed. Such a situation can occur in many 
instances, but is best illustrated by a simple situation of sale. Where, under a 
contract of sale, the purchase price has not been paid and there is reason to believe 
that payment will not be made soon, the seller may refrain from delivering the 
object to the buyer.589 Vice versa, the buyer might also withhold the payment of the 
purchase price when he suspects the seller will not perform.590 Another example is 
offered in the area of security rights. When a right of pledge has been created, the 
 
587 See Legeais 2006a, p. 473-474. 
588 Legeais 2006a, p. 451. 
589 See Piedelièvre 2004, p. 171 et seq., Legeais 1996, p. 318 et seq., Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 165. 
590 Piedelièvre 2004, p. 172. 
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holder of the right of pledge may retain possession of the object under pledge until 
he has been paid.591 
This right, known as the right of retention, can be exercised on movable as 
well as on immovable objects, and even on incorporeal objects, rights and claims, 
insofar as they can be retained.592 There is a debate on whether there must be a 
relation between the object and the claim for which the right of retention is 
exercised.593 Refusing the requirement of such a connection would entitle the 
retentor, the person using the right of retention, to retain possession of any object of 
the debtor. However, the leading opinion in France seems to require a connection 
between the object under retention and the claim the right intends to secure.594 
The Civil Code does not explicitly deal with the right of retention, but recog-
nises its existence.595 This recognition can be seen in several instances where the 
Civil Code specifically excludes the possibility of exercising a right of retention.596 A 
contrario, the drafters of the Civil Code did accept the possibility that parties would 
exercise a right of retention. The existence of the right of retention is therefore not 
debated.597 However, the legal nature of the right, in particular the question whether 
the right of retention is a property security right, has been subject to a long debate.  
To start with, French legal scholarship is generally divided over the question 
whether the right of retention is a security right. Although the right of retention 
secures the performance of an obligation, usually the payment of a debt, the right 
lacks the basic characteristic of a security right – the entitlement to the value of the 
object.598 Although the majority of authors recognise the right of retention as 
security in the broad sense of the word, as sûreté, the question whether it is also a 
security right is much more complicated.599 In general the exercise of the right of 
retention is connected to contract law.600 It is a method to strengthen the position of 
a creditor in a situation where a debtor does not perform or threatens not to per-
form. Therefore, the primary effect of the right of retention is against the non-
performing debtor and not against the world. It is because of this aspect of the right 
of retention that Catala-Franjou has argued that the right of retention is nothing 
more than a personal right.601 However, retaining factual control of an object does 
not only have effect against the non-performing debtor, but also has effect against 
 
591 See Piedelièvre 2004, p. 173. Legeais 1996, p. 320. 
592 Piedelièvre 2004, p. 174-177, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 482-483, on incorporeal rights see 
Legeais 1996, p. 320-321. 
593 See Piedelièvre 2004, p. 177. 
594 Legeais 1996, p. 322-323, Piedelièvre 2004, p. 177-180, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 477. 
595 Piedelièvre 2004, p. 172, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 478-481, Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 167. 
596 See, e.g., Art. 1885 C.civ, Piedelièvre 2004, p. 173-174. 
597 Legeais 1996, p. 319-320. 
598 Piedelièvre 2004, p. 185-186, Legeais 1996, p. 318-319, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 476-477, 
see Crocq 1995, p. 238-241 who does not consider the right of retention as full security. 
599 On the classification as security see Piedelièvre 2004, p. 185-186, Legeais 1996, p. 318-319, 
Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 476-477, Crocq 1995, p. 238-241, contra see Cass. Com. 20 May 
1997, D. 1998, p. 479, Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 178-179. 
600 Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 476. 
601 Catala-Franjou 1967, p. 9 et seq., see also Legeais 1996, p. 318. 
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other parties. It is because of this effect that another group of authors argues that the 
right of retention is a property security right.602 But the effect of the right against 
third parties is not the same as a normal property right. The right of retention lacks 
the essential characteristics of droit de suite and droit de préférence. Due to the absence 
of these characteristics some authors call the right of retention an incomplete 
property right.603  
Furthermore, unlike any other property security right, the right of retention 
allows the holder to withhold the object from the debtor, but does not allow the 
creditor to sell the object and take the proceeds of the sale to satisfy his claim.604  
In 1992 the Cour de cassation ruled on the subject and decided that the right of 
retention is a property right with effect against everyone, including third parties not 
related to the claim.605 This includes a situation in which the right of retention is not 
registered and is therefore unknown to these third parties.606 With this remarkable 
decision, the Cour de cassation enlarged the number of property rights with an 
additional security right. However, the leading opinion continues to refrain from 
classifying the right as either a personal or a property right.607  
The classification problem was even further complicated by the Cour de cassa-
tion in 1997 when it held that the right of retention was not a sûreté.608 Finally, with 
the 2006 reforms of the Civil Code, the right of retention has come to be dealt with 
under the heading of general provisions on security. This new classification there-
fore somewhat settles the debate.609 Article 2286 of the Civil Code now provides 
general rules on when to invoke the right of retention. The Article states: 
The exercise of a right of retention on an object is possible by:  
1. The person to whom the object was handed over until the payment of his debt; 
2. The person whose outstanding debt results from the contract that binds him to 
deliver the object. 
 
602 Legeais 1996, p. 318, Piedelièvre 2004, p. 185. 
603 Picod 1999, No. 129, Catala-Franjou 1967, p. 40. See also Simler and Delebecque who seem to 
suggest that the right of retention should be a security right, Simler & Delebecque 2004,  
p. 476-477. 
604 See Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 474-475. 
605 Cass. Civ. 1er 7 January 1992, RTD civ. 1992.586, JCP 1992.I.3583, Piedelièvre 2004, p. 185, 
Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 165 et seq. In support also see Recueil complet des travaux prépara-
toires du code civil 14, p. 507, 516-517. 
606 See Cass. Civ. 3ème 16 December 1998, Bull. Civ. III No. 253, DP 1874, p. 457. Aynès & Crocq 
2003, p. 175.  
607 See Piedelièvre 2004, p. 185-186, Legeais 1996, p. 318-319, in particular Aynès & Crocq 2003, 
178-179. This refusal of French doctrine to recognise the right of retention as a property right 
is why this right is dealt with in this section and not in the section dealing with property 
rights. 
608 The Cour de cassation states ‘Mais attendu que le droit de rétention n’est pas une sûreté et 
n’est pas assimilable au gage…’, Cass. Com. 20 May 1997, D. 1998, p. 479, see also Cass. Com. 9 
June 1998, Bull. 1998 IV No. 181, p. 150. 
609 The Grimaldi-report published to prepare the 2006 reform does not mention the nature of the 
right of retention either. See Grimaldi et al. 2003. 
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3. The person whose outstanding debt was created at the moment he started holding 
the object. 
A right of retention is lost through the voluntary release of the power over the object.610 
The 2006 reform upholds the decision of the Cour de cassation on the classification of 
the right of retention as a property right. Nevertheless, at the same time, legal 
scholarship seems to remain divided on the issue and refrains from taking a posi-
tion.611 Because of this it seems justifiable to deal with the right of retention as an 
exceptional right amongst the other property rights. Even with the classification of 
the Cour de cassation, the right of retention continues to lack the essential charac-
teristics of droit de suite and droit de préférence and hence possibly the characteristics 
of a property right at all. 
4.2. Real Obligations 
Like in any civil law system, the separation between the law of obligations and the 
law of property in French law creates some classification problems.612 Certain 
agreements between parties cannot be characterised as a property right, but are not, 
strictly speaking, a personal right either. An example of such an agreement is 
offered by the positive duties connected to a principal negative duty in case of a 
right of servitude.613 These secondary obligations are not part of the right of 
servitude as such, but transfer with the right of servitude to a third party. In other 
words, the debtor of the obligation is bound to the obligation in his capacity as 
owner of the servient land. Because of this effect these obligations are known as real 
obligations or obligations propter rem. A real obligation or obligation propter rem is 
an obligation closely related to an object.614 Because of this relation the obligation 
bears the characteristics not only of a personal right but also of a property right, 
including the effect against a third party when the right is transferred.615 The nature 
of the real obligation is subject to considerable debate.616 This debate not only 
focuses on the recognition of real obligations, but also concerns questions such as 
the distinction between the law of obligations and the law of property, the recog-
 
610 Art. 2286 C.civ, ‘Peut se prévaloir d’un droit de rétention sur la chose: 1. Celui à qui la chose a 
été remise jusqu’au paiement de sa créance; 2. Celui dont la créance impayée résulte du 
contrat qui l’oblige à la livrer; 3. Celui dont la créance impayée est née à l’occasion de la 
détention de la chose. Le droit de rétention se perd par le dessaisissement volontaire’. 
611 See Piedelièvre 2004, p. 185-186, Legeais 1996, p. 318-319, Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 178-179, 
Libchaber 2004, p. 399 et seq. 
612 On German and Dutch law see Chapter 4; 4. Borderline Cases in German Property Law, and 
Chapter 5; 4. Borderline Cases in Dutch Property Law. 
613 See above; 3.1. Real Servitudes. 
614 Sometimes also the term charge réelle is used. Aberkane 1957, p. 2, Atias 2005, p. 56, De Juglart 
1937, p. 33, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 589-590, 655, Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 8-10. 
615 See Sagaert 2004b, p. 59-60, Sagaert 2006, p. 43-45, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 655, Malaurie & 
Aynès 2005, p. 103, Carbonnier 2000, p. 72-73. 
616 See Aberkane 1957, De Juglart 1937, Larroumet 2004, p. 31 et seq., Sagaert 2004a, No. 16, 
Sagaert 2004b, p. 47 et seq. 
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nition of a numerus clausus of property rights, and the doctrine of privity of contract 
in French law.617  
The theory of real obligations is primarily connected to the existence of 
property rights. Certain obligations can come into existence that are not part of a 
property right itself and which should be seen as a separate agreement. However, 
this agreement does not create a mere personal obligation, but an obligation that 
transfers with the property right to which it is connected. Therefore the real obliga-
tion, like the property right to which it is connected, has effect against third parties. 
In legal theory, these agreements are considered to be accessory to the property 
right.618 In his study on this subject, Aberkane recognises three situations in which 
the Civil Code, by force of law, recognises the existence of these real obligations.619 
The existence of real obligations by force of the Civil Code resembles the legal 
property rights which have been dealt with above.620 First, in case of a right of 
servitude, the obligation that arises through the application of Article 699 C.civ for 
the maintenance of the object under servitude can be seen as a real obligation. The 
maintenance obligation is not part of the right of servitude itself, but is seen as a 
separate obligation arising from Article 699 when the parties agreed on the main-
tenance of the object under servitude.621 Furthermore, Article 701 C.civ also offers an 
example of a real obligation. Any maintenance or other works under the normal 
exercise of a right of servitude cannot be a part of the right of servitude itself as they 
are positive duties.622 Legal scholarship and case law therefore recognise these 
positive duties as a real obligation.623  
Article 655 C.civ offers another example. This Article deals with a situation of 
co-ownership of a wall and stipulates a duty to repair the wall at the costs of each 
co-owner. Aberkane holds that also this obligation is a real obligation.624 Finally, he 
also mentions the old Article 2168 C.civ, now Article 2463 C.civ, which describes the 
obligation of a third person holding an object on which a right of hypothec is 
created or on which a priority right is held to pay interest and capital, or repayment 
of the debt or claim the performance of which these rights secure, over the object.625 
Furthermore, a theory of real obligations connected to the right of ownership 
has become recognised through the works of Ginossar.626 Although his studies do 
 
617 See Sagaert 2005b, p. 1004-1016, Sagaert 2004b, p. 60-61, Larroumet 2004, p. 31-35. It is De 
Juglart who focuses the attention on the influence of German doctrine in the development of 
French doctrine on the real obligation, see De Juglart 1937, p. 50-52. 
618 See Aberkane 1957, p. 1-16, Sagaert 2004b, p. 56 et seq. 
619 Aberkane 1957, p. 1 et seq. 
620 E.g. the legal pledge and legal hypothec, see above; 3.5. Pledge and 3.6. Hypothec. 
621 Aberkane 1957, p. 2-3, see also De Juglart 1937, p. 16-17, 34-36, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 655. 
622 This is why Belgian law generally is very restricted to recognise positive real obligations. See 
Sagaert 2004b, p. 60-61, Sagaert 2004b, p. 1006-1007. 
623 Cass. Civ. 3ème 26 November 1960, Bull. Civ. III, No. 646, Aberkane 1957, p. 6-9, 117 et seq., 
Sagaert 2004b, p. 56-57. A similarly real obligation could be recognised in case of the main-
tenance duty of a usufructuary. See Sagaert 2004b, p. 64-65. 
624 Aberkane 1957, p. 2. 
625 Aberkane 1957, p. 2. 
626 Ginossar 1960, p. 18 et seq. On Ginossar see, inter alia, Larroumet 2004, p. 31, Snijders & Rank-
Berenschot 2001, p. 49-50, Hervieu 1981, p. 176 et seq. 
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not reflect the leading opinion in French law, Ginossar’s ideas are worth consider-
ing.627 Ginossar looks at the right of ownership as a set of obligations which should 
not be defined in terms of personal rights or property rights.628 Any power exercised 
over an object constitutes obligations towards the owner of the object, limited 
property rights are considered obligations towards the owner and vice versa.629 The 
result of this is that the owner is bound to respect the rights of a holder of a limited 
property right. When the right of ownership or the limited property right is 
transferred, the obligation to respect the rights of the other party is transferred with 
that property right. This effect in case of a transfer is why Ginossar does not see 
these obligations as personal rights, but recognises the property characteristics of 
these obligations, naming them real obligations.630  
Real obligations are therefore considered to be obligations, but with some 
characteristics of property rights.631 These characteristics are specifically to be found 
in the transfer of the real obligation to another party when the property right to 
which the right is connected is transferred. In terms of a property right, the real 
obligation achieves a droit de suite effect.632 However, the leading opinion in French 
law resists the recognition of real obligations as property rights. The primary reason 
for the refusal is the acceptance of the rule of numerus clausus in French law.633 The 
recognition of a real obligation would lead to an additional property right, 
governed by contract law and without restrictions as to its contents.634 Furthermore, 
the doctrine of privity of contract, which determines that, in principle, personal 
rights only have effect against the persons that created them, also resists the recog-
nition of a real obligation with effect against the whole world.635 In other words, 
from both property law and contract law there are objections to the recognition of 
the effect of real obligations. 
Finally, next to these real obligations that are created as part of the creation of 
a property right, there are also authors who argue for the recognition of real obliga-
tions that come into existence independently of the creation of a property right.636 
Aberkane has suggested using Article 686 C.civ, which provides the general defini-
tion for servitudes created by agreement, as a guideline for the acceptance of these 
 
627 Ginossar’s ideas have been taken over by some French authors. See Zenati 1981, p. 18, 
Larroumet 2004, p. 31, Chabas 1996, No. 166. 
628 Ginossar 1960, p. 181 et seq., see Sagaert 2005b, p. 996-997, Larroumet 2004, p. 31, Rank-
Berenschot 1992, p. 60-65. 
629 Larroumet 2004, p. 32, Sagaert 2005b, p. 996-997. 
630 Ginossar 1960, p. 181-185, Sagaert 2005b, p. 996-997. See also Zenati 1981, p. 18-21, 695 et seq. 
631 See also Carbonnier 2000, p. 72-73, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, 103, on Belgian law see Sagaert 
2005a, p. 983 et seq. 
632 See Sagaert 2005b, p. 1006-1007. However, Aberkane favours only a partial transfer of the real 
obligation, where the transferee remains bound by the duty, see Aberkane 1957, p. 147-148. 
633 On the existence of the numerus clausus in French law see below; 5. A Numerus Clausus in 
French Property Law? 
634 Sagaert 2004b, p. 60-61, Sagaert 2005b, p. 1013-1014, Larroumet 2004, p. 31-35, implicitly 
Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 103. 
635 Sagaert 2004b, p. 61, Sagaert 2004b, p. 1012-1013. 
636 Aberkane 1957, p. 117, De Juglart 1937, p. 332. 
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autonomous real obligations.637 Also De Juglart in an earlier thesis used the pro-
visions on the right of servitude, in particular Articles 698 and 699 C.civ, to argue 
for a general category of real obligations created by agreement.638 Others have also 
advocated the recognition of non-transferability clauses as real obligations. Non-
transferability clauses are part of contracts of sale and usually limit temporarily the 
powers of the owner to dispose of an object. These clauses are under strict scrutiny 
from the Cour de cassation.639 
Although the ideas of autonomous real obligations are interesting and 
persuasive, the majority of French scholarship has not adopted these suggestions, 
and neither the legislature nor the Cour de cassation has adopted them either. There-
fore, real obligations, even when they are just recognised as accessory obligations to 
an existing property right, remain controversial. The doctrine of separation between 
the law of property and the law of obligations, in particular the law of contract, does 
not allow for an intermediate category. Maintaining this distinction forces French 
scholarship into a difficult position. In general the French handbooks deal with real 
obligations after they explain what a property right is as opposed to a personal 
right.640 However, an answer to the exact nature of these rights is usually not 
provided. 
4.3. Concession Immobilière 
In 1967 a law reform introduced a special type of contract called concession immo-
bilière.641 Article 48 of this 1967 reform Act states: 
The concession immobilière is a contract in which an owner of an immovable object or 
part of an immovable object, built upon or not, gives the use and enjoyment to a 
person known as concessionnaire, for a duration of a minimum of 20 years and for the 
payment of an annual sum of money …642 
The contract cannot just be agreed upon, but must take the form of an authentic act 
and be registered.643 When registered, the contract will have effect against third 
parties, in particular against acquirers of the object.644 This includes a situation 
 
637 In particular because Art. 686 C.civ does not prohibit positive obligations explicitly, Aberkane 
considers this Article a good basis for his theory. Aberkane 1957,p . 115-117. 
638 De Juglart 1937, p. 332. 
639 See Crocq 1995, p. 170-171, Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 75-77, Chabas 1996, No. 217, 
p. 314. See above; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
640 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 42-43, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 102-103, Carbonnier 2000, p. 72-
73, Larroumet 2004, p. 11-22, Chabas 1994, p. 3, Atias 2005, p. 45-61, Jourdain, Marty & 
Raynaud 1995, p. 1. 
641 Loi No. 67-1253 du 30 décembre 1967 d’orientation foncière. 
642 Art. 48 Loi du 30 décembre 1967, ‘La concession immobilière est le contrat par lequel le 
propriétaire d’un immeuble ou partie d’immeuble, bâti ou non bâti, en confère la jouissance à 
une personne dénommée concessionnaire, pour une durée de vingt années au minimum et 
moyennant le paiement d’une redevance annuelle’. 
643 Art. 48 Para. 2 Loi du 30 décembre 1967, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 706. 
644 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 706, Larroumet 2004, p. 471. 
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where the object under contract is sold and transferred to another person.645 Fur-
thermore, the right arising from the contract can be subject to a right of pledge.646  
During the existence of the contract, the concessionnaire may change the 
purpose for which the object is used, make alterations or construct buildings or 
constructions necessary for the exercise of the contract.647 Furthermore, the conces-
sionnaire is allowed to transfer his right or part of his right to another person.648 In 
exchange for his right, the holder must pay a price to the owner of the object. 
Furthermore, if the object decreases in value, compensation must be paid.649 The 
contract will come to an end when the period for which it was agreed comes to an 
end or when the contract is terminated under the provisions of contract law.650 Any 
right created on the basis of the contract will also come to an end.651  
With the concession immobilière the legislature intended to create an instrument 
that would suit practical needs.652 Therefore, the contract may be used for any 
purpose, including habitation.653 In that case legislation on leases will not be 
applicable and the 1967 reform law provides its own rules. However, even with 
these possibilities to avoid undesired application of lessee protection rules, the 
concession immobilière is not much made use of.654 
The effects of the concession immobilière are such that it has been argued that the 
contract constitutes a property right, particularly because of the registration 
requirements.655 Furthermore, the contract resembles a contract creating a right of 
superficies. Terré and Simler, but also Jourdain, argue that the contract of concession 
immobilière constitutes a right of superficies.656 They argue that, as in the case of a 
contract of lease, a building constructed by the right-holder will be owned by that 
holder until the end of the contract.  
However, although the arguments seem convincing and in line with the case 
law and legal scholarship in respect to other, similar, contracts, the arguments do 
not provide that contract of concession immobilière is a property right itself. There are 
authors who argue that the contract is a full property right as well, but these seem 
to be in the minority.657 Nevertheless, the contract, introduced by special legislation, 
 
645 Art. 53 Loi du 30 décembre 1967. 
646 This is complicated because, would the right be characterised as a property right it would, 
because of its creation on an immovable object be treated as an immovable right and hence 
would have to be subject to a right of hypothec and not a right of pledge. See Art. 51 Para. 3 
Loi du 30 décembre 1967, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 707. 
647 Art. 50 Loi du 30 décembre 1967, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 708, Larroumet 2004, p. 472-473. 
648 Art. 51 Loi du 30 décembre 1967. 
649 Art. 52 Loi du 30 décembre 1967. 
650 Art. 53 Loi du 30 décembre 1967. 
651 Art. 55 Loi du 30 décembre 1967, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 710. 
652 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 706. 
653 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 708. 
654 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 706, Larroumet 2004, 473-474. 
655 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 706-707, Larroumet 2004, p. 471-472, Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 
1995, p. 235-237. 
656 Terré & Simler 1998, p. 707, Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud 1995, p. 236. On the application of 
the right of superficies see above; 3.3. Superficies. 
657 See Boulanger 1968, p. 99. 
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functions on the borderline between the law of property and the law of obligations 
and offers problems for legal scholarship upholding this separation. 
4.4. Real Suretyship 
A suretyship or cautionnement is a contract by which one party, the surety, agrees to 
pay the debt of another person.658 For the payment of this debt the surety is liable 
with his full set of objects. Suretyships are a type of contract and are a personal 
security right. However, French law also recognises a cautionnement réel or real 
suretyship. In a real suretyship, a third party, known as the surety, creates a right of 
pledge or hypothec on an object that serves as security for the payment of the debt 
of another person.659 In a real suretyship the liability of the surety is therefore 
limited by the value of the object over which he provided security.  
The Civil Code does not deal with real suretyship, but recognises some 
situations in which real suretyship applies.660 The recognition and development has 
therefore been a matter for legal scholarship and case law. Partly because of this 
method of development the nature of the right has been the subject of debate. The 
debate centred on the question of whether the real suretyship constituted a personal 
right, as a normal suretyship does, or whether, because of its real nature it can be 
considered a property right.661 The characterisation of the right as personal or 
proprietary is especially relevant for the question of liability of the surety. If the real 
suretyship constitutes a property right, the surety will only be liable for the object 
serving as security itself. The creditor to the agreement would therefore only be able 
to seize that particular object.662 If the real suretyship constitutes a personal right, 
the surety is liable for the value of the object for which he provided security. 
Although scholars following this school of thought do not challenge the nature of 
the security right established by the surety, they consider the suretyship itself a 
personal right.663 The creditor to the agreement would therefore be able to seize any 
object of the surety, providing the value of the object is not higher than the value of 
the object for which security was given.664 
In 1999 the Cour de cassation decided that the real suretyship constituted a 
property security right.665 In this case the court did not take a position in the dispute 
between the two schools of thought, but seemed to hint at the former. In a series of 
 
658 On French law see Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 15 et seq., Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 59, 
Piedelièvre 2004, p. 17 et seq. 
659 Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 43. 
660 Cf. Arts. 1020 and ex. 2077 C.civ, see Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 59, Houtcieff 2006, p. 458 et 
seq. 
661 See Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 60 et seq., Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 43 et seq. 
662 Grimaldi 2003, 170, Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 44. 
663 The term mixed approach would therefore be more accurate. See Grimaldi 2003, p. 170 et seq., 
Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 43-44, Piedelièvre 2004, p. 30, Crocq 2002, p. 546-548. 
664 Grimaldi 2003, p. 170, Grimaldi 2006a, p. 454. 
665 Cass. Civ. 1er 4 May 1999, Bull. Civ. I, No. 144, p. 96, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 318. 
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case law decisions in 2002, however, the court opted for the personal theory.666 
These cases dealt with the question of whether Article 1415 C.civ applied to real 
suretyships. Article 1415 C.civ concerns marital property law and prevents one 
spouse from entering into agreements that affect the common marital property. 
When a contract of suretyship is signed, the liability of the surety includes the 
matrimonial objects. Article 1415 C.civ prevents one of the spouses, without permis-
sion of the other spouse, from entering into such agreements. 
Whether an agreement such as a real suretyship falls under Article 1415 C.civ 
was in question until the 2002 judgments.667 In particular, the question arose when 
the object provided as security was an object in the communal property of a married 
couple. The Cour de cassation held that the suretyship was a personal agreement 
limited to the value of the object given as security. The creditor to the agreement 
was therefore prohibited to seize a common object, and had to seize another object 
or series of objects not exceeding the value of the original object.668  
The decision of the court seemed to have settled the debate on the nature of 
real suretyship. However, in 2005 the Cour de cassation in a joint session revised its 
opinion and held that real suretyship agreements constitute actual security rights to 
secure a debt of a third party.669 Even more remarkable, the court held that a real 
suretyship created no personal obligations at all and that therefore the real surety-
ship was not to be considered as a suretyship.670 Article 1415 C.civ was therefore not 
applicable in case of real suretyship.671 In other words, the court returned to its 
earlier case law, expressly stating that the provisions on normal suretyship would 
not apply and that the creditor could only seize the particular object over which 
security was provided. 
The case has been received with much criticism, but has been followed in 
other decisions by the Cour de cassation.672 It is remarkable that the court has recog-
nised the real suretyship as a security right, thus effectively creating a new property 
right. It is also this definition of a property right that was adopted by the Grimaldi 
report preparatory to the 2006 reforms of French security law.673 The proposed 
Article 2295 C.civ stated:  
 
666 Cass. Civ. 1er 20 May 2002, Bull. Civ. I, Nos. 127, 128 and 129, for a critical analysis see Crocq 
2002, p. 546 et seq. See also Cass. Com. 13 November 2002, Bull. Civ. IV, No. 161, Crocq 2003,  
p. 128-129. 
667 I.e., the characterisation of a real suretyship as a real security right could include that the real 
suretyship was not be considered as a suretyship in the meaning of Art. 1415 C.civ. See 
Aynès & Crocq 2003, p. 43-44, Simler & Delebecque 2004, p. 60-61. 
668 Grimaldi 2003, p. 170 et seq., Grimaldi 2006a, p. 454 et seq., Houtcieff 2006, p. 458 et seq. 
669 Cass. Ch. mixte 2 December 2005, D. 2006, 722, JCP G 2005.II.10183, JCP N 2006, p. 61. On the 
case see Simler 2005, p. 2425 et seq. 
670 Hence the title of the contributions of Grimaldi and Houtcie et seq. Translated in English these 
would be ‘real suretyship is no suretyship’, see Grimaldi 2006a, p. 454, Houtcieff 2006, p. 458. 
671 For a critical evaluation of the applicability of Art. 1415 C.civ see Grimaldi 2006a, p. 454 et seq. 
672 See Cass. Com. 21 February 2006, Cass. Civ. 1er 7 February 2006. On the criticism see Grimaldi 
2006a, p. 454 et seq., Simler 2005, p. 2428. 
673 However, the law authorising the Ordonnance did not provide competence to reform the law 
on suretyship. See Simler 2006, p. 598.  
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A real suretyship is a property security right created to guarantee the debt of another. 
The creditor cannot seize any other object than that provided as security.674 
This definition followed the most recent case law of the Cour de cassation, but was 
eventually not implemented.675 Instead, the right of pledge was extended to cover a 
property security right in respect of the object of another.676 Nonetheless, the deci-
sion of the Cour de cassation to accept real suretyship as a property right remains and 
enlarges the category of available property rights.677 The classification of the right as 
such, however, remains controversial. 
4.5. Fiducie 
On 19 February 2007 a law was adopted that introduced the fiducie, a trust-like 
device.678 This instrument, which is a contract that creates a transfer of ownership of 
objects, rights or securities, both present and future, to a fiduciary who will hold 
these objects for a specific purpose on behalf of a beneficiary, has already been dealt 
with above, under the heading of security ownership.679 However, the fiducie can be 
used for more purposes than to provide security. By analogy with its Roman law 
foundations, not only the fiducia cum creditore, but also the fiducia cum amico is 
recognised.680 The latter is a transfer of ownership for management purposes known 
in French law as a fiducie à fin de gestion.681  
The contract creating the fiducie may provide for a specific management pur-
pose and state the rights and duties of the fiduciary in this respect.682 This enables 
the parties to make detailed agreements about matters such as the investment 
powers of the fiduciary. Furthermore, the provision on the requirements for the 
fiducie contract leaves room for unknown beneficiaries at the moment the contract is 
created. Instead of requiring the beneficiaries to be mentioned, requirements to 
identify them may be given.683 Therefore, a fiducie might also give the fiduciary 
discretionary powers to appoint beneficiaries, enabling the institution to be used for 
scholarships and charitable purposes. 
The fiduciary will be under the obligation to take care of the objects in 
accordance with the fiducie contract. For any mistakes the fiduciary makes, he will 
 
674 The proposed Art. 2295 stated ‘Le cautionnement réel est une sûreté réelle constituée pour 
garantir la dette d’autrui. Le créancier n’a d’action que sur le bien qui en forme l’objet’. See, 
inter alia, Grimaldi 2006a, p. 454 et seq. 
675 This because of political reasons, see above; 3.5. Pledge. Grimaldi 2006a, p. 455, Legeais 
2006a, p. 60. 
676 Art. 2334 C.civ, Legeais 2006a, p. 60, 353. See above; 3.5. Pledge. 
677 See Legeais 2006a, p. 57-61. 
678 Loi No. 2007-211 du 19 février 2007, JORF 21 February 2007.  
679 Art. 2011 C.civ, see above; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
680 See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
681 See De Roux 2007, p. 12, Kuhn 2007, p. 32. 
682 Art. 2018 C.civ. 
683 Art. 2018(5) C.civ, De Roux 2007, p. 43-44. 
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be personally liable with his own set of objects and debts.684 The liability of the 
fiduciary is not only against the transferee and beneficiary, who are the parties to 
the contract, but also against any third parties that suffer damage.685 Furthermore, 
when the transferee or the beneficiary is unsatisfied with the performance of the 
fiduciary, or even when a third party is unsatisfied with the fiduciary, they may 
approach a court to ask for a replacement.686 
The fiducie creates a right of ownership that is limited by the contract of trans-
fer. These limitations are limitations in time (the right of ownership for management 
purposes of the fiduciary may last for a maximum of thirty-three years) but are also 
limitations on the rights and duties of the owner.687 Although the fiduciary becomes 
owner, his right of ownership can hardly be qualified as a standard right of owner-
ship, even though doctrinally there is only one right of ownership. The fiducie cre-
ates a purpose-bound ownership that can, depending on the purpose of the transfer, 
be called either security ownership or management ownership  
In any case the right will be temporary, awarding the transferee a right of 
‘remainder’: at the end of the fiducie he will become full owner again. In this sense 
the fiducie approaches the concept of the English trust.688 However, compared with 
the English trust, the beneficiary only has a right against the trustee and not a right 
that he may be able to invoke against third parties.689 A fiducie is, contrary to an 
English trust, a mere contract creating personal rights. However, at the same time, 
some proprietary effects, in particular on the right of ownership of the fiduciary, 
cannot be denied. It remains therefore unclear what is the status of the newly 
introduced fiducie in French law.690 
4.6. Lease 
An owner may give a right to use and enjoy his object under ownership not only by 
creating a limited property right in respect of or on behalf of another person, but he 
may also create a personal right in respect of or on behalf of another person. Such a 
personal right can be a right of lease.691 The agreement creating the lease is therefore 
not a démembrement of the right of ownership and does not constitute a limited 
property right, but limits the owner in his powers.692 This limitation on the powers 
of the owner can be justified by the lease agreement, to which the owner agrees, 
 
684 I.e., with his own patrimony. Art. 2026 C.civ. 
685 De Roux 2007, p. 52-53. 
686 Art. 2027 C.civ, De Roux 2007, p. 53-54. 
687 Art. 2018 C.civ, see above; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
688 See Chapter 6; 1.5. Trust Law. 
689 The effect of the right of the beneficiary in English law is also not unlimited. But when a 
property right is the subject of a trust, the beneficiary may have a right to act against third 
parties. See Chapter 6; 1.5. Trust Law. 
690 See critically Crocq 2007, p. 12 et seq. 
691 See Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 100, Carbonnier 2000, p. 295, Hervieu 1981, p. 61. 
692 See Carbonnier 2000, p. 296, Patault 1989, p. 168-172. 
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and, in a normal situation, by the compensation the owner receives from the 
lessee.693 In this respect Article 1709 of the Civil Code states: 
A lease of objects is a contract by which one of the parties binds himself to let another 
enjoy the object for a certain duration of time, and at a certain price which the latter 
party binds himself to pay.694 
The definition of a lease comes very close to the definition of a right of emphyteusis 
or the definition of a building or construction lease.695 These rights give the right-
holder a property right, whereas the holder of a lease is entitled to a personal right 
only. However, legislation on leases has been introduced, mainly to protect the 
lessee in case of a sale and transfer of the ownership of the lessor, with the effect of 
making a lease not just a mere personal right either.696 
The owner of the object under lease is bound by the lease agreement. The 
result of this is that he is obliged to make the object under lease available to the 
lessee and perform any maintenance or repair work that are necessary.697 Especially 
when the ownership of the leased object is transferred to another person, by 
operation of law, the new owner becomes bound by the lease agreement, including 
these duties of repair and maintenance.698 Article 1743 of the Civil Code states: 
If the lessor sells the object under lease, the acquirer of the object may not evict the 
lessee, tenant of a part of the object or tenant who has an authentic lease or one of 
which the date can be ascertained.  
He may however evict a non-rural lessee or tenant when he has reserved a right to do 
so in the lease agreement.699 
Article 1743 of the Civil Code expresses the maxim that a sale does not break a lease. 
In other words, the lease is given a droit de suite effect on the part of the owner. It is 
because of this that some scholars have argued that a lease constitutes a property 
right.700 However, already in 1861 the Cour de cassation held that a lease did not 
constitute a démembrement and is a personal right.701 The right of lease is a personal 
right awarding the lessee nothing more than personal rights, with the exception of 
the case of a sale and transfer by the owner, in which case the full lease agreement 
 
693 See Carbonnier 2000, p. 295-296. 
694 A lease of objects is contrasted by a lease of labour which is also possible under the similar 
rules in the French Civil Code, see Art. 1708 C.civ. Art. 1709, ‘Le louage des choses est un 
contrat par lequel l’une des parties s’oblige à faire jouir l’autre d’une chose pendant un 
certain temps, et moyennant un certain prix que celle-ci s’oblige de lui payer’. 
695 On these rights see above; 3.4. Emphyteusis. 
696 See Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 100-101. 
697 Arts. 1719 and 1720 C.civ. 
698 Art. 1743 C.civ. 
699 Art. 1743 C.civ, ‘Si le bailleur vend la chose louée, l’acquéreur ne peut expulser le fermier, le 
colon partiaire ou le locataire qui a un bail authentique ou dont la date est certaine. Il peut, 
toutefois, expulser le locataire de biens non ruraux s’il s’est réservé ce droit par le contrat de 
bail’. 
700 See e.g. Troplong 1845, Nos. 5 et seq., Nos. 473 et seq. On this see Sagaert 2005b, p. 1010. 
701 Req. 6 March 1861, DP, 1861, I, 713, Hervieu 1981, p. 62. 
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transfers to the new owner or lessor and the personal rights of the lessee can be 
exercised against that new owner.702 
In 1975 a legislative reform introduced an extension of the applicability of 
possessory actions.703 Before the reform these actions had only been available to 
possessors, but after the reform the actions were extended to detentors as well. In 
French law a lessee does not become possessor of the object of lease, but detentor. In 
other words, the holder of a personal right over an object, a detentor, becomes 
entitled to claim return of his detention when the object is removed from his factual 
power.  
In order to limit the possibilities of the lessee instituting this action against the 
lessor, the Civil Code prevents the lessee from taking such action.704 However, 
against persons interfering with his detention the lessee may use a possessory 
action to claim back factual control over the object.  
With this extension the lessee has been awarded rights and powers over the 
object that he can exercise against third parties, albeit a limited class of third 
parties.705 Remarkably, these new powers to claim back factual control by the lessee 
have not led to a renewed debate on the legal nature of the lease.706 
5. A Numerus Clausus in French Property Law? 
French law adheres to the separation between the law of obligations and the law of 
property and therefore also to the separation between personal rights and property 
rights. This is not just to be deduced from the structure of the Civil Code, but is also 
the starting point for case law and legal scholarship.707 Although the separation is 
not as strictly advocated in the structure of the Civil Code, in which property law 
seems to take the leading role, the effects of personal rights are considered to be 
different from those rights created in the area of property law.708 
The separation between the law of obligations and the law of property can also 
be seen in the area of security rights. Not only in the Civil Code of 1804, but also in 
 
702 Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 101, Carbonnier 2000, p. 301. 
703 Loi No. 75-596 du 9 juillet 1975, JORF du 10 juillet 1975. 
704 Art. 2282 C.civ, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 101, 153, Carbonnier 2000, p. 301. 
705 Carbonnier 2000, p. 319. 
706 See Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 101, Carbonnier 2000, p. 301. The absence of a debate is re-
markable seen the debate on the availability of the possessory action for detentors has created 
in Germany. On German law see Chapter 4; 4.3. Entitlement to Possession Through the Law 
of Obligations. 
707 With respect to case law see Cass. Civ. 3ème 16 November 1988, D. 1989, p. 157. See also Zenati 
1989, p. 577, Hervieu 1981, p. 195. 
708 Such a structure is different in German or Dutch law where the law of contract is known as 
the law of contract and not as different ways to acquire property. The leading role of property 
law in the French Civil Code is deceptive. At least its drafting was not as controversial as 
other subjects. The collected works of the commission and the debates on the drafts of the 
Civil Code, collected by Fenet show a 340 page volume dealing with the second book of the 
Civil Code dealing with property law, whereas 3 books deal with the law of contract, of 
which e.g. the book on sale comprises 614 pages. See Recueil complet des travaux prépa-
ratoires du code civil 11 and Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du code civil 14. 
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the 2006 reform on security law, a distinction is made between personal security 
rights and property security rights. Personal security rights are personal rights and 
therefore only have effect between parties, property security rights are property 
rights and therefore have effect against the whole world. However, the strict separa-
tion creates classification problems with certain rights.709 This is partly because of 
the consensual transfer system. In principle, the conclusion of a contract transfers 
ownership of an object from one person to another. This same principle also applies 
to the creation of limited property rights. The conclusion of a contract creates a 
limited property right and determines the content of that right.  
Through this system of transfer and creation the law of contract has a sub-
stantial influence on the law of property. The right of servitude offers one of the best 
examples of this influence. In French law, the right of servitude is not only created 
by contract, but is also governed by it. Whether the right of servitude concerns a 
right of way or a right of water or of support depends on the content of the contract 
creating the right. Not only does the law of contract in this way interfere in the law 
of property and achieve effect against third parties, it also allows parties to attempt 
to give any content to a right of servitude that is possible.710 Nevertheless, property 
law does not allow parties the same amount of party autonomy as does the law of 
contract. Therefore, a tension is present between the contract the parties conclude 
and the effect property law may give to such a contract.711 
This tension can be illustrated with a case that came before the Cour de 
cassation. In 1984 the court dealt with the question whether a right given to a third 
party to put a poster on a wall was a right of usufruct.712 The court of Aix-en-
Provence had classified the right to put a poster on a common wall as a right of 
usufruct, but the Cour de cassation held that, from the definition of a usufruct in 
Article 578 of the Civil Code, the right could not be a right of usufruct.713 In other 
words, as a result of the refusal to classify the right to put up a poster as a right of 
usufruct, the parties had not succeeded in creating a property right in this case.714 
Zenati in his observations on the case considers the possibility that the right to put 
up a poster might be a real servitude, but rejects the option because of the lack of a 
dominant piece of land.715  
Therefore it could be stated that the Civil Code of 1804 does provide 
guidelines for the restrictions the courts impose on practice in respect to the content 
parties attempt to give to their legal relations. The definitions provided by the Civil 
Code and common interpretations of these definitions are used by the courts as a 
 
709 See above; 4. Borderline Cases in French Property Law. 
710 On this tension see Hervieu 1981, p. 8 et seq. 
711 In the same sense see Hervieu 1981, p. 32. 
712 Cass. Civ. 3ème 18 January 1984, D. 1985, p. 504. In French known as a droit d’affichage. See also 
Crocq 1995, p. 80. 
713 On the case see Zenati 1985, p. 504 et seq. 
714 This case could be seen as an application of the Typenfixierung. On this concept see Chapter 4; 
5. A Numerus Clausus in German Property Law. 
715 Zenati 1985, p. 505. 
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restriction on party autonomy.716 However, at the same time the definitions pro-
vided and the interpretations of these should not be taken as making it impossible 
to recognise new rights.  
As early as 1834 the Cour de cassation was asked to decide on a particular situa-
tion of co-ownership.717 This case concerned a situation in which one party, named 
Caquelard, owned a riverbank and the grass and plants growing on it. Another 
party, named Lemoine, was the owner of the trees that grew on the riverbank. A 
lower court in Rouen had decided that both parties were owners, or at least co-
owners, of the riverbank, but that Caquelard had to respect the rights of Lemoine 
over the trees.718 Lemoine’s rights, the court of Rouen held, were recognised as a 
right of servitude.719 Caquelard appealed in cassation and argued that the court of 
Rouen had violated the Civil Code’s principles of ownership. The Cour de cassation 
rejected the appeal and ruled that the two parties could very well be co-owners, 
even with an unfamiliar division of rights as in this case. The court stated that 
Articles 544, 546 and 552 of the Civil Code are representing the general law on 
ownership, but that they are not prohibitive.720 
Somewhat contradictory to the decision of the Cour de cassation is Article 543 of 
the Civil Code which names three possible property rights a person can have in an 
object; a right of ownership, a right of usufruct or a right of servitude. The contra-
diction between the judgment of the Cour de cassation in Caquelard v Lemoine and 
Article 543 C.civ has been the subject of much debate that is not completely settled 
today. The debate specifically centres on the interpretation of Article 543 C.civ.  
When looking at the Civil Code of 1804 a clear picture is provided. On the 
structure of the second book of the Civil Code dealing with these property rights, 
one of its draftsmen, Treilhard, stated: 
See here, in effect, the only modifications to which the owners can be susceptible in our 
political and social organisation. There can be no other rights in respect of any object 
than a right of ownership, full and complete, including the right to use and enjoy and 
to dispose; or a simple right of use and enjoyment, without the right to dispose of a 
piece of land; or, finally, a right of servitude on the object of another.721 
 
716 The interpretation of the definition of property rights is of particular importance with respect 
to the prohibition to impose positive duties in case of a right of real servitude. Although 
Article 686 C.civ provides a definition, the restriction to negative duties is interpreted and not 
explicitly mentioned. See above; 3.1. Real Servitudes. 
717 Req. 13 February 1834, D.P. 1834.I.218, S.1834.I.205. 
718 Cour royale de Rouen 14 March 1832, Hervieu 1981, p 57. 
719 A servitude discontinue, non établie par titre, S. 1834.I.205. See also Patault 1983, p. 222-223. 
720 The Court states ‘Attendue, en droit, que les articles 544, 546 et 552 du Code civil, sont 
déclaratifs du droit commun relativement à la nature et aux effets de la propriété, mais ne 
sont pas prohibitifs’. 
721 ‘Voilà, en effet, les seules modification dont les propriétés soient susceptibles dans notre 
organisation politique et sociale; il ne peut exister sur les biens aucune autre espèce de droits: 
ou l’on a une propriété pleine et entière, que renferme également et le droit de jouir et le droit 
de disposer; ou l’on n’a qu’un simple droit de jouissance, sans pouvoir disposer un fonds; ou 
enfin on n’a que des services fonciers à prétendre sur la propriété d’un tiers …’, Recueil 
Æ 
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Although this statement seems very clear and unambiguous, on several occasions 
the Cour de cassation has ruled in outright contradiction. Patault has shown that in 
order to understand the case law of the Cour de cassation, the Civil Code should be 
seen in the light of the abolition of the feudal system.722 First and foremost, the 
unitary nature of the right of ownership had to be protected. Only later, at the end 
of the nineteenth century, did the exclusivity of the right of ownership come to 
receive greater emphasis.723 According to Patault, this first method of looking at the 
right of ownership as a non-feudal right enabled what she calls propriétés simultanées 
or simultaneous ownership.724 Although the recognition of a unitary concept of 
ownership in the Civil Code of 1804 brought an end to the multiplicity of property 
rights in the ancien régime, the use of the right of ownership remained contro-
versial.725 
Patault refers to a case in 1832 in which the court in Nancy was asked to 
decide on a situation in which both a municipality as well as the State had a right of 
ownership on the hills surrounding a village.726 In this case the court stated that it 
saw no problem in the division between the two rights of ownership. In a decision 
three months after the decision in Caquelard v Lemoine, the Cour de cassation upheld 
this judgment.727 Patault shows also that on other occasions the courts have had no 
problem in recognising several persons sharing a right of ownership.728 
Only in the second half of the nineteenth century does Patault detect a change 
in the case law of the Cour de cassation.729 She notes that when the Court was asked 
to decide on a case where one person claimed to own a building and another 
claimed to own the land on which the building was constructed, the court would 
recognise a situation of co-ownership entitling the owner of the house to co-owner-
ship of the land.730 From 1858 onwards the court started to recognise a separate 
right of ownership from the ownership of the land for the owner of the house.731 
Only in 1873 did the Cour de cassation recognise the ownership of the house as a 
separate and distinct property right in the form of the right of superficies.732 Further-
more, on several other occasions the Cour de cassation has recognised other property 
rights. These include the right of emphyteusis, but also most recently the rights of 
retention and real suretyship.733  
 
complet des travaux préparatoires du code civil 11, p. 33. In the same sense see Recueil 
complet des travaux préparatoires du code civil 11, p. 41. See also Hervieu 1981, p. 109. 
722 Patault 1983, p. 217-221, Patault 1989, p. 182 et seq. 
723 Patault 1983, p. 228 et seq. See also Bürge 1991, p. 42 et seq. 
724 On the term see Patault 1989, p. 15. 
725 Libchaber 2004, p. 352. 
726 Cour royale de Nancy 16 August 1832, S. 34, I, 720, see Patault 1983, p. 221. 
727 Patault 1983, p. 222. 
728 Patault 1983, p. 224-228. See, inter alia, Req. 14 January 1840, D. 1840, I, 20. 
729 Patault 1983, p. 228 et seq. 
730 Patault 1983, p. 232. 
731 Cass. Civ. 18 May 1858, S. 1858, 1, 661, see also above; 3.3. Superficies. 
732 Cass. Civ. 16 December 1873, S. 1874, I, 457, Patault 1983, p. 235. 
733 Cass. Civ. 24 August 1857, DP 1857, I, p. 326 (right of emphyteusis), Cass. Civ. 1er, 7 January 
1992, RTD civ. 1992.586, JPC 1992.I.3583 (right of retention), Cass. Ch. mixte 2 December 2005, 
D. 2006, 722, JCP G 2005.II.10183, JCP N 2006 (real suretyship). 
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The recognition of these new property rights seems connected to the approach 
taken towards the creation of property rights in general. The theory of démembre-
ment connects the creation of property rights to the right of ownership itself. In a 
time when the right of ownership could be simultaneous, there was little need for 
the creation of new property rights. Bürge has attempted to show that the develop-
ment of the theories in France on the exclusivity of the right of ownership was in-
fluenced by German legal scholarship, in particular Von Savigny and the Historical 
School.734 Bürge argues that it was only after Von Savigny and his school of thought 
became influential in France that French legal scholarship, and with it legal scholar-
ship and also case law, started to adhere to an exclusive and unitary concept of 
ownership.735 Hervieu in his dissertation on the subject of limitation of property 
rights underlines this conclusion.736  
The combination of the two theories could explain why it was only in the 
second half of the nineteenth century that French courts started to adhere to a more 
exclusive right of ownership. The exclusive concept of ownership led to a change in 
approach, the development of the abuse of rights doctrine to limit the powers of the 
exclusive owner offers a clear example.737 In any case, only upon the recognition of 
an exclusive concept of ownership did the need for a clear definition of property 
rights other than ownership arise. 
A property right in French law is either a right of ownership or a limited 
property right. The limited property rights are further divided into principal 
property rights; the rights of servitude, usufruct, emphyteusis and superficies, and 
accessory property rights; the rights of pledge and hypothec. The second category of 
rights is known as accessory because these rights are traditionally seen as connected 
to the claim the performance of which these rights seek to secure.738  
The traditional system of French property law uses the theory of démembrement in 
order to determine what is a property right. In other words, a property right is seen 
as a right consisting of certain powers of the owner, who, for the time the limited 
property right exists, cannot exercise these rights. This narrow definition of a 
property right created some difficulties in French legal scholarship. Those property 
rights that can be brought under the narrow definition are the principal property 
rights.739 These principal property rights comprise the traditionally recognised 
powers of the owner; usus, fructus and abusus.740  
Accessory property rights do not fit easily in this model. In general the 
modern handbooks do not deal with the question of démembrement of accessory 
 
734 Bürge 1991, p. 42-63, 89-93, Heirbaut 2004, p. 322-323. On Von Savigny see Chapter 4; 1. 
Introduction. 
735 Bürge 1991, p. 521-523. 
736 Hervieu 1981, p. 117 et seq. 
737 Also see above; 2. The Right of Ownership. 
738 On the distinction see above; 3. Other Property Rights. 
739 Their status as property rights is usually not challenged. See Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 99-
100, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 40-42. 
740 On the recognition of these elements of the right of ownership see above; 2.1. Ownership. 
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property rights.741 Whether accessory property rights actually are a démembrement of 
the right of ownership is questionable. Becqué has suggested that the accessory 
property rights also deprive the owner of some of his powers.742 Crocq even implies 
that limiting the powers of the owner in case of non-payment by the debtor 
constitutes a démembrement of the right of ownership when an accessory property 
right is created.743 According to Crocq these powers include the powers of the 
owner to sell and transfer the object.744 
At the same time, others argue that accessory property rights do not constitute 
a démembrement of the right of ownership as they are focused on the value of the 
object and not on the use of an object.745 Partly because of their nature as distinct 
property rights, the development of security rights in France has been different 
from the development of the rights to use that certainly comprise a démembrement of 
the right of ownership. Taking into account the origin of security rights, which is 
usually a contract, their recognition as property rights has been controversial.746 The 
recognition of new rights to use, the right of superficies and the right of emphyteusis, 
has also been problematic to some extent, but the recognition of new security rights 
has led to a much fiercer debate.747 Crocq in his doctoral thesis has argued for the 
possibility of using contract law to extend the possible security rights in the French 
system.748 He argues that a contractual limitation on the right of ownership, for 
instance a non-transferability clause, would provide the right of ownership with an 
accessory and therefore also security character.749 
When combining the above, the complicated situation in French law becomes 
clear. Only since the second half of the nineteenth century have case law and legal 
scholarship been forced to clarify the catalogue of property rights. With the recogni-
tion of a unitary and exclusive right of ownership, the need to protect that right of 
ownership also arose. Although this development forced the Cour de cassation to 
recognise several new property rights, a new series of recognitions such as occurred 
in the first half of the nineteenth century seems unthinkable.750 Nevertheless, the 
Cour de cassation has continued to hold itself competent to recognise new property 
rights. This competence is best illustrated by the recognition of the rights of reten-
 
741 See Terré & Simler 1998, p. 41-42, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 100, Atias 2005, p. 55-56, 
Libchaber 2004, p. 356 et seq. 
742 Planiol, Ripert & Becqué 1953, p. 375-376, see also Crocq 1995, p. 78-87. 
743 Crocq 1995, p. 81, where Crocq states ‘Ceci étant admis, il apparaît que le démembrement du 
droit de propriété dans le but d’en faire un droit accessoire n’est pas incompatible avec 
l’essence du droit de propriété. En effet, le créancier a une vocation à recouvrer la plénitude 
de ses prérogatives en cas de défaut de paiement par le débiteur’. See also Libchaber 2004,  
p. 364. 
744 See Crocq 1995, p. 78-81. 
745 Cabrillac & Mouly 2004, No. 504, Aubry, Rau & Eismein 1961, p. 94. 
746 See, in general, Chapter 2. 
747 On the recognition of the right of superficies and emphyteusis see above; 3.3. Superficies and 3.4. 
Emphyteusis. 
748 Crocq 1995, p. 81. 
749 Crocq 1995, p. 83-87. 
750 See Patault 1983, p. 217 et seq., Libchaber 2004, p. 351-352. 
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tion and real suretyship as property rights.751 It can therefore be stated that although 
Article 543 of the Civil Code enumerates the three most important principal 
property rights, the list is not as limited as this Article seems to suggest.  
Whether the system of property rights in French law is a closed system 
remains controversial. Von Bar and Drobnig in their study on property law and 
non-contractual liability law and how these areas of law relate to contract law signal 
a continuing debate in French law.752 The debate does not so much centre on the 
interpretation of Article 543 of the Civil Code, but concerns the tension between 
party autonomy in contract law and the possible party autonomy in property law as 
well.753 Surprisingly, the term numerus clausus is also familiar to French authors.754  
Some of the most influential classic authors in French law, Demolombe, and 
Aubry and Rau, have recognised a numerus clausus in French law.755 Also modern 
authors like Chabas, Crocq, Cabrillac and Mouly, Carbonnier, Larroumet and 
Zenati recognise the existence of the principle.756 These authors consider the 
property rights mentioned in the Civil Code, added to those naturally recognised by 
the Cour de cassation, as a closed system and deny parties the freedom to create new 
property rights. They therefore seem to adhere to a rule of numerus clausus.757  
At the same time, several other influential authors, including the classic 
authors Eismein, Chauveau, Laurent and Picard, but certainly also modern authors, 
like Atias and Terré, and Simler. recognise a freedom for parties to create new prop-
erty rights.758 This second group of authors examines the classification problems 
French law faces and conclude that parties must be given the freedom to create new 
property rights, especially in respect to real obligations.759 
Currently the first group is considered the leading opinion.760 Particularly 
Crocq seems successful in showing that parties should not have the freedom to 
 
751 See above; 4.1. Right of Retention and 4.4. Real Suretyship. 
752 Von Bar & Drobnig 2002, p. 312-313. 
753 Or the autonomie de la volonté. 
754 Although also terms as limitation of property rights and closed system are used. The use of 
the term in French law is surprising because the term numerus clausus seems to have come 
from German scholarship at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Only through compar-
ative research the term seems to have become known in other legal systems as well. See e.g. 
Van Erp 2003b, Swadling 2000a. On the origin of the term numerus clausus see Struycken 2007, 
p. 122-123. See also Chapter 7; 1.3. Considering Numerus Clausus. 
755 Demolombe 1870, p. 436-437, Aubry, Rau & Bartin 1935, p. 69-74. 
756 Chabas 1994, p. 4-5, Crocq 1995, p. 191-192, Cabrillac & Mouly 2004, No. 505, Carbonnier 
2000, p. 76-77, Larroumet 2004, p. 33-35, Zenati & Revet 1997, No. 196, p. 216. See also Witz 
1981, p. 76. 
757 There seems only one doctoral thesis on the subject in France itself. Hervieu, the author of 
this thesis, comes to the conclusion that the system of French property rights is closed. 
Hervieu 1981, p. 117 et seq. In a Swiss thesis Foëx comes, in respect to Swiss law, to this same 
conclusion. See Foëx 1987, p. 113. 
758 Aubry, Rau & Eismein 1961, p. 91-93, Chauveau 1931, p. 562-563, Laurent 1878, p. 107-115, 
Picard 1952, No. 48, p. 54, Atias 2005, p. 47-50, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 42-43. See very care-
fully Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 91-93. 
759 On this see also Sagaert 2004b, p. 47 et seq., Sagaert 2005b, p. 983 et seq. 
760 Crocq 1995, p. 189-191, Malaurie & Aynès 2005, p. 91, Zwalve 2003, p. 154. 
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recognise new property rights.761 He argues that the recognition of new property 
rights would violate Articles 2284, 2285 and 2323 of the Civil Code.762 These Articles 
establish that a debtor will be liable with his full set of objects and that all creditors, 
save those holding a property right giving them a right of preference, are equal. 
Crocq reasons that the free creation of new property rights would either create a 
separate patrimony or at least enable the right-holder of such a property right to 
take an object from the set of objects of the debtor before any creditor could reach it. 
Such a new property right would infringe on the principle of equality of creditors, 
or would entitle the creditor to a right of preference not recognised by the Civil 
Code.763 Furthermore, Crocq also brings the rule of numerus clausus in connection 
with the impossibility to fragment the right of ownership.764 Similarly, in a case 
where the right of ownership is fragmented when a party succeeds in creating a 
separate patrimony, the three Articles from the Civil Code would be equally 
violated. 
In conclusion, although French law does not award parties the freedom to 
create new property rights, both the legislature and the Cour de cassation have 
shown they are capable as well as competent to create or recognise new property 
rights. The interpretation of difficult cases of classification such as real obligations 
remains strict so that the system does not shift into an open system of property 
rights. A rule of numerus clausus is therefore present in French law, although not as 
clearly and strictly as in other civil law systems. 
 
761 Crocq 1995, p. 189 et seq. 
762 Ex Arts. 2092, 2093 and 2094 C.civ. 
763 Crocq 1995, p. 189-191, see also Larroumet 2004, p. 33-35. For a very similar approach with 
respect to Dutch law see Snijders 1997, p. 87 et seq., Snijders 2005a, p. 79 et seq. 
764 Crocq 1995, p. 191 et seq. 
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Chapter 4 
GERMAN LAW 
1. Introduction 
The development of property law in the territories that now constitute the Federal 
Republic of Germany has been different from that in France.1 One of the principal 
reasons that explains this difference is that, before the unification of private law into 
a Civil Code, the Germanic countries did not form a unity, nor did they have a 
central administration, a central court system or a central organisation of lawyers.2 
There was a unifying factor, however, in that the Holy Roman Empire, of which the 
Germanic countries were the largest part, was focused strongly on restoring the 
territory and unity of the old Roman Empire. 
In 1495 a central court was established, the Reichskammergericht (Imperial 
Court), which was ordered to deliver judgment on the basis of the common law of 
the Germanic countries. Depending on the substance of the conflict before it, the 
Court would first look at local customary law. If the Court did not know of this law 
or could not decide the case on this basis, it would use Roman law to solve the 
issue.3 The judges had been educated in Roman law and were far better equipped to 
decide matters using Roman law than they were using customary law.4 Further-
more, commentaries based on the jurisprudence of the Imperial Court were written, 
on the basis of which jurists, who were educated in Roman law, were trained. These 
jurists were not only Court officers, but also clerks, municipal officers, or legal ad-
visors.5 In this way, the rediscovered Roman law, the law that had been commented 
 
1 Most literature referred to in this chapter will be German literature. However, if an English 
source was available I have tried to mention it where I considered it appropriate.  
 Zweigert and Kötz, in their famous introduction to comparative law distinguish the civil law 
into the romanistic and German legal family. See Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 132 et seq. 
2 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 134-135, Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 220 et seq., Zwalve 2003, p. 42 et 
seq. 
3 Zwalve 2003, p. 44. 
4 Zwalve points out that this leads to a Bartolistic interpretation of the law in order allow for 
the maximum impact of received Roman Law. See Zwalve 2003, p. 44-45. 
5 Zwalve 2003, p. 45, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 135. 
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on by the Glossators, was received in the Germanic countries as well as applied and 
altered. Received Roman law was not merely applied, it became a living system of 
law subject to alterations to fit the circumstances of the Germanic countries.6 Es-
pecially when practice demanded a different or unknown solution, German jurists 
would seek an answer to the problem in Roman law, or make a new interpretation 
of Roman law. This method, comparable to the method used by the Glossators, 
became known as the usus modernus Pandectarum.7 
In the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment movement introduced a new 
view of the world based on reason.8 In the legal domain this led to a rediscovery of 
natural law.9 Private law in particular became an area of study, which resulted in a 
systematic overview of principles by, amongst others, Pufendorf and Wolff.10 With 
this development, German legal scholarship became a rational and abstract method 
that was out of touch with actual legal practice.11 The usus modernus Pandectarum, 
with its enormous theoretical framework, became the principal subject of study and 
development. It was this Enlightened work that inspired several leaders and admin-
istrators to reform and humanise the practice of law. Unlike in France, where the 
Enlightenment eventually resulted in the French Revolution and the overthrow of 
the ancien régime, the authorities in the Germanic countries wanted to replace the 
Roman law basis with a modern system based on reason.  
One of the most prominent Germanic countries was Prussia. This country, also 
known as the Prussian States, once part of the Holy Roman Empire, had developed 
into a powerful organisation. Prussian territories were spread throughout the major 
parts of the Germanic countries and were only bound by their shared King and the 
subsidiary application of Roman law.12 The Prussian King was strongly influenced 
by natural law and ordered a code of law based on the principles of reason.13 The 
code was intended to replace Roman law as the subsidiary system, with customary 
law continuing to apply as the primary source of law. The drafter of the code, 
Suerez, created a system based on the ideas developed by Pufendorf and Wolff. 
Moreover, the code was intended to be a comprehensible document in which the 
influence of natural law was clearly visible.14  
The code entered into force on 1 June 1794 as the General Land Law for the 
Prussian States, Allgemeines Landrecht für die preußischen Staaten (ALR).15 The ALR 
was in force throughout Prussia until Napoléon defeated some of the Prussian 
States in 1806, and Napoléon introduced his Code civil in the conquered parts. In the 
unconquered Prussian States the ALR remained in force and, after Napoléon’s 
defeat in 1813, the ALR was restored in the whole of Prussia. However, in the 
 
6 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 135, Zwalve 2003, p. 45. 
7 Zwalve 2003, p. 45-46. 
8 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 135. 
9 On the natural law school see Chapter 2; 5. Natural Law and the French Revolution. 
10 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 136. 
11 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 136. 
12 Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 225-227, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 137. 
13 Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 226, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 137. 
14 Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 230, Hattenhauer 1989, p. 88. 
15 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 137. 
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conquered territories, the French had abolished the customary law. This customary 
law was not restored after 1813, and as a result, the ALR, contrary to its original 
application, had exclusive force of law.16 
Nevertheless, the Germanic countries in general remained without a general 
code of law that unified German private law. It is no surprise that at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century several influential scholars started to call for a German 
Civil Code. In 1814 Thibaut published his Über die Nothwendigkeit eines allgemeinen 
bürgerlichen Rechts für Deutschland, in which he argued for a general German Civil 
Code.17 As the ALR had been intended to provide an overall system of private law 
and to be a comprehensible document at the same time, it was increasingly consid-
ered to be a failed attempt to clarify eighteenth-century law that could not be used 
to codify German private law. New ideas on the development of law arose that 
were based on research into the historical evolution of the law. These ideas culmi-
nated in the German Historical School of which Von Savigny became the most 
famous advocate. Von Savigny published a reaction to Thibaut’s article in which he 
agreed that the Germanic countries needed a codification of private law, but that the 
time to draft such a civil code had not yet come.18 Instead, Von Savigny argued that 
both Germanic law and Roman law should first be studied from a historical pers-
pective. It was on the study of Roman law that Von Savigny focused. However, 
instead of studying Roman law in the form received by the Glossators, which had 
been the focus of study in the method of the usus modernus Pandectarum, he studied 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis itself. Civil Codes such as the ALR and the French Code civil 
could not win his approval.19 Von Savigny and his followers studied and inter-
preted what they perceived to be true Roman law, and categorised it under a new 
system of private law. From this study the Pandectists, as they became known, 
created a doctrinal system of ‘current’ private law with legal concepts that were 
similar for all of the Germanic countries. 
In 1871, when Bismarck’s efforts had resulted in a unified Germany, the draft 
of a private law code became a subject for consideration. By that time, German legal 
scholarship was prepared for this task in the way Von Savigny had intended it to 
be. The study of what the Pandectists called the ‘current Roman law’ would form 
the basis of the new Civil Code. Windscheid, one of the most influential members of 
the Historical School, served in the First Commission that would draft the new 
code.20 This commission, which started work in 1874, published its first draft for a 
German civil code in 1887. This draft was heavily criticised because of its academic 
nature and the influence of the Historical School, which some critics regarded as 
detrimental to Germanic principles of law. On this last aspect, especially the criti-
 
16 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 138, Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 232. 
17 The title translates as ‘On the need for a general private law for Germany’, Thibaut 1814, p. 37 
et seq. 
18 Von Savigny 1814, p. 61 et seq. 
19 Zwalve 2003, p. 46. 
20 Zwalve 2003, p. 47, Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 253-254, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 142, see Johow 
1982. 
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cism of Von Gierke was very influential.21 In 1895 a Second Commission submitted 
an improved draft, but the criticism of the first draft had only resulted in the 
inclusion of some laymen in the commission and a number of textual revisions.22 
The proposal was adopted by parliament, and it entered info force on 1 January 
1900 as the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.23 
The German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) is a civil code based on the work of 
the Historical School. One of its main characteristics, a general part on principles 
common to the specific parts of private law, had been strongly urged by Von 
Savigny.24 The general part of the BGB is followed by specific parts on the law of 
obligations, the law of property, family law and the law of succession. This system 
differed from other civil codes where these distinctions, especially between contract 
law and property law, were not as clear, such as, according to the Historical School, 
the French Code civil and the Prussian ALR.25 
The ALR did not adhere to a strict separation between the law of contract and 
the law of property and it enabled parties to create a relation with third-party effect 
by contract.26 German legal scholarship strongly opposed this idea. Thibaut had 
published an article on the distinction between personal rights and property rights 
in Roman law. In his view, mixing the two was not a Roman-law-based distinc-
tion.27 The Historical School became the most ardent advocate of a strict separa-
tion.28 Already in his System des Heutigen Römischen Rechts or System of Current 
Roman Law, Von Savigny wrote:29 
Roman law keeps both [the law of property and the law of obligations. BA] strictly 
separated, and deals with each part as fully independent of the other’.30 
Von Savigny provides examples of less strict separation and concludes that mixing 
the two types of rights could result in a system of obligations in which property 
rights would naturally follow from these obligations. Alternatively he saw a mixing 
of property law and the law of obligations leading to a system where property 
rights would be the only ‘proper’ rights and obligations, that is to say, ‘improper’ 
 
21 See Von Gierke 1889, Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 142, Pfenning 1997, Füller 2006, p. 14-16. 
22 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 142. 
23 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 142. 
24 Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 254. Füller 2006, p. 11. 
25 See, explicitly, Motive III 1888, p. 3. Also the Austrian ABGB was included in the criticism. 
On the French Civil Code see Chapter 3; 1. Introduction. Zwalve 2003, p. 46. 
26 Liebs 1975, p. 13, Motive III 1888, p. 2-3. 
27 Thibaut 1817a. 
28 See Füller 2006, p. 8-10. 
29 On Von Savigny and his influence on the system of property law in German law, see 
Wiegand 1990, p. 112 et seq. 
30 ‘Das Römische Recht hält beide [The law of property and the law of obligations. BA] streng 
aus einander, und behandelt jeden Theil für sich als ganz unabhängig innerhalb seiner 
Gränzen’, Von Savigny 1981, p. 374. 
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rights, would only serve as a means to create these property rights.31 Von Savigny 
considered such approaches incomplete and one-sided.32 
Von Savigny’s observations were closely followed in the draft of the BGB.33 In 
fact, under the Trennungsprinzip or principle of separation, the separation between 
the law of property and the law of obligations is at the foundation of the German 
system of property law.34 According to the Motive, the explanatory memoranda to 
the Civil Code: 
In the system of the draft of the BGB property law takes an independent position. On 
the one hand it is independent from the law of obligations and family law and on the 
other hand from the law of succession. Its independence is founded in the distinction 
between property and personal rights.35 
Wiegand has emphasised the connection between the drafter of the property law 
part in the First Commission, Johow, and Von Savigny’s theory on the strict separa-
tion between the law of obligations and the law of property.36 Von Savigny’s 
doctrine sees property rights as instruments to organise nature, not in its entirety 
but in a limited area. Such a limited area is a corporeal object (Sache) to which a 
property right can exist.37 Of these property rights the right of ownership is the 
most extensive right.38 The law of property provides rules on how nature can be 
organised. Rights against another person concern either objects or powers over 
objects (law of property) or rights that follow from a person’s acts (law of obliga-
tions). The Motive further explain the independence of property law: 
Property Law, to safeguard its independence, must deal with the creation of property 
rights itself.  
… A person can therefore not be free to create any right in relation to an object with a 
property effect. Party autonomy as it is used in the law of obligations is therefore not 
applicable in property law. Here the opposite is the case: persons can only create those 
 
31 For which Von Savigny quotes Domat and the French Code Civil. Von Savigny 1981, p. 374, 
see also Wiegand 1990, p. 115. 
32 Von Savigny 1981, p. 375. 
33 Füller 2006, p. 8-9. 
34 On this principle see extensively Füller 2006, p. 177 et seq. In respect to numerus clausus see  
p. 373 et seq. 
35 ‘Das Sachenrecht nimmt in dem System des Entwurfs eine selbständige Stellung ein. Es 
schließt sich ab einerseits gegen das Recht der Schuldverhältnisse und das Familienrecht, 
anderseits gegen das Erbrecht. Seine Selbständigkeit beruht wesentlich in dem Gegensatz 
zwischen dinglichem und persönlichem Rechte’, Motive III 1888, p. 1, see also Wiegand 1990, 
p. 113. 
36 Wiegand 1990, p. 113-114, Johow 1982, p. 125-128. 
37 In Von Savigny’s view, nature comprises tangible objects only. Intangible or incorporeal 
objects in this reasoning are outside the definition of Sache. See below; 2. The Right of Owner-
ship. 
38 ‘Die unfrye Natur kann von uns beherrscht werden nicht als Ganzes, sondern nur in 
bestimmter räumlicher Begränzung; ein so begränztes Stück derselben nennen wir Sache, 
und auf diese bezieht sich daher die erste Art möglicher Rechte: das Recht an einer Sache, 
welches in seiner reinsten und vollständigsten Gestalt Eigenthum heist’, Von Savigny 1981,  
p. 338. On objects see Para 90 BGB. See also Füller 2006, p. 43-47. 
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rights that are recognised by the law. The number of property rights is consequently 
limited.39 
The inclusion of these, admittedly very short, explanations for the separation 
between the law of property and the law of obligations should be seen in the light of 
the development of the right of ownership. Under the influence of the Glossators, 
for many centuries property law had recognised a fragmented type of ownership. 
Heavily influenced by the feudal system of landholding, a distinction had been 
made between dominium directum, the right of ownership of a feudal lord, and 
dominium utile, the right to use the land of the feudal vassal.40 In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries too, natural law still recognised the distinction between these 
two types of ownership.41 Based on the state of legal scholarship at the time the 
Prussian ALR, and also the Austrian Civil Code, the ABGB, was drafted, such a 
duplex dominium was recognised in these civil codes.42 It was about this fragmenta-
tion of ownership that Thibaut published an article in 1817.43 Thibaut considered 
such a fragmentation un-Roman. Instead, he focused on the holder of the dominium 
utile.44 Many authors agreed with him and in the nineteenth century a unitary con-
cept of ownership came to be considered the only possible type of ownership.45 
Where the ALR permitted separating powers from the owner into another type of 
ownership, the new approach considered ownership to be the complete and indivis-
ible power over an object. As Von Savigny observed twice in his book on ‘current’ 
Roman law: 46  
… right of ownership, or the complete and exclusive power of a person over an 
object.47 
Another power, outside ownership, over the unfree nature cannot be imagined.48 
 
39 ‘Das Sachenrecht muss, um seine Selbständigkeit zu wahren, die Erwerbung der dinglichen 
Rechte nach Gesichtspunkten ordnen, die auf seinem Gebiete liegen. … Den Betheiligten 
kann es daher nicht freistehen, jedem beliebigen Rechte, welches sich auf eine Sache bezieht, 
den Karakter des dinglichen zu verleihen. Der Grundsatz der Vertragsfreiheit, welcher das 
Obligationenrecht beherrscht, hat für das Sachenrecht keine Geltung. Hier gilt der umge-
kehrte Grundsatz: die Betheiligten können nur solche Rechte begründen, deren Begründung 
das Gesetz zulässt. Die Zahl der dinglichen Rechte ist daher nothwendig eine geschlossene’, 
Motive III 1888, p. 3. The limitation of property rights will be dealt with below in 5. A 
Numerus Clausus in German Property Law? 
40 See Chapter 2; 4.3. Ownership. 
41 Wiegand 1976, p. 130-131. 
42 E.g. § 16 of Title 8 of Part I ALR provided: The ownership of an object is divided, when the 
different rights contained in the ownership belong to several people. ‘Das Eigenthum einer 
Sache ist getheilt, wenn die darunter begriffenen verschiedenen Rechte verschiedenen 
Personen zukommen’ as quoted by Wiegand 1976, p. 131, 139. 
43 Thibaut 1817b, on this article see Wiegand 1976, p. 136-138. 
44 See also Chapter 2; 6.1. General Summary. 
45 See, inter alia, Puchta 1873, p. 324-326, Wiegand 1976, p. 139 et seq. 
46 See Füller 2006, p. 38, 48-50. 
47 ‘Eigenthums, oder der unbeschränkten und ausschließenden Herrschaft einer Person über 
eine Sache’, Von Savigny 1981, p. 367. 
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Property law should therefore be governed by its own rules in respect to objects, 
and it should not be subject to alterations made by the law of obligations. The strict 
separation between the law of obligations and the law of property, emphasised by 
the Motive, forms the basis of the German system of private law.49 This independent 
system of property law deals with those legal relations that can be used to control 
objects. Of these relations, ownership is the most extensive right, but other rights 
exist as well. However, only those relations that are recognised by law can be 
property rights. The German property law system is thus characterised by a 
numerus clausus of property rights.  
However, although the system of German property law is built on the strict 
separation between the law of property and the law of obligations (the Trennungs-
prinzip), and the principle of numerus clausus, certain developments have resulted in 
deviations from both principles. This chapter will deal with the recognised list of 
property rights first, after which these developments and other quasi-property rela-
tions are examined. Because of the influence of Germanic law, the list of property 
rights in German law is longer than the French or the Dutch.50 Furthermore, because 
of German legal doctrine, which places distinction upon distinction, some addition-
al explanation is necessary. The right of ownership especially is subject to many of 
these distinctions. The main distinctions of the right of ownership will be dealt with 
in separate sections, even though all concern the regular right of ownership. The 
chapter will conclude with an examination of the system of property law in German 
law and specify how German law recognises a numerus clausus. 
2. The Right of Ownership 
In German law the right of ownership is the most comprehensive right a person can 
have to an object. Since the BGB follows the general doctrinal structure of Von 
Savigny’s system, an object or Sache susceptible of ownership can only be a corpo-
real thing.51 Since this doctrine considers a property right to be a power over nature, 
and nature consists of corporeal objects and the acts of other persons, a property 
right can only concern such a corporeal object.52 What an object is, is clearly 
described in Paragraph 90 BGB:  
The term object as it is used in this law can only be a corporeal object.53 
 
48 ’Eine noch außer dem Eigenthum liegende Herrschaft des einzelnen Menschen über die 
unfreye Natur ist nicht denkbar’ Von Savigny 1981, p. 369. 
49 More will be stated on this below in 3. Other Property Rights. See Füller 2006, p. 8-11, Baur, 
Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 6 et seq. 
50 See Chapter 3; 3. Other Property Rights, and Chapter 5; 3. Other Property Rights. 
51 See, inter alia, Johow 1982, p. 15 et seq. 
52 The latter is dealt with in the law of obligations. See above; 1. Introduction, but also Rank-
Berenschot 1992, p. 242. 
53 Para. 90 BGB, ’Sachen im Sinne des Gesetzes sind nur körperliche Gegenstände’. 
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Of all property law entitlements, the right of ownership grants the paramount 
power. Consequently, a power over such an object is considered an absolute power, 
it can, subject to limitations, be exercised against the whole world.54 Property rights 
over objects other than corporeal objects cannot in principle exist.55 Nevertheless, 
the power does not grant owners the unrestricted right to do as they wish. When 
there are several owners or when the right of ownership is used for a specific pur-
pose, such as ownership of an apartment, or ownership for security purposes, the 
right loses some of its unlimited nature. Because of the distinction between the nor-
mal, full, type of ownership and several other types, this section will be divided into 
subsections, each dealing with a different variant of the right of ownership, yet it 
should always be kept in mind that, paradoxically, German doctrine regards all 
these variants as manifestations of one right of ownership.56 
2.1. Normal Ownership 
The right of ownership is thoroughly dealt with by German law. Ownership does 
not only serve a purpose in private law, it is also considered to be a relation 
between the State and an individual person.57 To this end, Article 14 of the Grund-
gesetz, the German Constitution, provides: 
(1) The right of ownership and the right of succession is guaranteed. Their content and 
limit shall be defined by law. 
(2) The right of ownership entails duties. Its use shall also serve the public good. 
(3) Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. …58 
Although Article 14 of the Constitution concerns a public law relationship, it is 
considered to guarantee the right of ownership and provide room for the free 
development of the individual as well as for the protection of individual ownership 
against the State.59 Nevertheless, there are differences from the private-law type of 
ownership. For instance, the definitive interpretation of Article 14 is given by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (the Constitutional Court) and not by the private-law 
courts. Furthermore, the concept of ownership as guaranteed by Article 14 is inter-
preted much more widely than the private-law concept of ownership. The Constitu-
 
54 Along the same reasoning, Motive III 1888, p. 2, Johow 1982, p. 619. 
55 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 269. 
56 See, inter alia, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 27, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 8, Wolf 2005, p. 26 
et seq. 
57 At the foundation of this development was an influential article by Wolff, see Wolff 1923. 
Wolf 2005, p. 19, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 134 et seq., 270, Mayer-Maly 1984, p. 145 et seq. 
58 Article 14 Grundgesetz, ’(1) Das Eigentum und das Erbrecht werden gewährleistet. Inhalt 
und Schranken werden durch die Gesetze bestimmt. (2) Eigentum verpflichtet. Sein 
Gebrauch soll zugleich dem Wohle der Allgemeinheit dienen. (3) Eine Enteignung ist nur 
zum Wohle der Allgemeinheit zulässig. …’. 
59 Wolf 2005, p. 20. 
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tional Court has extended the term ownership to cover not only rights to corporeal 
objects, but also rights to other, incorporeal, rights and assets.60  
In German doctrine, the relationship between the owner and the State is 
considered highly relevant in private law, but at the same time different from the 
relation governed by the regular right of ownership. It is the BGB that deals with 
the right of ownership as a relation between private persons. The private-law right 
of ownership is considered as a relation of the owner against the rest of the world, 
and is dealt with in Paragraph 903 BGB: 
The owner of an object can, when this does not interfere with the law or other rights of 
third parties, do with the object what he wishes and exclude others from interfering. 
The owner of an animal must, in the exercise of his powers, uphold the special condi-
tions for the protection of animals.61 
At the basis of this definition is the concept of ownership advocated by Von 
Savigny, the right of ownership is considered the most absolute and total power 
over a corporeal object.62 At the same time, the old definition of Bartolus of the right 
of ownership as a ius in re corporali perfecte disponendi nisi lege prohibeatur can also 
still be distinguished.63 Any object other than a specific corporeal object is excluded 
from the right of ownership.64 
Because the right of ownership is seen as the paramount entitlement to a 
corporeal object, ownership is regarded as an indivisible power over an object.65 The 
right of ownership cannot therefore be separated into several types of ownership, as 
this would deprive the right of ownership of its primary characteristic. In order to 
work around this indivisibility, German doctrine follows the reasoning that the 
creation of a property right will not deprive the right of ownership of its character-
istics, the transfer of certain powers of the owner will not make the other party an 
owner. Instead, the other person will hold a property right as a ius in re aliena.66 
Ownership will remain the right of ownership, even if another property right is 
created.  
The right of ownership is an absolute right, it has effect against the world. Any 
disturbance of the right of ownership itself or of the object encumbered with this 
 
60 See, inter alia, BVerfG 17 July 1981, BVerfGE 58, 300, 336, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 271. 
61 Para. 903 BGB, ’Der Eigentümer einer Sache kann, soweit nicht das Gesetz oder Rechte Drit-
ter entgegenstehen, mit der Sache nach Belieben verfahren und andere von jeder Einwirkung 
ausschließen. Der Eigentümer eines Tieres hat bei der Ausübung seiner Befugnisse die 
besonderen Vorschriften zum Schutz der Tiere zu beachten’. 
62 Wiegand 1990, p. 117. 
63 Wiegand 1976, p. 121 see Chapter 2; 4.3. Ownership. 
64 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 269. In principle, this also excludes ownership of a general set 
of assets as e.g. a company (Unternehmen). This includes the obligation to transfer each asset 
of a company through the normal rules of transfer. However, practice has lead to some 
exceptions enabling the term Unternehmen to be seen as an object capable of transfer. For 
more details see Hattenhauer 1989, p. 101 and Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 323 et seq. 
65 Wiegand 1990, p. 117, Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 243. 
66 The relation between the right of ownership and other property rights will be dealt with 
below in 3. Other Property Rights. 
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property right can be remedied through a set of special claims available to the 
owner. First, a removal of the object from the powers of the owner entitles its owner 
to a claim based on Paragraph 985 BGB: 
The owner can claim the return of the object from the possessor.67 
This claim is available exclusively to the owner who has lost possession (factual 
power) over the object.68 It entitles the owner to reclaim the lost object. Although the 
provision uses the concept of possession, dealing with factual power over the object, 
only the owner can initiate the claim, as German doctrine considers that possession 
follows from the right of ownership.69 The formulation of Paragraph 985 BGB is 
therefore slightly misleading. The claim can only be initiated by the owner against a 
holder of the object. If the object is transferred, or brought into the hands of 
someone else, the claim will consequently no longer be directed at the old possessor 
but at the new possessor.70 The claim of Paragraph 985 BGB thus offers the owner 
the possibility to retrieve factual power. 
Secondly, Paragraph 903 BGB emphasises the power of the owner. German 
doctrine distinguishes a positive side and a negative side of the powers of the 
owner.71 The positive side is that owners may do with their objects as they see fit. 
However, the powers of the owner are not unlimited. The drafters of the BGB recog-
nised this and wanted to make clear that the powers of the owner can be limited.72 
These limits may concern provisions from public law, general private law, the law 
of neighbours or property rights.73  
The negative side of the powers of the owner is visible in the power to exclude 
others from the use or enjoyment of the object.74 The owner can claim exclusion 
through Paragraph 1004 BGB:75 
(1) If the right of ownership is influenced in another way as by removal or non-return 
of the possession, the owner may claim the discontinuation of the influence. If 
further influences can be expected, the owner may claim the ceasing of the activity. 
 
67 § 985 BGB ’Der Eigentümer kann von dem Besitzer die Herausgabe der Sache verlangen’. Cf. 
the Roman rei vindicatio, see Chapter 2; 2.3. Ownership. 
68 The term possession in German law is used in two ways. First, as the Roman possessio, but, 
secondly, also in the sense of the Roman detentio. See Chapter 1; 4. Terminology. Wolf 2005,  
p. 97-98. 
69 Wolf 2005, p. 97. In case a possessor exercised factual control over an object, but was not the 
owner, e.g. in case of a detentor, there is another specific claim available. On this see below; 
4.3. Entitlement to possession through the law of obligations.  
70 See Wolf 2005, p. 100. 
71 See Windscheid 1906, p. 856-857, Wolf 2005, p. 24-25, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 138-139, 
Müller 1997, p. 97-99. 
72 Protokolle § 848, 849 (G. 903-905), Mugdan 1979, p. 577. 
73 Motive III 1888, 260. See Aicher 1975, p. 71 et seq. The other property rights will be subject 
below in 3. Other Property Rights. Limitations on the right of ownership by law are not 
subject of this study. On this see, inter alia, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 273 et seq. 
74 Wolf 2005, p. 25. 
75 On § 1004 BGB in general see Müller 1997, p. 249 et seq. 
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(2) The claim cannot be initiated if the owner is obliged to endure the influence.76 
Any disturbance of the owner’s use or enjoyment of the object can lead to a claim 
based on Paragraph 1004 BGB.77 The threat of a disturbance can be a reason to ini-
tiate the claim. The criterion for a threat of disturbance is whether, from the pers-
pective of an independent third party, an act would normally lead to a disturbance 
of the powers of the owner.78 Consequently, the claim can only succeed insofar as 
the owner is not obliged, by law or by agreement, to tolerate such a disturbance.79 
This duty to tolerate includes both the law of neighbours and other property rights. 
Finally, there are several other claims protecting the right of ownership, both 
in property law and in the law of obligations.80 These claims all serve the purpose of 
guaranteeing the power of the owner over the object as defined by Paragraph 903 
BGB.  
The system of claims strengthens the right of ownership as the most compre-
hensive right. Furthermore, the right of ownership is a unitary right. Influenced by 
the reasoning of the Historical School, the right of ownership in German law confers 
an indivisible power on the owner.81 Primarily a reaction to the duplex dominium of 
former ages, the right of ownership cannot be fragmented into other rights.82 In 
doctrinal reasoning the right of ownership is always unitary and complete.  
However, there are several applications of the right of ownership which show 
that its unitary nature is not as clear as it seems. For example, a conditional transfer 
of ownership presents the legal system with some difficulties. There are two possi-
ble conditional transfers of ownership; the transfer under a resolutive condition, 
under which a transfer is made but the ownership of the object returns to the trans-
feror upon the occurrence of an event described in the condition, and the transfer 
under a suspensive condition, under which a transfer of ownership is postponed 
until the event described in the condition occurs. 
The transfer under a resolutive condition (unter auflösende Bedingung) poses a 
problem. The acquirer receives a right of ownership, which has to be absolute and 
unitary, but he will lose it upon fulfilment of the condition. Nevertheless, such a 
transfer will grant the transferee a full right of ownership. After all, in German 
doctrine ownership cannot be fragmented. 
 
76 § 1004 BGB ‘(1) Wird das Eigentum in anderer Weise als durch Entziehung oder Vorent-
haltung des Besitzes beeinträchtigt, so kann der Eigentümer von dem Störer die Beseitigung 
der Beeinträchtigung verlangen. Sind weitere Beeinträchtigungen zu besorgen, so kann der 
Eigentümer auf Unterlassung klagen. (2) Der Anspruch ist ausgeschlossen, wenn der 
Eigentümer zur Duldung verpflichtet ist’. Compare in this respect the Roman actio negatoria, 
see Chapter 2; 2.3. Ownership. 
77 Müller 1997, p. 250. 
78 Müller 1997, p. 270. 
79 Müller 1997, p. 267-269. 
80 §§ 986 et seq. BGB, but also § 823 BGB (tort), see Wolf 2005, p. 97 et seq. 
81 Von Savigny 1981, p. 367, Puchta 1873, p. 324, Windscheid 1906, p. 856. 
82 On the effect of the right of ownership in case of the creation of a limited property right see 
below; 3. Other Property Rights. 
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The transfer under a suspensive condition (unter aufschiebende Bedingung) 
creates the opposite situation. Here, the acquirer does not obtain ownership until 
the condition is fulfilled. The right of ownership therefore remains with the trans-
feror, but the transferee will expect to obtain the right of ownership. In most 
situations, this transfer takes the form of a reservation of ownership or Eigentums-
vorbehalt.83 Unlike the transfer of ownership under a resolutive condition, where the 
right of ownership and the expectation of ownership are mirrored, the transferor of 
a right of ownership under a suspensive condition will retain full ownership. The 
transferee has nothing but an expectation. In principle, therefore, the law of prop-
erty does not limit the transferor’s right to use, enjoy or dispose of his ownership.84 
The German approach to conditional transfers of ownership emphasises the 
unitary nature of the right of ownership. The doctrinal attitude of the system creates 
an unfair situation in which the person who does not have the right of ownership 
but merely expects to obtain it, is in a very vulnerable legal position. At the outset of 
the system, the person expecting ownership only has a personal right. When the 
owner becomes insolvent, the personal right will almost certainly not be sufficient 
to claim the right of ownership. German legal practice has found a solution in the 
recognition of a new property right: the Anwartschaftsrecht or acquisition right.85 
With the recognition of this new right, the person expecting ownership is granted, 
through the law of property, a better position than a personal right provides, 
without affecting the fullness of the right of ownership. 
2.2. Co-Ownership 
There are two types of co-ownership in German law. First, German law recognises a 
right of co-ownership in equal indivisible shares. These shares entitle their holders 
to act separately from each other. Secondly, there is a pure co-ownership in which 
there are indivisible and equal shares held by two or more persons, but these can 
only act jointly with regard to an object.  
The community of indivisible shares, known as Miteigentum nach Bruchteilen, is 
dealt with in Paragraphs 741 and further and 1008 and further of the BGB. The 
ownership of the object in question will, unless otherwise provided, be separated 
into equal indivisible shares.86 Each share will entitle each holder to a part of the 
ownership but also to a part of the right to use, as well as to a part in the proceeds of 
the object owned.87 Although each co-owner will hold a share in the community, 
only the holders together can manage the object they co-own. Usually, a majority 
 
83 See Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 741 et seq. 
84 Such limitations can be imposed by contract, which is normally done in case of a reservation 
of ownership. See Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 743. 
85 The Anwartschaftsrecht will be dealt with below in 3.4. Expectation Rights: Pre-Emptive Right 
and Acquisition Right. 
86 § 742 BGB, Wolf 2005, p. 26-27. 
87 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 190. 
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will provide a decision and will also bind any votes against.88 Doctrinally however, 
these co-ownership shares are treated as if they constituted normal ownership. The 
result of this is that they can be transferred and burdened in almost the same way as 
a normal right of ownership.89 The community in indivisible shares enables the 
owner of a share to act independently of the owners of the other shares. Conse-
quently, the claims available to the owner to protect his right of ownership are also 
available to the owner of a share in a community. At the same time the holders of 
the shares are also bound to each other. The claim for the return of the object can 
only be made by the co-owners together.90 Finally, a co-ownership share itself 
cannot, subject to certain exceptions, be subject to another co-ownership by a com-
munity of indivisible shares.91  
The second type of co-ownership is known as Gesamthandseigentum. This type 
of co-ownership is characterised by an indivisible community over which the 
owners can only exercise their powers together. The holders of shares in this 
community cannot exercise their powers over these shares without the holders of 
the other shares.92 This is different from the other type of co-ownership in which 
each holder of a share can act independently of the other holders in respect of his 
own share. This second type of co-ownership can only exist where the law provides 
for it, for instance, partnerships in company law, marriage or the receipt of an 
inheritance.93  
Co-ownership in an indivisible community especially can hardly be character-
ised as an indivisible power over an object. German doctrine offers a solution to the 
question of whether this type of co-ownership still concerns a right of ownership. In 
this line of reasoning, the indivisible share itself represents the full and indivisible 
right of ownership. Consequently, even though several people share the power 
granted by the right of ownership, that power is not divided among them. In this 
way, the right of ownership remains unitary and the most comprehensive right a 
person can have to a corporeal object. 
2.3. Ownership of an Apartment 
The ownership of an apartment, or Wohnungseigentum, is a specific type of owner-
ship that gives the owner entitlement to a specified part of a building. The introduc-
tion of this special type of ownership required the inclusion of some exceptions to 
the general provisions of the BGB, such as Paragraph 93 BGB, which prohibits the 
 
88 § 745 BGB, but § 1010 provides an extra requirement of registration in case of an immovable 
object. See Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 290-291. 
89 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 19, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 290-291. 
90 § 1011 BGB which states ‘Jeder Miteigentümer kann die Ansprüche aus dem Eigentum 
Dritten gegenüber in Ansehung der ganzen Sache geltend machen, den Anspruch auf 
Herausgabe jedoch nur in Gemäßheit des § 432’. 
91 The exception is the specific ownership of an apartment (Wohnungseigentum), which is dealt 
with in the next Section. See Wolf 2005, p. 27, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 290. 
92 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 19, Wolf 2005, p. 27. 
93 § 718, 105 et seq., 161 et seq., § 1405 et seq. and § 2032 et seq. BGB, as mentioned by Baur, Baur & 
Stürner 1999, p. 18-19. See also Wolf 2005, p. 26-27. 
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separation of an object into several parts capable of being the subject of property 
rights, and Paragraph 94 BGB, which considers the land and any building con-
structed on it a single entity.94 The Wohnungseigentum was introduced in German 
law through special legislation.95 The act introducing the ownership of an apart-
ment also introduced the Dauerwohnrecht, the right to live in a building for a longer 
duration of time.96 
The ownership of an apartment is constructed around a co-ownership in a 
community with indivisible shares.97 The Wohnungseigentum enables several people 
to each ‘own’ a separate area of a building they co-own.98 The Wohnungseigentum 
thus comprises a share in the community as well as a specific, exclusive ownership 
of a defined part of the building. Together these two entitlements form the 
Wohnungseigentum that German doctrine considers a normal type of ownership.99 As 
such this type of ownership of an apartment can be transferred and be burdened 
with other property rights in the same way as a normal right of ownership.100 Fur-
thermore, the claims available to normal owners through Paragraphs 985 and 1004 
BGB are available to the holders of this special right of ownership.101 In addition 
these special co-owners can use Paragraph 1004 BGB to exclude others, including 
other co-owners, from the exclusive ownership of their part of the building.102 
The share in the community and the exclusive part of the ownership of an 
apartment are inseparable. The owner can only dispose of the indivisible owner-
ship.103 Because German doctrine considers the ownership of an apartment a normal 
right of ownership, it is mostly treated as such. However, there are differences 
between these types of ownership. For instance, the law introducing the ownership 
 
94 § 93 BGB states ‘Bestandteile einer Sache, die voneinander nicht getrennt werden können, 
ohne dass der eine oder der andere zerstört oder in seinem Wesen verändert wird (wesent-
liche Bestandteile), können nicht Gegenstand besonderer Rechte sein’. § 94 BGB states ‘(1) Zu 
den wesentlichen Bestandteilen eines Grundstücks gehören die mit dem Grund und Boden 
fest verbundenen Sachen, insbesondere Gebäude, sowie die Erzeugnisse des Grundstücks, 
solange sie mit dem Boden zusammenhängen. Samen wird mit dem Aussäen, eine Pflanze 
wird mit dem Einpflanzen wesentlicher Bestandteil des Grundstücks’. The latter is a 
codification of the rule superficies solo cedit. See Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 292-293, Baur, 
Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 330. 
95 Gesetz über das Wohnungseigentum und Dauerwohnrecht (WEG) of 15 March 1951 (BGBl. I 
175). See Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 332. 
96 § 31 WEG. The Dauerwohnrecht is not to be confused with the Wohnungsrecht in the BGB, 
which is a special type of limited personal servitude. When the Dauerwohnrecht is created on a 
building not fit to live in, the right is known as a Dauernutzungsrecht. On this distinction see 
Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 342. 
97 § 1 WEG (Wohnungseigentumsgesetz) see above; 2.2. Co-ownership. 
98 § 10 WEG. 
99 See BGH 17 January 1968, NJW 1968, 499 = BGHZ 49, 250. 
100 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 333. 
101 Also § 823 will be available to the owner, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 333. 
102 § 13 WEG, Wolf 2005, p. 68. 
103 § 6 WEG, Wolf 2005, p. 67, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 337. 
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of an apartment permits certain limitations that cannot be imposed on normal 
ownership.104 Paragraph 12 of the Wohnungseigentumsgesetz (WEG) states:  
A provision that the owner of an apartment cannot transfer his right without permis-
sion from the other owners or from a third party can be made the content of the special 
exclusive ownership.105 
Such a provision limits the powers of the owner and constitutes a contractual inter-
ference in the law of property. Under the general theory on the right of ownership, 
property law provides its own rules, and contractual interferences, especially limita-
tions on property rights, are not allowed, and they therefore do not have third-party 
effect.106 As a general rule of German property law, Paragraph 137 BGB states:  
The power to dispose over a transferable right cannot be excluded or limited by 
juridical act. …107 
Certain deviations from the normal right of ownership are also permissible through 
legislation. The WEG deals with the relation between co-owners and contains a 
number of provisions that deviate from the provisions on the normal type of owner-
ship. Furthermore, co-owners themselves are allowed to deal with their affairs by 
contract within the limits of the law.108 However, such provisions will only have 
effect against third parties if they are registered as part of the exclusive owner-
ship.109  
A community of co-owners is created by force of law. The result is a com-
munity of shares that cannot be dissolved easily, neither on the request of one of the 
co-owners nor upon insolvency.110 Although each of the co-owners has an exclusive 
right of ownership as part of the ownership of an apartment, which each co-owner 
can transfer and burden, the community also binds each co-owner. In respect of 
costs and division of these costs, the co-owners are entitled to deal with their affairs 
on their own, usually through an association of co-owners.111  
 
104 Bundesgesetz vom 15.3.1951 über das Wohnungseigentum und das Dauerwohnrecht (WEG or 
Wohungseigentumsgesetz). 
105 § 12 WEG, ‘Als Inhalt des Sondereigentums kann vereinbart werden, daß ein Wohnungs-
eigentümer zur Veräußerung seines Wohnungseigentums der Zustimmung anderer Woh-
nungseigentümer oder eines Dritten bedarf’. 
106 The agreement is, however, binding on the parties as a contract, but has no effect on the 
property relation per se. 
107 § 137 BGB, ‘Die Befugnis zur Verfügung über ein veräußerliches Recht kann nicht durch 
Rechtsgeschäft ausgeschlossen oder beschränkt werden. …’. 
108 § 10 WEG, this could include costs but also a rule that a majority decision concerning the 
common parts of the building will bind all the owners. A majority decision having impact on 
the exclusive ownership of a part of the building will not have effect. BGH 20 September 
2000, BGHZ 145, 158 = NJW 2000, 3500, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 295. 
109 § 10 (2) WEG. 
110 § 11 WEG. 
111 § 20 et seq. WEG. 
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Finally, the right of ownership of an apartment can also be used to enable 
ownership of a separate part of an immovable object other than an apartment. In 
those cases the right is not known as ownership of an apartment but as Teileigentum, 
which translates as right of ownership of a certain part.112 
The right of ownership of an apartment is a special type of ownership. Al-
though German doctrine treats this right as a normal type of ownership, contractual 
or community-imposed restrictions create a more limited type of ownership. Unlike 
the normal type of ownership, the Wohnungseigentum does not confer on its holder 
the absolute and indivisible power over an object. 
2.4. Treuhand Ownership 
The Treuhand is best characterised as a contractual relation with far-reaching prop-
erty effects.113 In German doctrine, Treuhand does not so much concern the most 
comprehensive nature of the right of ownership as it concerns the substance and 
scope of the owner’s powers. A Treuhand enables parties to limit the powers of the 
owner by contract.114 In this respect, the Treuhand deviates from a basic principle of 
the BGB that the law of obligations and the law of property are strictly separated.115 
This separation is especially reflected in Paragraph 137 BGB, which prohibits 
contractual limitations on the power of the owner.116 
A Treuhand is created by a transfer of ownership whereby the transferee, the 
Treuhänder, is obliged to manage the transferred object for the benefit of the 
transferor, or Treugeber. The Treuhänder may appear to be the normal owner, but in 
relation to the Treugeber, the Treuhänder is obliged to manage the object as was 
agreed in the contract of transfer.117 This special transfer effectively fragments the 
right of ownership into economic ownership of the Treugeber and legal ownership of 
the Treuhänder.118 This distinction had been recognised in 1899, shortly before the 
introduction of the BGB. The Reichsgericht, or Imperial Court, but a different court 
than the Imperial Court (Reichkammergericht) mentioned above, stated: 
An object or claim, which is transferred to a debtor who is insolvent, however with the 
agreement that the object or claim is not treated as his ownership … is legally and 
formally owned by him, but not economically and practically.119 
 
112 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 330. 
113 Ganter 2004, p. 260. Another classification would be a trust-like device. The comparison to 
trusts has been made before, see, inter alia, Kötz 1963, Marwede 1972, Helmholz & 
Zimmermann 1998, p. 27 et seq. 
114 Wolf 2005, p. 27-28, Füller 2006, p. 387-392. 
115 See above; 1. Introduction. 
116 Although § 137 BGB did and does function as a limitation to what can be agreed upon by the 
parties. On the development of Treuhand in relation to § 137 BGB see Liebs 1975, p. 32-33. 
117 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 22. 
118 See Wolf 2005, p. 29. 
119 As cited by Wiegand 1990, p. 126, note 56. ‘Ein Gegenstand, der dem Gemeinschuldner zwar 
zum Eigentum übergeben ist, jedoch mit der Abmachung, daß derselbe gleichwohl von ihm 
Æ 
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Wiegand has emphasised that the decision of the Reichsgericht, which was followed 
by the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) or Federal Court, forms the basis of treating Treu-
hand ownership differently from the normal right of ownership.120 Nevertheless, 
German doctrine continues to recognise the unitary right of ownership as the only 
type of ownership. Judicial recognition of two rights of ownership, economic and 
legal ownership, does not doctrinally interfere with the notion of absolute and 
unitary ownership. The recognition of economic ownership does not imply a lesser 
form of legal ownership. A doctrinal solution is found in the distinction between the 
internal and external effects of the Treuhand.121 In relation to third parties there is 
only one type of ownership – the right of ownership of the Treuhänder. From a 
property-law point of view, the Treuhänder can freely dispose of the object under 
Treuhand. However, in the internal relation between Treugeber and Treuhänder, the 
Treuhänder is bound by the terms of the contact. This contract can limit the 
Treuhänder’s power to dispose, but may also stipulate duties to manage and take 
care of certain objects. In case of non-performance, the Treugeber has a set of 
contractual remedies against the Treuhänder at his disposal.122 However, the legal 
ownership of the Treuhänder is not affected by his personal duties. 
The explanation of the Treuhand relationship is one thing, but German legal 
doctrine has developed certain deviations from this doctrinal solution that give rise 
to interesting problems. First, the personal relation between Treugeber and Treu-
händer is extended in such a way that a third party who knows of the Treuhand 
relation and still decides to act can be affected by the contract.123 Secondly, in case of 
insolvency of either the Treugeber or the Treuhänder, the legal ownership of the 
Treuhänder is not decisive. The Treuhänder’s creditors cannot simply seize the object 
under Treuhand, although the Treuhänder is the legal owner.124 Instead, the Treugeber 
is awarded a counter-claim to stop a creditors’ seizure of the object through Para-
graph 771 of the Civil Procedure Regulation, Zivilprozeßordnung (ZPO).125 Moreover, 
Paragraph 47 of the Bankruptcy Regulation, Insolvenzordnung (InsO), entitles the 
Treugeber to claim the object from the set of assets and debts of the Treuhänder.126 The 
justification for this exception is the emphasis on the Treugeber’s economic owner-
ship.127 Furthermore, as a result of the recognition of the economic ownership of the 
 
nicht wie sein Eigentum behandelt werden dürfte … gehört dem Gemeinschuldner zwar 
formell und juristisch, aber nicht materiell und wirtschaftlich’ RGZ 45, 80 et seq., p. 85. 
120 Wiegand 1990, p. 126 et seq., for a comparative study of Swiss and German law see Wiegand 
1982, p. 565 et seq. 
121 Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 354-355, Wiegand 1982, p. 574, Wiegand 1990, p. 127. 
122 See Wolf 2005, p. 27-28. 
123 A claim for damages through § 823 is awarded. BGH NJW-RR 1993, 367. Wolf 2005, p. 28. 
124 Wolf 2005, p. 29. 
125 This is the Drittwiderspruchklage, Henckel 1982, p. 137, Wolf 2005, p. 29, 362-363. 
126 This is the Aussonderungsrecht. Before 1994 the Aussonderungsrecht was awarded by § 43 of the 
Konkursordnung (KO) which is mentioned in older literature. Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999,  
p. 726-727. 
127 Henckel 1982, p. 137. 
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Treugeber, creditors of the Treugeber can seize the object, even though the Treuhänder 
has legal ownership.128 
These rules on Treuhand apply when a Treugeber transfers an object for his 
personal benefit to a Treuhänder through a contract stating the purpose of the trans-
fer as well as the limitations of the Treuhänder’s powers. Such a transfer creates two 
types of Übertragungstreuhand.129 The first of these is the Verwaltungstreuhand or 
Uneigennützige Treuhand, whereby the Treuhänder becomes the legal owner for the 
purpose of managing the object that was transferred. Such a Treuhand can also be 
created through a contract giving the Treugeber legal ownership but providing the 
Treuhänder with certain powers of management.130 The second type is the 
Sicherungstreuhand or Eigennützige Treuhand, transferring an object with the purpose 
of providing security.131  
The Treuhand ownership has led to an approach to the right of ownership in 
which the Treugeber is awarded a property-like right to the detriment of the Treu-
händer’s ownership. With the specified limitations in force, the legal ownership of 
the Treuhänder, although doctrinally pure, can hardly be classified as a right of 
ownership under Paragraph 903 BGB, but is not a personal right either.132 
2.5. Security Ownership 
The right of ownership is not only used for the enjoyment of an object, but can also 
be used as security for the performance of a certain obligation. Among the security 
property rights recognised by German law, security ownership takes an important 
position.133 The use of ownership as a security right developed through case law as 
a method next to the security rights dealt with mainly in the BGB.134 When the trade 
in movable objects increased, the security rights to these movable objects also rose 
in importance. Immovable objects, in particular land, were no longer the primary 
object of value, movable objects such as machines and company inventory were also 
offered as security in exchange for capital.135  
 
128 Henckel 1982, p. 137. 
129 Schmidt also distinguishes forms of Erbwerbstreuhand and Vereinbarungstreuhand. These will 
be dealt with below in 4.5. Treuhand Bank Account. See Schmidt 2005, p. 937, Ganter 2004,  
p. 251-252. 
130 Wolf 2005, p. 28, Marwede 1972, p. 45 et seq. A Treuhand in which the right of ownership is 
not transferred to the Treuhänder will consequently not require the deviation from the insol-
vency procedure, as is the case when the Treuhänder is legal owner. 
131 This type of security-Treuhand will be dealt with below in 2.5. Security Ownership. 
132 See Wiegand 1990, p. 127, Wiegand 1999a, p. 118-119. 
133 On these other rights see below; 3.5. Real Burden (Reallast), 3.6. Pledge, 3.7. Hypothec and 3.8. 
Grundschuld. 
134 See Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 199-200, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 706. 
135 The concept of security ownership is not applicable to immovable objects; it can exist in 
respect to immovable objects only. In case of rights there is a possibility to assign these for 
security purposes. However the terms ‘transfer’ and ‘ownership’ in German law are 
restricted to corporeal objects. 
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However, the existing security rights were not suited for this purpose. The 
main reason for this was the requirement to transfer possession (factual power) of 
the object serving as security. Especially, since security over movable objects was 
sought, the right of pledge demanded such a transfer of possession. By transferring 
ownership of a movable object, the factual power over the object and the legal 
entitlement to it can be separated. In other words, transfer of ownership does not 
necessarily include actual transfer of the object itself.  
The German system of property law allows such a transfer.136 The owner, the 
transferor, transfers his right of ownership of a movable object to another person, 
the transferee. The object serves as security for the payment of a claim the transferee 
has against the transferor. The transferee is intended to retain the right of ownership 
until the transferee’s claim is satisfied, but only for security purposes. Because of 
this purpose, the right of ownership acquired by the transferee is not normal owner-
ship but security ownership.  
Doctrinally, the difference between security ownership and normal ownership 
is very small. The right of ownership is an indivisible power over an object, regard-
less of what it is used for. The right of ownership transferred for security purposes 
is therefore a full right of ownership. However, at the same time, the powers of the 
security owner are not the same as those of a normal owner. The security owner 
retains the object serving as security for security purposes and not for personal 
enjoyment, and will eventually have to return the object to the original owner in the 
same state as received. In other words, there are specific limitations to the powers of 
a security owner, and security ownership can therefore be considered a different 
type of ownership from the normal right of ownership. 
In order to create this special type of ownership the parties conclude a contract 
known as a Sicherungsvertrag or security contract. This contract not only serves as 
the basis for the transfer of the right of ownership, but also limits the powers of the 
security owner.137 Moreover, the parties also stipulate what will happen when the 
claim of the security owner, the transferee, is satisfied. There are two possibilities; 
the parties can agree that upon satisfaction of the claim the security owner will 
retransfer the ownership of the object to the original owner, or that the transferor 
transfers the right of ownership to the transferee under the resolutive condition that 
when the claim is satisfied, the right of ownership will revert to the original 
owner.138 Mutual agreement is required because security ownership is not an 
accessory right.  
An accessory right is a right that is connected to the existence of a claim. 
Accessority will lead to termination of a security right when the secured debt ceases 
to exit upon satisfaction. When no accessority between a right and a debt exists, a 
specific act by the parties is needed to retransfer the right to the transferor or to 
extinguish the right. As regards security ownership, where no accessority exists, the 
right of ownership will not automatically revert to the original owner.139  
 
136 § 930 BGB, see Van Vliet 2000, p. 52-60. 
137 See Wolf 2005, p. 356-359. 
138 Wolf 2005, p. 356-357, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 710. 
139 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 710, for an overview in French see Crocq 1995, p. 151 et seq. 
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The security contract will also contain duties for the transferor, including the 
duty to hand over the factual power over the object when the security owner is 
contractually entitled to it.140 However, the most important function of the security 
contract is to protect the transferor by imposing limitations on the powers of the 
security owner. The contract will usually ensure that the security owner can only 
use the object for security purposes and may only exercise his ownership rights if 
the transferor fails to perform. Until then the transferor remains in control of the 
object.141  
The use of ownership for security purposes is not without risk. Parties are 
relatively free to arrange the division of powers, but only within certain limits. 
These limits are imposed by analogous application of provisions on other security 
rights, but they are also determined specifically by case law. The limitations set by 
case law, especially the case law of the BGH, play a particularly important role in 
the protection of the rights of the transferor.  
The Sicherungsvertrag is subject to several requirements, including those of 
public morals as provided in Paragraph 138 BGB.142 The application of the principle 
of public morals severely limits the powers of the security owner. Because the 
security owner does not own the object to enjoy it, but merely for the purpose of 
securing the transferor’s debt, the security owner cannot simply dispose of the 
object. In fact, the security owner can only use his powers over the object in case the 
transferor fails to perform his duty. The security contract will have to describe the 
security owner’s powers in detail. Furthermore, unless otherwise provided and if 
not to the detriment of the transferor, by analogous application of the provisions on 
the right of pledge, the security owner must sell the object serving as security in the 
event that the debtor, usually the transferor, does not perform.143 In that case the 
provisions on pledge also apply in such a way that the security ownership is recog-
nised not as a right of ownership but as a type of pledge. The object serving as 
security is therefore considered part of the set of assets and debts of the transferor to 
which the security owner has a preferential claim.144 
Another limitation imposed by Paragraph 138 BGB is known as Knebelung. In a 
situation of Knebelung the transferor is so disproportionately dependent on the 
security owner that the transferor can no longer properly enjoy the object serving as 
security.145 Paragraph 138 BGB renders such a security contract void, in which case, 
assuming ownership has been transferred, the security owner loses his legal basis 
for retaining the right of ownership. The ownership of the object in case of Knebe-
 
140 This will usually include the situation where the transferor can no longer pay and the 
security owner ‘executes’ the contract. See Wolf 2005, p. 357. 
141 Wolf 2005, p. 357-358. 
142 Or in German, gute Sitten. The German translation of the German Ministry of Justice states 
‘Public Policy’ as a translation. See <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de>. 
143 BGH 27 June 1995, NJW 1995, 2221. The Paragraph’s on pledge concern §§ 1233 et seq., see 
Wolf 2005, p. 357-358. 
144 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 722. 
145 Wolf 2005, p. 360-361, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 714-715. 
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lung will not automatically return to the transferor, but the transferor will have a 
claim in unjust enrichment against the security owner.146 
A third and more difficult situation occurs when an object is used to secure a 
debt of much less value than the object. Such a situation, known as over-securiti-
sation or Übersicherung, can arise at the moment of creation, but also during the 
existence of the security right.147 An Übersicherung-situation is not always clear. Fol-
lowing decisions of the German Federal Court, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), parties 
commonly included a clause in their Sicherungsvertrag specifying a maximum 
amount of money that the objects serving as security secured. This clause would 
normally also oblige the transferee to make those objects exceeding the maximum 
amount available to the debtor.148 However, parties were not under a strict legal 
obligation to include such a clause. In a landmark decision, the Grand Senate of the 
Bundesgerichtshof specifically considered a situation where no such clause had been 
inserted.149 In this situation, but also when such a clause had been used, the Senate 
of the BGH used Paragraph 138 BGB to limit the powers of the security owner. The 
BGH was not only concerned with the imbalance of power between the transferor 
and the security owner, but also with the relation between the security owner and 
the other creditors of the transferor. A transfer of ownership would, in principle, 
bring the object serving as security outside the set of assets and debts of the trans-
feror and into the set of assets and debts of the security owner. In the absence of a 
clause in the contract stating otherwise, the transferor’s creditors could not claim the 
value of the object. Especially when the value of the object was higher than the debt, 
the excess value would be available to the other creditors of the transferor. In order 
to address this problem the Grand Senate of the BGH ruled that in case of 
Übersicherung the Sicherungsvertrag is void.150 Furthermore, the BGH now assumed 
by implication the existence of clauses limiting the agreement to a certain amount of 
outstanding debt, and the obligation for the security owner to disclose the excess 
value of the object.151 
Most importantly, the Senate of the BGH answered the question of when 
Übersicherung occurs. According to the Court, the lower limit of Übersicherung is 
when the value of the claim for which security is given exceeds 110% of the actual 
value of the object serving as security, but is not higher than 150% of the estimated 
 
146 This is due to the abstract system of transfer. See Van Vliet 2000, p. 31 et seq. 
147 These are the anfängliche and nachträgliche cases of over-securitisation. See Baur, Baur & 
Stürner 1999, p. 721, Wolf 2005, p. 361. 
148 BGH 8 October 1986, BGHZ 98, 303 and 13 January 1994, BGHZ 124, 371. Baur, Baur & 
Stürner 1999, p. 715-716. 
149 BGH GS NJW 1998, 671, 675. For a detailed analysis of this complicated decision and the facts 
that lead to it see Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 717-721. 
150 Although a distinction should be made between initial Übersicherung, in which the contract 
and the transfer is void, and nachträgliche Übersicherung that follows another approach. In 
such cases the debtor under a Freigabeanspruch can reclaim part of the objects. Baur, Baur & 
Stürner 1999, p. 719, Wolf 2005, p. 361. 
151 Wolf 2005, p. 361. 
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value of the object.152 The latter requirement connects to the general provision in 
Paragraph 237 BGB, which limits the value of the object in relation to the debt it 
secures to 150%.153 Finally, a contract creating a transfer of ownership for security 
purposes with an initial surplus value of the object will be void by application of 
Paragraph 138 BGB as well. According to the BGH, a situation of Übersicherung 
exists when the value of the object is twice the limit of 150% of the secured claim.154  
Although the transfer of ownership for security purposes does transfer a type 
of ownership – security ownership –, in insolvency cases, security owners are not 
treated in the same way as normal owners. In German insolvency law, security 
ownership is treated as a pledge-like right.155 The result of this approach is that the 
object serving as security is not considered to have left the assets of the transferor 
completely. To the outside world the security owner is the owner, but not to the 
extent a normal owner is. The principal objective of the transfer for security pur-
poses is to enable the security owner to institute actions in order to protect his 
position in case the transferor becomes insolvent. Contrary to the claim of a normal 
owner, the security owner cannot claim the object from the transferor, but has a 
right to separate the object from the set of assets through Paragraph 51(1) InsO.156 
This claim for separation is awarded for practical reasons. Like a pledgee, the 
security owner will be entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the complete set of 
assets of the transferor. This will, at least theoretically, increase the proceeds of the 
sale.157 However, to protect the security owner who joins the other creditors in the 
sale of the total set of assets of the debtor, a counter-claim is awarded to block 
claims of the creditors of the transferor.158 These, in their turn, may claim nullity of 
the Sicherungsvertrag based on Paragraph 138 BGB. This would make both the 
contract and the transfer void, and fully return the object serving as security to the 
transferor’s set of assets and debts.159 The creditors can claim financial compen-
sation if the security owner mistreats the transferor or gravely disadvantages the 
other creditors of the transferor.160 The transferee, who is then no longer the security 
owner, will no longer be able to use a counter-claim to block the claims of the 
creditor or claim a separation of the security object.161 
 
152 The actual value or realisierbaren Wert, is the value which is received upon sale of the object. 
The estimated value or Schätzwert is the estimated worth in money of the object serving as 
security. 
153 Wolf 2005, p. 361, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 720. 
154 BGH 12 March 1998, NJW 1998, 2047, Wolf 2005, p. 361. 
155 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 722. 
156 And not a claim for revindication of the object, § 51(1) Insolvenzordnung or Bankruptcy Code 
awards a Absonderungsrecht or separation claim, Wolf 2005, p. 360, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, 
p. 722. 
157 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 722-723. 
158 § 771 ZPO (Zivilprozeßordnung or Civil Procedure Code) awards a Drittwiderspruchsklage or 
third party counter-claim, Wolf 2005, p. 359-360. 
159 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 721. 
160 § 826 BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 722, 725. 
161 Wolf 2005, p. 360. 
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Considering the effects of the Sicherungsvertrag, security ownership can hardly 
be described as a right of ownership that grants the owner powers comparable to 
those of a normal owner. Although doctrinally security ownership is just another 
form of the regular type of ownership of Paragraph 903 BGB, security contracts 
severely limit the powers of owners.162 In fact, security ownership is one of the 
primary recognised forms of Treuhand.163 The result of this is that the contract 
establishing the security ownership greatly restricts the property relation between 
the transferor and the security owner. Security ownership is thus also a special type 
of ownership at the same time. 
3. Other Property Rights 
In German law, the right of ownership is considered the supreme property right. 
The right is absolute, it has effect against the whole world, and it is unitary, it 
cannot be fragmented. The doctrine of ownership as an indivisible power over an 
object, as primarily advocated by Von Savigny, firmly establishes and emphasises 
this position. Nevertheless, German law also recognises property rights other than 
the right of ownership. Like the right of ownership, these are primarily restricted to 
corporeal objects and they are known as Dingliche Rechte.164 The absolute and 
unitary nature of the paramount property right, the right of ownership, also charac-
terises the other property rights, albeit that these other rights are derived from the 
right of ownership itself. These other property rights are Beschränkte Dingliche Rechte 
or limited property rights.165  
The relation between the right of ownership and the other property rights is 
complicated in German law. Doctrinally the right of ownership is the ultimate and 
indivisible power over an object. In reaction to the situation before the introduction 
of the BGB, the First Commission stated: 
The specific powers of the owner could be derived … from the provisions on the 
protection of the right of ownership and from the planned transfers of the owner; it is 
not possible to describe a sum of powers, since ownership cannot be characterised as a sum 
of powers. Therefore, ownership also cannot be fragmented in a way in which two 
parties receive powers contained in the rights of ownership while their rights are still 
characterised as ownership.166 
 
162 See above; 2.1. Normal Ownership. For a similar discussion in French law see Crocq 1995,  
p. 59 et seq. 
163 See above; 2.4. Treuhand Ownership, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 726. 
164 However, also property rights in respect to rights are recognised. The term Dingliche Rechte 
best translates as rights in respect to an object. Nevertheless, these property rights in respect 
to rights are property rights. Therefore property right will be the term with which these 
rights are dealt with in this chapter. 
165 Wolf 2005, p. 3-4, Füller 2006, p. 35. 
166 Emphasis by the author, ‘Die einzelnen Befugnisse des Eigenthümers würden, …, aus den 
Vorschriften über den Eigenthumsschuz und über die von dem Eigenthümer vorzuneh-
menden Veräußerungsgeschäfte entnommen werden können; sie lassen sich nicht vollständig 
aufzählen; das Bedürfnis einer solchen Aufzählung liegt auch nicht vor, da das Eigenthum 
Æ 
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The last sentence should be understood as a general rejection of the fragmentation 
of ownership into dominium directum and dominium utile.167 The statement that 
ownership cannot be characterised as a sum of powers should be understood as the 
expression of Von Savigny’s theory of ownership as an indivised and indivisible 
power over a corporeal object. However, at the same time limited property rights 
are recognised that limit the powers of the owner. In modern doctrine, the creation 
of a limited property right is explained as a transfer of certain powers from the right 
of ownership to another property right.168 However, even such a transfer will not 
deprive the right of ownership of its characteristics, or as Wiegand states: ‘Owner-
ship remains ownership, even when powers of the owner are transferred to some-
one else’.169 The First Commission itself concluded: 
The primary function of the law of property is to deal with property rights. Of these 
rights the right of ownership is the most complete and important, its treatment 
separate from the other rights is commonly accepted. The order in which the other 
property rights connect to the right of ownership is more or less random, and for the 
creation and use of the law more or less the same. A specific point follows from this, 
that the limited property rights receive their content from the power to use and the 
power to transfer of the owner.170 
The approach of German property law to limited property rights is twofold. First, 
the right of ownership is considered absolute and indivisible, the right of ownership 
remains whole even when a property right is created. Secondly, the limited prop-
erty rights are considered to receive their content from the right of ownership. In, 
for example, the French system, such an approach to limited property rights would 
result in the termination of the property right once it has reverted to the owner. This 
approach to the creation and termination of property rights is commonly described 
as elasticity of ownership.171 The system of creation of property rights in French law 
is known as démembrement. 
 
nicht eine Summe einzelner Befugnisse ist. Deshalb lässt sich das Eigenthum auch nicht so 
theilen, dass dem Einen und dem Anderen eine Reihe bestimmter im Eigenthume liegender 
Befugnisse zugewiesen werden und dem beiderseitigen Rechte der Karakter des Eigen-
thumes beigemessen wird’, Motive III 1888, p. 262, see also Hattenhauer 1989, p. 90-91. 
167 See also Füller 2006, p. 367-381. 
168 Wolf 2005, p. 4 (Teilinhalte aus dem Eigentum), Wiegand 1990, p. 117 (einzelne Befugnisse 
jemandem anderen übertragen werden), Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 17 (er hat die Möglichkeit, 
aus seinem Vollrecht beschränkte Befugnisse zugunsten anderer ’abzuspalten’), see also Müller 1997, 
p. 100 (die sich aus dem Eigentum ergebende Herrschaftsbefugnis beschränken). 
169 Wiegand 1990, p. 117, Eigentum bleibt auch dann Eigentum, wenn einzelne Befugnisse jemandem 
anderen übertragen werden. 
170 ‘Die Hauptaufgabe des Sachenrechts ist die Regelung der dinglichen Rechte. Unter diesen 
Rechten ist das Eigenthum das vollkommenste und wichtigste, seine Behandlung von dem 
übrigen daher allgemein gebräuchlich. Die Reihenfolge, in welcher die letzteren sich ihm 
anschließen, ist mehr oder weniger willkürlich, für die Gestaltung und Anwendung des 
Gesetzes auch ziemlich gleichgültig. Ein gewisser Anhalt ergiebt sich daraus, dass die 
begrenzten Rechte ihren Inhalt entweder aus dem Nutzungsrechte oder aus dem Veräus-
erungsrechte des Eigenthümers schöpfen’, Motive III 1888, p. 22-23. 
171 Wolf 2005, p. 4-5. 
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The termination of a property right once it has reverted to the owner is known 
in German law as Konsolidation, which does not have a directly equivalent term in 
English.172 However, it does not apply to all limited property rights.173 As regards 
property rights to immovable objects, German law seems to follow an approach 
different from the Konsolidation approach generally taken under the démembrement 
method, as it is used in French law.174 This remarkable deviation from the tradi-
tional system was included under economic pressure, especially in the area of the 
right of hypothec.175 
The law in Prussia before the introduction of the BGB provided for the 
establishment of a limited property right that would continue to exist after it had 
returned to the owner, enabling the owner to use the same right again for another 
transaction.176 Applying the French approach of démembrement would result in the 
destruction of the limited property right when the powers of the owner and the 
powers of the holder of the right of hypothec, the hypothecee, were merged. After 
all, the powers of the hypothecee were originally the owner’s and would reunify 
with the right of ownership once they had returned to the owner.177  
Furthermore, the drafters of the BGB also considered it undesirable that a third 
party should be entitled to a right to the limited property right, and this right would 
be destroyed when the limited property right ceased because of mixing with the 
right of ownership.178 For that reason, the German BGB includes Paragraph 889: 
A right to another piece of land does not expire when the owner acquires the piece of 
land or the holder of the right receives the ownership of the same land.179 
The effect of this Paragraph is that it is possible for one person simultaneously to 
have a limited property right to a piece of land and the right of ownership of that 
same piece of land. Combined with a right of ownership that cannot be charac-
terised as a sum of powers, but from which it is still possible to transfer powers into 
 
172 Füller 2006, p. 468-470. A translation of Konsolidation into English is difficult to provide. 
Possibly terms as coincidence or concurrence could describe the same effect. A concurrence of 
ownership and property rights would in this sense be a Konsolidation in the German doctrinal 
sense.  
173 Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 128, Schwab & Prütting 2003,p. 10, See Chapter 3; 3. Other Property 
Rights. 
174 § 889 BGB. The démembrement method considers a limited property right as a part of the 
larger right, usually the right of ownership, from which it was derived. See Chapter 3; 3. 
Other Property Rights and Chapter 7; 2.2. Of Ways to Create a Lesser Property Right. 
175 On the previous system see Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 128-129. 
176 Specifically under the ALR., see Motive III 1888, p. 203-204, Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 128-129, 
592-593. 
177 Elasticity of ownership, see above; 2. The Right of Ownership. 
178 Motive III 1888, p. 201-205. Remarkably, the Dutch civil code has opted for the opposite 
solution, whereby the property right ceases to exist except for the holder of a property right 
in respect of that property right. See Chapter 5; 4.5. After-Effects of Property Rights. 
179 § 889 BGB, ‘Ein Recht an einem fremden Grundstück erlischt nicht dadurch, dass der Eigen-
tümer des Grundstücks das Recht oder der Berechtigte das Eigentum an dem Grundstück 
erwirbt’. 
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another property right, German law adheres to a complicated theory describing the 
relation between ownership and other property rights in respect to immovable 
objects.180 Although the First Commission recognised this problem, it observed: 
How the right recognised in § 836 [now § 889 BGB, BA] to a person’s own object can be 
legally constructed, is not dealt with by the law. The construction is a task for legal 
science. Only this can be stated, that the often heard objection against the owner-
hypothec, that the owner cannot have a specific property right in respect of the same 
object as his ownership, because the ownership already contains the advantages the 
specific property right provides, is not correct. Until now, the discussion results in the 
situation that the owner, when the piece of land is transferred, can exercise his specific 
property right in respect of the same piece of land and, when he continues to have 
ownership, dispose of it for the benefit of a third party, – both advantages, of which the 
actual value should not be argued.181 
In the documents preceding the Motive, Johow, the drafter of the Property Law part 
of the BGB, also addressed the issue. On the relation between ownership and 
limited property rights, he states: 
The powers of the owner find their natural limitation in the concept of ownership. This 
concept is provided by objective law and cannot be given content by practice. The 
owner can do with the object what he wants, he could transfer it out of his assets or 
give up the right of ownership. However, he cannot continue to hold the object in his 
assets and at the same time, by randomly trimming several powers, which contain the 
same as his right of ownership, reduce his right of ownership. If he could do so, then 
he would have the power to transform his right of ownership on a specific object into 
another right, which the legal system no longer recognises as a right of ownership. 
With that the right of ownership would have disappeared … 
It is now commonly recognised that the opinion advocated by certain writers as, e.g., 
Puchta, Pand. §145, that a limited right contains powers taken from the right of 
ownership, cannot be upheld. Ownership is an undividable right, which may consist of 
a list of powers, but which cannot be characterised as such. The owner is not in the 
position to take certain of his powers and transfer these to others. The limited right, 
which he creates, does not comprise of a limitation of the right of ownership; it is 
simply a right of a non-owner to the object, which limits the power of the owner over 
the same object. With the ceasing of this right the limitations on the powers of the 
 
180 See Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 175. 
181 ‘Wie das in dem § 835 [now § 889, BA] anerkannte recht an der eigenen Sache juristisch zu 
konstruiren ist, entzieht sich der Bestimmung durch das Gesetz. Die Konstruktion ist 
Aufgabe der Wissenschaft. Nur das mag hier hervorgehoben werden, daß der oft gehörte 
Einwurf gegen die Eigenthümerhypothek, der Eigenthümer könne ein besonderes Recht an 
der Sache nicht haben, weil das Eigenthum bereits alle mit der begrenzten Rechten 
verbundenen Vortheile gewähre, nicht zutreffend ist. Die bisherigen Erörterungen ergeben, 
daß der Eigenthümer, wenn das Grundstück veräußert wird, das an demselben ihm 
zustehende Recht vollinhaltlich ausüben und, wenn er das Eigenthum behält, zu Gunsten 
eines Dritten verfügen kann, – beides Vortheile, deren reeller Werth sich nicht bestreiten 
läßt’, Motive III 1888, p. 205. 
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owner cease as well. The right of ownership consolidates itself, without the necessity to 
re-transfer powers which belong to the holder of the limited right.182 
Windscheid responds in similar fashion.183 In discussing servitudes, he states: 
I must explain my position against this opinion [that servitudes consist of parts of the 
right of ownership. BA]. As little as servitudes are dealt with as parts of ownership, so 
little they comprise parts of ownership.184 
Both Johow and Windscheid conclude that the pre-BGB situation, where a property 
right was considered to comprise a part of the owner’s powers, was no longer 
represented in the system of the BGB.185 Taking these considerations into account, it 
could be argued that the doctrinal system of the BGB should be understood as 
differing from the French system of démembrement. 
Despite these remarks on the complicated nature of the relation between 
ownership and limited rights in the BGB, modern handbooks on German property 
law do not consider the problem as very fundamental.186 Yet in respect to this 
 
182 ‘Das Verfügungsrecht des Eigenthümers findet seine natürliche Begrenzung durch den 
Begriff des Eigenthums. Dieser Begriff ist durch das objektive Recht gegeben und der 
Bestimmung durch Privatwillkür entrückt. Der Eigenthümer kann allerdings an sich mit die 
Sache machen, was er will, er kann dieselbe namentlich auch aus seinem Vermögen aus-
scheiden und also das Eigenthum aufgeben. Aber er kann nicht die Sache in seinem Ver-
mögen behalten und gleichzeitig sein Eigenthum durch willkürliche Abtrennung einzelner 
Befugnisse, welche dasselbe verleiht, abschwächen. Dürfte er dies, so läge es in seiner Hand, 
das Eigenthum an einer bestimmten Sache in ein Recht umzuformen, welches die Rechts-
ordnung nicht mehr als Eigenthum gelten lassen könnte. Damit aber wäre der Eigen-
thumsbegriff selbst verflüchtigt. … Als unhaltbar ist wohl jetzt allgemein erkannt die von 
einigen Schriftstellern, z.B. Puchta, Pand. §. 145, aufgestellte Ansicht, dass die dinglichen 
Rechte aus dem Eigenthum herausgenommene Befugnisse seien. Das Eigenthum ist ein 
untheilbares Recht, welches zwar eine Reihe von Befugnissen gewährt, aber nicht aus solchen 
sich zusammenfesst. Der Eigenthümer ist mithin gar nicht in der Lage, ein solche Befugniss 
aus seinem Rechte herauszunehmen und auf einen Anderen zu übertragen. Das dingliche 
Recht, welches er bestellt, besteht auch nicht in einer Beschränkung des Eighenthums; es ist 
einfach ein Recht des Nichteigenthümers an der Sache, welches die Herrschaft des Eigen-
thümers über deselbe beschränkt. Mit dem Erlöschen dieses Rechts erlischt zugleich die 
Beschränkung. Das Eigenthum konsolidiert sich wieder, ohne dass es einer Rückerwerbung 
der dem Berechtigten zugestandenen Befugnis seitens des Eigenthümers bedürfte’. Johow 
1982, Begründung, p. 126, 127. 
183 Windscheid 1875, p. 633, note 3, specifically pages 634-635. See also Vangerow, who is of the 
same opinion Vangerow II 1876, p. 686-687. 
184 ‘Ich muss mich auch gegen diese Auffassung erklären. So wenig wie die Dienstbarkeiten 
nach ihrer Begründung Eigenthumsbestandtheile sind, so wenig sind sie aus Eigenthums-
bestandtheilen gebildet’, Windscheid 1875, p. 634. 
185 On the situation before the BGB see also Staudinger & Gursky 2002, § 889, p. 311.  
186 See, inter alia, Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 128, Müller 1997, p. 439, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 75, 
Wolf 2005, p. 444, more elaborate Wilhelm 2002, p. 52, 232 and Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999,  
p. 25. 
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research, a clear explanation of the relation between the right of ownership and 
other property rights is highly relevant.187 
Two modern handbooks, Baur, Baur and Stürner and Wolf, deal with the 
issue, but not along the same lines as Johow and Windscheid.188 These modern 
handbooks describe the powers of the owner as a comprehensive and indivisible 
unit, but recognise the possibility of transforming some specific powers into a 
property right other than ownership. This explains the use of the term abspalten, 
which is best translated as separate, in relation to powers of the owner.189 Wolf even 
refers to Teilinhalte aus dem Eigentum, or parts of the right of ownership, to describe 
limited rights.190 However, in this approach it is difficult to explain how a property 
right, which contains a power that was originally part of the right of ownership, and 
the right of ownership from which that power is missing, can be held by the same 
person. In German doctrine, this would be a situation of Konsolidation. The doctrinal 
question seems to be why this power does not revert into the right of ownership.  
It is interesting to see that these authors find the answer in Paragraph 889 
BGB. Under the BGB, a property right to an immovable object will not cease to exist 
when the owner acquires the property right; this will only occur if the owner so 
desires.191 However, in other situations, the limited right will cease to exist.192 Baur, 
Baur and Stürner explain this situation by referring to the ranking of property 
rights.193 It is possible for several limited property rights to be created on the same 
object. Especially in cases of insolvency sale the order and existence of these rights 
become relevant. Subject to conditions, the right of ownership can also be part of the 
ranking of the aforementioned limited property rights.194 If the property right 
ceased to exist the holders of other property rights would move up in rank.195 
Furthermore, an explanation can be given in respect to third parties holding a 
property right to the limited right that would cease to exist in a Konsolidation. Such a 
situation can occur specifically when an owner acquires land to which a right of 
servitude is created and subsequently transfers it to another party. It is held that the 
necessity to create a new servitude with the same contents as the extinct right would 
bring unnecessary costs.196 
Following the reasoning of Baur, Baur and Stürner, if in such a situation the 
owner has acquired a property right to his own immovable object, the owner will 
 
187 On the relevance of two different models of creating property rights see Chapter 7; 2.2. Of 
Ways to Create a Lesser Property Right. 
188 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999 and Wolf 2005. 
189 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 17, Wolf 2005, p. 4. 
190 Wolf 2005, p. 4. 
191 This power would include a limitation on the owner to decide so, if there are third parties 
with a right in respect of the property right in question. 
192 Wolf 2005, p. 5. 
193 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 25. 
194 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 25. See also Kipp 1911, p. 211 et seq. 
195 See also Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 311. 
196 Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 311. 
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participate in insolvency proceedings ranking both as the owner and as holder of a 
property right.197 
This approach does not, however, consider the statements made by Johow and 
Windscheid, which are at the foundation of the BGB.198 The approach does concern 
the practical application of Paragraph 889 BGB, but does not answer the doctrinal 
question on the relation between the right of ownership and the other property 
rights. Such a solution seems to agree with the views of Johow and Windscheid. In 
German law, a limited property right is modelled on the powers of the owner, but 
does not comprise them. The right of ownership remains complete, but the powers 
of the owner are limited for the duration of the existence of the property right. The 
limited property right that comes into existence will not burden the right of owner-
ship itself but rather the exercise of the powers of ownership. This approach makes 
it possible for a limited property right and the right of ownership to co-exist and, 
possibly, to continue to exist when the property right reverts to the owner. 
Perhaps the system of the BGB should be understood as follows. When a 
limited property right is created in respect to an immovable object and the right 
returns to the owner, Paragraph 889 BGB renders a Konsolidation impossible. In this 
approach, there can be no démembrement in German property law. Konsolidation 
would not then be so much a mixing of the powers of the owner with the powers 
contained in the limited property right, but the situation in which the powers of the 
owner are still restricted, but in which that restriction is temporarily relative since 
the owner is also entitled to the limited right restricting his powers as an owner. The 
transfer of the limited right to another person will not change the right of ownership 
in any way, nor will it change the limitations on the powers of the owner.  
When ownership and property right fall into the same hands, the limited 
property right will remain to exist. In that situation, the owner is able to exercise his 
powers in his capacity as owner as well as his powers in his capacity as right-holder 
of a limited right.199 Property rights in German law therefore do not limit the owner-
ship as such, but only burden the powers of the owner, with third-party effect. This 
would be in line with the statement in the Motive dealing with restrictions to the 
right of ownership other than limited property rights: 
8.  The limitations on the ownership by force of law dealt with in this title are not 
absolute in nature. The owner can establish property rights – real servitudes or 
limited personal servitudes – on his own land, which decrease or annul the powers 
of the owner that follow from the current chapter.200 
 
197 See also Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 314. 
198 Also the Staudinger Commentary does not consider the statement by Johow, but only refers 
to the Motive stating the solution is for legal science to decide on. See Staudinger & Gursky 
2002, p. 314. 
199 Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 314. 
200 ‘8. Die in diesen Titel bestimmten gesetzlichen Eigenthumsbeschränkungen sind nicht abso-
luter Natur. Der Eigenthümer kann an seinem Grundstücke dingliche Rechte – Grund-
dienstbarkeiten oder beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeiten – bestellen, welche die aus 
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In terms of doctrine, this would answer the need for the ownership to remain 
unitary. The owner has not lost the power that characterises him as an owner, and 
the property right, which co-exists besides the ownership, only burdens these 
powers.201 Finally, in case of property rights in respect of movable objects or rights, 
specifically usufruct and pledge, the situation is different. By force of the BGB these 
rights cease to exist when they are acquired by the owner.202  
The conception of limited rights as separate rights co-existing with the right of 
ownership also enables the owner to create a limited right in respect of his own 
object, and according to his own terms and conditions. The advantages of this are 
twofold. First, the limited right will take rank from the moment of its creation. Any 
property right created at a later moment will be lower in rank than the limited right 
created by the owner. Secondly, it allows the owner to transfer his ownership while 
continuing to hold the property right that was created under his own terms and 
conditions with the ranking he wanted.203 This can be done with all the rights in 
respect of land and for some rights other objects.204  
The relation between ownership and other property rights is therefore highly 
relevant, but it should be emphasised that this relation, as well as the concept of 
Konsolidation, are not given the attention they deserve. 
This Section will deal with the limited property rights recognised by German 
law. In order to organise the discussion of these property rights, German doctrine 
makes a distinction between movable and immovable objects on which various 
limited property rights can be created. Moreover, the system of German property 
can be divided into rights to use and rights for security.205 As in other legal systems, 
property rights created in a movable object and the same property rights created in 
an immovable object can be different in content.206 Furthermore, German law also 
recognises a third category of property rights: acquisition rights.207 This Section will 
first deal with the main property rights to use, followed by the acquisition rights. 
 
dem gegenwärtigen Abschnitte sich ergebenden Rechte des Eigenthümers mindern oder 
aufheben’, Motive III 1888, p. 260. 
201 This approach seems to be followed by Müller who states ‘Rechte Dritter, die im Rahmen des 
§ 903 BGB die sich aus dem Eigentum ergebende Herrschaftsbefugnis beschränken, sind die 
beschränkte dinglichen Rechte. … Insofern ist das Eigentum als zunächst allumfassendes 
Herrschaftsrecht gegenüber den beschränkt dinglichen Rechten subsidiär: Das sich aus dem 
Eigentum ergebende Herrschaftsrecht wird durch ein beschränktes dingliches Recht im 
Umfang seines Inhalts verdrängt. Deshalb ist es zutreffend, beschränkte dingliche Rechte 
auch als Belastung des Eigentums zu definieren’, Müller 1997, p. 100. Also affirmative of this 
view is Schön 1992, p. 12-13. 
202 § 1063 and § 1256 BGB, Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 313. 
203 Hess 1998, p. 501. 
204 On the difficulty with usufruct, see Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 422. On servitudes, see 
Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 238. 
205 These are the Nutzungsrechte and the Sicherungsrechte. Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 22-27. On 
Nutzungsrechte in general see Ahrens 2004. 
206 The best example would be a usufruct, which the owner can create on his own immovable 
object, but not on his own movable object. On the right of usufruct, see below; 3.2. Personal 
Servitudes. 
207 These are the Erwerbsrechte, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 24-27. 
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The Section will finish with the security property rights.208 The differences in con-
tent of these rights when created in movable objects, immovable objects or claims 
will be dealt with under the heading of the specific rights respectively. 
3.1. Real Servitudes 
German law does not adhere to a single concept of servitude, but recognises several 
types of servitudes. Real servitudes or Grunddienstbarkeiten are the primary type of 
servitudes and are dealt with in the BGB.209 The primary Paragraph on real 
servitudes is 1018 BGB: 
A piece of land can, for the benefit of an owner of another piece of land, be burdened 
in such a way that the owner may use this piece of land for specific purposes or certain 
action cannot be taken on the piece of land or a certain right which follows from the 
burdened piece of land against the other piece of land cannot be exercised.210 
The Grunddienstbarkeiten are servitudes in the same sense as the Roman law cate-
gory of real servitudes.211 The result of this is that the main criteria from Roman law 
are recognised and applied in German law. A right of servitude binds the holders of 
the property right in their capacity as owners of two pieces of land, which are 
known as the dominant and servient land.212 It is also possible, under conditions, for 
holders of property rights other than ownership to create a real servitude.213 The 
pieces of land must be in the vicinity of each other in order to fulfil the requirement 
set by Paragraph 1019 BGB. This Paragraph requires the dominant land to benefit 
from the existence of the right of servitude.214 In other words, in order for the 
dominant land, and not the right-holder personally, to benefit from the servitude, 
the land should be in the neighbourhood of the servient tenement.215 Furthermore, 
German law, albeit implicitly, also adheres to the perpetua causa rule, according to 
 
208 This chapter will provide an overview of the principal property rights as they are recognised 
in German law. However, certain variations on certain property rights exist in the respective 
Länder, which, seen the scope of this research, will not be dealt with. 
209 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 366. 
210 § 1018 BGB, ‘Ein Grundstück kann zugunsten des jeweiligen Eigentümers eines anderen 
Grundstücks in der Weise belastet werden, dass dieser das Grundstück in einzelnen Bezie-
hungen benutzen darf oder dass auf dem Grundstück gewisse Handlungen nicht vorge-
nommen werden dürfen oder dass die Ausübung eines Rechts ausgeschlossen ist, das sich 
aus dem Eigentum an dem belasteten Grundstück dem anderen Grundstück gegenüber 
ergibt’. 
211 Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 430, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 205. See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property 
Rights. 
212 Or in German the herrschendes and dienendes Grundstück, see Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 236. 
213 For dominant tenements see Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 237-238, for servient tenements p. 241-
242. 
214 Such benefit does not have to be a value for Money, but can also be e.g. an aesthetic benefit, 
see Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 369.  
215 This could include a servitude of view or silence, see Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 369. 
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which a servitude is intended to last forever.216 The creation of a real servitude 
limited in time is therefore difficult.217 
Furthermore, German law also recognises the Roman maxim of servitus in 
faciendo consistere nequit, a right of servitude can only impose a negative duty.218 Any 
positive duty, even if formulated negatively, is prohibited.219 However, in this 
respect German law distinguishes between primary duties and secondary duties. 
The first category cannot comprise a positive duty, whereas the latter can. A secon-
dary duty can only be positive in cases where such a duty serves the negative 
primary duty. Examples of such a positive secondary duty include the duty to take 
care or maintain a construction or a road needed for the exercise of the servitude.220 
However, the exact status of these secondary duties has been highly debated. 
Hess has divided the duties of the parties to a right of servitude in two.221 First 
of all, there is a property relation that accords property effect to rights and claims. 
Secondly, there is also an internal relation between the respective owners. This 
distinction is relevant because this last relation allows for more influence by the 
parties, since it does not concern a relation that has effect against third parties.222 
After a long debate and initial reluctance of the BGH this internal relation is now 
recognised as a legal subsidiary relation, known in German as a gesetzliches Schuld-
verhältnis, for which the owner is liable with his personal assets.223 In other words, 
for those duties arising from the real servitude during the period of time when the 
owner is owner of the servient piece of land, he shall be personally liable when 
these duties are not fulfilled. Contrary to the primary relation, which concerns the 
servitude itself, the internal relation is a type of obligation.224 The recognition of this 
obligation by force of law in the relation between the owner of the dominant and 
the owner of the servient land is of high practical relevance. Not only does the 
subsidiary relation comprise the legal duties to maintain and take care of the object, 
it can also contain positive duties that do not follow specifically from the law.225 
Parties are relatively free to add content to this relationship as well. The internal 
relation is subject to the law of contract, which results in the availability of contrac-
tual remedies upon non-performance. However, the content of the internal relation 
will, by operation of law, transfer with the servitude to any who subsequently 
 
216 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 248, 264. 
217 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 221. 
218 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 251. See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
219 E.g., a prohibition to use the products of the competition implicitly is a duty to take on 
products of the right-holder of the servitude, BGH 30 January 1959, BGHZ 29, 244. 
Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 253, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 416, see also BayObLG, MDR 1977, 
139 and NJW-RR 1990, 600. 
220 § 1020 and § 1021 BGB, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 252, Füller 2006, p. 405-421. 
221 Hess 1998, p. 502 et seq., Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 276. 
222 Amann 1989, p. 539-540. 
223 BGH 28 June 1985, BGHZ 95, 144, 146 = NJW 1985, 2944, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 276. 
224 This type of obligation comes into existence by operation of law and not by agreement 
between parties. Although such agreement is present, i.e., it is required to establish the right 
of real servitude, it is not the causa for the creation of the subsidiary obligation. 
225 Such as a building duty, see Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 277. 
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acquire the land on which it runs.226 The possibility for parties to give content to 
their relation should therefore not be underestimated.227 In any case, whatever duty 
a servitude comprises, the duty must be formulated in such a way that it can be 
objectively identified by an independent party.228 
The definition of Paragraph 1018 BGB provides three categories of servitudes; 
the servitude that entitles the holder to do something on the land of another, the 
servitude that forces an owner not to do something on his land, and the servitude 
that forces the owner of a piece of land not to exercise certain powers against the 
owner of the dominant land . First, there is a servitude that will give the owner of 
one piece of land a specific right to do something on another owner’s land.229 Such a 
right of servitude is limited to the exercise of a specific right or power that the right-
holder of the servitude holds, exclusively or co-operatively.230 The duty must con-
cern a factual duty, a limitation in the power to dispose of the owner is not 
allowed.231 Secondly, a right of servitude may include a duty for the owner of the 
servient land to refrain from undertaking a specific act on his land.232 Like the first 
category of real servitudes, the second type of servitude is restricted to factual 
acts.233 However, the duty to refrain can, contrary to the right to do something on 
another’s land, refer to a single act. A reference to a general category of acts is also 
possible.234 In practice, it is possible to limit the purpose for which a piece of land is 
used through this type of servitude, for example, a duty not to build on the land, 
but also a prohibition to have a petrol station or a cinema on the land.235 Such a 
restriction of use can only be imposed insofar as it directly concerns the use of the 
land on which the right of servitude is created.236 The justification for such a right of 
servitude is made by reference to the power of the owner through Paragraph 903 
BGB to do with the object as he wishes. This power of the owner is considered to 
include the power to decide on the purpose for which the land is used, which can 
consequently be limited by a right of servitude.237 This can either be done by a 
 
226 The case deciding the issue concerned a servitude of road over which the owner drove with 
heavy equipment which caused damage to the road surface. The recognition of the subsidiary 
relation, with the duty to maintain the road following from § 1020 BGB, allowed the holder of 
the servitude to claim for compensation. A claim for compensation for a violation of the duty 
in § 1020 BGB had previously not been possible. See Amann 1989, p. 532, 535-536, Staudinger 
et al. 2002, p. 277. 
227 Amann 1989, p. 544-545. More on this at the end of this Section. 
228 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 255, RGZ 117, 326. 
229 The is the Benutzungsdienstbarkeit. Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 366. 
230 Although a single act cannot be subject of this servitude. Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 257 et seq. 
231 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 250. 
232 This is the Unterlassungsdienstbarkeit. Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 366.  
233 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 262. 
234 This can be the duty not to build a specific building over a certain height, but also a general 
prohibition to build or have constructions over a certain height. See Staudinger et al. 2002,  
p. 263. 
235 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 264. 
236 § 1019 BGB. For instance, the duty to only use petrol, gas and oil from a certain firm in the 
tank-station cannot be imposed by real servitude, see Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 265-266. 
237 BGH 30 January 1959, BGHZ 29, 244, 249 = NJW 1959, 670, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 264. 
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general prohibition on a certain use of the land or the possibility to only permit one 
type of use.238 
In German legal practice these general prohibitions are used in order to secure 
a certain act of the owner of the servient tenement. This can be done through a 
general prohibition on using the land for a certain purpose, for example, not to have 
a petrol station, except with permission, through contract, of the right-holder. When 
the right-holder of the servitude retracts his permission, the right of servitude will 
prohibit the owner of the land from, to follow the example, having a petrol 
station.239  
German legal practice also uses a combination of a real servitude and a con-
tract to create what is known as a security-servitude.240 The deed creating the right 
of servitude will contain a general prohibition on the owner of the servient piece of 
land, for example, where there is a petrol station, on behalf of the owner of the 
dominant piece of land, for example, a petrol company, to use the land for a certain 
purpose. The parties then enter into a contract whereby the owner of the servient 
land agrees to the terms of the contract, for example, to buy and use the petrol of a 
petrol company or beer from a particular brewery, and the right-holder, the owner 
of the dominant land, restricts his exercise of the servitude to those situations where 
the contract is not performed.241 This contract should not be confused with the 
abovementioned internal relation that comes into existence by operation of law and 
that contains secondary duties. The security contract and the right of servitude are 
connected in the sense that the fulfilment of one of these will lead to the fulfilment 
of the other. In this way double duties, for example, for payment, arising from two 
different sources are prevented.242 However, the contract does not come into 
existence by operation of law. In other words, the contract will not be accessory to 
the property right and will give the parties the possibility to keep the terms of the 
contract secret, since the contract does not need to be registered with the servi-
tude.243 Upon termination of the contract the servitude will continue to exist.  
The security-servitude is modelled after the security-Grundschuld, a type of 
property security right that will be dealt with below.244 If a situation concerning a 
security-servitude is not clear, the courts will refer to the security-Grundschuld.245 
The contract finds its limits both in Paragraph 138 BGB and in national and 
 
238 The first of these would be an example of a non-competition clause, see BGH 30 January 1959, 
BGHZ 29, 244, 249 = NJW 1959, 670 on the prohibition to have a petrol station. The latter 
would be a combination of the first and second type of servitudes, see BGH 22 September 
1961, BGHZ 35, 378, 381 = NJW 1961, 2157.  
239 See Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 267. 
240 Or Sicherungsdienstbarkeit, see Walter & Maier 1988, p. 377, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 370-
371, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 267, Füller 2006, p. 505-506. See also De Waal 1995, p. 197-205. 
241 BGH 18 May 1979, BGHZ 74, 293, 296 = NJW 1979, 2150, BGH 22 September 1961, NJW 1961, 
2157. 
242 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 267. 
243 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 267-268. 
244 On Grundschuld and security-Grundschuld see below; 3.8. Grundschuld. 
245 Walter & Maier 1988, p. 387. 
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international competition law.246 However, the invalidity of the contract will not 
automatically bring the invalidity of the servitude with it.247 The right of servitude 
itself will be limited by the general rules on servitudes; a negatively formulated 
positive duty will still be prohibited. However, it is clear that with a negative real 
servitude but a positive duty imposed by contract in relation to such a right of 
servitude, the security-servitude balances on the border of what is allowed.248  
Thirdly, a servitude can impose a duty on the owner of the servient tenement 
not to exercise some powers which he has as an owner against the owner of the 
dominant land under, inter alia, Paragraphs 903 and 1004 BGB. This duty can 
include the agreement not to take action over a right to a path or way by operation 
of law or a building that leans over on the servient land.249 Finally, although these 
three different types of servitudes are distinguished in German doctrine, parties are 
free to combine several of these types into one right.250 
The previous examples show that parties are relatively free to give content to 
their relationship. The Motive indeed state that the content of servitudes mainly 
comprises the act creating the property right. The content of the right is therefore set 
by the content of the agreement creating the right.251 Rights of servitude are 
intended to give freedom to the parties to provide content to their relationship. 
Nevertheless, there is a tension between the rules of Paragraph 1018 BGB and party 
autonomy.252 The recognition of the subsidiary obligations by the BGH has given 
rise to a renewed discussion on the content of servitudes.253  
The debate stretches from those authors who claim that the limit of party 
autonomy follows from the provisions of Paragraphs 1020 and 1021 BGB, which 
deal with the agreements that can be made between the owner of the servient land 
and the holder of the right of servitude, to those authors who claim that any party 
agreement which fits in the system of the law should be recognised.254 Each of the 
participants to the debate attempts to answer the question of to what extent the 
agreement between parties can be considered part of the right of servitude itself in 
the sense that it will transfer with the right of servitude to any acquirer. Any agree-
ment outside the criteria, whatever these may be, will still be an agreement, but will 
not automatically transfer with the right of servitude.  
 
246 The former will limit the contract to a 15-20 year period. Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 370, 
Füller 2006, p. 509-512. The latter, specifically Art. 81 EC concerns EC competition law and 
exceeds the scope of this research. Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 271, Stürner 1994, p. 284 et seq. 
247 This is mainly a result of the abstract system in German law, see BGH 28 January 1988, V ZR 
310/86, NJW 1988, 2364, Van Vliet 2000, p. 31-34, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 371, Stürner 
1994, p. 287. 
248 OLG München 4 September 2003, NJW-RR 2004, 164, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 268, critically 
see Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 416-417 and Joost in Quack 1997, p. 1476 et seq. 
249 See Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 369, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 272 et seq. 
250 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 275. 
251 Motive III 1888, p. 476. 
252 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 249. 
253 For a good overview of the discussion see Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 281-286. The discussion 
concerns articles by Amann, Stürner and Hess, Amann 1989, Stürner 1994 and Hess 1998. 
254 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 281, Füller 2006, p. 410-412, Falckenberg in Quack 1997, p. 1319 et 
seq. (conservative), Hess 1998, p. 510 et seq. (progressive). 
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Amann argues for a wide possibility for parties to include duties to maintain 
as part of the subsidiary obligations.255 He recognises agreements between parties 
that only work between parties but which have a property effect in the sense that 
they transfer to acquirers of the servitude.256 In order for an agreement to reach such 
a proprietary status, he suggests that the agreement is in direct and immediate 
connection to the content of the right of servitude, that the agreement concerns the 
land on which the right of servitude is created, the agreement does not constitute a 
mere personal duty, and that the content of the agreement is not such that it can no 
longer be considered to be a secondary duty.257  
Stürner searches for the deciding criteria in the BGB itself. He considers the 
system of property rights in the BGB and emphasises that the BGB adheres to a 
model that exclusively prescribes the available property rights.258 He sees the 
available property rights as building blocks that form the construction to which 
party agreement can give content. This party freedom is, for reasons of legal clarity 
and legal certainty, limited to the property rights the BGB has available.259 In this 
approach parties can only give content to the property rights as they are available in 
the BGB.260 
Hess has argued against this by showing that the property rights to use in 
German property law are so abstractly formulated that parties need to give content 
to their right by agreement.261 Practically, these agreements on the content will, in 
order for the law to function, also have to work against those who acquire the right 
of servitude. Hess argues for criteria following from the general direction of the 
law.262 He clearly distinguishes the servitude on the one hand and the internal 
relation between owner of the servient land and holder of the right of servitude on 
the other hand. By using examples from other areas of property law where a subsid-
iary obligation by force of law is recognised, for example, usufruct and emphyteusis, 
he concludes that parties should also have a limited freedom to give content to the 
servitude relation. The absolute boundary of this limited party autonomy follows 
from the law, a positive burden is not allowed.263 When the party agreement 
remains within the limit of the system of the law, it should be allowed. In his view 
property rights are not just building blocks, but form the guideline for the decision 
of what is allowed and what is not.264 
 
255 Amann 1989, p. 536 et seq. 
256 Amann 1989, p. 560-561. 
257 Amann 1989, p. 561. 
258 This concept, which is part of the numerus clausus of property rights, is known as Typizität, 
Stürner 1994, p. 275. For a detailed discussion on the numerus clausus of property rights in 
German law see below in 5. A Numerus Clausus in German Property Law? 
259 This theory is known in German doctrine as the formal theory, Stürner 1994, p. 275 et seq., 
Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 282. 
260 Stürner 1994, p. 281-282. 
261 Hess 1998, p. 509 et seq. 
262 Or the gesamtgesetzlichen Leitbild, Hess 1998, p. 513-515. 
263 Hess 1998, p. 504 et seq. 
264 Hess 1998, p. 513-515. 
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Each of the criteria suggested raises objections. The law is unclear on the status 
of party agreements in case of servitudes.265 Furthermore, the recognition of a 
subsidiary agreement by force of law to which parties can also give limited content 
leads to new questions. In any case, Paragraphs 138, 134 and 305 et seq. BGB will 
govern a right of servitude.266 
3.2. Personal Servitudes: Usufruct and Limited Personal Servitudes 
The category of personal servitudes in German law includes two different property 
rights; the right of usufruct and the limited personal servitude.267 The last is known 
in German as beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeit. Both these rights are servitudes 
that are connected to a person, and not to a piece of land. Such a person can be 
either a natural or a legal person. Specifically the creation of a personal servitude on 
behalf of a legal person enables a more flexible application of these property rights. 
This section will first deal with the right of usufruct, after which the limited 
personal servitude is dealt with. 
The right of usufruct is considered the right that most closely resembles the 
right of ownership. This right, which limits the powers of the owner, entitles the 
right-holder to use the object under usufruct. The right-holder is entitled to the 
usufruct not in his capacity as the owner of a piece of land or other object, but in his 
personal capacity.268 An object of a usufruct can be not only a immovable or a 
movable, but also a claim.269 The full right of use, which includes the right to take 
the fruits the object produces, and the personal nature of the right are its defining 
characteristics. Without any further agreement, the usufructuary will receive a full 
power to use the object under usufruct. The power to use can be limited, but not to 
one specific incidence of use. Instead the right must entitle its holder to a particular 
type of use.270 The right of usufruct is dealt with in Paragraph 1030 BGB, which 
states: 
(1) An object can be burdened in such a way, that the person, for whose benefit this 
burdening occurs, is entitled to the use of the object and to take the fruits. (Usu-
fruct) 
(2) The usufruct can be limited by the exclusion of certain powers to use.271 
 
265 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 284-285. 
266 These Paragraphs concern good faith, agreements against the law, and general terms and 
conditions. Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 286. 
267 On the distinction between real and personal servitudes, see Füller 2006, p. 455-460. 
268 Schön 1992, p. 29-30. 
269 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 421, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 360. 
270 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 362-363. 
271 § 1030 BGB, ‘(1) Eine Sache kann in der Weise belastet werden, das derjenige, zu dessen 
Gunsten die Belastung erfolgt, berechtigt ist, die Nutzungen der Sache zu Ziehen (Nieß-
brauch). (2) Der Nießbrauch kann durch den Ausschluss einzelner Nutzungen beschränkt 
werden’. 
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The right of usufruct creates a property relation between the owner of an object and 
the usufructuary, whereby the usufructuary receives possession.272 The usufructu-
ary, i.e., the holder of a right of usufruct, has a property right that has effect against 
third parties and that enables him to use the same claims the owner has for the 
protection of the object.273 This includes both the claim for vindication as well as the 
actio negatoria to stop or prevent interference with the object under usufruct.274 
Because the right of usufruct is connected to a person, the usufruct will end with the 
death of the usufructuary and in principle cannot be transferred. It is possible, 
however, to establish a right of usufruct on behalf of a legal person, which creates 
some transfer possibilities.275 
German doctrine recognises, as with rights of real servitude, an internal rela-
tion between the owner and the usufructuary. This internal relation is recognised as 
a subsidiary obligation existing by force of law, to which parties can make altera-
tions by agreement.276 The rights and duties contained in this subsidiary obligation 
will transfer with the ownership of the object under usufruct.277 The subsidiary 
obligation will in any case contain the legal duties of the usufructuary. This includes 
the duty of the usufructuary to preserve the object and deal with it according to the 
principles of property management.278 Other legal duties include the duty to pay 
certain fees, to insure the object and to replace certain parts of the object under 
usufruct.279 Moreover, parties can provide content to their relation through agree-
ment. They can do so without the obligation losing its effect against later acquirers 
of the property right. As in the case of real servitudes, the content of the agreement 
will transfer to the new subsidiary obligation between the new holders of the 
property right. 
In order to have effect against subsequent acquirers, the agreements parties 
make will have to fulfil certain criteria. In the case of usufructs the main criteria for 
property effect follow from the system of property rights.280 The general rules on the 
nature of the usufruct cannot be deviated from.281 Parties cannot just give any con-
tent to their relation, they can only do so if the relevant provisions in the BGB give 
them permission to do so.282 If the duty in question concerns third parties the BGB 
provides almost no freedom at all. Only in respect to the inner relation between 
owner and usufructuary do the parties have some freedom, but no agreement 
 
272 § 1036 (1) BGB, this is the mittelbarer Besitz, § 868 BGB. Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 422. 
273 § 1065 BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 363-364, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 425. 
274 §§ 985 and 1004 BGB. On the claims connected to the right of ownership, see above; 2.1. 
Normal Ownership. 
275 § 1059 BGB, § 1061 BGB and § 1059a, BGB. 
276 BGH 21 June 1985, BGHZ 95, 99, 100, Amann 1989, p. 540-541, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999,  
p. 364, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 367-379, Schön 1992, p. 260 et seq., Füller 2006, p. 421-422. 
277 A transfer on the side of the usufructuary is possible, but only in case the usufruct is created 
for the benefit of a legal person, see Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 364, Schön 1992, p. 30. 
278 § 1036 (2) BGB. 
279 §§ 1047, 1045 and 1048 (2) BGB, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 376. 
280 Füller 2006, p. 423-431. 
281 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 367, Hess 1998, p. 504, Schön 1992, p. 262. 
282 § 1030 (2) BGB is a clear example. 
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should interfere with the relation between owner and usufructuary as is provided 
for in the system.283  
When the right of usufruct ends, the usufructuary is under the duty to return 
the object to the owner.284 The owner will have a claim for vindication against the 
usufructuary from the moment the right of usufruct ends.285 The object must be 
returned in the state in which it was received. A decrease in value, other than 
through normal use, will have to be compensated. Any increase of value of the 
object will be for the owner.286 
In legal practice, the usufruct is mainly used for two purposes. First, in the law 
of succession it is a common arrangement that a usufruct is created for the surviving 
spouse while appointing the children as heirs.287 Secondly, the right of usufruct is 
used for security purposes. When made subject to a right of pledge, the right of 
usufruct can be used to give advantages to the pledgor to which he normally would 
not be entitled.288 The combination of the right of usufruct with the right of pledge 
effectively creates a situation in which the pledgor becomes entitled to use the 
object, or at least to take the fruits the object produces, which power was not 
included in the system of pledge in the BGB.289  
Furthermore, the right of usufruct can be used to secure a contractual relation 
of lease. In this flexible application of the right, the function of the usufruct is to 
effect and secure the lease.290 However, a property right cannot be created on a right 
of lease itself. Parties must therefore be careful not to connect the property right to 
the lease by attempting to make the usufruct accessory, i.e. dependent, on the lease 
contract, or by referring explicitly to the lease relation in the deed of creation.291 The 
Bundesgerichtshof has recognised the validity of a usufruct to strengthen a lease.292 It 
is possible for two persons to be entitled to the use of an object following from a 
contract and from a property right at the same time.293 
Any object mentioned in Paragraph 90 BGB can be the subject of a usufruct.294 
This includes immovable as well as movable objects. The general rules on the right 
of usufruct are applicable on rights of usufruct on all types of objects. However, 
because of the different nature of immovable and movable objects, some differences 
exist. For example, it is possible to limit the exercise of a right of usufruct to a specif-
 
283 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 377. 
284 Or, in case of death of the usufructuary, the heirs will have to return the object. § 1055 BGB, 
Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 424, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 506. 
285 § 985 BGB, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 506. 
286 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 507-508. 
287 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 361. 
288 E.g., payments of rent, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 361. 
289 Schön 1992, p. 370. On the concept of fruits in German law see § 99 BGB. On the right of 
pledge see below; 3.6. Pledge. 
290 Schön 1992, p. 371 et seq., Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 380, Füller 2006, p. 512-517. 
291 Schön 1992, p. 371. 
292 BGH 22 April 1966, WM 1966, 1089, Schön 1992, p. 372. 
293 This is the Dopperlwirkung, see Schön 1992, p. 373, but also in general Staudinger et al. 2000,  
p. 41-47, Kipp 1911, p. 220-233. 
294 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 374. 
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ic part of the land on which the right runs, and the owner can establish a right of 
usufruct on his own land. A right of usufruct on movable objects cannot be limited 
to the exercise of a specific piece of such a movable object, nor can an owner create a 
right of usufruct on his own movable objects.295 Rights that resemble the right of 
ownership on immovable objects, such as the right of ownership of an apartment, 
but also the right of superficies, can be subject of a right of usufruct. 
Because the usufructuary is under a duty to return the object at the end of the 
usufruct, movable objects that are either perishable or that can be used up, cannot 
be subject of a right of usufruct. In order to solve this problem, and to enable the 
creation of a property right also on these types of objects, German law recognises a 
right of quasi-usufruct.296 The right of quasi-usufruct is actually a transfer of the 
right of ownership combined with the personal duty for the ‘holder of the right of 
quasi-usufruct’ to replace the value of the objects he received.297 Because the right of 
quasi-usufruct is not really created on an object or set of objects, but is better 
defined as a transfer with the personal duty to return the object or set of objects, it is 
not really a property right. This characterisation offers advantages, most important-
ly in more freedom for parties to decide on the content of their relation.298 
Furthermore, the BGB provides additional rules for rights of usufruct on 
rights. Paragraph 1068 BGB states: 
(1) A right may also be the subject of a usufruct. 
(2) The provisions on usufruct on objects apply to the usufruct on rights, insofar as §§ 
1069 until 1084 do not provide otherwise.299 
The usufruct on rights can only exist on a right that is transferable and which can be 
used in such a way that fruits can be taken from it.300 The usufruct on a right is 
mainly used to create a usufruct on a set of assets or on a company.301 The usufruct 
on a set of assets will usually concern claims. A usufruct on a claim creates a three-
party relationship between the debtor, creditor and usufructuary. The property 
right will entitle its holder to the proceeds of the claim.302 A usufruct on a general 
set of assets is not specifically recognised in the BGB, but is possible under the same 
conditions as any other right in respect of a set of assets, e.g. those of a company.303 
 
295 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 427, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 422. 
296 § 1067 BGB, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 559 et seq., Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 426. On quasi-
usufruct, see Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
297 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 426. 
298 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 561. 
299 § 1068 BGB, ‘(1) Gegenstand des Nießbrauchs kann auch ein Recht sein. (2) Auf den Nieß-
brauch an Rechten finden die Vorschriften über den Nießbrauch an Sachen entsprechende 
Anwendung, soweit sich nicht aus den §§ 1069 bis 1084 ein anderes ergibt’, translation 
partially taken over from Goren 1994. 
300 § 99 BGB and § 1069 (2) BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 426-427, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, 
p. 776. 
301 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 775. 
302 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 427-428. 
303 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 428. 
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In reality, the usufruct on a set of assets will be a sum of rights of usufruct on the 
individual objects in the set assets.304 
In respect of a right of usufruct on a set of assets, the relation between the 
holder of the claim and the holder of the right of usufruct, as well as the relation 
between the debtor and the creditor, also right-holder, should be separated. The last 
relation concerns the external relation of the usufruct. The creditor can execute the 
claim in insolvency of the debtor. The holder of the right of usufruct will have to 
respect the execution, although he is entitled to its use.305 The internal relationship 
between the holder of the claim and the holder of the right of usufruct concerns the 
question of whether the holder of the usufruct can, following from his right to use 
and take the fruits of the claim, execute the claim himself. Under conditions, the 
holder of a usufruct will have this power.306 
The second personal servitude in German law is the limited personal servi-
tude. Like the right of usufruct, a person holds this right not in his capacity as 
holder of a property right in respect of an object, but as a person. However, in 
respect to the rest of its contents, the beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeit is based on 
a right of real servitude.307 Like a right of real servitude, the limited personal 
servitude does not concern a general power to use, as is the case with a right of usu-
fruct, but a specifically described power for the use of another’s land.308 Although 
the limited personal servitude is strictly personal, i.e., it will end with the death of 
the holder of the right, as in case of a usufruct, it can be transferred when created on 
behalf of a legal person.309 Furthermore the beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeit 
cannot be transferred unless it is created on the immovable object of another for the 
construction of, inter alia, electricity cables, gas, water or a sewer system.310  
On the limited personal servitude, Paragraph 1090 BGB states: 
A piece of land can be burdened in such a way that a person for whose benefit the right 
is created is entitled to a specific use of the land or that it awards him a power that can 
be subject to a real servitude.311 
Given that the limited personal servitude is modelled on the right of real servitude, 
the way in which it is applied is also very similar. A limited personal servitude can 
comprise duties to use land in a specific way, to refrain from doing something on 
the land, and to refrain from using a power connected to the entitlement to land.312 
 
304 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 375, see also RG 30 October 1936, RGZ 153, 29, in particular, p. 31. 
305 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 431. 
306 See Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 431. 
307 Or a subjective-persönliches recht, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 682. 
308 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 682. 
309 §§ 1090 (2) and 1061 BGB, § 1092 (2) BGB. 
310 § 1092 (3) BGB. 
311 § 1090 BGB, ‘Ein Grundstück kann in der Weise belastet werden, dass derjenige, zu dessen 
Gunsten die Belastung erfolgt, berechtet ist, das Grundstuck in einzelnen Beziehungen zu 
benutzen, oder dass ihm eine sonstige Befugnis zusteht, die den Inhalt einer Grunddienst-
barkeit bilden kann’. 
312 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 692. 
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Like the right of real servitude, the law imposes limitations on what conditions the 
parties may agree. A limited personal servitude cannot contain a positive duty or a 
single factual act.313 However, secondary duties are recognised. These can be posi-
tive, as in the case of rights of real servitude.314 Just as with the other servitudes, the 
limited personal servitude also gives rise to a subsidiary obligation by force of law, 
to which parties are relatively free to give content. The limited personal servitude is 
therefore of particular interest as a security-servitude.315 The construction is the 
same as with a right of real servitude, but the holder of the right will be limited in 
his personal capacity and not in his capacity as owner or holder of another property 
right to a piece of land.316 Moreover, because of the possibility to bind a person, the 
right is also used to secure lease payments, as can also be done with a usufruct.317 
Finally, Paragraph 1093 BGB deals with a specific type of limited personal 
servitude: 
A limited personal servitude (beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeit) can also include a 
right to use, to the exclusion of the owner, a building or part of a building as housing 
accommodation …318 
With respect to this right, known as an apartment right or Wohnungsrecht, parties 
are not as free to give content to their relationship as in case of other servitudes.319 
Contrary to the right of ownership of an apartment, this apartment right is strongly 
connected to the right-holder as a person, i.e., not in his capacity as holder of a 
property right in respect of land with a building on it, and cannot be transferred.320 
The apartment right only entitles one to the use of an apartment and not to a 
general right to use as in case of a right of usufruct. The right to live in an apartment 
will be the main element of the servitude. Paragraph 1093 BGB declares various 
provisions on the right of usufruct applicable, which include the duty to take care of 
the building.321 
The apartment right can be combined with a contract of lease that will func-
tion as a security contract. The technique used for this is the same as with security-
servitudes and security-Grundschuld.322 In respect of a security apartment right, the 
 
313 See BGH 25 February 1959, V ZR 176/57, DNotZ 1959, 240. 
314 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 693. 
315 See BGH 3 May 1985, V ZR 55/84, NJW 1985, 2474, BGH 29 January 1988, V ZR 310/86, NJW 
1988, 2364. 
316 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 695. On security servitudes see above; 3.1. Real Servitude. 
317 See Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 682. 
318 § 1093, ‘Als beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeit kann auch das Recht bestellt werden, ein 
Gebäude oder einen Teil eines Gebäudes unter Ausschluss des Eigentümers als Wohnung zu 
benutzen …’ This specific usage of the beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeit resembles the 
Roman personal servitude of habitatio, D. 7.8.1 et seq., Kaser 1971, p. 454. 
319 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 728. 
320 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 683. 
321 The duties are very similar to those of the usufructuary, excluding the duty to insure the 
object. Staudinger et al. 2002,p. 744. 
322 On security servitudes see above; 3.1. Real Servitude. On security-Grundschuld, see below; 3.8. 
Grundschuld. 
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apartment right will comprise a duty not to use an apartment. At the same time the 
lease and security contract deviates from the servitude by granting permission to 
use the apartment in the same way as in case of other security-servitudes. Only in 
the event that the lessee cannot pay or the contract expires will the servitude be 
invoked. 
3.3. Superficies 
The Erbbaurecht or right of superficies was part of German law before the BGB. 
Although the right of superficies came from the received Roman law, Germanic law 
knew an equivalent as a right that was part of the feudal system of landholding.323 
Over time, the two different concepts became one.324 The relation between owner 
and right-holder was often characterised as dominium directum and dominium utile, 
which came to be rejected in the BGB.325 Nevertheless, because of its origin, the right 
was considered with great suspicion. The drafters of the BGB included the right of 
superficies, mentioned its limited use in practice, and considered the right as rela-
tively unimportant.326 They therefore only provided minimum regulations in Para-
graphs 1012 to 1017 BGB.327 Nevertheless, a right to hold a building on or under 
someone else’s land that could be transferred and inherited was included.  
Practice changed after the introduction of the BGB. More people needed 
housing and the right of superficies could enable them to acquire their ‘own home’.328 
However, the provisions in the BGB were so limited that they were not of much use 
for legal practice. These limited provisions in the BGB created a lot of legal uncer-
tainty, especially in relation to the creation of other property rights in respect of the 
right of superficies in order to finance its acquisition.329 Under pressure from legal 
practice a legislative reform was introduced on 15 January 1919 in the Verordnung 
über das Erbbaurecht (ErbbauVO) or Regulation on the right of Superficies. This new 
Regulation was primarily intended to make the right of superficies available for 
practice and to enable the use of the right as an object of security.330 The Regulation 
states in Paragraph 1 ErbbauVO: 
 
323 This was the Bodenleihe, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 3-4. 
324 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 4. 
325 See above; 2. The Right of Ownership. 
326 Von Oefele & Winkler 2003, p. 13, Motive III 1888, p. 466-467. 
327 In modern times these Paragraph’s are still mentioned in the BGB, but are empty. 
Hattenhauer 1989, p. 95-96, Von Oefele & Winkler 2003, p. 13. 
328 Von Oefele & Winkler 2003, p. 14. 
329 Von Oefele & Winkler 2003, p. 14, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 4. 
330 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 7. For more on the development of the right of superficies see Von 
Oefele & Winkler 2003, p. 13 et seq. 
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A piece of land can be burdened in such a way that the person for whose benefit the 
right is created has the transferable and inheritable right to have a building upon or 
under the surface of that land. (right of superficies) …331 
The right of superficies is a property right to use connected to a person.332 Although 
the right is created on behalf of a person, natural or legal, it can be transferred and 
inherited. The right of superficies entitles the holder to have a building on another’s 
land. These elements constitute the nature of the right of superficies.333 
The right to have a building is open for interpretation. First of all, the term 
‘building’ should be interpreted very broadly. It includes constructions that are not 
buildings but for which work on the land is necessary, for example, a golf course.334 
In order to decide on the content of the right the factual situation and common 
speech are taken into account.335  
Secondly, it was already the intention of the First Commission to create a right 
that would be treated as if it was a piece of land. German law adheres to the Roman 
maxim of superficies solo cedit.336 The right of superficies entitles the right holder to 
ownership of the building which is already on the land, or which is to be con-
structed, in which case the right-holder will receive ownership from the moment 
construction starts.337 The right of superficies is therefore an exception to the rule that 
buildings on land follow the ownership of the land. Furthermore, because the 
holder of the right of superficies becomes the owner of the building on the land of 
another, he may use the same actions as an owner to protect his ownership.338 
The right of superficies is treated in the same way as a right of ownership of 
land. Upon registration the right receives its own page in the register, just like the 
right of ownership.339 Consequently, the right of superficies can be burdened with 
other property rights almost as if it was a right of ownership of land. For legal 
practice this is especially relevant in combination with ownership of an apartment. 
The combination of a right of superficies with Wohnungseigentum enables the creation 
of apartments without the acquisition of the land.340  
Nevertheless, the right remains a property right and ownership remains 
ownership. When the holder of a right of superficies creates another right of super-
ficies the holder of the second right will become owner. No two owners at the same 
 
331 § 1 ErbbauVO, ´Ein Grundstück kann in der Weise belastet werden, dass demjenigen, zu 
dessen Gunsten die Belastung erfolgt, das veräusserliche und vererbliche Recht zusteht, auf 
oder unter der Oberfläche des Grundstücks ein Bauwerk zu haben (Erbbaurecht) …’. 
332 A subjectiv persönliches Recht. Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 21. 
333 RGZ 61, 2; BayObLGZ 14, 254, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 17. 
334 BGH 10 January 1992, BGHZ 117, 19, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 23. 
335 RGZ, 56, 42, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 22. 
336 §§ 93 and 94 BGB, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 20. 
337 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 20. Especially the ownership of a building that is still to be con-
structed is debated in French law. On French law see Chapter 3; 3.3. Superficies. 
338 § 11 ErbbauVO, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 21, 115 et seq. 
339 A Grundbuchblatt, § 14 ErbbauVO. 
340 The right of superficies itself resists vertical separation. § 1(3) ErbbauVO. § 30 WEG enables 
the application of the WEG on the right of superficies, on this see Von Oefele & Winkler 2003, 
p. 84-85, 112 et seq. 
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time can be recognised.341 It is also impossible to create a right of superficies on part 
of a piece of land. Legal practice solves this in a form of co-ownership whereby one 
of the co-owners holds the general right of superficies.342 The ErbbauVO specifically 
intends to allow the possibility to create another property right in respect of the 
right of superficies. The possibility to create another property right enables the 
creation of a right of hypothec or Grundschuld, which allows the holder to obtain 
finance, and therefore enables people to acquire ownership of a privately owned 
home without buying the land on which the building is created. 
When dealing with the right of superficies, parties are more limited in their 
party autonomy than they are in respect of other property rights to use. Since the 
right of superficies imposes a very large burden on the right of ownership, the 
ErbbauVO provides specific rules. However, parties still have influence on the exact 
contents of their relation.343 A legal subsidiary obligation as is recognised in the case 
of other property rights to use does not exist.344 Parties must, therefore, if they want 
their agreements to have property effects, deal with their relation in the contract 
creating the property right. 
However, not every agreement the parties make will have property effect. 
Paragraphs 2 to 8 of the ErbbauVO stipulate the content of the right, to which par-
ties can, under conditions, add agreements.345 Such an agreement remains a con-
tract, even when the law awards it property effect.346 Paragraph 2 ErbbauVO 
stipulates cases in which the party agreement will have property effect. These 
categories of agreements are agreements on the purpose and maintenance of the 
building, the insurance of the building and re-building in the event of its destruc-
tion, the responsibility for private and public law burdens, the duty, under specific 
conditions, to transfer the right to the owner, a duty to pay contract penalties, the 
privileged right of the holder of the right to renew the right of superficies, and the 
duty of the owner to sell the land to the right holder.347 Other agreements with 
property effect include the duty for the right holder to ask permission from the 
owner when he wishes to change the building or burden his right.348 Because of the 
third-party effect of these provisions they will be interpreted objectively and nar-
rowly.349 Any other agreement which, either through interpretation or content, falls 
outside the scope of these Paragraphs will be a contract only having effect between 
the parties. 
Finally, it is possible for the parties to agree on a periodic payment for the 
right of superficies. The provisions on Reallast or real burdens will be applicable to 
 
341 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 20-21. 
342 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 25. For more information see Von Oefele & Winkler 2003, p. 84 et seq. 
343 See BGH 22 April 1994, NJW 1994, 2024. 
344 Motive III 1888, p. 469, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 42. 
345 In this respect the nature of the right of superficies is relevant. On the nature of the right of 
superficies see the top of this Section. See Füller 2006, p. 448-451. 
346 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 42. 
347 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 47-60. 
348 § 5 ErbbauVO. 
349 Von Oefele & Winkler 2003, p. 129. 
 214 
German Law 
such payments.350 The result of this is that the creation of a right of superficies for 
periodic payment of money will also create a real burden. The burden will serve as 
security for the payments by the holder of the right. However, Paragraph 9 
ErbbauVO specifically states that the holder can only be forced to return the right of 
superficies to the owner when there has been no payment for at least two years.351 In 
respect to the real burden that came into existence, the general provisions on real 
burdens apply, including the legal subsidiary obligation between parties, to which 
parties may also give content.352 
A return of the right of superficies to the owner, because of Paragraph 889 BGB, 
will not result in the destruction of the right. Furthermore, an owner can also estab-
lish a right of superficies on his own ownership on his own terms and conditions and 
subsequently transfer his ownership or his right of superficies to a third party.353 
3.4. Expectation Rights: Pre-Emptive Right and Acquisition Right 
German law recognises two property expectation rights.354 The pre-emptive right, or 
Vorkaufsrecht, is dealt with in the BGB. The acquisition right, or Anwartschaftsrecht, is 
fully developed by case law.355 The introduction of this last right has given rise to a 
fundamental debate, both on the nature of the right itself as well as on the system of 
property rights in German law.356 
The dingliche Vorkaufrecht, or property pre-emptive right, has its origins in 
Germanic property law.357 The right was widely applied and could have far reach-
ing consequences. These included, for example, the reversal of an already made 
transfer of ownership. Under the old feudal system the lord would have such a 
property right in respect of an object that a vassal could sell.358 The Vorkaufrecht is an 
expectation right, a right that, as such, was unknown to Roman law. The system of 
the BGB recognises various expectation rights or gives rise to the recognition of 
expectation rights, of which not all are recognised as property rights. These include 
the Vormerkung, a form of pre-emptive registration, which gives a property effect to 
a sales agreement, and the already mentioned Anwartschaftsrecht or acquisition right 
which are based on the system of the BGB, but not dealt with by it.359 Each of these 
 
350 With the limitation that the specific provisions in the different Länder do not apply. § 9 
ErbbauVO. On real burdens see below; 3.5. Real Burden (Reallast). 
351 § 9(4) ErbbauVO. 
352 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 85. 
353 BGH 142, 231 = JW 1934, 282, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 18. 
354 Or Erwerbsrechte Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 24. 
355 On the early development of Anwartschaftsrechte see Von Tuhr 1957, p. 180 et seq., Sponer 
1965, p. 20. 
356 The debate on the nature of the right is dealt with in this Section, the debate on the system of 
property rights is dealt with below in 5. A Numerus Clausus in German Property Law? 
357 Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 498-499, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 759, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 437-
438. 
358 Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 499. 
359 These rights will be dealt with below in 4. Borderline Cases in German Property Law, see, in 
particular, 4.2. Pre-emptive registration (Vormerkung). 
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rights operates on the border between contract and property. Not surprisingly 
therefore, it is debatable in German doctrine whether these last two rights are 
property rights.  
The pre-emptive right is a property right and is dealt with in Paragraph 1094 
BGB: 
A piece of land can be burdened in such a way that the person for whose benefit the 
right is created is entitled to the pre-emptive sale in respect to the owner.360 
This complicated sentence results in a right that entitles the holder to force the 
owner to permit the sale and transfer of ownership to him. The right can be created 
either on behalf of a person in his capacity as holder of a property right or on behalf 
of a holder personally.361 Although the right concerns the contract of sale, the right 
is commonly recognised as a property right since it burdens the land, burdens the 
owner in his capacity as an owner, has effect against third parties, and remains in 
existence in insolvency.362 
The effect of the property right is that when an owner and another person 
agree on the sale and transfer of an immovable object, they create a property pre-
emptive right that is designed to protect the right holder against the owner selling 
and transferring the object to a third party before the formalities are dealt with.363 
The property right entitles the right holder to preclude the conclusion of a contract 
of sale concluded between the owner and a third party and, under conditions, to 
demand a transfer of ownership.364  
The property right entitles the right-holder to declare his right.365 Making this 
declaration will entitle the holder of the right to a claim for the transfer of the 
ownership. In principle, this claim will only be effective against the owner, and not 
against third parties. Paragraph 1098 BGB stipulates, however, that the claim can be 
invoked against third parties by way of Vormerkung.366 When the pre-emptive right 
is pre-emptively registered, i.e., through Vormerkung, the existence of the right will 
be in a public register. The Vormerkung functions as a vehicle to enable the success-
ful claim of the right holder. Vormerkung makes a possible transfer of ownership 
between the owner and a third party invalid in respect to the holder of the pre-
emptively registered property right, who by rank of his property right, remains 
 
360 § 1094 BGB, ‘Ein Gründstuck kann in der Weise belastet werden, dass derjenige, zu dessen 
Gunsten die Belastung erfolgt, dem Eigentümer gegenüber zum Vorkauf berechtet ist’. 
361 The subjectiv-persönliches Recht and the subjectiv-dingliches Recht, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 775. 
362 See Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 760-762. 
363 § 1094 BGB, also a share in a community of co-owners can be subject of the right, § 1095 BGB. 
Also other land-like rights, e.g. the right of superficies (§ 11 ErbbauVO) can be subject, see 
Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 765, 772-773. 
364 § 1098 BGB. The right itself does not interfere with the party autonomy of the owner and the 
third party to decide on the contents of their agreement, see Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 796. 
365 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 780. 
366 § 1098 (2) BGB, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 797, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 244-245. 
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entitled to claim the transfer of ownership.367 A transfer between the owner and a 
third party will be valid against the rest of the world.368 
However, the right holder is not just entitled to the transfer of ownership. He 
can not only ask for the transfer of ownership under the conditions, but he is also 
allowed to claim, instead of the transfer, the purchase price that the owner and the 
third party agreed on. As to the price, the holder of the right will be dependent on 
the agreement of the owner and the third party; a price already contained in the 
pre-emptive right will be invalid.369 If the right-holder decides not to invoke his 
property right, the right will cease to exist.370  
Parties do not have a great deal of freedom to decide on the exact content of 
the property right. By force of law a subsidiary obligation will come into existence, 
but this obligation, like their whole relation, will be covered by Paragraphs 465 until 
473 BGB.371 The application of these provisions from contract law emphasise the 
contractual nature of the right, which by force of the BGB achieves the status of a 
property right. 
Finally, against the claim of the holder of this right, a third party who enters 
into a contract of sale with the owner is entitled to invoke Paragraph 1100 BGB. 
When the third party has already acquired the right of ownership of the immovable 
object, the position of the holder of the right depends on whether the purchase price 
has already been paid. If the price has not yet been paid, the holder invokes his 
right against both the owner and the third party, i.e., because of the Vormerkung the 
transfer of ownership between the owner and the third party takes no effect in 
respect to him.372 When the purchase price has been paid, the ‘new owner’, i.e., the 
third party, can refuse to transfer the ownership to the holder of the right and 
vacate the immovable object until the purchase price has been paid to the holder.373 
The contract of sale between the owner and the third party will remain valid, which 
also entitles the third party to claim for damages.374 
A special feature of German property law is the recognition of the special 
nature of the position of a person acquiring a property right as a distinct legal 
relation with limited third-party effect. These relations are known as acquisition 
rights or Anwartschaftsrechte. Although the term Anwartschaft was mentioned during 
the making of the draft, the acquisition right as such is unknown to the BGB.375 
Predecessors of the currently recognised right were already known in Germanic 
law, partly based on Roman law as well.376 However, the current Anwartschaftsrecht 
 
367 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 797, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 437. 
368 This effect concerns the concept of Vormerkung, see below; 4.2. Pre-emptive registration 
(Vormerkung). 
369 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 780. 
370 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 245. 
371 § 1098(1) BGB, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 795. 
372 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 802-803. 
373 § 1100 BGB, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 803, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 437. 
374 § 435 et seq. BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 437. 
375 Achilles, Spahn & Gebhard 1897, p. 181, Raiser 1961, p. 2, Konzen 2000, p. 882, Füller 2006,  
p. 517-519. 
376 Sponer 1965, p. 20 et seq. 
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was introduced by the German courts, in particular the BGH, and was also further 
developed through case law. Whether a new property right was recognised with the 
recognition of the acquisition right has been highly debated.377 The leading opinion 
in German doctrine seems to be to accept the acquisition right as a limited property 
right or a quasi-property right.378 However, these proponents of the acquisition 
right as a property right are also forced to recognise that the acquisition right also 
lacks certain characteristics.379 
The acquisition right is connected to the acquisition of a property right and 
therefore with the system of transfer. The German transfer system is a traditio 
transfer system, meaning that the contract underlying the transfer and the transfer 
of ownership of the object itself are two different and distinct legal acts. They are 
related in such a way that the contract functions as justification for the transfer.380 
When a contract of sale is concluded between a seller and a buyer, the buyer 
acquires a personal right against the seller for the transfer of the object. It is this 
personal right that is strengthened by the recognition of the acquisition right. 
In certain situations the rights of the buyer are stronger than just a personal 
right against the seller.381 This is especially so when the seller reserves his right of 
ownership until payment by the buyer. A reservation of ownership is a transfer of 
ownership under a condition of suspension.382 In case of a reservation of ownership 
the BGB provides that the owner can no longer use his power to dispose to prevent 
the acquisition of ownership over the object by the buyer.383 Almost all acts by the 
owner in this respect will be invalid.384 Furthermore, the buyer has a claim for 
compensation when the object is damaged in the care of the owner. When the 
owner resists the act that would fulfil the condition, the buyer can acquire owner-
ship by force of law.385 The position of the buyer in case of a reservation of 
ownership is therefore more than just a personal right against the seller. It is this 
‘secured’ position that has given rise in German doctrine and legal practice to the 
recognition of the right of the buyer in reservation of ownership cases as a special 
right. This right of the buyer is considered not just a personal right for the transfer 
of the object, but a pre-emptive right in respect of the right of ownership itself. In a 
landmark decision the BGH, dealing with a reservation of ownership case, intro-
duced the concept of acquisition rights.386 This decision introduced a concept which 
was as such unknown to the drafters of the BGB.387 
 
377 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 187, Wolf 2005, p. 315-316, Wiegand 1990, p. 128-129, Baur, Baur 
& Stürner 1999, p. 755-756, Raiser 1961, p. 45 et seq., Mülbert 2002, p. 912 et seq. 
378 Soergel et al. 2002, p. 15. 
379 For a short overview see Wolf 2005, p. 316. 
380 Although, technically, a contract is not required to transfer the right of ownership. For that a 
real agreement suffices. Van Vliet 2000, p. 31 et seq. 
381 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 755. 
382 See above; 2.1. Normal Ownership. 
383 Wolf 2005, p. 314-315. 
384 § 161 (1) BGB, but see § 161 (3) BGB. 
385 §§ 160 and 162 BGB, Wolf 2005, p. 315. 
386 BGH 24 June 1958, BGHZ 28, 16, 21, BGH 25 February 1966, BGHZ 45, 186 (192). 
387 Konzen 2000, p. 882. 
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The BGH introduced the acquisition right as a right that so closely resembles a 
full property right, that the rights and actions available to the holder of such a full 
right should be a model for the rights and actions of the holder of the acquisition 
right. The BGH held the acquisition right to be a ‘wesensgleiches minus’, i.e., essen-
tially the same as, but a little less than, of ownership.388 After its introduction into 
German property law the acquisition right was further developed through case law.  
The main result of this development is that the holder of an acquisition right is 
entitled to possession of the object. Leading opinion considers the right to posses-
sion of the right-holder as a right with third-party effect.389 The result is that the 
right-holder can claim the return or transfer of possession against an unlawful 
possessor.390 Furthermore, because the acquisition rights so closely resemble the full 
property right the right-holder is about to acquire, leading opinion awards the 
actions available to the holder of such a full property right to the holder of the 
acquisition right. This includes the claims for return of the object and the actio 
negatoria.391 Finally, since the acquisition right is recognised as a property right, also 
a claim for damages in tort is available when the right is interfered with.392 
Parallel to the recognition of the acquisition right in case of reservation of 
ownership, there are other situations where the BGB awards a secured position to 
the acquirer of a property right. Such a situation also occurs during the acquisition 
of immovable objects. The transfer of immovable objects requires more formalities 
than the transfer of movable objects. One of these formalities is that parties must 
formally agree on the transfer and that such agreement must be registered.393 This 
requirement is further specified in Paragraph 925 BGB, which requires the parties to 
declare their intention and agree to transfer together in front of an official, usually a 
notary.394 Such agreement is known as Auflassung and should be distinguished from 
a contract of sale, which is a separate individual agreement.395 After the Auflassung 
has been made, the agreement can be registered, which, because of the registration 
system, can take some time. The need for protection of the acquirer of a property 
right in respect to immovables is different from the acquirer of a movable object 
under reservation of ownership. Paragraph 925 BGB prohibits a conditional transfer 
 
388 BGH 24 June 1959, BGHZ 28 , 16 = NJW 1958, 1133. Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 187, Wolf 
2005, p. 316. 
389 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 762, Wolf 2005, p. 318. 
390 BGH 21 May 1953, BGHZ 10, 69 = NJW 1953, 1099, §§ 858 et seq. and 1007 BGB, Baur, Baur & 
Stürner 1999, p. 762. 
391 §§ 985 and 1004 BGB, Wolf 2005, p. 318, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 190. For an overview of 
the debate on the application of these claims see Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 762-763. 
392 § 823 BGB uses the terms ‘Eigentum oder ein sonstiges Recht’ or ownership and ownership-
like rights. Leading opinion places the acquisition right in the latter category. Schwab & 
Prütting 2003, p. 190, Wolf 2005, p. 318-319, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 762-763. 
393 § 873 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 165. 
394 § 925 BGB, although the law does not require the parties to appear personally, see Schwab & 
Prütting 2003, p. 165-166, Wolf 2005, p. 206 et seq. 
395 § 925a BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 166-167. 
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of immovable objects; a reservation of ownership of an immovable object is there-
fore not possible.396  
When the buyer of an immovable object requests registration or when the 
Auflassung was made by official deed in front of a notary, the BGB strengthens the 
position of the buyer. Naturally, the agreement will bind parties as to its contents, 
but as such it will only create a personal right for the buyer. However, upon request 
for registration or passing of a deed the seller can no longer oppose the registration 
of the Auflassung, and, even more, can therefore no longer oppose the acquisition of 
ownership by the buyer.397 The right of the buyer can also be protected through a 
pre-emptive registration or Vormerkung.398 In such a strengthened position, the 
buyer is awarded an acquisition right.399 There has been much debate on the exact 
moment of creation of the right. Leading opinion recognises the acquisition right 
after Auflassung and request for registration.400 Some authors also recognise an 
acquisition-like right when the Auflassung has been made but no request for regis-
tration or Vormerkung has yet been made.401 
Thirdly, a more secured position of the acquirer of a property right also exists 
in case of the creation of a right of hypothec for a future claim.402 When the claim to 
which the right of hypothec will be accessory is not yet in existence, an owner-
Grundschuld comes into existence, which will automatically change in a right of hy-
pothec for the creditor when the claim comes into existence.403 If the right of 
hypothec is constructed as a Briefschuld, and not a Buchschuld, the same reasoning 
applies where the document proving the existence of the Briefschuld is not yet trans-
ferred.404 The owner-Grundschuld is made under resolutive condition of the exis-
tence of the claim or the transfer of the brief. Such a situation will give the creditor 
an acquisition right for the right of hypothec.405  
Apart from these three primary examples, other types of acquisition rights 
exist in German law, but are more debated.406 In any case, all of these rights share 
the characteristic that they are expectation rights. In other words, these rights are a 
phase prior to the acquisition of a property right. The examples show that this can 
relate both to ownership and to other property rights. The character of the acquisi-
tion right will be determined by the right the holder intends to acquire. The claims 
 
396 § 925 (2) BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 167. 
397 § 873 (2) BGB, further protected by §§ 130 (2), 979 BGB and §§ 17 and 45 Grundbuchordnung 
(GBO), Wolf 2005, p. 216-217. 
398 BGH 30 April 1982, BGHZ 83, 395, 399, Wolf 2005, p. 216, Konzen 2000, p. 877-878. 
399 The Auflassungsanwartschaft, Wolf 2005, p. 216, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 168, Baur, Baur & 
Stürner 1999, p. 205, Konzen 2000, p. 875. 
400 BGH 18 December 1967, BGHZ 49, 197 = NJW 1968, 493, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 168, 
Konzen 2000, p. 875. Critically see Mülbert 2002, p. 913 et seq. 
401 Wolf 2005, p. 217, contra see Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 168 and Konzen 2000, p. 884-885. 
402 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 542 et seq. 
403 §§ 1113 (2), 1163 (1) BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 543. On the owner-Grundschuld see 
below; 3.8. Grundschuld. 
404 § 1163 (2) BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 543. On Buchschuld and Briefschuld see below; 
3.7. Hypothec. 
405 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 543, Sponer 1965, p. 114 et seq. 
406 For an overview see Sponer 1965, p. 73 et seq. 
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available will be modelled on the full property right, and will include both personal 
claims and property claims.  
The acquisition right is almost a full property right, but connected, through 
accessority, to the acquisition of the full right it is modelled after. This accessority 
has important effects. When the holder of the acquisition right is no longer entitled 
to acquire the property right, the acquisition right will cease to exist. In case of res-
ervation of ownership this also occurs when the reservation of ownership ends.407  
Because the acquisition right itself represents a value it can be subject to other 
property rights.408 Moreover, the acquisition right can also be transferred to another 
party.409 The new holder will acquire the acquisition right under the same condi-
tions as the old holder was holding the right. However, the agreement to which the 
acquisition right is connected will not transfer automatically to the new right-
holder.410  
It is with the transfer of the acquisition right that doctrinal problems appear. 
The leading opinion in doctrine is to accept a transfer of the acquisition right. The 
requirements for transfer are the same as the requirements for transfer the acqui-
sition right is modelled after.411 This system of transfer fits the nature of the acquisi-
tion right. However, it creates serious doctrinal problems. A transfer of an Auflas-
sung acquisition right will have to be modelled after Paragraphs 873 and 925 BGB. 
Mülbert has shown that this means that parties have to agree on the transfer of the 
acquisition right in a second Auflassung, but that the third party acquiring the 
acquisition right cannot request a registration of the transfer.412 One of the require-
ments for the transfer is therefore lacking. The lack of registration will lead to the 
impossibility of the second acquirer of the acquisition having the right to act against 
the transfer of ownership of the object to another party. This problem can only be 
solved by interference of the first holder of the acquisition right, who is entitled to 
alter his request for registration.413 
Secondly, Mülbert emphasises that the transfer of an acquisition right that was 
strengthened through Vormerkung is especially problematic.414 A right that is regis-
tered through a Vormerkung is accessory to the agreement on which basis it is regis-
tered.415 However, the acquisition right is by its nature not an accessory right. 
Mülbert argues that the acquisition right through Vormerkung changes this nature 
and creates an accessory right. Doctrinally, accessory rights are transferred with the 
principal claim underlying the accessory relationship.416 However, the acquisition 
 
407 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 188. 
408 Wolf 2005, p. 321, Mülbert 2002, p. 920. 
409 According to the leading opinion this also includes the admissibility of an acquisition right as 
the subject for a legal pledge, i.e. a pledge by force of law, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 189. 
Wolf 2005, p. 321. 
410 Therefore, the acquisition right is not an accessory right. 
411 Mülbert 2002, p. 920. 
412 Mülbert 2002, p. 924. 
413 Mülbert 2002, p. 925-926. 
414 Mülbert 2002, p. 920 et seq., 933. 
415 Mülbert 2002, p. 921, Mülbert 1997, p. 336 et seq. 
416 § 401 BGB, Mülbert 2002, p. 921. 
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right must be transferred according to the right after which it is modelled. In many 
situations, these two transfer requirements will conflict with each other. 
The problems with the transfer of the acquisition right illustrate the doctrinal 
and systematic issues the right creates. Although the proprietary nature of the right 
is commonly recognised, its characterisation in the system creates problems. On the 
one hand, the right is recognised as a right to use, i.e., a wesensgleiches minus of 
another property right.417 On the other hand, which seems to be leading opinion, the 
right is considered to be a distinct category, i.e. as an expectation right.418 Although 
the acquisition right secures the acquisition of a property right it bears characteris-
tics of a right to use as well. In other words, the right secures the right to use, but 
also the right to acquire.419 
3.5. Real Burden (Reallast) 
Unknown as such by Roman law, the Reallast in the BGB comes from the influence 
of Germanic law, and is a perfect example of the influence of Germanic law on the 
modern German property law system.420 The Reallast is a real burden that finds its 
origin in the feudal system. A tenant could be under a burden, which was con-
nected to him holding the land for a lord, to provide a lord with, for example, 
money or proceeds of the land.421 Because of this system of land holding, these real 
burdens were an important part of everyday life. Each of the different Germanic 
countries dealt with real burdens in its own specific way.422 Especially after the 
French Revolution and the new ideas on freedom and individuality, certain of them 
limited the application of real burdens on their territory.423 Nevertheless, real 
burdens, especially because they continued to be used, were of great economic 
importance. The First Commission drafting the BGB recognised this legal diversity 
as well as the economic importance of real burdens and explicitly decided to 
include real burdens in the new Civil Code, but to leave the content, except the 
general provisions on real burdens, to the different states of the German federa-
tion.424 It is therefore for each state to provide exact rules on real burdens.425  
A real burden as it is dealt with by the BGB is a burden in private law and is 
described by Paragraph 1105 BGB, which states:426 
A piece of land can be burdened in a way, that a person, to whose benefit the right is 
created, is entitled to returning benefits from the land. (Real Burden). The returning 
 
417 Raiser 1961, p. 65 et seq. 
418 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 25-26. 
419 Mülbert 2002, p. 918-919. 
420 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 813, Füller 2006, p. 460-465. 
421 Motive III 1888, p. 572 et seq., Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 510-511, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 440. 
422 For an overview see Motive III 1888, p. 573-578 and for modern times see Staudinger et al. 
2002, p. 814-817. 
423 Motive III 1888, p. 578. 
424 Motive III 1888, p. 579. 
425 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 813. 
426 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 823. 
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benefits can be adapted, without any further action taken, when the expected develop-
ment of the burden of the land can be decided on the basis of the nature and scope of 
the burden in the agreement ...427 
The real burden is different from a right of servitude because it entitles the right-
holder to take a benefit from the land of another. The duty in a real burden is there-
fore a positive duty, whereas a right of servitude cannot consist of a positive duty.428 
Furthermore, a real burden cannot contain a burden to refrain from doing some-
thing.429 The burden can be created between a party and the owner of a certain 
immovable object but also between a party and another person, not in his capacity 
as holder of a property right in a certain immovable object.430 In both types of this 
right it is not possible to change the real burden to the other type.  
The most important difference to other property rights is that a real burden is 
not a right to use. Leading opinion characterises the real burden as a Verwertungs-
recht, in other words a right that entitles the holder, under conditions, to claim the 
value of the object.431 Nevertheless, the difference between the right to the value and 
the right to use is very small.432 A right of servitude allows the holder to take, 
whereas a real burden allows the right-holder to receive.433 This difference is best 
seen in case of non-performance. A non-performance by the owner of the burdened 
land, i.e., non-delivery of the benefit the real burden entails, will not lead to a claim 
to the continuation of the duty, but for a claim for the value of the object under 
burden.434 
The benefits to which the real burden entitles its holder cannot be one single 
benefit. The benefit must be repeated or return, even if it is not periodically.435 A 
single benefit can only be part of a real burden besides a returning benefit.436 A 
returning benefit is usually a duty to perform services or to pay money.437 More-
over, the content of the burden does not have to be particularly specified. The 
 
427 § 1105 BGB, ‘Ein Grundstück kann in der Weise belastet werden, dass an denjenigen, zu 
dessen Gunsten die Belastung erfolgt, wiederkehrende Leistungen aus dem Grundstück zu 
entrichten sind. (Reallast). Als Inhalt der Reallast kann auch vereinbart werden, dass die zu 
entrichtenden Leistungen sich ohne weiteres an veränderte Verhältnisse anpassen, wenn 
anhand der in der Vereinbarung festgelegten Voraussetzungen Art und Umfang der Belas-
tung des Grundstücks bestimmt werden können’. 
428 On the requirement for rights of servitude see above; 3.1. Real Servitude. 
429 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 836. 
430 Subjectiv-dingliche Reallast § 1110 BGB and Subjectiv-persönliche Reallast § 1111 BGB, Wolf 2005, 
p. 396-397. 
431 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 23-24, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 820. 
432 Also depending on the content the parties whish to provide the property right with. See Baur, 
Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 380. 
433 See Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 823-824. 
434 For an overview of the real burden in insolvency see Amann 1993, p. 222 et seq. 
435 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 837-838. 
436 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 838. 
437 Or wiederkehrende Leistungen, § 1105 BGB, Wolf 2005, p. 396. 
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second sentence of Paragraph 1105 BGB allows for a connection to index figures in 
order to increase the value of the burden equally without additional agreement.438 
The real burden is therefore a property right that entitles to a periodic benefit 
under pressure of execution against the object under burden. Doctrine distinguishes 
two parts of the real burden. On the one hand there is the real burden as a general 
property right which contains all the specific burdens. This part is known as the 
Stammrecht or stem-right.439 It is this part of the property right that directly burdens 
the land on which it is created.440 However the possibilities to execute the right in 
respect of the land itself are very limited.441 On the other hand, doctrine recognises 
the right to the specific benefits, which follow from the stem-right.442  
The relation between these two parts of the right can be considered by analogy 
to the right of hypothec. The stem-right is the right of hypothec itself, which entitles 
the holder of the right to a proprietary claim upon non-payment of the owner. The 
payments of the owner, to which the right-holder of the hypothec is entitled, are 
specific benefits the holder of the right receives. In order to protect this second type 
of benefits, the BGB offers protection for the holder of the right of hypothec.443 
Paragraph 1107 BGB declares the provisions on the protection of the holder of a 
right of hypothec in respect to the payment for the right of hypothec applicable to 
the holder of a real burden.444 Furthermore, in order to enhance the position of the 
holder of the real burden, through Paragraph 1108 BGB the owner is liable with his 
personal assets for those benefits that have to be paid during his ownership. As in 
the case of servitudes, this personal liability is constructed through a subsidiary 
obligation arising by force of law.445 
Other resemblances with servitudes exist as well. Besides the legal subsidiary 
obligation arising between the owner and the holder of the right, an independent 
agreement can be made which can be connected to the property right. Such a 
construction enables a security-real burden or Sicherungsreallast.446 As in the case of 
servitudes, the security-real burden is modelled on the Sicherungsgrundschuld.447 As 
a result, the security contract is not accessory, but merely connected to the property 
right, and specific arrangements have to be made to protect the owner. Finally, it is 
also possible for an owner to create a real burden on his own property. Creating a 
real burden on the owner’s land by the owner enables the owner to establish a real 
 
438 This is not possible in case of a pledge, which adds to the attractiveness of the real burden for 
practice. See BayOlG 9 December 1992, NJW-RR 1993, 530, Staudinger et al. 2002, p 830. 
439 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 382, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 818. 
440 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 440, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 818-820. 
441 This will especially be the situation in which the owner invokes a right, if available, to pay a 
sum of money in exchange for a ceasing of the right. Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 382. 
442 § 1107 BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 382-383, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 847. 
443 These are the provisions of §§ 1113 et seq. BGB, for an overview see Staudinger et al. 2002,  
p. 848-851. 
444 With the limitation of those provisions which particularly concern the objects in the hypothec 
or the accessory character. See Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 848. 
445 § 1108 BGB, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 821, 853-854. 
446 See Amann 1993, p. 222 et seq. 
447 On this type of Grundschuld see below; 3.8. Grundschuld. 
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burden on his own terms after which he can transfer either the burden, or his 
ownership, and continue to hold the other for himself.448 
In legal practice the Reallast is mostly used in very specific circumstances.449 
Since the real burden originates from before the introduction of the BGB, it is still 
possible to come across an old pre-BGB type of the right.450 Its most important 
present application is in support of a burden following from other rights, such as 
payments of lease of hypothec.451 Furthermore, the right is used for the providing of 
heat, water and electricity on construction sites.452  
3.6. Pledge 
The right of pledge was intended to provide German legal practice with a security 
property right in respect of movable objects and rights. The inclusion of a security 
right in respect of movable objects and rights was considered very important. The 
First Commission therefore, following the general opinion at the end of the nine-
teenth century, introduced a classic right of pledge.453 This right of pledge, based on 
the Roman pignus, is a security right whereby the pledgor brings the object under 
pledge into the power of the pledgee. In German law this includes a transfer of 
possession.454 The possessory-pledge was already criticised before the BGB entered 
into force and remains the subject of discussion.455  
However, the right of pledge, mainly because of the requirement to transfer 
possession, is overshadowed by the use of ownership for security purposes with 
which similar results can be achieved without the transfer of possession of the 
object serving as security.456 In practice the right of pledge serves a limited function, 
especially in respect to lease and pledge of claims.457 This section will first deal with 
the right of pledge on movable objects, after which the pledge on rights is consid-
ered. 
The BGB recognises three types of pledge; the contract pledge, the legal pledge 
and the insolvency pledge.458 This section will primarily deal with the right of 
pledge created by contract, Pfandrecht. At the end of this section some remarks on 
the rights of pledge by force of law will be made. The normal pledge, i.e., the pledge 
 
448 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 834. 
449 See in particular Wolf 2006, p. 17-20. 
450 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 440. 
451 Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 830. 
452 Wolf 2005, p. 397, Heyman 2003, p. 25. 
453 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 374, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 4-5. 
454 § 1205 BGB. A fictional possession, i.e. a transfer through a constitutum possessorium, see 
Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 377, Van Vliet 2000, p. 53 et seq., 127 et seq. 
455 See Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 4. 
456 This includes both the transfer of ownership for security purposes and the reservation of 
ownership. See above; 2.5. Security Ownership. Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 4, Füller 
2006, p. 490. 
457 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 375-376. 
458 Or Vertragspfand, Gesetzliche Pfandrecht and Pfändungspfandrecht, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999,  
p. 671-672, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 374, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 14. 
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created by agreement between the parties, is dealt with in Paragraph 1104 BGB, 
which states:  
A movable object can, for purposes of securing a claim, be burdened in such a way that 
the creditor is entitled to be satisfied from the object’s value.459 
The normal type of pledge can be created on any movable object.460 For a right of 
pledge to be created a relation between the pledgor and pledgee is necessary where-
by the pledgee has a claim on the pledgor.461 The standard circumstance is a loan of 
money whereby the pledge is used as security for the repayment of the loan. In 
German law, the right of pledge is accessory to the claim.462Although the right of 
pledge is accessory, the claim does not need to be in existence at the moment the 
right of pledge is created.463 Also a future claim can be used to create a right of 
pledge, as long as at the moment of the creation the claim itself can be anticipated.464 
The right of pledge will come into existence at the moment of creation and take its 
rank from that moment.465 If it becomes clear that the claim will not come into 
existence, the right of pledge will cease to exist.466 
In content the right of pledge is an agreement between parties that focuses on 
the conditions under which the pledgee is entitled to execute the right of pledge and 
to sell the object. Because of this primary personal relation the nature of the right of 
pledge can be questioned.467 Nevertheless, leading opinion in Germany considers 
the right of pledge a property right, especially as the right entitles the pledgee to the 
same actions as the owner, and will also give the pledgee a right to separate the 
object that was pledged from the other assets of the pledgor in case of insolvency of 
the pledgor.468 This protection of the pledgee is different from the Roman law 
origins where an actio Serviana was available. Instead, the BGB awards the pledgee 
the same actions as an owner. These include the revindication of Paragraph 985 BGB 
and the actio negatoria of Paragraph 1004 BGB.469 
Furthermore, German law recognises the possibility, in Paragraph 1213 BGB, 
to create a pledge whereby the pledgee is entitled to use the object under pledge. 
This antichresis clause will, with exceptions, only be effective if the parties specifi-
 
459 § 1204 BGB, ‘Eine bewegliche Sache kann zur Sicherung einer Forderung in der Weise 
belastet werden, dass der Gläubiger berechtet ist, Befriedigung aus der Sache zu suchen 
(Pfandrecht)’. 
460 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 676, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 28. 
461 In other words, whereby the pledgee is creditor of the pledgor, the debtor. 
462 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 672-673. 
463 § 1204 (2) BGB. 
464 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 678, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 26. 
465 BGH 26 January 1983, BGHZ 86, 340=NJW 1983, 1619, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 678, 
Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 26-27.  
466 RGZ 145, 336. 
467 See Wiegand 1981, p. 1 et seq. 
468 § 1227 BGB and § 50 InsO, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 6-7, 9, Baur, Baur & Stürner 
1999, p. 671. 
469 Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 137, 139. 
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cally agree on it.470 The antichresis will entitle the pledgee to the general benefits of 
use, but also to the fruits the object produces. When the object under pledge delivers 
fruits and its possession is transferred solely to the pledgee, in case of doubt, the 
right to use can be accepted, without proof of an agreement.471 A general exception 
is money, for which an irregular right of pledge is used, resulting in the right of the 
pledgee to use the money, but the duty to replace it.472 
Between the pledgor and the pledgee a subsidiary legal obligation comes into 
existence by force of law.473 The BGB provides regulations on the essential content 
of the parties’ relation, to which the parties themselves can change or add content. 
The legal provisions include: the duty for the pledgee to refrain, save the already 
mentioned exception, from using the object serving as security, or from establishing 
a right of pledge on the right of pledge; the duty of the pledgor to compensate costs 
the pledgee has incurred while possessing the object; the possibility for the pledgor 
to claim replacement or repair of the object in the care of the pledgee; the possibility 
for the pledgor to claim the object back for replacement when it decreases in value; 
and the claim, vice versa, of the pledgee to replace the object, as well as the possibili-
ty for the pledgor to claim the object back after the right of pledge ceases.474 
When the pledgor is not able to fulfil his duties under the security agreement 
that created the right of pledge, the pledgee is entitled to execute his right. When 
this occurs, German doctrine considers the claim Pfandreif or ripe for execution.475 
The execution in case of a right of pledge on movable objects is effected through a 
sale of the object. Upon the sale, the pledgee can use the proceeds of the sale to 
satisfy the claim that remains against the pledgor.476 Most importantly, the pledgee 
is under no condition entitled to keep the object for himself; the sale is compul-
sory.477 Although the pledgee is not the owner of the object, the acquirer in such a 
transfer will acquire ownership through Paragraph 1242 BGB.478 
A right of pledge can also be created on rights. The provisions on the right of 
pledge on movable objects are also generally applicable to the right of pledge on 
rights, but the BGB also provides additional regulations.479 Only those rights that 
represent a value which can be acquired by a possible pledgee in case of non-
performance of the duties of the pledgor can be accepted as the subject of a right of 
 
470 This will create the Nutzungspfandrecht, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 88. 
471 § 1213 (2) BGB, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 89. 
472 Although a normal right of pledge in respect to money is also possible. On both possibilities 
see Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 37-38. 
473 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 380, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 13, 92. 
474 §§ 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218 and 1223 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 380-381, Staudinger, Nöll 
& Wiegand 2002, p. 98 et seq. 
475 On the term Pfandreif see Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 470, 682-683, Staudinger, Nöll & 
Wiegand 2002, p. 141-142. 
476 § 1228 BGB, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 140. 
477 In other words, the lex commissoria in German law is strictly prohibited. § 1229 BGB, 
Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 144. 
478 § 1242 BGB, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 167-169. 
479 § 1273 BGB. 
 227 
Chapter 4 
pledge.480 Also rights that are treated as immovable objects in the system of German 
property law cannot be the subject of a right of pledge. This category includes the 
rights of superficies and ownership of an apartment.481 Also the right of ownership 
itself cannot be subject to a right of pledge. Since a right of pledge concerns the 
object and not the right of ownership itself, the nature of the right of ownership 
resists it being subject to other property rights.482 
Also future rights, especially claims, can be the subject of a right of pledge. The 
criteria for the admissibility of future rights are parallel to the transfer of future 
rights. The result is that as long as the right can be ascertained at the moment of 
creation of the right of pledge, the right of pledge will be valid. The deciding factor 
in German law is that if an independent third party would be able to identify the 
claim, it can be allowed.483 When the criteria are fulfilled, the right of pledge will 
come into existence. 
The right of pledge is created with the transfer of right or, in case of a claim, 
the notice to the debtor of the claim that the claim has been pledged.484 When the 
transfer of a right requires the transfer of an object, for example, a document prov-
ing the existence of the right, the possession of the document must be transferred in 
order to acquire the right.485 In case of execution of the pledge on rights, the pledgee 
will execute by seizure instead of sale.486 
When claims are subject to the right of pledge a three-party relationship comes 
into existence between the pledgor, the pledgee and the debtor of the claim. The 
right of pledge on claims is the most important application of the right of pledge on 
rights.487 Before the right of pledge can be executed, both the pledgor and the 
pledgee are entitled to receive the fulfilment of the claim.488 The pledgor will be-
come owner or will become entitled to the object or claim that is received from the 
debtor. Furthermore, the pledgee will receive a right of pledge on the object or claim 
by the force of law. This will especially be so in case the right to the transfer of an 
object is pledged. 
However, when the right of pledge can be executed the position of the pledgee 
becomes stronger.489 The pledgee becomes entitled to demand the fulfilment of the 
claim. The pledgor can only demand the proceeds of the fulfilment from the 
pledgee and no longer from the debtor.490 When the pledgee receives an object for 
 
480 Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 251. 
481 Or the Erbbaurecht and Wohnungseigentum, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 252. 
482 Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 252. 
483 Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 253-254. 
484 BGH 30 November 1977, BGHZ 70, 75, 78 = NJW 1978, 642, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 390-
391,Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 785. 
485 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 390. 
486 § 1277 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 391, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 783. 
487 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 391-392. 
488 § 1281 BGB, before the pledge is ‘ripe’ (Pfandreif), Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 785, 
Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 291-292. 
489 § 1282 BGB, the pledge is then ‘ripe’ (Pfandreif), Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 786, Staudinger, 
Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 293. 
490 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 393, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 297. 
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the fulfilment of the claim, he will receive a right of pledge on that object by the 
force of law and the pledgor will become owner.491 When the pledgee receives 
money, he can satisfy his claim and will only have to transfer the surplus after com-
pensation to the pledgor.492 
Finally, the right of pledge can also come into existence by operation of law or 
in insolvency procedures. On the former, Paragraph 1257 BGB declares the provi-
sions on pledge that are applicable. It should be emphasised that these rights come 
into existence by operation of law and are rights of pledge in the same sense as the 
contract-pledge rights. The result is that they take rank against the other property 
rights and therefore should not be considered lightly. An example of such a right is 
the right of a lessor of an immovable object on the objects the lessee brings into the 
immovable object to secure the payment of the rent through Paragraph 562 BGB.493 
The second type of pledge, the insolvency pledge, is not dealt with in the BGB, but 
in the insolvency regulations, InsO. The insolvency pledge is imposed on the mova-
ble assets in the insolvency procedure and will take rank amongst the other security 
rights.494  
3.7. Hypothec 
German law recognises two main property security rights in respect of land. In 
doctrine, these rights are confusingly known as rights of pledge on land, Grund-
pfandrechte.495 This is confusing because the terminology of the BGB restricts the 
right of pledge to movable objects and rights.496 The Grundpfandrechte consist of the 
right of hypothec and the right of Grundschuld, which are similar rights, but with 
doctrinal differences. Because of the similarities between these rights, the BGB uses 
a similar approach to deal with each of these. This is particularly so in respect to the 
way in which they can be created.  
Grundpfandrechte can either be a Briefrecht, a ‘document-right’, or a Buchrecht, in 
a ‘register-right’.497 The difference between the two is that in the case of the docu-
ment-right, the security right is registered and this registration can be proven by a 
document that also serves as the object of transfer in the event of a transfer of that 
security right, whereas the registration-right is a security right that is formally regis-
tered and whose existence follows only from the registration. The Buchrecht is 
therefore less suited to transfer. Both the right of hypothec and the right of Grund-
schuld can be either a document-right or a registration-right. The main reason that 
both these property security rights were included is that both of these rights were 
applied in practice, the right of hypothec in the north and the right of Grundschuld in 
 
491 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 786, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 394. 
492 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 394, Staudinger, Nöll & Wiegand 2002, p. 296. 
493 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 690. 
494 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 693. 
495 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 384, Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 10. 
496 See above; 3.6. Pledge. 
497 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 406. 
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the south.498 This section deals with the right of hypothec and the next section will 
deal with the right of Grundschuld.499  
The right of hypothec was specifically designed by the drafters of the BGB to 
be useful for practice. However, from the second half of the twentieth century, the 
Grundschuld has taken over in practice. Because of this, the right of hypothec has 
lost most of its practical relevance.500 Nevertheless, the main rules on hypothec find 
analogous application to the right of Grundschuld and therefore remain of impor-
tance.501 Furthermore, the right of hypothec, although not used much anymore, is 
still a property right in the system of the BGB that is worthy of consideration. The 
right of hypothec is defined in Paragraph 1113 BGB: 
A piece of land can be burdened in such a way that the person for whose benefit the 
right is created is entitled to a specific sum of money from the piece of land for the 
fulfilment of a claim (right of hypothec).502 
The right of hypothec connects a claim between an owner and a creditor to a prop-
erty right for security on an immovable object on behalf of that creditor.503 The right 
must be created on land or on land-like rights.504 Also movable objects on the land 
that are considered part of the land can be subject to the right of hypothec.505 The 
right of hypothec is an accessory right, it cannot exist without the claim the per-
formance of which it seeks to secure. Because of this connection the right of hypoth-
ec combines a personal relation, i.e., the claim, with a property relation, i.e., the 
right of hypothec.506 
The accessory nature of the right of hypothec exists from the moment of crea-
tion, and means that there can be no right of hypothec without a claim.507 When a 
right of hypothec is created without an existing claim, the creditor cannot become 
right-holder of the hypothec. Yet, it is possible to hold a right of hypothec without 
an existing claim. In such a situation, the right will rest with the owner as a Eigen-
tümerhypothek, in English ‘owner-hypothec’.508 When a right of hypothec is trans-
 
498 Motive III 1888, p. 604-612, Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 521-522, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 506, 
Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 12-14. 
499 See below; 3.8. Grundschuld. 
500 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 398, Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 74-75. 
501 § 1192 BGB. 
502 § 1113 BGB, ‘Ein Grundstück kann in der Weise belastet werden, dass an denjenigen, zu 
dessen Gunsten die Belastung erfolgt, eine bestimmte Geldsumme zur Befriedigung wegen 
einer ihm zustehenden Forderung aus dem Grundstück zu zahlen ist (Hypothek)’. 
503 The creditor of the claim and the holder of the property right must be the same person, § 1153 
BGB. Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 420, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 322. 
504 This includes inter alia the Wohungseigentum and the Erbbaurecht, Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 
2002, p. 27-28. 
505 § 1120 BGB. The deciding factor is whether these rights are included in the ownership of the 
land, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 317. 
506 See Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 325-328. 
507 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 305. 
508 §§ 1163 and 1177 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 305. 
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ferred, the transfer cannot take effect without a transfer of the claim and vice versa.509 
And, finally, when the claim ceases to exist, the right of hypothec will not cease, but 
will return to the owner as an owner-Grundschuld.510 
Apart from the right of hypothec itself, the section on hypothec in the BGB 
also provides regulations concerning the claim. First, the claim must be for money, 
in whatever currency.511 Secondly, the claim must be identifiable.512 A future claim 
can also be used to establish a hypothec. The right of hypothec will be created if the 
claim can be sufficiently identified in anticipation of its existence. However, contra-
ry to the right of pledge, the creditor will only become right-holder of the hypothec 
when the claim comes into existence. Prior to that time a right of owner-hypothec 
will rest with the owner, but the creditor will have an Anwartschaftsrecht.513  
The BGB recognises two models of hypothec; the Verkehrshypothek or transfer-
able-hypothec, and the Sicherungshypothek or security-hypothec. The BGB presents 
the Verkehrshypothek as the standard model. The drafters of the BGB specifically 
started with this type of hypothec, which is intended to allow for a transfer of the 
right. This type of hypothec can be created in two ways; as a Briefhypothek or as a 
Buchhypothek. Especially the former enables parties to transfer the right of hypothec 
to another party by transferring a document (Brief). The document-hypothec is 
therefore not intended for long-term relations, it is more used for a situation in 
which it is desirable to change creditors.514 As a standard in the BGB, a right of 
hypothec will be of this type unless parties explicitly agree otherwise.515 In case of 
doubt the hypothec will be considered to be a document-hypothec.516  
The registry issues the document, the Brief, after the right of hypothec has been 
registered and gives it, unless specifically provided otherwise, to the owner. How-
ever, parties can decide otherwise either by creating a transfer of the document 
through constitutum possessorium, or agreeing that the document will directly be 
transferred to the creditor.517 The result of this regulation is that the owner will have 
an owner-hypothec until he transfers the document to the creditor. A registration 
after transfer is not necessary.518  
The document itself will contain the registration data, including the identifica-
tion of the land on which the right is created, but also the sum of money the right 
secures.519 Furthermore, parties can add information to the document as well, e.g., 
 
509 § 1153 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 305-306. 
510 § 1163 (1) 2nd sentence BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 306. The right of hypothec can, 
because of its accessory nature, never be held by the owner on his own object. See Füller 2006, 
p. 471-472. 
511 § 1113 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 308, Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 19. 
512 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 421-422. 
513 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 310, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 543. On Anwartschaftsrechte see 
above; 3.4. Expectation Rights: Pre-Emptive Right and Acquisition Right. 
514 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 307. 
515 § 1116 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 307. 
516 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 314, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 406. 
517 § 1117 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 313. 
518 § 1154 BGB. 
519 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 314. 
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information on the payment.520 Finally, the document proves the existence of the 
right of hypothec, but the registry will remain to give the overriding correct infor-
mation, unless explicitly proven otherwise.521 
The second type of hypothec, the Buchhypothek, is created when parties agree 
on the claim and the establishment of the right of hypothec, which is then registered 
under specific exclusion of a document.522 Upon registration the right of hypothec 
comes into existence and the creditor immediately becomes right-holder of the 
hypothec. This type of hypothec is specifically used for long-term relations where 
there is no change in creditor to be expected. 
The second model of hypothec, the Sicherungshypothek, is presented as the 
exception to the main type of hypothec.523 However, in fact, the security-hypothec is 
the purest form of hypothec.524 The security-hypothec is completely dependent on 
the existence of the claim. Different from the Verkehrshypothek, the security-hypothec 
must be connected to the owner of the land.525 Furthermore, the security hypothec 
will come into existence with the claim and will cease to exist with the claim as well. 
The security-hypothec is always a Buchhypothek.526 
The right of hypothec, on whichever model, enables the holder of the right to 
put pressure on the owner to fulfil his duties under the claim. The nature of the 
right brings with it specific claims the holder of a right of hypothec can initiate, both 
before and after the owner does not fulfil his duties. In order to safeguard the value 
of the object the holder of the hypothec is entitled to prevent damage to the object 
under hypothec.527 If the object under hypothec is damaged or its condition has be-
come worse in such a way that the security of the holder is in danger, he can require 
the owner to repair or maintain the object. If the owner does not do so, the right 
holder will be able to execute his right of hypothec.528 Furthermore the right holder 
has a similar possibility to stop others from interfering with the object when the 
object is damaged or its condition has deteriorated in such a way that the value is 
affected.529  
When the owner does not fulfil his duties under the claim the holder of the 
right of hypothec becomes entitled to execute his right. The execution of the right of 
hypothec is typically effected through a sale of the object under the rules of execu-
tion.530 In order to do so the holder of the right must present the document proving 
 
520 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 315-316. 
521 § 1140 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 316. 
522 § 1116 (2) BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 313. 
523 § 1184 et seq. BGB. 
524 Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 76-77. 
525 In case of a Verkehrshypothek, it is possible that the owner and the debtor are two different 
persons, as long as the creditor and the holder of the right are the same person. Schwab & 
Prütting 2003, p. 358. 
526 § 1185 BGB. 
527 These actions are also available for damage to any part of the object, which is not the land 
itself. § 1135 BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 472-473.  
528 § 1133 BGB. 
529 § 1134 BGB. 
530 A private sale is prohibited. § 1147 BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 467. 
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his right or refer to the official register in the case of a Buchhypothek.531 In order to 
prevent the acquisition of the right by a third party during or just after the execu-
tion, the owner may claim the document.532 When the owner repays the holder and 
therefore fulfils the duty under the claim, the execution will stop. However, when 
the owner does not pay, the right-holder can execute his right of hypothec through 
seizure of the immovable object.533 The holder cannot claim the object for him, he 
will only be entitled to the proceeds of the object after execution.534 Furthermore, 
also in case of insolvency of the owner, the holder of the right of hypothec will have 
a preferential position in relation to other creditors.535 
Although the right of hypothec is not used much in practice anymore, two 
special types should be mentioned that do have relevance for legal practice. The 
first of these types is the Höchstbetraghypothek or maximum-amount-hypothec.536 
This type of hypothec is a security-hypothec, but is valid as long as the maximum 
amount of the claim connected to the right of hypothec is created. The result of this 
type of hypothec is that not only the claim underlying the right can change, but also 
that different claims can be used under the same right.537 However, in respect of the 
rest of the right, it is similar to the security hypothec.538 The second type, the 
Gesamthypothek or combined-hypothec, enables several pieces of land to be used to 
secure one claim.539 This special type of hypothec enables several owners to combine 
forces and secure one claim. However, the danger is that the creditor of the claim 
can execute his right in respect of any or part of any of the land securing his claim.540 
3.8. Grundschuld 
The second type of Grundpfandrecht is the right of Grundschuld. The right of Grund-
schuld is of Germanic origin and was in force in various countries including Prussia 
prior to the introduction of the BGB.541 Different from the right of hypothec, the 
right of Grundschuld is a property security right in respect of an immovable object 
that is not connected to a claim.542 The right is therefore a non-accessory right. In 
practice this non-accessory nature allows parties much more freedom than they 
 
531 § 1160 BGB. 
532 § 1144 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 340. 
533 § 1147 BGB, Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 47. 
534 Also in respect to the right of hypothec German law strictly prohibits the lex commissoria. 
Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 476. 
535 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 484-485. 
536 § 1190 BGB. 
537 Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 78. 
538 This type of hypothec is similar to the Dutch trust-hypotheek, see Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 
2002, p. 13, see Chapter 5; 3.7. Hypothec. 
539 § 1132 BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 497 et seq., Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 355. 
540 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 498. 
541 Motive III 1888, p. 605. 
542 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 505. On the danger of non-accessority in modern finance 
practice see Clemente 2007, p. 737 et seq. 
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would have in respect to the right of hypothec. Especially the Sicherungsgrundschuld 
or security-Grundschuld is widely applied.543 
The definition of the right in Paragraph 1191 BGB is identical to the definition 
of the right of hypothec, but without the reference to the claim.544 Upon registration 
the parties only need to mention the holder of the right of Grundschuld, the amount 
of money the right represents and, if agreed, the sum of payment.545 In most other 
situations the right of Grundschuld is similar to the right of hypothec. The provisions 
on hypothec are, therefore, declared applicable, with the exception of the provisions 
dealing with the accessority of the right to the claim.546  
The non-accessory nature of the right has major consequences in practice. The 
independence from the claim is the main characteristic of the right of Grundschuld. 
The right will not only come into existence without any claim, but will also remain 
with the creditor if any claim, to which parties attempted to connect the right, 
ceases.547 In the past several authors have attempted to include a claim into the right 
itself, but leading opinion has continued to resist such a development.548  
Like the right of hypothec, the right of Grundschuld can be created as a 
document-right, Briefschuld, or as a register-right, Buchschuld. The main advantage 
of the document-right in the specific situation of a Grundschuld is that, since there is 
no registered claim identifying the creditor, the creditor can remain secret to his 
competitors. This is achieved by the owner creating a right of Grundschuld, then 
receiving the document and transferring it, without the need for further registra-
tion, to the creditor.549 Also similar to the right of hypothec, the right will be an 
owner-Grundschuld until the owner transfers the document to the creditor, who will 
become holder of the right from that moment.550 However, the property right itself 
will take rank from the moment of its creation. 
Two different types of Grundschuld are distinguished; the isolated Grundschuld 
and the security-Grundschuld. The isolated type, which is not used much, exists in a 
situation where the right is created without the existence of any claim. This would 
occur in a situation where the owner wishes to entitle another person to the value of 
part of his land and not his general set of assets, for example, by way of gift from a 
parent to a child.551 This type of Grundschuld is completely independent of a claim 
and will not need a claim in its further existence.552 The second type is actually the 
primary type of Grundschuld.553 The use of the right for security purposes is widely 
applied in practice. It is this right which was the model for the acceptance of the 
 
543 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 367. 
544 § 1191 BGB. 
545 § 1115 BGB. 
546 § 1192 BGB, Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 671, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 507. 
547 § 1163 BGB, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 364. 
548 Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 675. 
549 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 507. 
550 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 507. 
551 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 507. 
552 § 1196 BGB. 
553 See Füller 2006, p. 499-500. 
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different rights to use for security purposes.554 The security-Grundschuld combines 
the property right with an independent security contract. This independent agree-
ment can be a completely separate agreement, but also part of a larger contract.555 In 
effect, the security-Grundschuld creates a property right securing a claim. The con-
tract creating or identifying the claim remains independent of the security property 
right.556 
Nevertheless, the security contract is not completely independent. The transfer 
of the right of Grundschuld for security purposes in the fulfilment of a security 
contract with a creditor creates a Treuhand relation in the same way as this occurs in 
case of a transfer of ownership for security purposes.557 The right-holder is therefore 
bound as Treuhänder in his exercise of the right of Grundschuld. Furthermore, the 
security contract is also under control in case of securing overvalue, i.e., Übersiche-
rung, or agreements which are so seriously disadvantageous for the debtor that he 
can no longer exercise his property right, i.e., Knebelung.558 
The security-Grundschuld connects the property right to any claim. This can be 
a claim against the owner, but also against a third party. Furthermore, the right can 
be used to secure both current and future claims. In the latter situation there is a 
strict control over the possibilities. Any future claims of the holder of the right 
against the owner can be secured, but those against a third party are subject to some 
more criteria.559 
In any of these situations the security-contract remains a contract. It will con-
tain the duty to create a right of Grundschuld and the duty to transfer the right to the 
creditor, an agreement on the maximum value the right represents, an agreement on 
the execution powers of the holder of the right, and an agreement on re-transfer of 
the right when the claim has been fulfilled.560 Because the right of Grundschuld will 
not automatically return to the owner upon fulfilment of the claim, an agreement on 
re-transfer is needed. The owner will have contractual remedies to claim the return 
of the right of Grundschuld.561 When the owner receives the right of Grundschuld he 
is free to use it again under another security contract. Should the contract fall away, 
i.e. when it is void or avoided, the owner will have a claim in unjust enrichment 
against the creditor.562 Finally, the right of Grundschuld is, like the right of hypothec, 
executed by way of an executionary sale. The lex commissoria is also prohibited in 
respect to the right of Grundschuld.563  
 
554 The Sicherungsdienstbarkeiten and Sicherungsreallast, see above; 3.1. Real Servitude, 3.2. 
Personal Servitudes: usufruct and limited personal servitudes, and 3.5. Real Burden (Reallast). 
555 Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 677-678. 
556 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 513. 
557 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 515, Füller 2006, p. 500-501, BGH NJW 1080, 1732, 1733, see 
above; 2.4. Treuhand Ownership. 
558 On these concepts see above; 2.5. Security Ownership, § 1136 BGB. Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 
2002, p. 689-691. 
559 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 516, Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 687. 
560 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 368, Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 676-677. 
561 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 519-520. 
562 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 519. 
563 § 1147 BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 509. 
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The security-Grundschuld provides legal practice with a very flexible security 
right. It is not surprising that the right is used far more than the right of hypothec, 
which is more restricted in the ways it can be used. The security-Grundschuld can be 
used for any type of claim in money, both for current and for future claims. This 
flexibility allows the right to be used for credit facilities, but also in complicated 
multi-party financing constructions.564 The construction of a security-Grundschuld 
enables parties to use a property right for security purposes under terms and condi-
tions on which they are very much free to decide. The conditions that they set will 
be governed by contract law and therefore also party autonomy exists. It effectively 
enables parties to leave the strict and limited area of property law and give content 
to a property relation beyond the scope of property law by entering the law of 
contract.  
4. Borderline Cases in German Property Law 
In Section 3 of this chapter the standard set of property rights in German law is 
dealt with. In the discussion on these various property rights certain other relations 
have been mentioned that are not a property right, but nevertheless bear many of 
the same characteristics.565 Mainly for historical reasons, but also because of current 
developments in German law, there are some other additional relations that should 
be examined. Some of these are actual property rights, whereas others are relations 
that bear so many property characteristics that, although not recognised as such, 
they might be treated as a property right.566 
4.1. Old Property Rights 
The entry into force of the BGB on 1 January 1900 ended most of the fragmentation 
of law throughout Germany. However, property rights that existed prior to the 
introduction of the BGB partly remained in force. Article 184 of the Einführungs-
gesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (EGBGB), or Law Introducing the BGB, provides 
in one general provision for the continuation of property rights from before the 
BGB, known as old property rights.567 The starting point under this Article is the 
continuation of old property rights, although under certain conditions. Any old 
right, also those rights that are no longer included in the system of property rights 
in the BGB, remains in existence and is to be dealt with according to the law under 
which it was created. For instance, a property right of lease, as was recognised in 
Prussian law, falls under the Prussian ALR by force of Article 184 EGBGB.568 
 
564 See Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 514. 
565 For a general discussion of current developments in German property law see Staudinger et 
al. 2000, p. 38 et seq. and Soergel et al. 2002, p. 56 et seq. 
566 See Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 28. 
567 Staudinger et al. 1998, p. 774. 
568 On lease as a property right in Prussian law see below; 4.4. Lease of Immovable Objects. 
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The application of the old law specifically also applies to the interpretation of 
the content of the right.569 This also includes the relation of the old property right to 
the right of ownership and the way in which the right burdens the right of 
ownership. Moreover, also the rank of the right will have remained in existence.570 
Exempted from the continuation under the old law are the rights of hypothec, 
Grundschuld, superficies and real servitudes, in other words, those rights for which 
the BGB provides rules itself. In general, the rules in the BGB are declared applica-
ble to those rights in as far as is possible.571  
The law on ownership of an apartment in a building or Stockwerkseigentum also 
remained, but the relation between the owners of the building falls under the new 
law.572 Furthermore, a normal right of ownership continues under different con-
ditions. From 1 January 1900 the new rules of the BGB apply to as many cases as 
possible.573 
Because of the recognition of old property rights, i.e., pre-BGB property rights, 
in theory, it is possible that a property right from before the introduction of the BGB 
is still in existence and should be considered as an exceptional right outside the 
system of the BGB. 
4.2. Pre-Emptive Registration (Vormerkung) 
Vormerkung was mentioned above under the heading of the Vorkaufrecht or pre-
emptive property right where the Vormerkung functions as the vehicle to achieve the 
effect of the claim of the holder of the pre-emptive right against the third party who 
enters into a contract of sale with the owner.574 However, the technique of Vormer-
kung is much wider than its application in case of pre-emptive rights. 
The Vormerkung is a form of pre-emptive registration of a personal right, usu-
ally a claim, against an owner or holder of a property right. The technique of Vor-
merkung was known in the Prussian system before the introduction of the BGB and, 
although it applied in a wider range of cases, it formed the basis for provisions in 
the BGB.575 The BGB deals with the Vormerkung in Paragraph 883 BGB: 
(1) In order to secure the claim for the creation or ceasing of a right to a piece of land 
or of a right burdening a piece of land, or for the alteration of the contents or the 
rank of such a right, a pre-emptive registration can be made in the registry… 
(2) An act of disposition, which is conducted after the pre-emptive registration, does 
not have effect insofar as it interferes with the claim. …576 
 
569 Staudinger et al. 1998, p. 777. 
570 Staudinger et al. 1998, p. 778. 
571 For a detailed overview see Staudinger et al. 1998, p. 780 et seq. 
572 Art. 182 EGBGB, Staudinger et al. 1998, p. 767 et seq. 
573 Art. 181 EGBGB. 
574 See above; 3.4. Expectation Rights: Pre-Emptive Right and Acquisition Right. 
575 Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 14-15. 
576 § 883 BGB, ‘(1) Zur Sicherung des Anspruchs auf Einräumung oder Aufhebung eines Rechts 
an einem Grundstück order an einem das Grundstück belastenden Recht oder auf Änderung 
Æ 
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A pre-emptive registration enables the registration of a claim in respect of an 
immovable object or a property right in respect of an immovable object. Pre-
emptive registration for movable objects or rights in respect of movable objects is 
not possible.577 The claim that is registered is a personal claim, but can be both a 
current claim as well as a future claim.578 The use of pre-emptive registration in 
German law is very wide. In order for a claim to be suitable for registration it must 
be made to bring about a change in the legal situation of a property right in respect 
of an immovable object. Moreover, the claim must concern a change that is suitable 
for registration, and the claim must be made in respect of a private law situation.579  
When such a claim is registered through Vormerkung Paragraph 883 BGB 
awards certain effects. After registration the holder of the claim has a stronger posi-
tion against the owner or holder of a property rights than his personal claim would 
normally allow. Any act of the owner or holder that interferes with the registered 
claim will not have effect against the holder of the registered claim.580 Against the 
rest of the world any act of the owner or holder of a property right will be valid. A 
third-party acquirer will therefore acquire ownership in respect to the rest of the 
world if the owner transfers his ownership contrary to the agreement and to the 
pre-emptively registered claim of the buyer. However, for the buyer who pre-
emptively registered his claim, the old owner is still owner and not the third party. 
The first buyer can demand from the old owner an Auflassung.581 However, when 
both the old and new owner, i.e., a third party, have registered their Auflassung, the 
new owner will have been registered as the holder of the right.582 In that situation, 
the buyer will not have a right based on his agreement with the old owner against 
the new owner. In such a situation the buyer can use a claim based on Paragraph 
888 BGB that entitles him to claim, after the formalities with the old owner are ful-
filled, his registration as the rightful owner. In other words, through Vormerkung the 
claim that is registered is strengthened so that the registered right is granted limited 
third-party effect.583 
Furthermore, the claim and the registration are closely connected. If the claim 
ceases to exist, so will the rights arising from the registration.584 The connection is so 
 
des Inhalts oder des Ranges eines Solchen Rechts kann eine Vormerkung in das Grundbuch 
eingetragen werden. … (2) Eine Verfügung, die nach der Eintragung der Vormerkung über 
das Grundstück oder das Recht getroffen wird, ist insoweit unwirksam, als sie den Anspruch 
vereiteln oder beeinträchtigen würde …’. 
577 Wolf 2005, p. 222. 
578 § 883 (1)(2) BGB, Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 33. 
579 Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 25 et seq., Wolf 2005, p. 225. 
580 § 883 BGB, Wolf 2005, p. 226. 
581 On the concept of Auflassung see above in 3.4. Expectation Rights: Pre-Emptive Right and 
Acquisition Right. 
582 This premature registration is known as Voreintragung in the registry, not to be confused with 
the Vormerkung. Wolf 2005, p. 227-228. 
583 Wolf 2005, p. 226-227. 
584 Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 22-23. 
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strong that the term accessory is used.585 However, the registration will not change 
the character of the claim. The right is personal and will remain personal. The effect 
of Vormerkung is that the claim can be invoked in such a way that a property act of 
the owner or right holder is ineffective.  
Apart from the function to strengthen a claim as described above, the Vormer-
kung can also be used to secure the rank of a future right. Paragraph 883(3) BGB 
enables parties to register a future claim with a certain rank that is later replaced by 
a property right that takes over the rank of the pre-emptively registered claim.586 
Furthermore, in case of insolvency or in case of seizure of the object the pre-emp-
tively registered claim will be treated as if the right for which the claim is registered 
is already in existence.587 
In legal practice Vormerkung is used to secure many claims, which especially 
includes registration of the claim to the transfer of the object that follows from a 
sales agreement.588 Furthermore, it can also concern the claim for the creation of 
property rights or the termination of property rights. In case of hypothecs the agree-
ment on the termination of property rights is specifically dealt with in Paragraph 
1179 BGB.589 A holder of a property right can agree with the owner that, when the 
owner acquires another property right which is equal or higher in rank, the owner 
will make sure such a property right ceases to exist.590 In order to secure that claim, 
a special Vormerkung is allowed. Such an agreement is favourable to the holders of 
other property rights in respect to the same debtor, because with the ceasing of 
another property right that is equal or higher in rank, their rank is strengthened or 
even increases.591 
The nature of the Vormerkung has been highly debated.592 The leading doctrine 
agrees that a claim itself does not achieve a property status through Vormerkung.593 
However, the effects the Vormerkung produces closely resemble a property right. 
The procedure creates a claim that takes effect not just against the other contracting 
party but also against a third-party acquirer. It therefore entitles the holder of the 
claim, who is also holder of the registration, to the transfer or alteration of a 
property right. The concept of Vormerkung therefore balances on the line between 
the law of obligations, specifically contract law, and property law.594 It is clear that 
 
585 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 219, Mülbert 2002, p. 921, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 94, 
Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 176, Wolf 2005, p. 223. Very extensive see Mülbert 1997, p. 335 
et seq. 
586 § 883 (3) BGB, Wolf 2005, p. 229, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 229-230. 
587 § 106 InsO, § 48 ZVG, Wolf 2005, p. 229, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 229. 
588 Cf. the Dutch ‘Vormerkung’ in Article 7:2 BW, see Chapter 5; 4.4. Registration of a Consumer 
Contract of a Sale of a House. 
589 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 349, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 218, 546 et seq. 
590 § 1179 BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 547. 
591 Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 17. 
592 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 232-234, Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 172-176, Wilhelm 2002, 
p. 25. 
593 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 93, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 232, Staudinger & Gursky 2002, 
p. 23. 
594 See Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 172. 
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the drafters of the BGB, although the inclusion of the Vormerkung was somewhat 
complicated, did not intend the Vormerkung to be a property right.595 The Vormer-
kung is a separate method to secure a personal claim with third-party effects.596 
4.3. Entitlement to Possession through the Law of Obligations 
The BGB uses a concept of possession that includes both the Roman possessio as well 
as the detentio.597 In other words, German law distinguishes possession between a 
person who is entitled to the possession, i.e., has power over an object, and he who 
holds the object through usufruct, pledge or lease and for the duration of that right 
is entitled to factual power.  
In respect to these types of possession, i.e., by way of a limited property right 
or lease, the owner of the object will have mittelbarer Besitz, the holders of property 
rights will have unmittelbarer Besitz.598 When there is no right to possession in 
existence, there will only be unmittelbarer Besitz. German law also distinguishes 
Eigenbesitz and Fremdbesitz.599 He who holds the object is entitled to possession in 
the sense of Eigenbesitz. However, when such a possessor has to recognise another 
with a better right to possession, the possession will be a Fremdbesitz. The latter is 
the situation in case of lease where the lessee, unmittelbarer Fremdbesitzer, is forced to 
recognise the possession of the lessor, mittelbarer Eigenbesitzer. 
The concept of possession in German law, especially the recognition of the 
Fremdbesitz, makes it possible to hold possession through a contract. Although a 
lease only awards personal rights, the right still entitles the lessee to possession of 
the object.600 In respect to movable objects, a personal right that entitles a party to 
possession achieves certain property characteristics. These property characteristics 
are awarded on the basis of Paragraph 1007 BGB. This Paragraph awards a claim for 
the return of possession against the person who took possession away.601 The claim 
does not so much flow from the possession, but more from a property right grant-
ing possession. Nevertheless, the claim is also available to possessors who are not 
entitled on the basis of a property right but on the basis of a contract or other per-
sonal relation.602 With this inclusion, German law partly follows the Prussian law 
 
595 This can be seen from the placement in the General part of the Book 3 on property. Mugdan 
1979, p. 567, Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 173.  
596 Wolf 2005, p. 231 writes: ‘… als Sicherungsmittel eigener Art zur Verwirklichung von 
Ansprüchen ausgestaltet worden miet einzelnen dingliche Wirkungen’. 
597 See Otte 1978, p. 463. On different forms of possession see Chapter 1; 4. Terminology. 
598 § 868 BGB, the term unmittelbarer Besitz is not used by the BGB, but follows from the 
definition of mittelbarer Besitz, Wieling 2001, p. 43. 
599 § 872 BGB, the term Fremdbesitz is not used by the BGB, but follows from the definition of 
Eigenbesitz. Wieling 2001, p. 43. 
600 This applies for lease of movable as well as immovable objects. On the latter see 4.4. Lease of 
Immovable Objects. 
601 In that respect the claim resembles the actio Publiciana. Wieling 2001, p. 205. 
602 The Protocols state ‘Der Anspruch solle auch dem Miehter, dem Finder usw. zustehen’, 
Mugdan 1979, p. 699. Wieling 2001, p. 206. 
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from before the introduction of the BGB in which a personal right to possession 
entitled the holder to a property right.603 
Paragraph 1007 BGB entitles the possessor who has lost possession to claim 
the return of the object, unless the current possessor of the object holds in good 
faith.604 Furthermore, when the current possessor of the object holds a right of pos-
session himself, e.g., the lessee sublet the object to the current possessor, the claim 
cannot succeed.605 Between the current possessor and he who lost his possession a 
subsidiary legal obligation will come into existence.606 The obligation will entitle the 
holder of the personal right who is entitled to possession to claim damages.607 
Finally, Paragraph 1007 BGB will entitle the holder of a claim to separate the object 
in insolvency of the current possessor and a counter-claim to resist a seizure of a 
creditor.608 
A right to possession of a movable object flowing from a personal right 
therefore entitles the right-holder to claim his possession also against a third party. 
However, it should be emphasised that the claim based on Paragraph 1007 BGB will 
succeed if the right-holder has a better right than the person against whom he exer-
cises the claim, but another third party might hold an even better right, for example, 
the owner.609 Therefore, there is third-party effect, but not in the sense of a property 
right. 
4.4. Lease of Immovable Objects 
German law recognises the lease of immovable property as a special right. Although 
the right, like a lease of movable objects, is a personal right, it bears many charac-
teristics of a property right. The principal characteristic is dealt with in Paragraph 
566 BGB, which states:610 
If the leased living space, after the lessee has taken up the lease, is transferred to a third 
party, the acquirer will take the place of the lessor by force of law under the obligations 
following from the lease for the duration of his ownership.611 
The Paragraph codifies the maxim that sale does not break a lease.612 When an 
agreement is made for the lease of an immovable object, which includes room to 
 
603 Wieling 2001, p. 206. 
604 § 1007 BGB. 
605 §§ 1007 (3)(2), 986 BGB, Wieling 2001, p. 207, Staudinger & Gursky 1999, p. 601. 
606 § 1007 (3)(2) BGB, Wieling 2001, p. 207. 
607 Staudinger & Gursky 1999, p. 605. 
608 § 771 ZPO, Staudinger & Gursky 1999, p. 595, Wieling 2001, p. 208. 
609 Staudinger & Gursky 1999, p. 594-595. 
610 Since 1 January 2001 this Paragraph contains the ‘sale does not break lease’ maxim. Before 
2001 this subject was dealt with in Para. 571 BGB. 
611 § 566 BGB, ‘Wird der vermietete Wohnraum nach der Überlassung an den Mieter von dem 
Vermieter an einen Dritten veräußert, so tritt der Erwerber anstelle des Vermieters in die sich 
während der Dauer seiner Eigentums aus dem Mietverhältnis ergebenden Rechte und 
Pflichten ein’. 
612 In German Kauf bricht nicht Miete, see Schön 2001, p. 119-120. 
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live in, but also land, parts of land or parts of buildings, a personal relation arises 
between lessee and lessor.613 However, by force of Paragraph 566 BGB, the personal 
relation will transfer to a new owner in case the old owner transfers his right of 
ownership on the object to someone else. In other words, in specific situations the 
right of the lessee has effect against a third party. 
The maxim that sale does not break a lease is not entirely accurate, since in 
German law it is not a sale which ‘breaks’ a lease, but a transfer. The rule of Para-
graph 566 BGB will also apply when a transfer occurs for another cause other than 
sale, for example, a gift.614 Furthermore, the right of lease will also be effective in the 
insolvency of the owner or the seizure of the object by a creditor. Any person deal-
ing with the object or acquiring the object will also have to respect the lease.615 
The recognition of the third-party effect of a lease agreement has given rise to 
a debate on the nature of the right. The debate already started before the introduc-
tion of the BGB. The maxim that a sale does not break a lease came from Germanic 
law.616 In the Prussian ALR a general rule stated: 
When he who has a personal right to an object is entitled by that right to possession, a 
property right in respect of the object comes into existence.617 
In Prussian law, as well as in current German law, lease of an immovable object 
entitles the lessee to possession. In Prussian law this made the right of lease a prop-
erty right that would also have effect against the acquirer of the ownership of the 
object under lease.618 However, the right of lease did not need to be registered.619 
The First Commission mainly based its draft of the BGB on Roman law. In Roman 
law, lease was a personal right and a transfer of ownership therefore did not force 
the new owner to deal with the lessee and allowed the new owner to evict him.620 In 
other words, in the first draft of the BGB a lease was as a purely personal right.621 
However, lease as a property right was reality in Prussia, and under severe criticism 
from legal practice the Second Commission included a compromise in the provision 
of Paragraph 566 BGB.622 However, the lease itself remained a personal right, not 
suitable for registration. 
 
613 Staudinger, Emmerich & Rolfs 2003, p. 61-62, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 349, Wilhelm 
2002, p. 26. 
614 Schön 2001, p. 119. 
615 §§ 108, 110 and 111 InsO, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 350. 
616 See Otte 1978, p. 463 et seq. 
617 § 135 ALR I. 2. ‘wenn demjenigen, der ein persönliches Recht zu einer Sache hat, der Besitz 
derselben auf den Grund dieses Rechtes eingeräumt wird, so entsteht dadurch ein dingliches 
Recht auf die Sache’. Wieling 2001, p. 205, Wieling 2003, p. 201. 
618 Wieling 2003, p. 202, Staudinger, Emmerich & Rolfs 2003, p. 59, Otte 1978, p. 464. 
619 Wieling 2003, p. 203, Otte 1978, p. 471-472. 
620 Wieling 2003, p. 205-206. 
621 Wieling 2003, p. 207, Staudinger, Emmerich & Rolfs 2003, p. 59. 
622 Wieling 2003, p. 209, Staudinger, Emmerich & Rolfs 2003, p. 60. 
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Since the introduction of the BGB several authors have tried to argue for the 
re-introduction of the lease as a property right and for its wider application.623 The 
courts have, until now, followed a strict line restricting the application of Paragraph 
566 BGB to leases.624 The courts continue to characterise the lease as a personal right 
with an extraordinary protection provided by Paragraph 566 BGB.625 
The lessee is under even more protection than just Paragraph 566 BGB. The 
lease awards the lessee possession, the importance of which should not be under-
estimated. First, if the lessee is interrupted in his possession or his use of the object, 
this can lead to a claim in tort following from Paragraph 823 BGB.626 Doctrinally it is 
not the lease, but the possession which entitles the lessee to the claim.627 Secondly, 
although the lessee only has a personal right, he is entitled to a counter-claim to 
stop the seizure of the object by a creditor of the lessor.628 Thirdly, and even more 
important, the possession of the lessee entitles him to the possessory claims in order 
to protect his possession. When another takes the possession from the lessee, the 
lessee will, through Paragraph 861 BGB, have a claim for a return of the posses-
sion.629 However, this claim will not entitle the lessee to claim use of the object or 
compensation. Furthermore, the lessee may also use a claim as laid down in Para-
graph 862 BGB. When the lessee does not lose his possession, but his possession is 
interfered with, in whatever way, the lessee can use this claim against the person 
interfering with his possession to stop the interference.630 Even more, the BGH also 
admitted a claim based on Paragraph 1007 BGB, albeit by analogy, since Paragraph 
1007 BGB is restricted to movable objects.631 
The recognition of the possession of the lessee or any other possession of an 
object through a personal right therefore awards the personal right property 
characteristics.632 The right of lease breaks with the system of property law, especial-
ly since third party effect is awarded although the right of lease is not registered. A 
registered right concluded later than a lease will therefore come after the lease.633 
Primarily based on these arguments, Wieling has argued for the recognition of lease 
 
623 For an overview see Schön 2001, p. 120 et seq. 
624 This includes lease of a building or of land, in German classified as Miete and Pacht, RG LZ 
1921, S. 414, Schön 2001, p. 120. 
625 Wilhelm 2002, p. 27. 
626 RGZ 54, 233 et seq., Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 346, Wieling 2003, p. 214-215, Wilhelm 2002, 
p. 26, Otte 1978, p. 467 et seq. 
627 Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 346. 
628 § 771 ZPO, Wilhelm 2002, p. 26. 
629 § 861 BGB, Wieling 2001, p. 65-66. 
630 § 862 BGB, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 345-346, Wieling 2001, p. 66-68, Otte 1978, p. 465. 
631 BGH 25 September 1952, BGHZ 7, 208 et seq., Otte 1978, p. 466, Wilhelm 2002, p. 26.  
632 Such rights are known as verdinglichte Rechte, see Dulckeit 1951, Canaris 1978, Weitnauer 
1983, Wieling 2003. A similar discussion is held in English law in respect to bailment of 
chattels. Also a bailment might entitle to possession, but this does not make bailment itself a 
property right. See Chapter 6; 3.2. Leases / Bailment? 
633 Schön 2001, p. 127. 
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as a property right.634 However, in the system of German property rights, the lease 
remains a personal right. 
4.5. Treuhand Bank Account 
German law recognises three types of Treuhand; the transfer-Treuhand or Übertra-
gungstreuhand, the acquisition-Treuhand or Erwerbstreuhand, and the agreement-Treu-
hand or Vereinbarungstreuhand.635 These three types differ in the way in which the 
Treuhand originates. The transfer-Treuhand was the first type that was recognised. 
The transfer-Treuhand is created through a transfer of an object under agreement 
that the transferee will hold the object for the transferor. Its basic characteristics and 
main application in practice, i.e., Sicherungstreuhand, have already been dealt with 
under the heading of Treuhand-ownership.636 The second type of Treuhand is created 
when a person receives an object from a third party which he agrees to hold for 
another. These two types are not as problematic as the third type, in which the 
Treuhänder agrees to hold assets that he already holds for the benefit of a Treugeber. 
In other words, the creation of the last type of Treuhand does not require a transfer. 
The Treuhand is a concept widely applied in German law. The transfer-Treu-
hand is mostly used in respect to corporeal objects, but the other two types of Treu-
hand are mainly used in respect to claims and money. The Treuhand for claims and 
money is usually a receive-Treuhand and creates what is known as a Treuhandkonto 
or Treuhand bank account. The Treuhänder agrees to receive money on a separate 
account for the fulfilment of claims of the Treugeber. The claims are paid by third 
parties.637 The Treuhandkonto is part of the development of the Treuhand as a general 
device for the management of objects. The inclusion of incorporeal objects, i.e., 
claims and money, enables a wide variety of applications. The inclusion of such 
objects under a Treuhand is possible because a Treuhand is a contract with some spe-
cific third-party effect.638 In practice, the Treuhandkonto is widely used to protect 
money by making a separate account, for example, for the payment of a lease or a 
client’s fund for advocates.  
A Treuhand is mainly a contract, which results in the applicability of contract 
law. However, if an object is transferred and the parties agree in the contract in 
what way the Treuhänder will deal with those objects, the Treugeber will not only 
have a personal right against the Treuhänder, but also a claim for the objects in case 
of insolvency of the Treuhänder.639 The Treuhand therefore consists of two elements; a 
contract, and what is called a quasi-property right. The contract will set out the con-
tent of the relation between the parties, whereas the latter will entitle the enforce-
 
634 Wieling 2003, p. 212, see also Otte, Otte 1978, p. 474-475, Hattenhauer 1989, p. 100-101, differ-
ent see Hess 1998, p. 504-505. 
635 Schmidt 2005, p. 936-937. 
636 See above; 2.4. Treuhand Ownership. 
637 Ganter 2004, p. 253. 
638 Ganter 2004, p. 260. 
639 BGH NJW 2002, 3414, § 47 InsO, Ganter 2004, 253. 
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ment of that relation against third parties.640 As long as the Treuhänder keeps the 
Treuhand objects separated from his private assets, the Treugeber will have a claim 
for the objects in case of insolvency. However, when the objects are mixed the claim 
can no longer succeed.641 
A Treuhandkonto can also be created under the third type of Treuhand, the 
agreement-Treuhand or Vereinbarungstreuhand. However, in such a case no objects 
have been transferred, but the parties attempt to create a Treuhand relation by mere 
agreement.642 Such an attempt is recognised as a Treuhand but will not entitle the 
Treugeber to a claim to separate the assets in case of insolvency of the Treuhänder.643 
The transfer of assets is considered a principal criterion for the quasi-property right 
side of the Treuhand and is therefore not awarded to a Treuhand created without a 
transfer.644 
5. A Numerus Clausus in German Property Law? 
As a result of the influence of the Historical School the BGB is Pandektenrecht at its 
best. The influence of Roman law is visible in every area, but especially in property 
law. The solutions that were implemented are not always pure Roman law; the 
Historical School also developed Roman law and adapted it to modern condi-
tions.645 Under the heavy influence of Von Savigny’s system, the BGB was founded 
on a separation between the law of property and the law of obligations. In this 
system each of these areas fulfils an independent function.646 The system of the BGB 
was intended to break with the tradition of civil codes under influence of natural 
law theory, in which ownership could rest on everything, objects and rights, and in 
which the separation between the law of property and the law of obligations did not 
exist. The BGB deviated strongly from those systems, especially from the Prussian 
ALR.647 
The First Commission on the BGB restricted property rights to corporeal ob-
jects, with the exception of the rights of usufruct and pledge, which can also be 
created on rights, and in no more than three pages, justified the separate and 
independent position of property law.648 In German law the right of ownership is 
absolute and unitary. The right of ownership is the paramount right a person can 
have in a corporeal object. In order to protect this right of ownership and to guar-
antee its absolute nature, the German property law system restricts other property 
 
640 Ganter 2004, p. 262-263. 
641 BGH 12 December 2003, NJW 2004, 954, Schmidt 2005, p. 960-961. 
642 In terms of English law this would be a declaration of trust. See Swadling 2000a, p. 280. 
643 Ganter 2004, p. 259-260. 
644 Critically to this lack of protection for the Treugeber, see Schmidt 2005, p. 954-958. 
645 Cf. Von Savigny’s System of Current Roman Law, Von Savigny 1981. 
646 Von Savigny 1981, p. 374 et seq., Staudinger et al. 2000, p. 7, Wiegand 1987, p. 630, Wiegand 
1990, p. 133, Wiegand 1999a, p. 115 et seq., Füller 2006, p. 8-13. Not as in French law where the 
law of obligations is dealt with in order to support property law. See Chapter 3; 1. Introduc-
tion. 
647 Motive III 1888, p. 2-3. 
648 Motive III 1888, p. 1-3, Wiegand 1999a, p. 107 et seq., Füller 2006, p. 10-11. 
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rights. Such other property rights are possible, but these function, in contrast with 
the Prussian ALR, in a closed system. Furthermore, the First Commission made it 
very clear that a property right other than ownership can never be a right of 
ownership.649 
The property rights other than the right of ownership function in a closed 
system or numerus clausus of property rights.650 Doctrine expresses numerus clausus 
in two ways, which, although not generally recognised as such in the Motive, form 
the foundation for the doctrine of numerus clausus in German law.651 Contrary to the 
law of contract where party autonomy is the starting point, the law of property is 
characterised by a severe limitation on party autonomy. Parties are not free to give 
content to their relation in the way they desire. First of all, parties must choose one 
of the available property rights if they wish to give a property effect, i.e., third-party 
effect, to their relation. German doctrine uses the term Typenzwang for this part of 
the numerus clausus.652 Secondly, when the parties choose a property right, they are 
bound by the content the law prescribes for that property right. In other words, 
parties are also not free to decide on the content of their chosen relation. A property 
right to which parties attempt to give a content it cannot have, will not be a prop-
erty right. German doctrine uses the term Typenfixierung for this latter concept.653  
Especially in respect to Typenfixierung, party autonomy is limited but not 
absent.654 The Typenfixierung should be understood in the sense that parties can give 
content to their relation within the boundaries set by law. For example, a right of 
real servitude cannot comprise a positive duty as a primary duty. Although parties 
can agree on the content of their relation, for example, a right to walk over a specific 
area of another’s land in exchange for the payment of a price, they cannot agree on a 
positive duty. The effect of the Typenfixierung is that such a right containing a posi-
tive duty will be a contract and will therefore lack third-party effect. However, 
within the limits of the property right, parties are free to decide.655 What these limits 
are will depend on the nature of the property right.656 
The numerus clausus should be seen in relation to the absolute and unitary 
right of ownership.657 The specific refusal of the system to recognise fragmented 
ownership is strengthened by the recognition of a limited set of property rights 
other than ownership which burden the powers of the owner.658 The connection 
 
649 Motive III 1888, p. 3, Wiegand 1990, p. 117, Füller 2006, p. 367-378. 
650 See Füller 2006, p. 370. 
651 Staudinger et al. 2000, p. 24. 
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et al. 2000, p. 24, Füller 2006, p. 371. 
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655 Staudinger et al. 2000, p. 25, Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 9-10. 
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658 Johow 1982, p. 126, Wiegand 1987, p. 635, 638. 
 246 
German Law 
between the two is very clear. Recognising a fragmentation of ownership would 
make a restriction of the other property rights less useful, recognising a fully open 
system of property right other than ownership would make a unitary right of 
ownership less useful. Also the recognition of a property right, not as a part of the 
right of ownership, but as a separate right limiting the powers of the owner, should 
be understood as a method to safeguard the absolute and unitary concept of 
ownership.659 
Furthermore, recognising a limited category of property rights enables objects 
to remain relatively free and transferable. The intention of the German legislator to 
limit the possibilities for restriction of the transferability of objects should not be 
underestimated. Wiegand has emphasised that the German system of private law in 
the nineteenth century was primarily intended to stimulate the economy through an 
efficient and clear transfer system.660 The numerus clausus of property rights in 
German law should certainly also be understood as a method to restrict the number 
of possible burdens that could be imposed on an object in order to make it as freely 
transferable as possible.661 Moreover, the limited number of property rights also 
restricts the possibilities for an owner to keep his objects from his creditors. In the 
law of insolvency, the starting point is the possibility for the creditors to execute 
their claims on the full set of assets of the owner. Only the holder of a property right 
might have a right to separate the object, in order to take it outside the set of assets 
of the owner, or such holder may have a preferential position in relation to the other 
creditors. Neither in the Motive, nor in the BGB itself, are these reasons explicitly 
mentioned.662 Nevertheless, Wiegand, as well as Füller, has shown that Paragraph 
137 BGB, which was originally intended for the third book on Property law, fulfils 
these functions as the main protector of the numerus clausus.663 This Paragraph 
prohibits parties from limiting the powers of the owner with property effect, other 
than those limitations, i.e., property rights, recognised by law.  
Prussian law recognised the possibility to restrict the powers of the owner by 
contract but with effect against third parties.664 Wiegand emphasises that Paragraph 
137 BGB should be read as a reaction against the Prussian ALR, and a protection of 
the unitary nature of the right of ownership, as well as securing the independent 
position and closed nature of the law of property.665 Secondly, Paragraph 137 BGB 
also limits the powers of the owner to take his objects outside the reach of his 
 
659 On the relation between ownership and property rights other than ownership see above; 3. 
Other Property Rights. 
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creditors.666 In this last sense, Paragraph 137 BGB ensures the transferability of the 
object and the good functioning of the law of insolvency.667 
The choice made by the drafters of the BGB for the numerus clausus of property 
rights as well as the distinction between the law of obligations and the law of prop-
erty has come under heavy criticism.668 The Germanic law, especially Prussian law, 
had not known such a closed system, or such a sharp distinction between contract 
and property. The choice of the First Commission was therefore criticised as a 
choice that would result in a discontinuation of the development of property law as 
well as of the development of the law in general.669  
However, recognising a closed system of property rights does not necessarily 
result in an absolutely closed list of property rights. Unlike other civil law property 
systems, German doctrine does not consider the list closed in an absolute sense at 
all.670 To the contrary, the system of the BGB, as it was intended to facilitate the 
economy by referring to the maximum unburdened transferability of objects, does 
not restrict the development and recognition of new property relations.671 German 
doctrine focuses on the numerus clausus as a limitation of party autonomy – it is not 
for parties themselves to create new property relations. However, legislation and 
case law are not restricted to adapt the system of property law to modern develop-
ments.672  
Several new property rights have been recognised since the entry into force of 
the BGB in 1900. These developments concern both the right of ownership and 
property rights other than ownership. First of all, the Wohnungseigentumsgesetz 
(WEG) introduced a new type of ownership that could be limited in content by 
contract as well as by the community of owners, deviating from the protection of 
Paragraph 137 BGB.673 Secondly, case law also limited the rights of the owner in a 
Treuhand situation. The primary example of such limitation was developed in the 
case of a transfer of ownership for security purposes, which creates Sicherungseigen-
tum.674 In the case of a transfer of ownership creating a Treuhand, the right of owner-
ship is limited by contract, in the case of security ownership in such a way that it is 
difficult to characterise the right that results as ownership under Paragraph 903 
BGB.675 Furthermore, the development of the Treuhand by case law should also be 
 
666 Wiegand 1990, p. 118. 
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seen in the recognition of a property relation other than ownership. The Treuhand of 
claims and money, especially in case of a Treuhandkonto, also creates a protected 
position for the Treugeber which closely resembles a property right.676 The posses-
sion of movable property through a contractual relation and the lease of immovable 
property should be mentioned as property-like rights.677 
Finally, perhaps the best example of the enlargement of the available property 
rights is offered through the recognition of the Anwartschaftsrechte.678 The Anwart-
schaftsrechte awards a property-like position to the person who expects to acquire a 
right and who is awarded extra protection by the BGB already. These acquisition 
rights were recognised by case law and developed into a new property right, 
although the subject remains controversial.679 
Besides the recognition of new property relations, the development of German 
law since the entry into force of the BGB should also be seen in the relation between 
the law of obligations and the law of property.680 Already the criticism of the draft 
BGB concerned the sharp distinction between the law of obligations and the law of 
property. Traditionally, neither Germanic law nor the Prussian ALR had adhered to 
such a strict separation.681 Already the BGB of 1900 itself was forced to accept a 
certain influence of contract law as a means to transfer and create property rights.682 
The sharp separation between the two was difficult to maintain. The development 
of German private law after the introduction of the BGB shows a development 
towards a less strict separation in contract law as well as in property law.  
In the area of property law there is an increasing influence of contract law, 
described by doctrine as an Obligatoriserung der dinglichen Rechte.683 The influence of 
contract law in property law is twofold. First, contracts are used to explain the 
relation between the current holder of a property right and the current owner of the 
object the property right burdens. By way of a subsidiary legal obligation German 
law justifies the applicability of certain contractual or delictual remedies. The recog-
nition of these legal obligations in case of real servitudes and real burdens should 
not be underestimated. The existence of the obligation enables the current holder of 
the right to claim performance of the duties and compensation for non-performance 
of the current owner.684  
Secondly, and perhaps most interesting, contract law is also used to achieve 
what cannot be achieved by property law, i.e., it enables parties to work around the 
Typenfixierung. The development and recognition of the Sicherungsgrundschuld is the 
best example. A security-contract is used to create a right of Grundschuld on a claim, 
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but, because of its effect in property law, it will still enable the right-holder to enjoy 
the benefits of a Grundschuld over a hypothec. It is this security-Grundschuld that has 
been the model for security-servitudes and security-usufructs. Especially in case of 
security-servitudes, the combination of contract and property creates a positive 
burden, which is contrary to the property law requirements concerning servitudes, 
with quasi-property effect.685 
Also in the area of contract law as such, there is a development towards prop-
erty law. Parties attempt to create a contractual relation with property effect. This 
process is described by doctrine as Verdinglichung obligatorischer Rechte.686 To a cer-
tain extent German property law also facilitates property effect of contractual rela-
tions through Vormerkung. Although Vormerkung itself does not create a property 
right, it enables the holder of a personal right to invoke his right against a third 
party as if such a person was holding a property right.687 Secondly, the increasing 
influence of the law of property on the law of contract should also be seen in rela-
tion to the Treuhand. A Treuhand enables a Treugeber to limit the powers of the Treu-
händer by contract with effect against third parties, especially in case of insolvency 
of the Treuhänder.688 However, doctrinally the Treuhand remains a contract.689 Third-
ly, a personal right that entitles the holder to possession of an object is also awarded 
a property-like status. The clearest example of such a situation is a lease. If the lease 
concerns movable objects, the lessee, i.e., the holder of the right of lease, is awarded 
a right to possession that he can, in case the possession is lost or interfered with, 
enforce against third parties. When the lease concerns an immovable object, the 
lessee is awarded extra protection through Paragraph 566 BGB, which entitles the 
lessee to assert his right against a new owner in case the old owner transfers his 
ownership. Nevertheless, a lease remains a contract, but a holder of a lease can 
claim his right against more than just the lessor. 
Wiegand, based on the Motive and texts of Johow, who drafted the parts on 
property law, argues that it was the intention of the legislator to create a system of 
law that would facilitate the economy.690 He argues that the criticism of the abstract 
and autonomous property law has partly proven itself to be correct.691 Wiegand sees 
the development of property law after the entry into force of the BGB as a materiali-
sation, i.e., as opposed to abstracting from reality, and a mixing of property and 
contract.692 
As early as 1930, Heck emphasised that the choice of the legislator for a closed 
system might not have been the best choice.693 He emphasises the richness of prop-
erty rights in Germanic law and states that if a property right is seen as a tree 
 
685 Staudinger et al. 2000, p. 27, see above; 3.8. Grundschuld. 
686 Dulckeit 1951, 7 et seq., Canaris 1978, p. 371 et seq., Weitnauer 1983, p. 705 et seq. 
687 Schwab & Prütting 2003, p. 93, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 232, Staudinger & Gursky 2002, 
p. 23. 
688 See above; 4.5. Treuhand Bank Account. 
689 Ganter 2004, p. 260. 
690 Wiegand 1987, p. 640, Wiegand 1990, p. 133-134, Wiegand 1999a, p. 115,  
691 Wiegand 1990, p. 133-134. See also Füller 2006, p. 526 et seq. 
692 Wiegand 1990, p. 134. 
693 Heck 1930, p. 84-87. 
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resting on the land that is ownership, Germany was a rich and dense forest before 
the introduction of the BGB.694 The restriction of the number of property rights to 
the Roman categories, complemented with the Germanic pre-emptive right, real 
burden and Grundschuld, has severely cut the forest away and left only a few trees 
standing.695 Even more, the pre-emptive right was adapted to fit in the Roman 
system of property rights and the right of Grundschuld was considered a less useful 
right than the Roman right of hypothec. 
It is not surprising that the developments in the law of property have come 
from its Germanic origins. First, the Prussian ALR, which adhered to an open 
system of property rights, has proven itself to be very influential, even after it was 
replaced by the BGB.696 Although the Prussian system of property rights conflicts 
with the strict Roman system of property rights, the developments in German 
property law described in this chapter all share a Germanic and often also a 
Prussian origin. Therefore, modern developments often create doctrinal problems. 
Already in the Motive of the BGB itself, the influence of the Prussian ALR is imma-
nent. The discussion on the possibility of the combination of a holder of a property 
right and an owner of the same object, especially in the case of a right of hypothec, 
directly follows from Prussian law.697 The Motive explain the economic relevance of 
such a possibility and leave legal science to deal with the doctrinal justification.698 
Secondly, the acceptance of the right of Grundschuld should be seen as a compro-
mise between the north of Germany, where the right of hypothec was used, and the 
south, i.e., Prussia, which used the right of Grundschuld.699 However, a non-acces-
sory security right clearly breaks with the Roman system of pledge and hypothec. 
Thirdly, the Vormerkung, which enables a limited third-party effect of a personal 
right, was also known to the Prussian ALR.700 The Vormerkung in the ALR gave the 
holder of a registered personal right a stronger position since it resulted in a claim 
against a third party as well.701 The current BGB saw the Vormerkung as a mixture 
between the law of obligations and the law of property and took away the claim, 
which returned in the form of Paragraph 899 BGB, and therefore outside the scope 
of pre-emptive registration, in order to deprive the Vormerkung of its main proprie-
tary characteristics.702 
 
694 Although Heck also states that the forest was a Mischwald comprising many different types of 
rights, Heck 1930, p. 85. 
695 Although the Motive consider the right of Superficies a Germanic right, Roman law knew a 
very similar right and the Erbbaurecht should not be considered to be purely Germanic, nor as 
purely Roman. Motive III 1888, p. 2-3. 
696 § 135 ALR, Wieling 2001, p. 205, note 2, Heck 1930, p. 86, Wiegand 1990, p. 114. 
697 §§ 52, 63-66 ALR, Motive III 1888, p. 201, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 408 et seq., Staudinger 
& Wolfsteiner 2002, p. 61 et seq. 
698 Motive III 1888, p. 205, more on this subject above in 3. Other Property Rights. 
699 Motive III 1888, p. 604-612, Wolff & Raiser 1957, p. 521-522, Staudinger & Wolfsteiner 2002,  
p. 12-14. 
700 However, it should be emphasised that also other Germanic legal systems used the Vormer-
kung, Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 14-15. 
701 Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 14. 
702 Motive III 1888, p. 239 et seq., Staudinger & Gursky 2002, p. 14-15. 
 251 
Chapter 4 
Furthermore, the developments after the entry into force of the BGB should 
also be seen in the light of the influence of Germanic law and the Prussian ALR. 
This includes the position of a lessee in relation to the lessor. The maxim that sale 
does not break a lease is commonly interpreted as a deviation from the classical 
Roman system in favour of the Prussian system.703 
The influence of Germanic, non-Prussian, law itself should not be underesti-
mated. It is this law that formed the basis for the recognition of the acquisition 
rights. Although Roman law knew situations in which a person expecting to acquire 
a property right had some extra protection, the distinction in ownership and a prop-
erty right to the expectation of ownership is Germanic.704 The acquisition right was 
as such not unknown to the Prussian system, but should be seen as a general 
Germanic concept.705  
Furthermore, the Treuhand also originates party in Germanic law. Although 
the Treuhand in the sense of a transfer of ownership for security purposes also 
resembles the Roman fiducia cum creditore, and also the influence of the Roman 
fiducia cum amico is recognised, the Germanic roots that enable the restriction of the 
powers of a right-holder with third-party effect are part of the current Treuhand.706 
The development in which a personal right is awarded limited third-party effect as 
such also fits the Prussian ALR. 
The development of property law is especially characterised by an increasing 
influence of contract law in the law of property. Wiegand emphasises that this 
should be seen as a result of a less strict approach towards the independence and 
autonomy of the law of property.707 In fact, he proposes to use the law of contract, 
specifically party autonomy, to develop the law of property insofar as the rights of 
third parties and the general interest does not object to such a development.708 
Wiegand argues for the recognition of property-like rights as property rights. 
He mentions Treuhand-ownership as a specific example. A right of ownership of 
which the powers are limited in such a way that the right can no longer be defined 
as absolute and complete ownership under Paragraph 903 BGB should be recog-
nised as a separate right of ownership.709 Along the same lines Hess argues in 
favour of allowing any party agreement that falls within the nature of a property 
right and the legal system as a whole, or the gesamtgesetzlichen Leitbild, as an agree-
ment with third-party effect.710 Such a development could put a stop to the doctrinal 
difficulties with property-like rights in which doctrine recognises limited property 
effects only in case of certain contracts. 
 
703 Schön 2001, p. 119-120, Wieling 2003, p. 202, Staudinger, Emmerich & Rolfs 2003, p. 59, Otte 
1978, p. 464. 
704 Sponer 1965, p. 20 et seq. 
705 Sponer 1965, p. 28, Heck 1930, p. 449. 
706 Enneccerus & Nipperdey 1960, p. 921 et seq., Schulze 1967, p. 1 et seq. 
707 Wiegand 1990, p. 134. See also Füller 2006, p. 558-560. 
708 Wiegand states: ´Der Parteiwille und die Gestaltungsfreiheit haben Vorrang vor der Autono-
mie des Sachenrechts, sofern und soweit nicht schützwerte Dritt – oder höherwertige Allge-
meininteressen entgegenstehen’, Wiegand 1990, p. 134-135. 
709 Wiegand 1990, p. 136-137. 
710 Hess 1998, p. 513-515. 
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Finally, perhaps the function the law of obligations fulfils at the moment 
should be maintained. The way in which obligations and contracts are used to 
create what cannot be created under property law, as it is seen in doctrinal legal 
thinking, resembles the development of praetorian law in Roman law and the devel-
opment of equity in English law. Specifically the acquisition rights show a develop-
ment in this direction. The Anwartschaftsrecht entitling the acquisition of ownership 
is modelled on the right of ownership. In fact, it is so much like a right of ownership 
that the claims the owner can use are also available to the right-holder. Strauch has 
argued that the situation very closely resembles a situation of duplex dominium.711 
The same could be said for Treuhand-ownership of the Treuhänder in relation to the 
rights of the Treugeber. Strauch’s argument is interesting because it attempts to 
justify deviations from the Roman system of private law, specifically property law, 
within the system itself. After all, in Roman law also he who could not have owner-
ship under Quiritian law, could still have bonitary ownership through the Praetor’s 
jurisdiction.712  
German law should therefore be studied closely as one of the leading civil law 
systems. Its complicated and compromising nature deserves to be understood. The 
consequences of the many compromises German law has made between Roman law 
and Germanic law create many doctrinal problems. The possibility to have a prop-
erty right and ownership at the same time in the same object is perhaps the best 
example. When German law is subsequently used as a model that could be applied 
in other civil law systems, for instance, in a European legislative project, this may 
cause unexpected and serious consequences, especially if that civil law system or 
legislative project does not share with German law its compromising nature leading 
to a mixture of Germanic and Roman principles.713 
 
711 Strauch 1984, p. 288, Hattenhauer 1989, p. 83 et seq. 
712 On bonitary or Praetorian ownership see Kaser & Wubbe 1971, p. 135, Chapter 2; 2.3. Owner-
ship. Also in respect to pre-emptive property rights, a close resemblance to the option to 
purchase in English law can be made. On this see Chapter 7; 2.6. Lesser Rights Used to 
Acquire a Certain Legal Position (Anticipatory Rights). 
713 In case of the property right in respect of the own object this would include a serious devia-
tion from the system of property rights in e.g. France and the Netherlands. See Chapter 3; 3. 
Other Property Rights, and Chapter 5; 3. Other Property Rights. On the European initiatives 
see Chapter 8; 2.1.3. European Commission Initiatives for Future Legislation. 
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Chapter 5 
DUTCH LAW 
1. Introduction 
The law of the Netherlands holds a special and separate place amongst the civil law 
systems in Europe.1 With the introduction of a major part of the new code in 1992, 
the Dutch legal system combines elements from both the French and the German 
legal systems. Dutch law has not always been in this special position. The specific 
nature of Dutch law in relation to French and German law, but also English law, is a 
result of its historical development. Therefore, before this chapter proceeds to deal 
with modern Dutch law, some remarks about its history and development have to 
be made. 
Before the French Revolution, which reached the Netherlands in 1795, the 
Netherlands was internally divided into several states with a large diversity of law.2 
The primary source of law was customary law, supplemented by Roman law when 
necessary.3 Specifically the law of the province of Holland, the Rooms Hollands recht, 
confusingly translated as ‘Roman-Dutch law’, was very influential.4 Moreover, there 
was a strong influence from the natural law school because of the influence of 
Grotius.5 In 1806, after France had gained more and more influence in the 
Netherlands, the Republic of the Netherlands concluded a treaty with Napoléon 
which included the imposition of a king. In 1807, the new king, Louis Bonaparte, 
brother of Napoléon, was ordered to introduce the French Civil Code, known as the 
code Napoléon, in the Netherlands.6 However, Louis Bonaparte did not obey his 
 
1 Most literature referred to in this chapter will be Dutch literature. However, if an English 
source was available I have tried to mention it where I considered it appropriate.  
2 Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 293. 
3 It was only externally that the Republic acted as one, with the estates general as the represen-
tative organ. Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 284-290.  
4 Confusingly because it was only the law of the province of Holland and not of the 
Netherlands entirely. Roman Dutch law is the law that was brought to South Africa where it 
still, although modified, applies today. See, inter alia, De Waal 2004, p. 83. 
5 Zwalve 2003, p. 48-50, Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 289. On the natural law school see Chapter 2; 
5. Natural Law and the French Revolution. 
6 Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 296-298. 
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brother’s orders and ordered the redrafting of the code Napoléon adapted to the 
situation in the Netherlands. With this procedure more influences from local Dutch 
law could be introduced in the Dutch Civil Code. The work on this adapted version 
resulted in the introduction of the code Napoléon as adapted for the kingdom of  
the Netherlands.7 However, in 1810 Napoléon forced the introduction of the code 
Napoléon on the Netherlands when he included the country in his empire.8 In this 
way the Netherlands were forced to use and apply French law. When the 
Netherlands became independent again in 1813, work was started on a properly 
Dutch code of private law.9 
The Civil Code that resulted from this work, now known as the old Civil 
Code, Oud Burgerlijk Wetboek (or old BW), entered into force in the major part of the 
Netherlands in 1838. Because of the circumstances it was primarily based on French 
law, but also showed some Roman-Dutch influences.10 This influence of French law 
was visible in particular in the traditional structure the code followed. Because of 
the circumstances under which the code had been drafted, there had been pressure 
to introduce a code quickly while French law continued to apply. The code was 
therefore never perceived as a purely Dutch product.11 During the next century 
several proposals were made to create a new Dutch Civil Code, but none of these 
were successful. The existing Dutch law was reformed in some areas.12 
After the Second World War, Professor E.M. Meijers was commissioned to 
develop a new Civil Code.13 Meijers introduced a new approach, partly based on 
comparisons with German law, French law and other legal systems. Whereas the 
old Civil Code had been primarily based on French law, Meijers especially intro-
duced concepts from German law.14 
One of the results of this new approach is that the Dutch Civil Code breaks 
with traditional distinctions, both in structure and in contents. The Dutch Civil 
Code has a layered structure, in which general rules are dealt with before specific 
rules. In the area of property law, the consequence of this approach is that there is 
no longer one single book of property law in the Code, but several books in which 
rules of property law are provided.  
In content the Dutch Civil Code does not follow a traditional approach either. 
As in most civil law systems, the code is founded on the distinction between per-
sonal rights and property rights and the related separation between the law of 
 
7 The Wetboek Napoleon, ingerigt voor het Koningkrijk Holland, see Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 297. 
8 However, the Southern part of the Netherlands has already been part of France since 1795, on 
the status of the different provinces see Ketelaar 1978, p. 46-47, Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 299. 
9 Ketelaar 1978, p. 56. 
10 Only in the province of Limburg the old BW entered into force in 1842, see Ketelaar 1978, p. 1. 
11 Lokin & Zwalve 2001, p. 306. 
12 Levenbach 1838, p. 129 et seq. 
13 Unfortunately, Professor Meijers died before the first version was completed. 
14 German law belongs to another legal family or legal tradition, i.e. has a different origin, and 
is therefore based on different concepts than French law. On legal families see Zweigert & 
Kötz 1998, p. 63 et seq., on legal traditions see Glenn 2006, p. 421 et seq. 
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obligations and the law of property.15 The separation between the law of obligations 
and the law of property had been recognised before, but had not been taken into the 
structure of the Civil Code. In 1905, the Hoge Raad, the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands, delivered a landmark decision in which the distinction between 
personal rights and property rights was first strongly affirmed.16 With this decision 
the separation became a fundamental principle of Dutch law. The new Civil Code, 
the Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW), although adhering to this separation, expresses it less 
strongly in the structure of the code than do other civil law systems. Moreover, 
there are several concepts in Dutch law that deviate from this principal separation, 
specifically in the area of contract law. However, at the outset, the system continues 
to adhere to the strict separation between personal and property rights.17 
The separation between personal rights and property rights has been the 
subject of only a few studies in the Netherlands.18 Both in case law and literature the 
separation has been perceived as a basic principle of Dutch law.19 However, the 
exact distinction between personal rights and property rights in the Netherlands has 
not been the subject of much research. In 1932 Kisch defended a doctoral thesis on 
this subject in which he argued that the essential characteristic of a property right 
should be found in its consequences.20 He understood the absolute nature of a 
property right as an effect against the world. In 1992 Rank-Berenschot defended her 
thesis in which she criticised Kisch’s viewpoints and developed her own theory.21 
Furthermore, in 2007 Struycken was the first to deal with the closed system of 
property rights in the Netherlands, also dealing with the separation between per-
 
15 Like the German Civil Code, the Dutch Civil Code takes the distinction between personal 
rights and property rights as its starting point. Only from the distinction between these two 
rights, the separation between the law of obligations and the law of property follows. On the 
German approach see Füller 2006, p. 8-13. 
16 HR 3 March 1905, W 8191 (Blaauboer/Berlips). In this case the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) 
stated: Considering that when every owner would be under an obligation and that the 
performance of this obligation would have a property effect, although created by a contract, 
without a specific legal basis, especially in these circumstances, cannot be accepted, because 
with that the existing sharp distinction in our Civil legislation between property law and the 
law of obligations would be erased. ‘O. verder, dat, waar de verbintenis zoude rusten op 
elken eigenaar als zoodanig het recht op de vervulling dier verbintenis een zakelijk karakter 
bekomt, hoewel voortspruitende uit een overeenkomst, iets, dat zonder eene wetsbepaling, 
dit bepaaldelijk voor een geval als het besprokene veroorlovende, niet kan worden aangeno-
men, omdat daarmede de in onze burgerlijke wetgeving bestaande scherpe onderscheiding 
tusschen zakenrecht en verbintenissenrecht, wordt uitgewischt’, Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) 
3 March 1905, W 8191 (Blaauboer/Berlips). On this decision see, inter alia, Pitlo 1968, Rijtma 
1969 and Heyman 2003. 
17 Meijers 1948, p. 266, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 3, Asser, Mijnsen, De 
Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 20, p. 19-20. 
18 See Rank-Berenschot 1992 and Struycken 2007. 
19 Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 309-310. 
20 Kisch 1932, p. 206 et seq. 
21 Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 53-54. On Rank-Berenschot’s views see below; 5. A Numerus Clausus 
in Dutch Property Law? 
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sonal and property rights as well as the separation between the law of obligations 
and the law of property.22  
In 1948 Meijers published his work on the general concepts of Dutch private 
law, in which he developed the theory that would become the foundation of the 
modern Dutch system of property law and the law of obligations.23 In this book on 
general concepts of Dutch private law, or the Algemene Begrippen, Meijers developed 
a theory on ‘subjective’ rights. This type of right is further divided into absolute and 
relative rights that correspond with property rights and personal rights.24 Meijers 
states that it is not possible to identify and list criteria that would apply to all prop-
erty rights.25 Instead he developed a theory of normal types. A normal type would 
be characterised by a set of criteria. Once a certain relation fulfils the majority of the 
criteria set for a type of right, the right would be characterised under that type. 
According to Meijers the normal-type absolute right is characterised by; an exclu-
sive power of the holder of the right, a duty on third parties to refrain from inter-
fering with the right, a possibility to claim the object over which the right is created 
in insolvency as if there was no insolvency, where registration of the right is 
required this concerns an object and not a person, where two rights cannot exist at 
the same time the older right prevails over the newer, and the powers of the holder 
of the right are considered to come from the right itself.26 
It is on this basis that the Dutch system of property law is built. The Civil Code 
uses the distinction between personal rights and property rights and consequently 
provides separate rules dealing with property law. For reasons of legal certainty 
only those property rights that are dealt with by law are recognised.27 The property 
rights in Dutch law therefore form a closed list or closed system of rights. However, 
as in other legal systems there are other legal relations recognised in Dutch law that 
closely resemble property rights, either in content or in their effect against third 
parties. This chapter will examine the list of property rights first, after which these 
other relations with some property effects are examined. The chapter will conclude 
with an examination whether the system of property law in Dutch law recognises a 
numerus clausus. 
2. The Right of Ownership 
In Dutch law the concept of ‘subjective’ right, which refers to a right that can be 
brought in relation to a specific person, forms the basis for the private law system.28 
 
22 Struycken 2007, p. 11-240. 
23 Meijers 1948. 
24 Meijers 1948, p. 266 et seq. 
25 Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 22, p. 20-21. 
26 Meijers 1948, p. 269-270. 
27 Art. 3:81 BW, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 3. This can include rights 
dealt with outside the BW, such as the right to a grave dealt with in Art. 28(1) Wet op de 
Lijkbezorging. 
28 Also in German law this concept of ‘subjective’ right is the starting point. See Füller 2006,  
p. 27 et seq. 
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Subjective rights are divided into rights to a person and vermogensrechten. Personal 
subjective rights are, for example, fundamental rights, vermogensrechten are those 
rights dealing with ‘patrimony’, or vermogen, best described as the full set of assets 
and debts a person can have.29 It is with this second group that property law is 
concerned. Dutch law deals with vermogensrechten in Article 3:6 BW:30  
Rights that, either separately or together with another right, are transferable, or give 
the right-holder material benefit, or are acquired in exchange for material benefit, are 
patrimonial rights.31 
Vermogensrechten are divided into relative rights and absolute rights. In Dutch law 
relative rights include personal rights, whereas absolute rights include property 
rights.32 As was mentioned in the introduction, the distinction between relative and 
absolute rights is at the foundation of Dutch private law.33 The Dutch BW deals with 
rules on vermogensrechten in book 3, property rights are subsequently dealt with in 
book 5, and personal rights in book 6.34 This division is different from the traditional 
division between property law and the law of obligations which is followed in other 
Civil Codes.35 In respect to property rights, the Dutch legal system makes a distinc-
tion between goederen and zaken. Both can be objects of property rights but differ in 
content. Zaken are, according to Article 3:2 BW, corporeal objects susceptible of 
human control.36 Goederen are, according to Article 3:1 BW, all zaken, which are cor-
poreal objects, and vermogensrechten, or, in other words, goederen are all corporeal 
and incorporeal objects. The relevance of the distinction comes with the definition of 
the right of ownership in Article 5:1 BW that states: 
 
29 Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 1, p. 1-2. 
30 Art. 3:6 BW refers to Art. 6 of book 3 of the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code). 
31 Art. 3:6 BW, ‘Rechten die, hetzij afzonderlijk hetzij tezamen met een ander recht, overdraag-
baar zijn, of er toe strekken de rechthebbende stoffelijk voordeel te verschaffen, ofwel verkre-
gen zijn in ruil voor verstrekt of in het vooruitzicht gesteld stoffelijk voordeel, zijn vermo-
gensrechten’. 
32 The category of absolute rights is wider than the list of property rights, it also includes, inter 
alia, intellectual property rights. Meijers 1948, p. 266, Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 
2006, Nos. 1, 21, p. 1-2, 20, Van der Steur 2003, p. 11. 
33 For an overview of the discussion on the difference between personal rights and property 
rights see Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 35 et seq. 
34 However, only those property rights in respect to corporeal objects are dealt with in book 5. 
Those property rights that can also be held on incorporeal objects, e.g. claims, are dealt with 
in book 3. Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, Nos. 21 et seq., p. 20 et seq. 
35 As, for instance, the German BGB that uses the second book for the law of obligations (Recht 
der Schuldverhäldnisse) and the third book for property law (Sachenrecht). Also the French Civil 
Code deals with property law in the second book (Des biens et des différentes modifications de la 
propriété) and in the third book with the law of obligations as a way to acquire ownership 
(Des différentes manières dont on acquiert la propriété), see, inter alia, Westra 1992, p. 287. 
36 Art. 3:2 BW states ‘voor menselijke beheersing vatbare stoffelijke objecten’. Translation by 
Haanappel & Mackaay 1990. 
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1. The right of ownership is the most extensive right a person can have on a corporeal 
object.37 
In other words, the concept of ownership is restricted to corporeal objects which 
means that incorporeal objects in the Netherlands cannot be owned. However, it is 
possible to have a position very much comparable to ownership of a corporeal ob-
ject. The Dutch Civil Code uses the term rechthebbende, right-holder, for the person 
entitled to incorporeal objects. In other words, Dutch law recognises entitlement to 
rights, either the right of ownership on zaken or other property rights in respect of 
goederen.38 However, the division in rights in respect of corporeal and rights in 
respect of incorporeal objects is not as logical as it seems. Zaken are corporeal objects 
capable of ownership while vermogensrechten are not, but ownership of zaken is 
included in the concept of vermogensrechten. The Dutch legislature has explained this 
illogical choice by stating that in normal terminology it is not the ownership of an 
object that is sold, but the object itself. Although it is actually the right of ownership 
that transfers to the acquirer, the law uses the term zaak to indicate the object. It is 
the right of ownership itself that is regarded as a patrimonial right, a vermogens-
recht.39 Nevertheless, the system of property law is structured around the categorisa-
tion of corporeal and incorporeal objects. 
2.1. Normal Ownership 
Article 5:1 BW states that the right of ownership is the most extensive right a person 
can have in a corporeal object. This definition of ownership is the result of a devel-
opment of opinions on the right of ownership throughout the ages. In the old BW of 
1838, the right of ownership was defined in Article 625 Old BW as: 
Ownership is the right to the free enjoyment of an object and to dispose of it in the 
most absolute manner, subject to limitations imposed by law or public regulation, 
imposed by the authority provided by the constitution, subject to the rights of others; 
all under the condition of expropriation for the public benefit for a reasonable 
compensation as provided by the Constitution.40 
 
37 Art. 5:1 BW ‘-1 Eigendom is het meest omvattende recht dat een persoon op een zaak kan 
hebben’. Another translation reads ownership is the most comprehensive right which a per-
son can have in a thing, Haanappel & Mackaay 1990. 
38 Van der Steur 2003, p. 14. 
39 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 3 1981, p. 63-64, Van der Steur 2003, p. 15, Asser, 
Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 68, p. 61-62. 
40 Art. 625 old BW: ‘eigendom is het regt om van eene zaak het vrij genot the hebben en daar-
over op de volstrekste wijze te beschikken, mits men er geen gebruik van make, strijdende 
tegen de wetten of de openbare verordeningen, daargesteld door zoodanige magt, die daar-
toe volgens de Grondwet, de bevoegdheid heeft, en mits men aan de regten van anderen 
geen hinder toebrenge; alles behoudens de onteigening ten algemeenen nutte tegen behoor-
lijke schadeloosstelling, ingevolge de Grondwet’. 
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The definition in the old BW was strongly based on the French equivalent in Article 
544 C.civ.41 It is immediately clear from the definition that the right of ownership is 
a special right. The right gives the holder free enjoyment of an object and a seem-
ingly unlimited power to dispose of that object in the most absolute manner.  
The development of the concept of the right of ownership is visible in this 
definition. It has long been held that the enjoyment of objects and the power to 
dispose of these are based on the Roman concept of dominium. However, Van der 
Bergh has shown that the definition of Article 625 old BW was not so much based 
on Roman law, but the result of a development of opinion about the right of owner-
ship from Bartolus through to nineteenth-century scholars.42 Under the influence of 
natural law scholars, specifically Grotius, the power to dispose of the object under 
ownership was firmly established in Dutch law.43 In this respect, the definition in 
Article 625 old BW is an echo of Bartolus’ definition of ownership as ius in re 
corporali perfecte disponendi nisi lege prohibeatur.44 The definition in the new BW turns 
away from the emphasis on the powers of the owner and focuses more on the 
nature of the right of ownership itself. Nevertheless, in content, the powers of the 
owner remain of importance and are further qualified in section 2 of Article 5:1 BW, 
which states: 
2. To the exclusion of everybody else, the owner is free to use the thing provided that 
this use not be in violation of the rights of others and that it respects the limitations 
based upon statutory rules and rules of unwritten law.45 
The right of ownership in Dutch law is absolute and unitary. The absoluteness of 
the right of ownership lies in the fact that everybody must respect the right and the 
holder of the right.46 The right of ownership is not the only absolute right, nor are all 
other property rights. Intellectual property rights, in Dutch law not part of the 
regular law of property, are also absolute rights.47  
Traditionally there are two characteristics of absolute rights. First, an absolute 
right will follow the object on which it is created. This effect is known as droit de 
suite. Second, in case of bankruptcy, the holder of an absolute right receives prefer-
ence over holders of other rights, specifically holders of relative rights. This effect is 
known as droit de préférence.48As well as being absolute the right of ownership is also 
 
41 Art. 544 CC states: ‘La propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la 
plus absolue, pourvu qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règle-
ments’, Feenstra 1976, p. 250 et seq., Feenstra 1990, p. 40. See Chapter 3; 2.1. Ownership. 
42 Van den Bergh 1988, p. 39-50.  
43 Van den Bergh 1988, p. 56, Feenstra 1990, p. 40, Smits 1996, p. 56. 
44 Wiegand 1976, p. 121, see Chapter 2; 4.3. Ownership. 
45 Translation by Haanappel & Mackaay 1990, Art. 5:1 (2) ‘-2 Het staat de eigenaar met uitslui-
ting van een ieder vrij van de zaak gebruik te maken, mits dit gebruikt niet strijdt met rechten 
van anderen en op wettelijke voorschriften en regels van ongeschreven recht gegronde beper-
kingen daarbij in acht worden genomen’. 
46 Pitlo et al. 2006, No. 22, p. 13. 
47 See Pitlo et al. 2006, Nos. 22 et seq., p. 13 et seq. 
48 Pitlo et al. 2006, Nos. 23, 24, p. 14. 
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unitary. The unitary nature of the right of ownership forms the basis of the system 
of property law in the Netherlands. It is impossible to have several types of owner-
ship on the same object. It is possible for several persons to have ownership at the 
same time as co-owners, but in situations of co-ownership, co-owners will always 
share the right, instead of each of them having a separate right of ownership.49 In 
other words a fragmentation of ownership is deemed impossible.50 This strict ap-
proach towards the right of ownership is expressed in other provisions in the Civil 
Code as well. Specifically in relation to the various forms of transfer of ownership 
the Dutch legislature has included Article 3:84 section 3 BW: 
A transfer of ownership for security purposes, or a transfer that does not intend to 
transfer the object to the patrimony of the acquirer, cannot be a valid title for transfer.51 
Dutch law only allows the transfer of ownership if there is a valid cause, which is 
confusingly named a title, a power to dispose of the current owner and an act of 
delivery.52 The cause needed for the transfer is usually a contract, but can have other 
forms as well, for instance, a legacy.53 The provision in Article 3:84 section 3 BW is a 
specific protection of the unitary concept of ownership. A transfer of ownership for 
security purposes, in Roman law known as a fiducia cum creditore, would deviate 
from the unitary nature of the right.54 A debtor who transfers his ownership to a 
creditor with the knowledge that, once he repays the loan that the transfer secures, 
the right of ownership will return to him, will continue to hold a certain right to the 
object. The question of the nature of the right of the debtor to the return of the object 
has been much debated. This debate is part of a larger debate on another problem 
with transfer of ownership that must be dealt with first. This problem concerns the 
conditional transfer of ownership. In Dutch law the right of ownership can be trans-
ferred under condition in two ways. First, the right of ownership can be transferred 
from A to B under a resolutive condition. Under such a transfer, B acquires owner-
ship, but not full ownership, because, on occurrence of the situation described in the 
condition, the right of ownership will return to A. Secondly, the right of ownership 
can be transferred from A to B under condition of suspension. Under such a trans-
fer, A will remain the owner, but not full owner, because, on occurrence of the situa-
tion described in the condition, the ownership will transfer to B. In the first situation 
of transfer, it is held that B has ownership under resolutive condition, ownership 
 
49 The co-owners will hold property in community or gemeenschap. See Arts. 3:166 et seq. BW, 
Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, Nos. 445 et seq., p. 496 et seq., Asser, Van Dam & 
Mijnsen 2002, No. 55, p. 66-67. 
50 Smits 1996, p. 57.  
51 Art. 3:84 sub 3 BW, ‘Een rechtshandeling die ten doel heft een goed over te dragen tot zeker-
heid of die de strekking mist het goed na de overdracht in het vermogen van de verkrijger te 
doen vallen, is geen geldige titel voor overdracht’. On this article see Heyman 1994, p. 1-14, 
Kleijn 1994, p. 15-17, Kortmann 1994, p. 18-23. 
52 Art. 3:84 sub 1 BW. On the Dutch system of transfer of ownership see Van Vliet 2000, p. 133 et 
seq. 
53 Pitlo et al. 2006, No. 113, p. 83-84. 
54 See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
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onder ontbindende voorwaarde. In the second situation of transfer A has ownership 
under condition of suspension, ownership onder opschortende voorwaarde.55 The con-
dition that is subject to these special transfers can be practically anything except a 
period of time, which is specifically prohibited by Article 3:85 BW.56 In Dutch law 
there is only one concept of ownership and, because the right of ownership is uni-
tary, it can only belong to one party. The result of this fundamental starting point is 
that either B will have ownership in case of a resolutive transfer, or that A will have 
ownership in case of a transfer under condition of suspension. The other party, A or 
B respectively, can have a right in respect of the object under condition, but this 
right logically cannot be ownership.57  
The debate centres on the nature of the remaining right. Granting a property 
right to the person expecting ownership would allow a better position than a per-
sonal right, especially in case of insolvency. However, in the system of Dutch prop-
erty law recognising such a property right is a difficult matter. The limited number 
of property rights recognised by the Civil Code does not include a lesser form of 
ownership or a property right similar to the position of the remaining party. 
Kortmann has argued that this other right is nothing more than an expectation of 
ownership or an eigendomsverwachting and that this is not a form of ownership, nor 
is it any other property right.58 In Dutch law, the expectation of ownership is just a 
personal right to acquire the right of ownership in case the condition for transfer is 
fulfilled.  
With this explanation the unitary nature of the right of ownership is upheld 
and no property rights are created outside the exhaustive list of property rights. It 
will depend on the situation which party is owner and which party will have an 
expectation of ownership. As a standard situation Kortmann mentions that the 
transferor will have ownership and the transferee an expectation of ownership. 
Only in case there has already been an actual delivery based on a resolutive condi-
tion, will the right of ownership transfer and the transferor will have an expectation 
of ownership.59 
 
55 Kortmann 1992, p. 199, Bartels 1997, p. 82, Van Vliet 2000, p. 36. 
56 A title for transfer of ownership under a condition of a certain period is changed, by opera-
tion of law to a title for the creation of a right of usufruct. A suspensive transfer of ownership 
for a certain period is changed to a full transfer of ownership and the creation of a right of 
usufruct for the benefit of the transferor. Art. 3:85 BW states: ‘-1 een verbintenis strekkende 
tot overdracht van een goed voor een bepaalde tijd, wordt aangemerkt als een verbintenis tot 
vestiging van een vruchtgebruik op het goed voor de gestelde tijd. -2 Een verbintenis strek-
kende tot overdracht van een goed onder opschortende tijdsbepaling, wordt aangemerkt als 
een verbintenis tot onmiddellijke overdracht van het goed met gelijktijdige vestiging van een 
vruchtgebruik van de vervreemder op het goed voor de gestelde tijd’. 
57 Kortmann 1992, p. 201, Aertsen 2004, p. 63-64. 
58 Kortmann 1992, p. 211. Compare in this respect the remainder in English law that is treated 
as a property right, but also the German Anwartschaftsrecht. See Chapter 4; 3.4. Expectation 
Rights, and Chapter 6; 1.1. Terminology. 
59 A transfer of ownership for security purposes, which is also a transfer under resolutive con-
dition, is not allowed in Dutch law. See Art. 3:84(3) BW and below; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
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2.2. Co-Ownership 
As mentioned in the last section, in Dutch law it is also possible for more than one 
person to share the right of ownership of an object. Like the German Civil Code, 
Dutch law makes use of the concept of community of objects, in Dutch gemeenschap, 
and the concept of shares in that community for the co-owners.60 The shares in the 
community of objects enable two or more persons to share the entitlement to an 
object between them.61 Instead of a right of ownership for each of them, the co-
owners will hold the ownership of the object between them. Because the concept of 
community is wider than just co-ownership, it can also include co-entitlement to 
other rights, the concept of community is dealt with in the third book of the Dutch 
Civil Code. Article 3:166(1) BW provides that a community of objects exists, when 
two or more persons are entitled to the same object.62  
The shares in a community are indivisible shares, reflecting the unitary nature 
of the right of ownership that is the object of the community. The share itself is a 
patrimonial right in the meaning of Article 3:6 BW and can be transferred to a third 
party, who will then hold the share in the community.63 Furthermore, a share can be 
burdened with a property right itself.64 The relation between the co-owners can be 
complicated depending on the number of co-owners and the nature of the right they 
are sharing. When nothing is specified each holder will hold an equal share in the 
community.65 The relation between the co-owners will be governed by the princi-
ples of fair and equal dealing, in Dutch, redelijkheid and billijkheid.66 Consequently, 
parties may reach agreements on the division of the shares and the ways in which 
the objects of the community are managed.67 
The nature of the right granted through the share in the community will there-
fore depend on the nature of the right that is object of the community. In case of a 
right of ownership, the co-owners, who are holders of the shares in the community 
of ownership, will be entitled to the benefits of the right of ownership proportional 
to their share.68 Also in the event that the community is dissolved and the objects 
must be divided or sold, each holder will be entitled to his share in the objects or in 
the proceeds proportional to his share. 
 
60 Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 349 et seq., Asser & Perrick 2007, No. 3, p. 5. 
61 Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 445, p. 496. 
62 Art. 3:166 BW, ‘Gemeenschap is aanwezig, wanneer een of meer goederen toebehoren aan 
twee of meer deelgenoten gezamelijk’. 
63 Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 352. 
64 Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 352-353, 364-366. 
65 Art. 3:166(2) BW, Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 352. 
66 Art. 3:166(3) BW. Asser & Perrick 2007, No. 7, p. 11. 
67 See Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 253, Struycken 2007, p. 636-637. 
68 Asser & Perrick 2007, Nos. 10 et seq., p. 15 et seq. 
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2.3. Security Ownership 
The best example of a resolutive transfer of ownership is the transfer of ownership 
for security purposes, although this is no longer allowed under the new Civil Code. 
An example of a transfer under the condition of suspension is the reservation of 
ownership, known in Dutch as eigendomsvoorbehoud, provided by Article 3:92 BW.69 
The latter type of security can be created in three situations that are specifically 
listed by the Civil Code itself.70 Each of these situations concerns two parties in-
volved in a transaction that includes a transfer of ownership. The first is when the 
transferee must still perform his obligation under a contract to deliver objects or 
future objects. The claim on the performance of the obligation, for which a reser-
vation of ownership can be made, creates a wide variety of possibilities to use the 
reservation instrument.71 Although usually the obligation will be the payment of 
money, the reservation of ownership is not restricted to this. The second is when the 
transferee must still perform an obligation under a contract to carry out some work 
or deliver an object. The third is when a claim arises on the transferee for non-
performance of the obligation to carry out work or to deliver an object. 
The reservation of ownership results in a right of ownership for the seller and 
a personal right to the expectation of ownership for the buyer. Only when the buyer 
performs his obligation under the contract entered into with the seller, will he 
acquire the right of ownership.  
The theory of expectation of ownership, which was dealt with above, applies 
both to transfer of ownership for security purposes and to the conditional transfer 
of ownership, but the difference in Dutch law is that the transfer for security 
purposes is prohibited by Article 3:84 sub 3 BW, while the reservation of ownership 
is not.72 
Under the old BW there was the possibility for a transfer of ownership for 
security purposes.73 The old BW provided very strict rules for the rights of pledge 
and hypothec. Specifically in respect of the right of pledge, Article 1198 sub 2 old 
BW provided that a right of pledge could not be created when the object would re-
main with the pledgee or when the object would immediately return to the pledgee 
after the creation of the property right.74 The Hoge Raad interpreted this article in a 
 
69 See also Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 101-104, 730 et seq. 
70 Art. 3:92(2) BW. 
71 See Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 734. 
72 Art. 3:84 section 4 BW restricts a transfer under suspensive condition but does not prohibit it, 
Art. 3:92 BW specifically authorises the transfer under suspensive condition for movable 
objects. On the Dutch approach to the expectation of ownership as a purely personal right see 
above; 2.1. Normal Ownership. See also Struycken 2007, p. 60 et seq. 
73 HR 25 January 1929, NJ 1929, 616, Feenstra 1990, p. 98-99, Kliebisch 1997, p. 75-78, Asser, 
Beekhuis, De Haan 1985, No. 296, p. 184-185, Struycken 2007, p. 60-61. 
74 Art. 1198 section 2 reads ‘het [the right of pledge, BA] is niet bestaanbaar op zaken, die in de 
magt van den schuldenaar of den pandgever worden gelaten of met den wil van den schuld-
eischer terugkeren’. It [the right of pledge, BA] can not exist on objects that are left within the 
possession of the debtor or pledgee or which, with consent of the creditor, return to him. 
Asser, Mijnsen & Van Velten 1986, No. 172, p. 137-138. 
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strict sense and held that it only applied to rights of pledge. With this decision the 
Hoge Raad created the possibility of transferring ownership for security purposes, or 
in Roman terms, a fiducia cum creditore.75 In the event of such a transfer the posses-
sion, factual control, would remain with the transferor.76  
In other words, allowing a transfer of ownership for security purposes solved 
the lack of a non-possessory pledge in Dutch law. This specific transfer of owner-
ship was carried out by the creation of a title of transfer, a contract and a special 
form of delivery, whereby the parties agree that the transferor would hold the prop-
erty for the transferee, known as a delivery constitutum possessorium.77  
As a result of this transfer of ownership, the creditor would now have more 
rights than he needed and the debtor would have to trust the creditor to treat the 
object properly until it was returned. Not surprisingly, in later cases the Hoge Raad 
corrected some of this inequality in powers. When, in 1929, the Hoge Raad accepted 
the obligation of the debtor to give his objects as security as a valid contract leading 
to a transfer of the ownership of those objects, it accepted the contract as a valid 
cause for transfer. At a later stage the Hoge Raad accepted that a contract to transfer 
ownership of an object for security purposes is not the same as a regular contract for 
the transfer of ownership. Moreover, the Hoge Raad accepted that there are situa-
tions in which the transfer of ownership for security purposes should be neglected.78  
Neglecting the transfer for security purposes could be necessary in respect to 
the recognition of rights of third parties with regard to the objects serving as securi-
ty. These third parties could be creditors of the debtor that, under specific provi-
sions of the law, had a priority right. Examples of such priority rights include the 
right of an unpaid seller, because he delivered the object serving as security to the 
debtor, and the debtor would not have had the object if the seller had not delivered. 
Other examples are the right of a transport company that provided Customs ser-
vices by paying levies for the debtor, and the right of a seller who transferred the 
object that was transferred for security purposes, but who had not yet received 
payment.79  
As a result of the case law of the Hoge Raad, the right of ownership acquired 
for security purposes is different from the right of ownership acquired in another 
situation. Moreover, because there are certain situations in which the transfer of 
ownership for security purposes can be neglected in respect to certain persons, 
security ownership is not as absolute as regular ownership. In those situations 
where the creditors have priority rights, the transfer is considered not to have 
occurred and the debtor will be treated as owner instead. Consequently, the debtor 
 
75 On Roman law see Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
76 HR 25 January 1929, NJ 1929, 616 (Beer brewery) and HR 21 June 1929, NJ 1929, 1096 (Luxury 
car-lease), on delivery constitutum possessorium see Van Vliet 2000, p. 51 note 96. 
77 The power to dispose of the debtor is highly relevant since if the debtor is not owner himself 
there can be no transfer of ownership Asser, Mijnsen & Van Velten 1986, No. 175, p. 141, Van 
Vliet 2000, p. 53, 127. 
78 HR 6 March 1970, NJ 1970, 433, HR 7 March 1975, NJ 1976, 91, Asser, Mijnsen & Van Velten 
1986, No. 178, p. 144, Brahn 1988, p. 90 et seq. 
79 HR 6 March 1970, NJ 1970, 433, HR 7 March 1975, NJ 1976, 91, Brahn 1988, p. 92-93. 
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will have a certain right of ownership that can only be used in these specific cases. 
In respect to the rest of the world, the creditor will be owner. 
Apart from this relative concept of ownership there is also fragmentation of 
ownership in another sense, because both parties continue to have rights of owner-
ship. In other words, both debtor and creditor continue to hold a fragment of the 
right of ownership during the existence of the bargain. In this respect, the charac-
terisation of the right of ownership for security purposes in a situation where the 
secured claim has ceased to exist is problematic. The majority of authors have 
concluded that the right of security ownership was of an accessory nature, depend-
ent on the claim whose performance it secured. Therefore ownership was con-
sidered to revert to the debtor the moment the claim ceased to exist, with no further 
action needed.80 In this theory the right of the debtor to the return of the right of 
ownership was considered a fragment of the right of ownership.81 
The Hoge Raad never decided on this matter, but did decide that a transfer for 
security purposes was a resolutive transfer of ownership and that, with the pay-
ment of the debt, the condition would be fulfilled and the right of ownership would 
fully transfer back to the debtor.82 This accessory nature of the ownership for securi-
ty purposes has led some authors to conclude that this transfer creates nothing more 
than a right of pledge, although a non-possessory type of pledge.83 
The Hoge Raad even decided that the rules in the old BW on the right of pledge 
should also be applied to the right of ownership for security purposes.84 As a result 
the right of ownership of the creditor could hardly be qualified as normal owner-
ship any longer.85 However, in theory, the rights of the debtor in respect to the 
object serving as security remained personal, an expectation of ownership, unless 
there was a specific situation where a creditor held a priority right and the transfer 
could be neglected. Moreover, in theory, the right of the creditor continued to be 
ownership.  
However, in effect the absolute and unitary concept of ownership under the 
old BW was deviated from and Meijers, the drafter of the new BW, refused to accept 
a transfer for security purposes in this new civil code.86 The result of this refusal 
eventually became known as the fiducia-ban of Article 3:84 section 3 BW. The second 
part of section 3 of this Article prohibits a transfer of ownership whereby the 
transferred object does not end up in the transferee’s set of assets and debts, and 
refers to the Roman fiducia cum amico.87 Even though, in a strict sense, this type of 
transfer is not a transfer of ownership for security purposes, the approach Dutch 
law takes in respect to both forms of fiducia, cum creditore and cum amico, is almost 
 
80 Asser, Mijnsen & Van Velten 1986, No. 181, p. 146-147. 
81 See also Struycken 2007, p. 62. 
82 HR 3 October 1980, NJ 1981, 60, Asser, Mijnsen & Van Velten 1986, No. 182, p. 147-148. 
83 Asser, Mijnsen & Van Velten 1986, No.181, p. 147. 
84 HR 3 January 1941, NJ 1941, 470 (Boerenleenbank Hazerswoude/Los), see Van Mierlo 1988, p. 15. 
85 Struycken 2007, p. 62. 
86 Meijers 1948, p. 89 et seq., Kortmann 1995, p. 455 et seq. 
87 Heyman 1994, p. 5. 
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the same.88 During the drafting of the fiducia-ban Article this second type of transfer, 
the transfer for management purposes, was also discussed thoroughly. The reason 
for this discussion was the possible introduction of a common law trust in Dutch 
law.89 
A transfer that does not result in the object becoming part of the set of assets 
and debts of the acquirer is, at least in the interpretation of the Dutch legislature, a 
trust.90 A trust is a special device that can, under certain circumstances, entitle the 
acquirer to a property right in respect of the acquired object, but without the object 
becoming part of the set of assets and debts of the acquirer. Instead, the object falls 
into the set of assets and debts of the person managing them who will, under 
circumstances, also have a property right.91 
The Dutch legislature specifically refused to recognise such a construction 
where both the acquirer and the transferee of an object would have a property right. 
It especially rejected the possibility that these property rights are considered as 
ownership, a situation in which both the manager as well as the transferee would 
hold a right of ownership, the unitary concept of ownership in Dutch law does not 
allow for such a fragmentation.92 
In a landmark decision the Hoge Raad dealt with the application of Article 3:84 
sub 3 BW. This case dealt with a sale-and-lease-back of certain machinery, financed 
by a financial company called Sogelease.93 Although most of the decision focuses on 
the security aspects of the sale-and-lease-back, the Hoge Raad also dealt with the 
prohibition of the fiducia cum amico.94 The case concerned a transaction whereby a 
firm, De Zaaiers BV, bought and took delivery of certain printing presses from a 
supplier, and contracted with Sogelease for the transfer of ownership of the presses 
and for the payment of the original purchase price by Sogelease to the supplier. At 
the same time a leasing agreement was entered into that obliged De Zaaiers BV to 
pay a yearly sum to Sogelease for seven years, after which the printing presses 
could be bought back for a token sum of money.  
The whole bargain was executed before the BW came into force and the ques-
tion before the Hoge Raad was whether this was a transfer of ownership for security 
purposes as was now prohibited under Article 3:84 sub 3 BW. In dealing with this 
question, the Hoge Raad distinguished between transfers for security purposes, in 
which there is at least some fragmentation of the right of ownership, and actual 
transfers, in Dutch werkelijke overdrachten, in which there is a full transfer of owner-
 
88 Also in French law, both forms of fiducia are usually considered together. See Chapter 3; 4.5. 
Fiducie. 
89 See below; 4.9. EC and International Influences. 
90 On the law of trust see Chapter 6; 1.5. Trust Law. 
91 In any case, the subject of the trust must be a property right. A trust of a personal right will 
not give the manager, i.e. the trustee, or the beneficiary a property rights. Trusts are simply a 
way of holding rights. On this see Swadling 2000a, p. 275-276. 
92 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 17-18. More will be stated about this 
debate below in 5. A Numerus Clausus in Dutch Property Law? Against this conception of a 
trust as a fragmentation of ownership see Chapter 6; 1.5. Trust Law. 
93 HR 19 May 1995, NJ 1996/119 (Sogelease). 
94 See also Struycken 2007, p. 63. 
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ship and the seller is left with only personal obligations, not a fragment of the right 
of ownership.95 The first type, a transfer for security purposes, is prohibited by 
Article 3:84 sub 3 BW, but the second type, the actual transfer, can escape the ambit 
of the Article. In this case escaping the ambit of the Article required an actual 
transfer of ownership to Sogelease, leaving De Zaaiers BV with a mere contractual 
duty of payment, and a personal right to purchase the printing presses after the 
lease had expired for a set amount of money. Finally, the Hoge Raad specifically 
stated that the doctrine of actual transfers would also apply in case of a fiducia cum 
amico.96 In other words, in Dutch law it is only possible to transfer ownership of an 
object for management purposes if the full right of ownership is transferred to the 
manager and the beneficiary is left with only personal rights. 
About ten years later, the Hoge Raad delivered another judgment on the con-
cept of an actual transfer.97 In this case, the Hoge Raad refined its judgment in the 
Sogelease case and held that, in order to decide whether a transfer is an actual trans-
fer, the contract underlying the transfer must be interpreted.98 The case concerned a 
transfer of agricultural machines in a sale-and-lease-back transaction. The value of 
the machines was about twice the value of the sum of money that was received in 
return.99 The Hoge Raad held that for the purposes of the transfer, the over value of 
the machines had no effect, but that over value could be an indication for the court 
interpreting the contract underlying the transfer to decide that the transfer would 
fall under the fiducia-ban of Article 3:84(3) BW.100 When an actual transfer has been 
made, the acquirer will still become full owner and will be entitled to vindicate the 
objects in case of insolvency of the other party. 
These examples of cases show the rigidity of Dutch law in respect of the 
unitary and absolute nature of the right of ownership. The judgment in the Sogelease 
case shows that the absolute and unitary nature of the right of ownership are 
connected; a limitation to the absoluteness will usually imply a deviation from the 
unitary nature of the right of ownership. Awarding a lesser form of ownership to a 
creditor, leaving the debtor with the remaining ownership, would mean a deviation 
in content of the right as well as creating multiple forms of ownership, since the 
debtor will continue to have a limited form of ownership as well.101 
However, many elements restrict the absoluteness of the right of ownership in 
Dutch law. Both public law and private law regulations ensure that the absoluteness 
of the right, as far as the form the right takes and the content of the right is con-
cerned, is less absolute than it was considered in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
 
95 HR 19 May 1995, NJ 1996/119 (Sogelease), Para. 3.4.3. For a similar discussion in French law 
see Crocq 1995, p. 59 et seq. 
96 HR 19 May 1995, NJ 1996/119 (Sogelease), Para. 3.6. 
97 HR 18 November 2005, NJ 2006/151 (BTL Lease). 
98 HR 18 November 2005, NJ 2006/151 (BTL Lease), Para. 3.5.2. 
99 On the case see also Struycken 2007, p. 504-505. 
100 HR 18 November 2005, NJ 2006/151 (BTL Lease), Para. 3.5.2. 
101 On the same conclusion see Struycken 2007, p. 64. 
 268 
Dutch Law 
centuries.102 Nevertheless, in Dutch legal doctrine the right of ownership remains 
absolute and unitary.103 Two examples will illustrate this. First, in respect to third-
party protection, the fair and equal results that Dutch law seeks to achieve create a 
relative element in the right of ownership.104 If owner A lends a certain object to B, 
who subsequently sells the object to C, and C has no reason to suspect B is not the 
owner and pays a good price, there is no transfer of ownership.105 B is not an owner 
but a detentor of the object and therefore cannot transfer more right than he has. In 
terms of Article 3:84 sub 1 BW, B lacks the power to dispose over the object.106 
However, through application of Article 3:86 sub 1 BW, if he acted in good faith and 
for a reasonable price, C still acquires ownership over the object.107 A has not com-
mitted himself to a transfer of ownership, nor has he fulfilled any of the relevant 
requirements in Article 3:84 sub 1 BW himself. Nevertheless, the result of the appli-
cation of Article 3:86 sub 1 BW is that A has to respect that his right of ownership 
transfers to C. Because in Dutch doctrine ownership is unitary, only one of them can 
have the right of ownership.108  
Secondly, in the last few decades there has been a discussion on the possible 
recognition of economic ownership in Dutch law. Proponents of this theory argue 
for a distinction between legal ownership and economic ownership.109 During the 
debate on the concept of ownership, the drafters of the new BW specifically refused 
a division between legal and economic ownership by explicit statement that they 
wanted to preserve the unitary nature of the right of ownership. Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, Dutch law refuses to recognise a trust device, which in the eyes of 
the majority of Dutch doctrine, leads to a fragmentation of ownership.110 
Nevertheless, economic ownership is recognised in Dutch law, but because of 
the clear doctrine on the unitary nature of the right of ownership, economic owner-
 
102 In public law this is mainly due to developments in society and new ideas on the function of 
the government. Van den Bergh 1988, p. 56 et seq. See also Chapter 3; 2.1. Ownership, and 
Chapter 4; 2.1. Normal Ownership. 
103 Kortmann & Van Hees 1995, p. 994. 
104 In Dutch redelijkheid en billijkheid, see Art. 6:248 BW. 
105 Art. 3:84 sub 1 BW. Dutch law requires a valid cause, i.e. underlying agreement, a power to 
dispose, and an act of delivery for a valid transfer. 
106 This is an application of the nemo potest plus iuris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet or nemo 
plus principle. Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, Nos. 331 et seq., p. 357 et seq. 
107 Art. 3:86 sub 1 BW states: Despite the lack of power to dispose on the side of the transferor, a 
transfer according to Arts. 90, 91 or 93 of a movable non-registrable object, is valid if the 
transfer is for due value and the transferee is in good faith. ‘Ondanks onbevoegdheid van de 
vervreemder is een overdracht overeenkomstig artikel 90, 91 of 93 van een roerende zaak, 
niet-registergoed, of een recht aan toonder of order geldig, indien de overdracht anders dan 
om niet geschiedt en de verkrijger te goeder trouw is’. 
108 HR 5 May 1950, NJ 1951, 1 (Damhof/State), Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 
325, p. 351, Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 132-133. 
109 See, inter alia, Slagter 1992, p. 357 et seq., Huijgen 1995. The Netherlands is not the only 
country to consider recognition of economic ownership. See e.g. for French law Crocq 1995,  
p. 149 et seq. 
110 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 17-18. 
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ship can be nothing more than a set of personal rights and obligations.111 Economic 
ownership was originally introduced into Dutch law through case law of the Hoge 
Raad on taxation.112 Until legislative interference, it frequently happened that an im-
movable object was sold, with the payment of the purchase price, and the agree-
ment that the benefits and risks would be for the purchaser, and that no transfer of 
the legal ownership would take place. Instead economic ownership would be trans-
ferred and no transfer taxes or levies were due.113  
As a further development in the area of private law, the concept of economic 
ownership has become recognised. Examples include certificate holders in case of 
certification of shares in company law, and rights of holders of property rights of 
rights of emphyteusis or usufruct on certain parts of the object, for example, buil-
dings or improvements to buildings made by them.114 The certification of shares 
deserves some extra attention. In Dutch law a certificate is a set of personal rights 
and obligations in respect to a certain object or set of objects, which itself can be 
subject of property rights.115 With the use of the possibility of certification it is 
possible to transfer the right of ownership of these objects to someone else under 
agreement that this person will manage the object for the benefit of the transferee. In 
Dutch law this construction is known as the transfer for management purposes, or 
eigendomsoverdracht ten titel van beheer, and is used for family estate planning.116 This 
solution allows parents to transfer certain objects, say shares and other equities, to a 
legal person, such as a foundation, which will issue certificates in return to the 
parents, combined with the agreement that the legal person will manage the objects 
for the benefit of the certificate holder. The certificates entitle the certificate holder 
to the value of the objects. The parents then donate the certificates to their 
children.117 The construction enables parents to provide wealth to their children 
without concerns about whether the children could manage such property.118 
Furthermore, the power of the manager to dispose of the objects is limited, by the 
agreement for transfer for management purposes and, if applicable, the rules apply-
ing to the foundation.119 This situation is an appearance of the fiducia cum amico as 
well and is held possible because the full ownership of the objects is transferred, 
constituting an actual transfer, and the creditors remain with personal rights. Certi-
fication therefore allows parties to work around the fiducia-ban of Article 3:84 sub 3 
BW. 
 
111 Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 483, p. 547. 
112 Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 483, p. 547 et seq., Huijgen 1995, p. 12 et seq. 
113 All requirements, but the act of delivery from Art. 3:84 BW are fulfilled, Huijgen 1995, p. 12. 
114 Under the rule of superficies solo cedit, the ownership of buildings is with the owner of the 
land, unless a right of superficies has been created. On the right of superficies and the rule of 
superficies solo cedit see below; 3.3. Superficies. Asser & Maeijer 2000, Nos. 403 et seq., p. 571 et 
seq., Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 483, p. 547, Bos 2005, p. 164 et seq. 
115 Aertsen 2004, p. 118-119, Asser & Maeijer 2000, Nos. 403 et seq., p. 570 et seq. 
116 Vegter 2004, p. 108. 
117 Example taken from Vegter 2004, p. 108, see also Aertsen 2004, p. 114 et seq. 
118 Furthermore, there are many fiscal advantages to a transfer of ownership for management 
purposes, which fall outside the scope of this study. See, inter alia, Vegter 2004, p. 105 et seq.  
119 Aertsen 2004, p. 114. 
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3. Other Property Rights 
The new definition of the right of ownership in Article 5:1 BW defines the right as 
the most extensive right a person can have. The words ‘most extensive’ emphasise 
the absolute and unitary nature of the right of ownership, but suggest that there 
may also be other, less extensive, property rights. In Dutch law, property rights 
other than ownership are known as beperkte rechten, or limited rights. Like the right 
of ownership, these limited property rights are absolute and unitary rights. These 
rights have effect against the world and cannot be fragmented so that two persons 
each hold a fragment of the same limited right. However, like the right of owner-
ship, two or more persons can share a limited right as a whole by making use of a 
community, gemeenschap.120 
In Dutch property law, a limited property right is considered as a part of the 
right of ownership that is in the hands of another person. Based on the French 
approach of démembrement of property rights, the creation of property rights in the 
Netherlands is perceived as a transfer of parts of the powers contained in the right 
of ownership to another person in the form of a property right.121 In this respect 
Article 3:8 BW states: 
A limited right is a right that is derived from a more comprehensive right.122 
From this description of limited rights in Dutch law, the creation of a property right 
in respect of a property right is also possible, and is also considered to be a transfer 
of parts of the powers of the more comprehensive property right to the more limited 
right.123 Article 3:8 BW, in other words, specifically enables parties to build limited 
property rights on top of each other, a method also known as stacking of rights. 
The method of creation of property rights in Dutch law is not debated. 
Struycken has shown that, alternatively from the démembrement method, which he 
terms the subtraction method, there is also the limitation method, which he terms 
the mirror method, which was considered during the draft of the new BW.124 
Struycken further shows that in Dutch doctrine there is no consensus, but also no 
debate, on the method that is followed by Dutch law.125 
Under the currently applied démembrement method, property rights comprise 
parts of the mother right from which they are derived. Therefore, these rights are 
known as limited rights or beperkte rechten. Furthermore, property rights created on 
corporeal objects, zaken, are known as zakelijke rechten. Because of their method of 
creation these rights are, in principle, also limited rights.126  
 
120 On this type of co-entitlement see above; 2.2. Co-Ownership. 
121 Art. 3:8 BW, Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 10, p. 11. 
122 Art. 3:8 BW, ‘Een beperkt recht is afgeleid uit een meer omvattend recht’. 
123 In support of this statement the Dutch Civil Code declares the provisions on transfer of 
property rights applicable to the creation of property rights as well. Art. 3:98 BW. 
124 Struycken 2007, p. 361-363. 
125 Struycken 2007, p. 363-366. 
126 The exception is the right of apartment that is dealt with in below in 3.5. Right of Apartment. 
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Rights created on incorporeal objects cannot be zakelijke rechten and therefore 
are only limited rights. For the purposes of consistent terminology, and to serve 
comparative conclusions, this chapter uses the expression ‘property rights’ to de-
note limited rights as well as limited zakelijke rechten, unless stated otherwise. 
Through the démembrement method there is a specific relation between the 
right of ownership and limited rights. All are considered property rights, but 
ownership will always be the principal right from which limited rights are de-
rived.127 It is possible that limited rights function as a source for other limited rights. 
However, the right of ownership, as the most extensive right, can only function as 
the principal right. Moreover, like in French law, a property right that comes back to 
the owner of the same object, in principle, ceases to exist.128 When the powers that 
were transferred from the right of ownership to another person in the form of a 
property right other than ownership return to the owner, through mixing the right 
of ownership becomes full and complete again.129 However, there is an exception to 
this rule, although not to the extent that it is accepted in German law.130 Also in 
Dutch law the legislature was confronted with the rights of third parties in a prop-
erty right that ceases to exist through mixing with the powers of the owner when 
the property right and the right of ownership from which that property right was 
derived fall into the same hands. Therefore, some property rights will not cease to 
exist in relation to those who already had a property right in respect of the property 
right that falls into the hand of the owner. Furthermore, mixing of powers and, with 
that, the destruction of a property right, also does not have effect in respect to those 
who held another property right in respect of the same object and were forced to 
recognise the existence of the destroyed property right.131 For example, a holder of a 
right of pledge on a right of usufruct will not automatically acquire a right of pledge 
on the ownership of an object once the right of usufruct and the right of ownership 
fall into the same hands. In other words, in respect to the démembrement model in 
Dutch law, the destruction of property rights through mixing with the rights and 
powers of the right of ownership – when ownership and limited property right fall 
into the same hands – is given relative effect in respect to third parties with a right 
in respect of that same right or on the same object. 
Dutch law is traditionally held to adhere to a closed list of property rights.132 
In Dutch law only those property rights that are recognised by law can be property 
rights. Especially after the interference of the Hoge Raad in respect to security owner-
 
127 Dutch law uses the terms mother and daughter rights, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, Nos. 
7, 10, p. 7, 11, Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 15. 
128 Art. 3:81(3) BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 13, p. 15-16. 
129 Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 10, p. 11. 
130 On the German exception through Para. 889 BGB, see 4 German Law; 3. Other Property 
Rights. 
131 See below; 4.5. After-Effects of Property Rights. 
132 Although not everybody agrees on this, the parliamentary history states that at the outset the 
system is closed. Whether this is the case will be subject of examination below in 5. A 
Numerus Clausus in Dutch Property Law? See Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 
1981, p. 3, Struycken 2007, p. 211-216. 
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ship under the old BW, the recognition of new property rights under the new civil 
code is, in principle, for the legislature.133  
3.1. Real Servitudes 
In Dutch law the right of real servitude is known as the right of erfdienstbaarheid. The 
Dutch term reveals that a right of servitude exists in relation to a specific piece of 
land, in Dutch erf, and that these are not personal servitudes such as exist in French 
and German law.134 Dutch law deals with rights of servitude in the civil code. 
Article 5:70 BW provides a definition of the right: 
1. A right of servitude is a burden, with which an immovable object, the servient land, 
is burdened for the benefit of another immovable object, the dominant land.135 
The requirement of two pieces of land is essential for the right of servitude to exist. 
The old BW of 1838 stated in Article 721 that the servitude had to be for the benefit, 
in Dutch ten nutte, of the dominant land.136 Under the old BW, the terminology ten 
nutte gave rise to a debate on the interpretation of the right of real servitude. Van 
Oven argued for a broad interpretation and a central place of the intention of the 
parties.137 In legal practice, the requirement of benefit was further connected to the 
requirement that the two pieces of land should be in close vicinity of each other, and 
that the right of servitude itself must be created perpetually.138 The new definition 
provided by Article 5:70 BW uses a different wording, which is to be interpreted as 
no longer including the requirement of vicinity. Therefore, under the new Civil 
Code it is possible to create a right of servitude between pieces of land that are far 
apart.139 Article 5:71 BW provides further requirements for the content of the 
servitude: 
1. The burden that a right of servitude imposes on the servient land consists of a duty 
to allow or refrain from something on, above or under one of the pieces of land. In 
addition, the deed of creation can contain an agreement that the burden includes a 
duty to construct buildings, works or plantings that are required for the exercise of 
 
133 See above; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
134 In Roman law terms, the right of real servitude in Dutch law includes both rural and urban 
praedial servitudes. Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 169, p. 195, Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 472. 
See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. On French and German Law see Chapter 3; 3.1. 
Real Servitudes, and Chapter 4; 3.1. Real Servitudes. 
135 Art. 5:70 ‘-1 Een erfdienstbaarheid is een last, waarmede een onroerende zaak – het dienende 
erf – ten behoeve van een andere onroerende zaak – het heersende erf – is bezwaard’. 
136 Art 721 stated ‘Erfdienstbaarheid is een last waarmede een erf bezwaard is, tot gebruik en ten 
nutte van een erf, hetwelk aan eenen anderen eigenaar toebehoort’, Asser, Van Dam & 
Mijnsen 2002, No. 172, p. 198, Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
137 See Maeijer 1966, p. 8. 
138 Asser, Beekhuis & Davids 1990, Nos. 210, 211, p. 203-204, Smalbraak 1966, p. 90, Davids 1988, 
p. 138. 
139 The interpretation centres on the terms ten nutte van and ten behoeve van. Asser, Van Dam & 
Mijnsen 2002, No. 172, p. 198-199. 
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the right of servitude, under the condition that these buildings, works or plantings 
are entirely or partly on the servient land.140 
The Dutch legislature deliberately left the definition of servitudes as open as possi-
ble.141 There are as few restrictions as possible and parties are left as free as possible 
to decide on the contents of their right themselves.142 Furthermore it is clear that the 
legislature, although using the word erf, indicating a piece of land, included the 
possibility to create a right of servitude on all immovable objects.143 The result of 
this is that a right of servitude can also be created in relation to objects on the land, 
for instance, a certain building or plants or trees.  
Article 5:71 sub 1 BW defines the outer limits of party autonomy. It connects 
the burden to servient land. This first sentence of the Article is intended to empha-
sise that a right of servitude is a property right that is attached to an erf. A right of 
servitude will therefore transfer with the ownership of either piece of land.144 A 
right of servitude must impose a negative burden. However, it is possible to include 
certain positive duties in a right of servitude. These positive duties, which should be 
seen as an exception to the rule that servitudes can only impose a negative burden, 
are mentioned in the Article. However, the positive duties mentioned by Article 
5:70 BW cannot be the main burden of the right of servitude.145 Another possibility 
to include positive duties is mentioned by the second paragraph of Article 5:70 BW:  
2. The burden that a right of servitude imposes on the servient land can also consist of 
a duty to maintain the servient land or buildings, works or plantings that are, or 
will be, entirely or partly on the servient land.146 
Paragraph 2 of Article 5:70 BW allows a right of servitude to comprise a positive 
burden in specific situations. The reason for this is that the legislature specifically 
intended to allow municipalities to impose burdens of maintenance on residents 
facing a public road.147 Such a burden could contain a duty to put up fences to 
separate pieces of land and to maintain gardens on behalf of the right of servitude 
in respect to this public road. However, the burden a right of servitude imposes 
cannot comprise a duty to conduct a legal act, in Dutch a rechtshandeling. The 
 
140 Art. 5:71 ‘-1 De last die een erfdienstbaarheid op het dienende erf legt, bestaat in een verplich-
ting om op, boven of onder een der beide erven iets te dulden of niet te doen. In de akte van 
vestiging kan worden bepaald dat de last bovendien een verplichting inhoudt tot het aan-
brengen van gebouwen, werken of beplantingen die voor de uitoefening van die erfdienst-
baarheid nodig zijn, mits deze gebouwen, werken of beplantingen zich geheel of gedeeltelijk 
op het dienende erf zullen bevinden’. 
141 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 254-255. 
142 Art. 5:73 BW. 
143 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 170, p. 196. 
144 Art. 3:7 BW. 
145 Pitlo et al. 2006, No. 614, p. 474. 
146 Art. 5:71 BW, ‘-2 De last die een erfdienstbaarheid op het dienende erf legt, kan ook bestaan 
in een verplichting tot onderhoud van het dienende erf of van gebouwen, werken of beplan-
tingen die zich geheel of gedeeltelijk op het dienende erg bevingen of zullen bevinden’. 
147 Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 615-616. 
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burden must impose a duty to refrain from a factual act, not a legal act. As a result 
of this restriction there are limitations on the use of servitudes in certain situations. 
For example, a duty to prohibit the sale of the object on which a right of servitude is 
created cannot be a valid right of servitude.148  
Even though there are restrictions on the content of servitudes, the Dutch 
legislature has left the category of servitudes itself wide open. Contrary to the old 
Dutch Civil Code, the old BW, there is just one type of servitude and there is no 
distinction in treatment. The old Civil Code made distinctions between visible, 
invisible, continuing, and non-continuing rights of servitudes.149 This distinction 
was particularly relevant in respect to acquisitive prescription, which is the acquisi-
tion of a right of servitude through lapse of time.150 Furthermore, the old civil code 
recognised specific servitudes that were subject to different criteria.151  
In the new Civil Code there is only one type of servitude which, as long as 
parties remain within the criteria stipulated by the provisions on the right of servi-
tude in the code, is a property right, and will transfer with the ownership of the 
respective pieces of land. Moreover, it is also possible to create a right of servitude 
between holders of property rights in respect of two pieces of land; the holders of 
the right of servitude need not be owners.152 These holders will create the servitude 
in their capacity as holder of a property right in respect of the land and the right of 
servitude will therefore be connected to the property right and not directly to the 
ownership of the land. If the property right of the right-holder ceases to exist, so 
will the servitude.153 A right of servitude will also cease to exist when the two pieces 
of land fall in the ownership of the same person and there are no holders of proper-
ty rights in respect of either of the pieces of land.154 In these situations, the right of 
servitude will mix with the right of ownership of both pieces of land and can there-
fore no longer exist. Even if at a later stage the tenements are separated in owner-
ship once more, the servitude will have to be re-created.155 
 
148 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 174, p. 201. 
149 Arts. 724 and 725 OBW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 170, p. 195-196. 
150 Van Vliet 2004, p. 223. 
151 Arts. 727-734 OBW, these rights include inter alia rights of view (uitzicht), light (licht) and 
watercourse (waterloop). 
152 Art. 5:84 BW. These property rights are usufruct, emphyteusis or superficies, Asser, Van Dam & 
Mijnsen 2002, Nos. 173, 207, p. 199, 223. 
153 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 207, p. 224. 
154 It is possible to have a right of servitude when both the dominant and servient tenement are 
owned by the same person but the servitude is created between the owner and the right-
holder of a property right in respect of either of the tenements. See Asser, Van Dam & 
Mijnsen 2002, No. 173, p. 199. 
155 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 204, p. 222. A right of servitude for the pater familias as 
is recognised in French law is therefore unknown to Dutch law. On this French type of servi-
tude, see Chapter 3; 3.1. Real Servitudes. 
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3.2. Usufruct 
In Roman law the right of usufruct fell under the general category of servitudes. 
Specifically a right of usufruct on land was widely used. However, the personal 
nature of the right, which refers to the connection of the property right to a person, 
and the fear of associating the right with personal burdens that existed under the 
ancien régime, have led to the recognition of a distinct property right in Dutch law.156 
A right of usufruct is a property right that entitles the holder to the user and the 
fruits of a certain object. This object can be corporeal, immovable or movable, and 
incorporeal. However, the right of usufruct remains connected to the usufructuary 
as a person. The property right will exist as long as the usufructuary lives or for a 
period of time agreed in the agreement that created the right. If the right of usufruct 
is created on behalf of a legal person, the maximum duration of the right is thirty 
years.157 
Contrary to the requirements in Roman law, that have been adopted in both 
French and German law, the Dutch civil code does not require the usufructuary to 
return the object in the state he received it when the usufruct comes to an end. With 
the introduction of the new Civil Code, the Dutch legislature has chosen to extend 
the scope of usufructs, opening the possibilities for a wide variety of applications of 
the right.158  
Book 3 of the new BW provides a general set of rules applicable to usufructs, 
but different parts of the Civil Code are also applicable to specific situations.159 
These specific parts include the law of succession, where specific rules for specific 
types of usufructs are provided.160 Insofar as no specific legislation applies, the 
general rules on usufruct from book 3 of the BW will apply. In this general part, the 
right of usufruct is dealt with in Article 3:201 BW, which states: 
Usufruct provides the right to use and take the fruits of objects that belong to someone 
else.161 
The legislature left the definition of the right of usufruct open, with the intention 
that the content of the right of usufruct can be further defined by the parties them-
selves. Article 3:207 BW states in this respect: 
1. A usufructuary can use and use up the objects under usufruct in accordance with 
the agreement made upon creation, or when such agreement is missing, in accord-
 
156 Lévy & Castaldo 2002, p. 639, Asser, Beekhuis & Davids 1990, No. 350, p. 300 et seq. 
157 Art. 3:203 BW. 
158 Art. 3:215 BW, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 3 1981, p. 639 et seq., Van Gaalen 
2001, p. 23 et seq., 76-77, Bos 2005, p. 5. 
159 Arts. 3:201 et seq. BW. 
160 See, inter alia, Arts. 4:30 et seq. BW, Van Gaalen 2001, p. 4 et seq., but also Asser, Van Dam & 
Mijnsen 2002, No. 278, p. 307 et seq. 
161 Art. 3:201 BW: ‘Vruchtgebruik geeft het recht om goederen die aan een ander toebehoren, te 
gebruiken en daarvan de vruchten te genieten’. 
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ance with the nature of the objects in respect to the local practice of use and using 
up.162 
Furthermore Article 3:215 BW provides: 
1. When upon creation of a right of usufruct, or after that, the power to partially or 
completely alienate or use up the objects under usufruct is given to the usufructu-
ary, the principal right-holder may demand the retro-transfer of the objects under 
usufruct or the objects substituted for these, unless the usufructuary or acquirers of 
his right prove that the objects were used up or vanished by coincidence.163 
These definitions show that it is possible that the usufructuary can be allowed to use 
up or consume the objects under usufruct. The inclusion of the power to use up, in 
Dutch verteringsbevoegdheid, breaks with the Roman tradition where the usufructu-
ary is under the obligation to maintain the objects under usufruct.164 With the 
inclusion of the power to use up or consume, the scope of the right of usufruct is 
extended. Where in the Roman tradition a usufruct on objects which by nature 
decay or vanish was, because of the obligation to maintain, not possible, the Dutch 
right of usufruct can easily be created.165 The recognition of a quasi-usufruct, as in 
French and German law, is therefore not necessary.166 
When a right of usufruct is validly created, the usufructuary is under a duty to 
manage the objects under usufruct.167 The consequence of his management powers 
can very well include the necessity to conclude a contract in respect to or to transfer 
the objects under usufruct. In this respect a distinction between acts within the law 
of obligations and acts within the law of property should be made.  
A contract that is made in respect to the objects under usufruct will be valid, 
unless one of the contracting parties was not aware of the existence of the right of 
usufruct, and successfully invokes a rule of third-party protection.168 Acts made by 
the usufructuary within the law of property, such as a transfer of ownership of the 
objects under usufruct, are more complicated. In order to decide on the validity of 
 
162 Art. 3:207 BW: ‘-1. Een vruchtgebruiker mag de aan het vruchtgebruik onderworpen goe-
deren gebruiken of verbruiken overeenkomstig de bij de vestiging van het vruchtgebruik 
gestelde regels of, bij gebreke van zodanige regels, met inachtneming van de aard van de 
goederen en de ten aanzien van het gebruik of verbruik bestaande plaatselijke gewoonten’. 
163 Art. 3:215 BW: ‘-1. Is bij de vestiging van een vruchtgebruik of daarna aan de vruchtgebruiker 
de bevoegdheid gegeven tot gehele of gedeeltelijke vervreemding en vertering van aan het 
vruchtgebruik onderworpen goederen, dan kan de hoofdgerechtigde bij het einde van het 
vruchtgebruik afgifte vorderen van de in vruchtgebruik gegeven goederen of hetgeen daar-
voor in de plaats getreden is, voor zover de vruchtgebruiker of zijn rechtverkrijgenden niet 
bewijzen dat die goederen verteerd of door toeval tenietgegaan zijn’. 
164 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 261, p. 289, No. 288, p. 323-324, Rank-Berenschot 1985, 
p. 178, Van Gaalen 2001, p. 23, 118-122. 
165 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 261, p. 289, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 3 
1981, p. 639. See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
166 See Chapter 3; 3.2. Personal Servitudes, and Chapter 4; 3.2. Personal Servitudes: usufruct and 
limited personal servitudes. 
167 Art. 3:207(2) BW, Van Gaalen 2001, p. 215-216, Rank-Berenschot 1985, p. 173 et seq.  
168 Art. 3:36 BW Van Gaalen 2001, p. 218. 
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these property law acts, Dutch law follows a functional approach. The usufructuary 
only has a power to dispose over the objects under usufruct insofar as is useful for 
the exercise of the right of usufruct. If an act of the usufructuary does not classify as 
an act within the exercise of the right of usufruct, it will be invalid. Consequently, 
the objects will not have left the usufruct.169 Only in the event that a third party 
successfully invokes a provision of third-party protection, the lack of power to 
dispose of the usufructuary will be remedied and the object will have left the 
usufruct.170  
However, what exactly constitutes an act within the exercise of the right of 
usufruct is not at all clear. It certainly includes the right to insure, to collect claims, 
to transfer those objects under usufruct that are supposed to be transferred, for 
instance, shares, to invest money, to transfer or consume if such powers or rights 
exist, and the right to repair.171 Van Gaalen refers to the general management power 
in case of a community of objects in Article 3:170 BW, which states:172 
1. Acts for the normal maintenance or to maintain a common object, and, in general, 
acts which cannot be delayed, can be, if necessary, performed by one of the holders 
of a share in the community. Each of the holders of a share is entitled to act in order 
to stop prescription.173 
When shares in a company are the objects under usufruct, the management duty of 
the usufructuary will usually include an obligation to invest these objects. However, 
high-risk investments are usually considered a violation of the management duties 
of the usufructuary and are not allowed.174 The circumstances of the case will deter-
mine whether a usufructuary has acted within his powers. The position of the third 
party is decisive: an act that seems valid for a third party and is made within the 
powers of exercise of the usufruct can be relied upon.175 In all other circumstances 
only the usufructuary and the owner together can dispose of the object. 
The act of the usufructuary can constitute a breach of his management powers 
in respect of the owner, or principal right-holder, of the objects under usufruct.176 
 
169 Van Gaalen remarks that the exact consequence of an act made by the usufructuary outside 
his powers is not clear, Van Gaalen 2001, p. 218, see also Bos 2005, p. 24 on the extension of 
the powers of the usufructuary. 
170 Art. 3:86 BW, Van Gaalen 2001, p. 218. 
171 Respectively Arts. 3:209, 3:210, 3:212, 3:214, 3:215, 3:217, and 3:220 BW, Asser, Van Dam & 
Mijnsen 2002, No. 283a, p. 316. 
172 On co-ownership, which is one of the forms of a community, in Dutch gemeenschap, see above; 
2.2. Co-Ownership. 
173 Art. 3:170 BW ‘-1 Handelingen dienende tot gewoon onderhoud of tot behoud van een 
gemeenschappelijk goed, en in het algemeen handelingen die geen uitstel kunnen lijden, 
kunnen door ieder der deelgenoten zo nodig zelfstandig worden verricht. Ieder van hen is 
bevoegd ten behoeve van de gemeenschap verjaring te stuiten’. 
174 Specifically not in a situation where the owner of these shares is a minor. See HR 9 January 
1998, NJ 1999, 285, Mellema-Kranenburg 1999, p. 30-31. 
175 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 3 1981, p. 650-651, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, 
No. 283a, p. 315. 
176 In Dutch hoofdgerechtigde. 
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This internal relation between usufructuary and owner is dealt with in Article 
3:207(3) BW: 
3. In relation to the owner the usufructuary is under the obligation to act as a diligent 
usufructuary in respect to the objects under usufruct and the management there-
of.177 
The distinction between the external effects and internal effects of the right of usu-
fruct allow for the possibility that an act would be valid against a third party, but 
would lead to a claim of damages by the owner against the usufructuary for a viola-
tion of this requirement of diligence.178 The result of such an act would be that the 
object leaves the usufruct, therefore decreasing the value of the property right.  
In order to maintain the value of the usufruct Article 3:213 BW introduces the 
possibility of substitution.179 Substitution is a technique under which those objects 
that the usufructuary receives in exchange for the object leaving the usufruct will 
fall under the usufruct instead.180 However, substitution is only possible in respect 
to certain objects. Immovable objects and claims cannot be easily substituted. Both 
need to be registered in the name of the owner or right-holder, before they fall 
under the usufruct.181 
A right of usufruct in Dutch law not only allows its holder the use of objects, 
but also allows the holder of the right to take the fruits the object produces. In 
respect to fruits Dutch law makes a distinction between natural fruits and civil 
fruits. Natural fruits are part of the object before they separate and can be used by 
the usufructuary. Examples are apples from a tree, the calf of a cow and the wool of 
a sheep. Civil fruits are proceeds such as dividend of shares, interests from sums of 
money, and income from rent, that the object produces.182 Generally, the usufructu-
ary is also entitled to receive these civil fruits. However, fruits can only be used 
when they can be identified. The principal rule is that at the moment the fruits are 
separated from the object, the usufructuary receives ownership of them and can 
therefore use the fruits.183 Consequently, the owner of the object will lose ownership 
of the fruits upon separation, but the object itself will, if not used up, eventually 
return to the owner.  
 
177 Art. 3:207(3) ‘-3. Jegens de hoofdgerechtigde is de vruchtgebruiker verplicht ten aanzien van 
de aan het vruchtgebruik onderworpen goederen en het beheer daarover de zorg van een 
goed vruchtgebruiker in acht te nemen’. The old BW used the criterion of pater familias (goede 
huisvader) in Art. 831 Old BW, Mellema-Kranenburg 1999, p. 30-31. 
178 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 3 1981, p. 651, Van Gaalen 2001, p. 216, Asser, Van 
Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 283, p. 314. 
179 See Bos 2005, p. 29 et seq. 
180 Van Gaalen 2001, p. 94. 
181 HR 23 September 1994, NJ 1996, 461 (Kas-associatie case), Bos 2005, p. 31. 
182 Pitlo et al. 2006, No. 686, p. 521-522, Mellema-Kranenburg 1999, p. 25. 
183 Art. 5:17 BW. 
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In practice the right of usufruct is used as a management device.184 The right of 
usufruct is used in cases of succession as well as inter vivos.185 For example, if the 
surviving spouse is not the only heir of the deceased, in Dutch law the other heirs 
are under the obligation to co-operate with the spouse in order to create a right of 
usufruct on the matrimonial home and its contents, usually household furniture.186 
Another good example is offered by usufructs on shares in a company. Articles 2:88 
and 2:197 BW specifically allow the creation of a usufruct on shares.187 The usufruct 
will give the usufructuary the right to manage the shares, but will not give him the 
voting right connected to these shares.188 The voting right will, unless the parties 
agree otherwise, remain with the owner. Furthermore the owner and the usufructu-
ary can agree to distribute more powers to the usufructuary. In fact, the possibility 
to distribute powers to the usufructuary makes the usufruct a very flexible device. 
Specifically in case of a usufruct on shares, the possibility to award the usufructuary 
more powers of investment is very interesting. The diligence requirement of Article 
3:207(3) BW does not require the usufructuary to successfully invest the shares in 
order to increase the fund under usufruct. To the contrary, any loss made while 
investing shares are to be paid by the usufructuary, while, as a standard situation 
the profits made by shares are not considered fruits and therefore are for the 
owner.189 The possibility of agreement will usually allow for a workable distribution 
of powers.  
Based on the right of usufruct, Dutch law recognises two usufruct-like rights 
in the right to use and the right to live in a building.190 Dutch doctrine considers 
these rights as special forms of the right of usufruct.191 Article 3:226 BW declares the 
provisions on the right of usufruct applicable to the right of use or the right to live 
in a building, also known as the right of habitation. However, because of the differ-
ent nature of these two rights, some provisions on usufruct will not apply. A right 
of use will give the right to use an object of another, but not the right to take the 
fruits that object produces. Only those fruits the holder needs for his family can be 
taken.192 A right of habitation grants a right to use a building, but only to live in, not 
to use it in another way.193 These rights can be created on a right of ownership, but 
also on other property rights. This includes, for example, a right of apartment, a 
 
184 Especially in Dutch law where the transfer of ownership for management purposes, i.e. the 
fiducia cum amico, is prohibited by Art. 3:84(3) BW there is a need for other management 
devices. 
185 See Bos 2005, p. 41 et seq. 
186 Art. 4:29 BW. 
187 Art. 2:88 BW for shares in public limited companies (NV) and Art. 3:197 for shares in private 
limited companies (BV) Mellema-Kranenburg 1999, p. 25. 
188 Art. 3:88(2) or Art. 3:197(2) BW. 
189 HR 9 January 1998, NJ 1999, 285, Bos 2005, p. 113. 
190 Based on the Roman law rights of usus and habitatio. See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property 
Rights. 
191 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 328, p. 351. Under the old Dutch Civil Code these two 
rights were treated separately by Arts. 865-874 old BW. 
192 Art. 3:226(2) BW. 
193 Art. 3:226(3) BW. 
 280 
Dutch Law 
special property right which is dealt with below, which may be burdened with a 
right of habitation.194  
Finally, the rights of use and habitation are strictly personal rights. These 
rights are held, like a right of usufruct, by a person not in his capacity as holder of a 
property right to an object, but are connected to that person specifically. When, as 
with a right of usufruct, the holder of the right dies, the right of use or habitation 
will end. However, in contrast with a right of usufruct in Dutch law, the rights of 
use and habitation cannot be transferred, nor can they be made subject of another 
property right.195 
3.3. Emphyteusis 
The right of emphyteusis, in Dutch erfpacht, is a property right that entitles one to 
hold and use an immovable object that is owned by someone else.196 Of all the 
property rights available in Dutch law, the right of emphyteusis most closely 
resembles the right of ownership.197 The scope of the right is established by book 5 
of the Civil Code, but also through agreement between parties contained in the 
deed of creation.198 Such agreements are known as conditions, in Dutch voorwaarden, 
and are part of the property right itself.199 The Articles in book 5 of the Civil Code 
can, in certain circumstances, be deviated from through these conditions. Further-
more, the conditions can also contain additional agreements governing the relation-
ship between the owner and the holder of the right of emphyteusis. 
Although these conditions are an agreement between parties, they are treated 
as part of the property right insofar as they have a sufficient connection to the right of 
emphyteusis and are not contrary to the nature of the right.200 These open criteria 
make it difficult to establish which agreements are included in the property right 
and which are not.201 Leading opinion in Dutch law seems to be that these agreem-
ents can be both negative and positive.202 Van Velten, however, has argued that the 
conditions cannot contain a positive duty unless there is a specific legal basis.203 
Struycken has held that there are limits to the freedom of parties to make these 
 
194 See 3.5. Right of Apartment. 
195 Art. 3:226(4) BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 328, p. 351-352. 
196 Art. 5:85 BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 215, p. 236. 
197 In German doctrinal terms it could be held that the right of emphyteusis is an Eigentumsähn-
liches right. However, German law itself does not recognises a right of emphyteusis in its 
catalogue of property rights. See Chapter 4; 3. Other Property Rights.  
198 De Jong 1995b, p. 1, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, Nos. 215 et seq., p. 236 et seq. 
199 See Vonck 2007, p. 598. 
200 HR 16 March 1977, NJ 1977, 399, Plantenga & Treurniet 1957, p. 177, Van Velten 1995, p. 47, 
De Jong 1995b, p. 17, Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 110-111, Struycken 2007, p. 391-392. Although 
this case dates from before the introduction of the new Civil Code, it can be assumed its 
reasoning applies to the new right of emphyteusis as well. See the opinion of Advocate 
General De Vries Lentsch-Kostense at 10, HR 27 April 2007, RvdW 2007/469. 
201 See also Struycken 2007, p. 394. 
202 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 217, p. 241, De Jong 1995b, p. 17-19, Vonck 2007, p. 603. 
203 Van Velten 1995, p. 49, see also Snijders 1995, p. 155. 
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agreements, explicitly referring to the method in which property rights are created. 
Through the démembrement model, which he terms the subtraction model, Struycken 
explains that in respect to positive duties a problem arises.204 Under this model, 
property rights are composed of powers that follow from the mother right from 
which the property right is derived. Positive duties are not part of the mother right, 
so neither can they be part of a property right derived from that right.205 
The powers of the holder of the right can be so extensive that the owner is left 
with nothing but a completely empty right of ownership. Such an empty right of 
ownership will only provide the owner with the expectation that, eventually, when 
the right of emphyteusis comes to an end, his ownership will be full and complete 
again. In other words, the extensive influence of the conditions on the right of 
emphyteusis makes this the property right most closely resembling the right of 
ownership.  
Dutch doctrine distinguishes between urban and rural types of emphyteusis. 
Rights of rural emphyteusis, for instance, a right to use a piece of agricultural land for 
a long duration of time, are mainly used for agricultural purposes and include 
combinations with, for example, milk quotas.206 The urban emphyteusis is the result 
of developments originating in Amsterdam from 1896.207 The city of Amsterdam 
decided that henceforth it would no longer transfer rights of ownership, but instead 
rights of emphyteusis would be created. In the conditions to these rights, the city of 
Amsterdam would provide additional rules and regulations that supplemented the 
powers of the city for regulating public law.208 The Amsterdam approach was soon 
followed by other cities as well and has become standard in the Netherlands. 
Because of this development, the urban emphyteusis became the most common form 
of emphyteusis, but the rural type also continues to be used.209  
Dutch cities establish general terms and conditions that apply to all rights of 
emphyteusis created on behalf of the city. These terms and conditions provide 
regulations on the powers of the municipality as owner and on the holder of the 
right. Furthermore, remuneration is paid in exchange for the right. The terms and 
conditions will also deal with the establishment and powers of alteration of this 
remuneration, also known as the canon. The general terms and conditions make the 
right of urban emphyteusis a very suitable method for regulation.  
The right of emphyteusis can be created for a limited or unlimited duration, 
either with full payment of the canon in advance or through a system of payments 
over time. A right of emphyteusis created for an unlimited period of time with a full 
payment of the canon in advance will very much resemble ownership. Article 5:89 
BW states: 
 
204 Struycken 2007, p. 412-415. 
205 Struycken 2007, p. 415-422. The nature of additional conditions to property rights will be 
dealt with extensively in the next section. See below; 4.7. Obligations as Part of Property 
Rights. 
206 See Snijders 1995, p. 89 et seq. 
207 De Jong 1995b, p. 3, Van Velten 1995, p. 17-18. 
208 De Jong 1995b, p. 4-6, Van Velten 1995, p. 18-28. 
209 See, inter alia, Snijders 1995, p. 89 et seq. 
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1. Unless provided otherwise in the deed of establishment, the emphyteuticarius will 
have the same power to enjoy the object as the owner.210 
The consequence of the comparison to the powers of the owner is that the holder of 
a right of emphyteusis is allowed to use and enjoy the object exclusively.211 The pow-
er to use the object includes the power to erect buildings or other constructions for 
which the owner will have to provide compensation once the right of emphyteusis 
ends.212 The holder of the right will not become the owner of the buildings or other 
constructions he erects.213 Like in other civil law systems, the rule of superficies solo 
cedit applies in Dutch law. The result of the application of this rule is that the owner 
of the land will become owner of the buildings on it.214 This consequence leads to 
the unfair situation that for as long as the right of emphyteusis exists, the holder of 
the right remains liable for both the land and the buildings or constructions erected 
on it, but is not automatically entitled to compensation of the value after termina-
tion of the right of emphyteusis.215 Van Velten has proposed to solve this problem by 
awarding ownership of the buildings to the holder of the right of emphyteusis.216 
The contents of a right of emphyteusis resemble the contents of a right of usu-
fruct. Both rights entitle the holder to the use and the enjoyment of an object, as well 
as the right to take and enjoy the fruits the object produces.217 However, the right of 
emphyteusis is not connected to the holder personally, as is the case with a right of 
usufruct. Therefore, a right of emphyteusis is capable of existing well beyond the life 
of the original right-holder.218  
Municipalities usually combine the creation of a right of emphyteusis on a par-
cel of land with the duty to erect a building.219 Any subsequent holder of the right of 
emphyteusis will take over the rights and duties concerning this building. Therefore, 
according to leading opinion, the holder of the right of emphyteusis is awarded 
economic ownership of the building.220 However, in practice, the powers of enjoy-
ment will usually be limited by the terms and conditions. These limitations can 
include, for example, a prohibition on altering the purpose for which the building is 
used, the duty to park cars on one’s own land, and a prohibition against polluting 
the environment.221 
 
210 Art. 5:89 BW ‘-1. Voor zover niet in de akte van vestiging anders is bepaald, heeft de erfpach-
ter hetzelfde genot van de zaak als een eigenaar’. 
211 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 221, p. 247. 
212 Art. 3:99 BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 221, p. 248. 
213 This is different in French law, where the contract creating the right of emphyteusis breaks 
with the superficies solo cedit rule. See Chapter 3; 3.4. Emphyteusis. 
214 This is the rule of superficies solo cedit. See below; 3.4. Superficies. 
215 Art. 6:174 BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 221, p. 248, Van Velten 1995, p. 78. 
216 Van Velten 1995, p. 78-79, see also Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 221, p. 248. 
217 De Jong 1995b, p. 46, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 223, p. 249. 
218 De Jong 1995b, p. 21-22. 
219 HR 8 March 1991, NJ 1991, 379, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 217, p. 241, De Jong 
1995b, p. 46. 
220 Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 483, p. 547. 
221 De Jong 1995b, p. 43-45. 
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Furthermore, the right-holder’s power to dispose can be limited.222 Without 
these limitations it is possible to create other rights, both personal and property 
rights, on the object under emphyteusis. It is also possible to transfer the right itself.223 
The limitations can only exist in the form of a requirement to ask permission from 
the owner before a transfer or creation of another right. If such permission is 
refused without reasonable grounds, the holder of the right can approach the court 
for an order to replace the required permission of the owner with permission from 
the court.224 The possibility to create rights in respect of the right of emphyteusis 
includes the creation of rights of hypothec, rights of apartment and possibly, but 
controversially, also rights of superficies.225  
Finally, the right of emphyteusis can impose a substantial burden on the right of 
ownership. In particular when the right has been created for an unlimited duration 
of time. In order to remedy property burdens still existing when they are no longer 
needed, Article 5:97 BW offers the possibility to approach the court to change the 
right or to bring it to an end.226 Both the holder of the right and the owner of the 
object may approach the court. The idea behind this Article is, in case a perpetual 
property right may be created, to allow parties, when circumstances have changed 
and twenty-five years have passed since the creation of the right, to change the 
content of their legal relation or to bring the legal relation to an end.227 In this way 
the unwanted effects of perpetual property rights, which sometimes recall the 
feudal rights that burdened generations of tenants, can be remedied, but only if the 
parties to the property right are in agreement. 
3.4. Superficies 
The right of superficies or opstalrecht is defined in Article 5:101 BW, which states: 
1. The right of superficies is a property right to have or acquire a right of ownership in, 
on or on top of buildings, constructions or plantings on an immovable object, that 
belongs to someone else.228 
The right of superficies breaks with the general rule in Dutch property law that what 
can be considered part of the main object is part of that object.229 In case of immova-
ble objects, ownership of land brings with it ownership of everything that is at-
tached to the land.230 This rule of superficies solo cedit was known in Roman law and 
 
222 See Vonck 2007, p. 603. 
223 Art. 5:91 BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, Nos. 224 et seq., p. 250 et seq. 
224 Art. 5:91(4) BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 224, p. 251. 
225 Asser, Beekhuis & Davids 1990, No. 224, p. 250, Heyman 1999, p. 52 et seq. 
226 Vonck 2007, p. 600, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 237, p. 263-264. 
227 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 238, p. 265. 
228 Art. 5:101 BW, ‘-1. Het recht van opstal is een zakelijk recht om in, op of boven een onroeren-
de zaak van een ander gebouwen, werken of beplantingen in eigendom te hebben of te 
verkrijgen’. 
229 Art. 3:4 BW, Ploeger 1997, p. 2, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 20. 
230 Art. 5:20 BW. 
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remains to be applied in Dutch law today. However, contrary to Roman law, Dutch 
law allows exceptions to this principle.231  
In fact, the main exception to the rule is provided by Article 5:101 BW which 
allows ownership of objects in, on or on top of an immovable object, which is in the 
ownership of someone else. The right of superficies, in other words, creates a split in 
the object of the right of ownership and results in two rights of ownership; one on 
the immovable object, one on the object that is split from that object.  
Unlike the other property rights, the right of superficies not only provides the 
holder with powers derived from the right of ownership, but also provides a right 
of ownership itself. This ownership is a right of ownership in the meaning of Article 
5:1 BW – absolute and unitary. The result of the creation of a right of superficies is 
therefore that the owner of the land remains the owner, and that the accession rule 
of superficies solo cedit does not apply. The ownership of a building on land is there-
fore in the hands of someone other than the owner of that land.  
The right of superficies resembles the right of emphyteusis. Both property rights 
are rights to use and enjoy immovable objects and can be created for an unlimited 
duration.232 Furthermore, rights of superficies and emphyteusis can be created in 
combination with one another. In legal literature these two rights have often been 
dealt with together.233 The Dutch civil code only provides a very short set of articles 
on the right of superficies and declares that several articles on the right of emphyteusis 
are applicable.234 Amongst those common rules is the possibility for parties to 
decide on additional agreements that become part of the right itself.235 
Nevertheless, there are also important differences.236 The possibility to break 
with the superficies solo cedit rule of Article 5:20 BW seems the principal example.237 
The right of ownership of the buildings, constructions or plantings will give the 
holder of the right of superficies the full powers of an owner.238 The right of emphy-
teusis will only give a right to use and enjoy the land on which the building, con-
struction or planting is placed.239 
In practice the right of superficies is used as an independent right, but also as a 
right dependent on another right of enjoyment.240 When the right is used dependent 
on another right, the right of superficies will fall under the general category of acces-
sory, or dependent, rights of Article 3:7 BW. In practice this will specifically be so in 
combinations with the right of lease and the right of emphyteusis. In regard to lease, 
the relationship between the parties will be personal, but the property right of 
 
231 See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. Ploeger 1997, p. 3. 
232 De Vries & Pleysier 1995, p. 110, Ploeger 1997, p. 169. This is different in French law where 
the maximum duration for a right of superficies is 99 years. See Chapter 3; 3.3. Superficies. 
233 See, inter alia, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 243, p. 250, De Vries & Pleysier 1995, De 
Jong 1995b, Ploeger 1997, p. 169 et seq. 
234 Art. 5:104 BW. 
235 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, Nos. 251, 253, p. 279, 281.  
236 See also Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 254, p. 281 et seq., Ploeger 1997, p. 177. 
237 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 247, p. 274. 
238 Ploeger 1997, p. 176. 
239 Art. 5:103 BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 253, p. 280. 
240 Art. 5:101(2) BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 250, p. 278, Ploeger 1997, p. 169, 203. 
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superficies can function as a method to ensure compensation for any building re-
maining at the end of the lease.241 Because the right of superficies is dependent on the 
lease, the end of the agreement will bring with it the end of the right of superficies. 
Furthermore, the right of emphyteusis could be combined with a right of superficies to 
arrange for the ownership of any buildings or constructions on the land. A right of 
emphyteusis only gives a right to use and enjoyment comparable to those of the 
owner, whereas the right of superficies enables the holder of the right to actually 
have ownership.242  
However, not just any right of superficies created in relation to another right or 
relation will necessarily be accessory, in the meaning of Article 3:7 BW. The right 
will be accessory if it cannot exist without the relation to which it is connected.243 
Furthermore, the deed of creation can provide clarity.  
The holder of a right of superficies has the power to create other property rights 
in respect of his right of superficies. In theory, these other property rights will have 
to be created on the right of superficies itself. Therefore, these newly created rights 
will become accessory rights within the meaning of Article 3:7 BW. The end of the 
right of superficies will then bring an end to the property right. A different doctrinal 
possibility would be the creation of a property right in respect of the ownership of, 
for instance, a building in the hands of the holder of the right of superficies. How-
ever, when the right of superficies came to an end and the ownership of the building, 
construction or planting returned to the owner of the land, the owner of the land 
would be bound by the property right which he had nothing to do with.  
This case should be distinguished from that of an acquirer of the object who, in 
his decision to acquire the object, can check the register and see which property 
rights are created. An accessory property right in respect of the right of superficies 
and not the ownership of the holder of the superficies solves this problem. It will 
result in a termination of the property right in relation to the termination of the 
right of superficies.244  
Another solution is provided in case of the creation of servitudes. Article 5:84 
BW provides that a right of servitude can be created on an immovable object, both 
as servient and as dominant land. If the right of servitude has been created from the 
right of superficies as the dominant land it will only cease to exist if the parties 
agreed to this possibility in the deed of creation.245 A right of servitude on the object 
under the right of superficies, where the object is the servient land, will terminate 
with the right of superficies itself.246 
 
241 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 250, p. 278, see also De Vries & Pleysier 1995, p. 114. 
242 Although De Jong remarks that it is not very likely that this combination is used much. See 
De Jong 1995b, p. 77, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 243, p. 270, Heyman 2005, p. 19 et 
seq. 
243 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 250, p. 278-279, see also HR 7 March 1979, NJ 1980. 116. 
244 In the same line see De Vries & Pleysier 1995, p. 116-117, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, 
No. 255, p. 283. 
245 Art. 5:84 (2) BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 255, p. 283. 
246 Art. 5:84 (3) BW. 
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Other property rights that could be created include apartment rights, but also 
a right of hypothec.247 Also those rights will be accessory to the right of superficies 
and therefore terminate with the termination of the right of superficies. In order to 
avoid over-complicated situations, in Dutch law a right of superficies that is already 
an accessory right in relation to another right or relation cannot in itself be 
burdened with another property right.248 Only if the mother right to which the right 
of superficies is accessory is burdened as well, will this be possible.249 The termina-
tion of the mother right will then bring with it the termination of the right of 
superficies as well as the newly created accessory right. However, this power of the 
holder of the right of superficies can be limited in the deed of creation.250 
3.5. Right of Apartment 
Appartementsrecht, the right of apartment, is dealt with by Article 5:106 BW. It is 
difficult to define the right of apartment in Dutch law since it includes a share in the 
ownership of a building as well as of the land on which the building is built, an 
exclusive right to use a certain part of that building and a right to use certain parts 
of the building together with the others who hold a right of apartment in the same 
property.251 Moreover, the term apartment is, both in Dutch and in English ambigu-
ous. In the first place, it refers to flats, used for residential purposes. However, the 
right of apartment in Dutch law can also include rights to commercial and industrial 
spaces, both in and outside of buildings. 
The foundation of the right of apartment can be found in the general rules on 
co-ownership. The apartment right in Dutch law is constructed around the owner-
ship of the land and the building that is constructed on it. The holders of the various 
rights of apartment together have the right of ownership of the land and of the 
complete building.252 This form of co-ownership is characterised as a community.253 
Each holder of a right of apartment holds a share in the community. Consequently, 
the holders of the shares together have the full right of ownership amongst them. 
The share that each of the holders of a right of apartment has in the communi-
ty is an indivisible share that represents a specifically defined fraction.254 As a result, 
 
247 It follows from Arts. 3:227 and 3:228 BW that a right of hypothec can be established on 
registered incorporeal objects (registergoederen), Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 255,  
p. 283. 
248 Ploeger 1997, p. 208, De Vries & Pleysier 1995, p. 117, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 
255, p. 283. 
249 De Jong 1995b, p. 76. 
250 Arts. 5:104 and 5:91 BW. 
251 Art. 5:106(3) BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 343, p. 366. 
252 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 343, p. 367. 
253 Or gemeenschap, see Art. 3:166 BW. The term community is preferred over co-ownership since 
in Dutch law ownership is restricted to corporeal objects. See Art. 5:1 BW. A right of apart-
ment can also be established on other property rights as e.g. a right of emphyteusis. Mertens 
1989, p. 3-4, Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, Nos. 445 et seq., p. 496, Asser, Van 
Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 343, p. 367. See above; 2.2. Co-Ownership. 
254 Art. 5:113(1) BW, Mertens 1999, p. 25. 
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the holder of a share is not entitled to specific objects in the community, but only to 
a share of the whole. A division at the end of the community will therefore require a 
division of the object amongst the holders of shares, usually a division of the 
economic value of the community.255  
The share in the community is combined with an exclusive right to use a spe-
cifically defined part of the building. This right to use is not a property right itself, 
not a type of ownership, but an accessory right to the share in the community.256 
The right to use cannot be transferred separately but can be given to someone else 
to use.257 The deed of separation in which the various shares are created contains a 
drawing in which is specified which parts of the building are for the right-holder’s 
exclusive use. Any other parts of the building will be for common use for all the 
holders of the shares. These common parts are also shown on the drawing.258 Also 
the right to use the common parts of the buildings can be given to someone else to 
use.259 
Furthermore, besides the share in the community and the exclusive and com-
mon rights to use, the holder of a share becomes a member of the association of 
owners, in Dutch vereniging van eigenaars. The membership of this association is 
‘qualitative’ in the sense that the holder of a share automatically becomes a member 
of the association. When the share is transferred to another person, so is the mem-
bership of the association.260 In the last few decades there has been much debate on 
the applicability of the rules on association of book 2 of the Civil Code. This second 
book provides rules on legal persons, including associations. However, the rules on 
the property law aspects, specifically on the community in which all holders of all 
shares together have a complete right of ownership, conflict with the majority vot-
ing system in book 2 on legal persons.261 Recently these problems have been solved 
by new legislation that introduces a more workable solution inspired by the law of 
associations.262 
Within the community, and therefore also within the association of owners, 
the holders of the shares are linked to each other. Even though on some issues the 
association may make majority decisions, the relation between the members is 
governed by the principles of good faith and fair dealing.263 In other words, the 
majority will have to take the minority into account as well. 
Apart from the right of ownership, the right of apartment can also be created 
on other property rights. These other property rights, most often the rights of 
emphyteusis and superficies, can therefore be subject to a separation into rights of 
 
255 Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 366 et seq., the general rules on community in book 3 of the BW are not 
applicable to apartment rights, although the concept is the same, Art. 3:189 BW. Title 9 of 
book 5 of the BW provides specific rules for apartment-rights, Art. 5:143 BW. 
256 Art. 5:106(3) BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 344, p. 368, Mertens 1999, p. 3. 
257 Art. 5:120 BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 344, p. 368. 
258 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 407, p, 424-425, Mertens 1999, p. 12. 
259 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 344, p. 369. 
260 Art. 5:125 (2) BW. 
261 Van Velten 2004, 554 et seq. 
262 Art. 5:139 BW, Van Velten 2004, p. 555. 
263 In Dutch the redelijkheid en billijkheid. HR 30 October 1998, NJ 1993, 83. 
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apartment.264 In those situations the holders of the rights of apartment together will 
share the full right of emphyteusis or right of superficies among them.265 However, in 
order to separate the property right, the permission of the owner from whom that 
property right is derived is required.266 The creation of a right of apartment on 
another property right creates additional problems. The problems most likely to 
arise is when the property right that is separated into rights of apartment ceases to 
exist. For example, when the canon for a right of emphyteusis is no longer paid, the 
owner might bring the right to an end. As a general rule, the rights of apartment 
will cease to exist when the property right from which they are derived ceases to 
exist as well.267 
In the case of payment of a canon for a right of emphyteusis, the duty for pay-
ment is divided among the different shareholders in the community. If all holders 
should stop their payment, the owner would have a right to terminate the right of 
emphyteusis. In the event that there is just one holder that does not pay, the owner 
can demand the transfer of the right of apartment of the non-payer instead.268 
Furthermore, the rights of apartment will not cease to exist when the underlying 
property right is extended or renewed.269  
The right of apartment is dealt with in book 5 of the Civil Code, which deals 
with property rights in respect of corporeal objects.270 Furthermore, the right is dealt 
with after the rights of emphyteusis and superficies. Systematically this would give 
rise to the assumption that the right of apartment is a limited property right in the 
same sense as the other rights dealt with in that part of the Civil Code. Never-
theless, there is a difference. As explained in the beginning of this section, property 
rights in Dutch law are considered to be limited property rights in the sense that 
they are derived from the paramount right of ownership.271 The right of apartment, 
which was originally known as just ‘apartment’, is a complex of rights and compe-
tences. Dutch doctrine therefore treats it as a separate and distinct property right.272 
After all, upon creation of the right of apartment the original right of ownership will 
disappear and will be replaced by several shares in a community. In case of a lim-
ited right, the right of ownership continues to exist and is burdened by the limited 
property right. Moreover, the right of apartment is placed in book 5 of the Civil 
Code, which deals with property rights in respect of corporeal objects, whereas the 
 
264 However, also other property rights could be subject to separation into rights of apartment, 
see Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 376, p. 400. 
265 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 374, p. 397-399, Mertens 1999, p. 4. 
266 Art. 5:106 (6) BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 374, p. 397-399. 
267 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 382, p. 406. 
268 Art. 5:116 (4)(5) BW, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 381, p. 405. 
269 Although this is a doctrinally difficult construction, see Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 
383, p. 406. 
270 This is not an entirely correct placement, since also a right of emphyteusis and a right of 
superficies can be separated into rights of apartment. Following this reasoning, the right of 
apartment should have been included in book 3 that deals with property rights in respect to 
both corporeal objects and rights. On this see Mertens 1999, p. 4. 
271 See above; 3. Other Property Rights. 
272 Van Velten 1989, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, Nos. 347, 348, p. 371-372. 
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right of apartment can also be created on property rights. Its place in the Civil Code 
is therefore not immediately evident. 
The different shares that arise after a separation into rights of apartment have 
a different character from the other limited property rights. For example, they can 
be in the hands of the same person without mixing and coming to an end.273 
3.6. Pledge 
Apart from rights to use someone else’s object, Dutch law also recognises property 
rights that are used to secure the performance of an obligation. Security rights are 
intended to provide the holder with a preferential position compared with other 
creditors, and to allow the holder to sell the object serving as security and use the 
proceeds of sale to satisfy the debt, usually a sum of money, for which security was 
given.274 In Dutch law these security rights are the right of pledge and hypothec. 
Like their Roman predecessors, the rights of pledge and hypothec share many 
characteristics.275 In this section the right of pledge will be dealt with, and the next 
section will deal with the right of hypothec.276 
The right of pledge is a property right in respect of a movable object or claim 
that gives security to the holder. The main element of this security is the power of 
the holder to sell the object under pledge and use the proceeds of the sale to satisfy 
a debt.277 The right of pledge is created to provide security for the payment of a 
certain debt. In the event that the debtor cannot pay his debt, the holder of the right 
of pledge can use his power to sell the object.  
Traditionally, the right of pledge in Dutch law has been a classic, possessory, 
security right. In a classic right of pledge, the pledgor brings the object under pledge 
into the power of the pledgee in order to provide security.278 Because of the obliga-
tion to bring the object in the power, the possession, of the pledgee, the type of 
objects that could be used was limited. Only those objects that the pledgor could 
miss would be brought into the power of the pledgee. The result of this was that ob-
jects used for normal business purposes, such as inventory or company cars, could 
not be used to provide security. It was for this reason that in 1929 the Hoge Raad 
acknowledged the transfer of ownership for security purposes.279 Such a transfer 
enabled the passing of the ownership without the loss of control over the object. 
When possession remained with the transferor, he could continue to use these 
objects and trade in order to pay his debt. 
Meijers, the founding father of the Dutch Civil Code, was a fierce opponent of 
this transfer of ownership for security purposes. He claimed that such a transfer 
 
273 See above; 3. Other Property Rights. 
274 Art. 3:227 BW. 
275 See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
276 See below; 3.7. Hypothec. 
277 The pledgee is not entitled to keep the object under pledge for himself; a sale is compulsory. 
Art. 3:235 BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 26, p. 25. 
278 Art. 1198(1) Old BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 13, p. 9. 
279 See above; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
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effectively created a right of pledge without the object being brought into the power 
of the pledgee.280 Following this reasoning, the scope of powers received by the 
owner for security purposes was, compared with the powers he needed, far too 
broad. A right of pledge only awards those powers to the pledgee that are necessary 
for the exercise of the pledge. 
In the new Civil Code the classic right of pledge remains, but is supplemented 
by a so-called silent or non-possessory pledge. The silent pledge creates a right of 
pledge on a certain object without the pledgor having to bring the object into the 
power of the pledgee. Combined with the introduction of this right of silent pledge, 
the legislature introduced Article 3:84(3) BW which prohibits transfers of ownership 
for security purposes.281  
A right of pledge, both classic and silent, can be created on all objects, or 
goederen, that are capable of pledge, except registered objects.282 This includes corpo-
real objects and also incorporeal objects such as claims. The corporeal object as well 
as the claim must be transferable. Non-transferability would make it impossible for 
the pledgee to execute his right of pledge and sell and transfer the object or claim to 
a third party.283 A right of pledge created on an incorporeal object is considered a 
so-called patrimonial right.284 Because a right of pledge can also be created on an 
incorporeal object, the right is dealt with in book 3 of the Civil Code which deals 
with patrimonial law in general, and not in book 5, which deals with property rights 
in respect of corporeal objects only.  
The right of pledge entitles the pledgee to preferential treatment over other 
creditors and awards the exclusive power to sell the object under pledge and use its 
proceeds to satisfy a debt. Also in the event of insolvency of the pledgor, the 
pledgee is entitled to sell the object and satisfy the debt as if there were no insol-
vency.285 The pledgee will be entitled to make such a sale as an executor of the 
pledge and not as a representative of the owner.286 When a non-possessory or silent 
pledge is created, the pledgee has the power to claim possession or actual power 
over the object before he realises his right.287 However, the pledgee must sell and is 
not allowed to take the object under pledge and keep it for himself. Any agreement 
that attempts to give this power to the pledgee is therefore void.288 Nevertheless, 
 
280 Meijers even used security ownership as an example of evasion of the law, see Meijers 1937, 
p. 65, Meijers 1948, p. 89 et seq., see also Van Mierlo 1988, p. 176, Molenaar 1991, p. 7. 
281 But not so-called actual transfers, see above; 2.3. Security Ownership. See further Molenaar 
1991, p. 6 et seq. 
282 The right of hypothec deals with registered objects. Any other object, corporeal and incorpo-
real, can be subject to a right of pledge, Art. 3:227(1) BW. 
283 Art. 3:228 BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, Nos. 16a, 28, p. 14, 31. 
284 In Dutch, vermogensrecht, Art. 3:6 BW. 
285 Art. 57 Bankruptcy Act (Fw). 
286 Molenaar 1999, p. 50. 
287 See Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 66, p. 76. 
288 Arts. 3:235, 3:250 and 3:253 BW, this prohibition is a remainder of the prohibition of the lex 
commissioria in Roman Law, see Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights, and 3.4. Other Proper-
ty Rights. The discussion on the prohibition was raised again with in the Netherlands on the 
occasion of the implementation of Directive 2002/47/EC of 6 June 2002 on Financial Collater-
al arrangements. This Directive introduces a specific type of pledge where the pledgee is 
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parties can agree that, when the pledgee is entitled to execute, the court may be 
approached for an order stating the price at which the pledgee may keep the object 
for himself.289  
The right of pledge is an accessory right. Therefore, the right of pledge must be 
dependent upon a claim or other relation in order to exist. Its accessory nature is 
visible when the claim or object for which the pledge was created is transferred to 
another person. In that situation, the right of pledge will transfer with that claim or 
relation and will remain in existence.290 When the claim for which the right of 
pledge was created ceases to exist, the right of pledge will cease as well.291 
Moreover, a right of pledge is also dependent on the existence of the object on 
which it is created. The ceasing of the claim that is the object of the right of pledge 
will also lead to the ceasing of the right of pledge itself. However, in some cases, a 
new right of pledge will arise in substitution. This new right of pledge will cover 
those claims that replace the original object or claim through substitution.292 This 
right of pledge on those new claims arises by operation of law and strengthens the 
position of the pledgor since this substitution is intended to preserve the value of 
the object or claim serving as security. However, this substitution will not work in 
all situations; a purchase price received for the sale of a corporeal object will not fall 
under the right of pledge.293 The Hoge Raad has stated that a specific legal basis is 
required for substitution.294 Such a legal basis is offered by Article 3:229 BW: 
1. The right of pledge or the right of hypothec includes a right of pledge by operation 
of law on all claims for compensation that substitute the object under pledge or 
hypothec, including claims for the devaluation of the object.295 
A paid purchase price is not considered as a ‘claim for compensation’ in the mean-
ing of Article 3:229 BW. The intention of the legislature was to only include insur-
ance claims or claims for unlawful destruction or damage.296 
The pledgee who holds the object will be under a duty of care in respect of it. 
The standard used is the standard of a good pledgee.297 The duty of care is linked to 
the obligation the pledgee has against the pledgor. A breach of the obligation 
 
entitled to keep the objects under pledge for himself in case of non-payment of the debt. See 
Keijser 2004, p. 768, Van Vliet 2005, p. 195. 
289 Art. 3:251 BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 26, p. 25. 
290 This is the droit de suite effect. Arts. 3:7 and 6:142 BW, see also Molenaar 1999, p. 43-44. 
291 Art. 3:81(2) BW. On the destruction of property rights see also above; 2.3. Other Property 
Rights. 
292 Art. 3:229 BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 25, p. 22 et seq. 
293 HR 23 April 1999, NJ 2000, 158, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 25, p. 23. 
294 HR 17 February 1995, NJ 1996, 471 (Mulder q.q./CLBN), 3.3.3, see also Van Mierlo 2000, p. 59. 
295 Emphasis by author, Art. 3:229 BW ‘1- Het recht van pand of hypotheek brengt van rechts-
wege mee een recht van pand op alle vorderingen tot vergoeding die in de plaats van het ver-
bonden goed treden, waaronder begrepen vorderingen ter zake van de waardevermindering 
van het goed’. 
296 Van Mierlo 2000, p. 59, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 3 1981, p. 734-735. 
297 Art. 3:243(1) BW uses the term goed pandhouder. 
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against the pledgor is also considered a breach of the duty of care.298 Dutch law dis-
tinguishes two types of breaches. First, if the object is devalued or is damaged in the 
care of the pledgee, the pledgor can demand that the object is taken into the posses-
sion of a third party.299 Consequently, the third party will also be under a duty of 
care.300 Secondly, only in case of ‘grave’ breaches can the pledgor approach the court 
for an order to return the object or place it into special care with a third party.301 
This special care of a third party is the so-called gerechtelijke bewaring.302 The same 
remedy will be available for a pledgee against the pledgor in case of a silent pledge.  
A right of pledge can be created for debts not only that are already in exis-
tence, but also for debts that will come into existence in the future.303 A future claim 
can be pledged, but only if such claim can be ascertained sufficiently.304 Although at 
the moment of creation of the pledge the debt does not yet exist, the subject of the 
pledge should be ascertainable.  
A classic right of pledge can only be created on objects and claims that exist at 
the time of creation. Other objects and claims cannot be brought into the power of 
the pledgee. However, a right of silent pledge may be created on future objects, 
since bringing these objects in the power of the pledgee is not necessary for the 
valid creation of the right. However, Article 3:239 BW limits this possibility by 
stating: 
1. A right of pledge on a claim against one or more persons that is not payable to 
bearer or to order, or on the right of usufruct of such a claim, can also be created by 
authentic deed or registered informal deed, without notification to those persons, if 
at the moment of creation of the right of pledge this claim exists or directly results 
from an existing legal relationship.305 
 
298 Arts. 3:243(1) and 6:74 BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 45, p. 55, Molenaar 
1999, p. 45. 
299 Arts. 3:243 and 3:237(3) BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 45, p. 55. 
300 Arts. 3:236(1) and 2:243 BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 45, p. 54. 
301 Art. 3:257 BW, mentions ernstige mate van tekortschieten (grave breach), Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen 
& Van Velten 2003, No. 45, p. 54, Molenaar 1991, p. 68. 
302 Special care is dealt with in Arts. 853 et seq. Civil Procedure Code (Rv). 
303 Art. 3:231 BW states: ‘1- A right of pledge or a right of hypothec can be established both for 
existing and for future claims …’, ‘-1 Een recht van pand of hypotheek kan zowel voor een 
bestaande als voor een toekomstige vordering worden gevestigd …’. For examples see Wibier 
2007, p. 9 et seq. 
304 Art. 3:231(2) BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 32, p. 34.  
305 Art. 3:239 BW, ‘-1 Pandrecht op een tegen een of meer bepaalde personen uit te oefenen recht 
dat niet aan toonder of order luidt, of op het vruchtgebruik van een zodanig recht kan ook 
worden gevestigd bij authentieke of geregistreerde onderhandse akte, zonder mededeling 
daarvan aan die personen, mits dit recht op het tijdstip van vestiging van het pandrecht reeds 
bestaat of rechtstreeks zal worden verkregen uit een dan reeds bestaande rechtsverhouding’. 
This article brings a difficulty with a right of pledge on claims. A company will establish a 
right of pledge on its current claims, but these will be paid in the course of business causing 
the right of pledge to disappear. Practice solves this difficulty by using lists that are signed 
and periodically registered. This practice was allowed by the Hoge Raad in its case HR  
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Although many rules are applicable both to classic pledge and silent pledge, the 
right of silent pledge is a somewhat weaker right than its classic equivalent. 
Specifically with regard to a right of pledge on claims, the debtor of the claim that is 
subject of the right of pledge, not the debt the payment of which the right of pledge 
secures, will not know the claim has been pledged. The debtor of that claim will pay 
his debt to the pledgor after which the right of pledge will cease to exist. The 
pledgee will only become entitled to the payment of the claim once he notifies the 
debtor of the existence of his right of pledge. With his notification the silent pledge 
becomes public and the pledge will henceforth be a classic right of pledge.306 The 
debtor of the claim will then have to pay his debt to the pledgee and can no longer 
pay to the pledgor. The received money will substitute the claim on which the right 
of pledge was created. The pledge will then continue to exist on the received 
money.307 
Before notification the pledgee is in a difficult position. The new Civil Code 
banned ownership for security purposes because the security owner was considered 
to have too many powers.308 Given the prohibition of Article 3:84(3) BW, Dutch legal 
practice is left with the right of pledge to fulfil its need for security.309 The silent 
pledge, the only real alternative for the ownership for security purposes, awards 
just enough rights to the pledgee. Especially in a case where a silent pledge has been 
created and no notification has been given, the pledgee, usually a bank, can lose its 
security right and, with that, its preferential position over the other creditors if the 
claims under pledge are paid to the pledgor. To address this problem, the Hoge 
Raad, in its landmark decision of Mulder q.q. v CLBN, ruled that although a right of 
pledge will cease to exist once the debt has been paid to the pledgor, the preferential 
position of the former pledgee remains to exist in insolvency.310 Therefore, the right 
of pledge is granted effects after it ceases to exist, a development that solves prac-
tical problems, but creates some doctrinal difficulties.311 
3.7. Hypothec 
The right of hypothec is the property security right that can be created on registered 
objects. These objects are land and buildings upon land, but can also be registered 
ships and registered aircraft.312 Furthermore, the category of registered objects also 
 
14-10-1994, NJ 1995, 447 (Stichting Spaarbank Rivierland/Gispen q.q.) and was further develop-
ed. On this see Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, Nos. 126 et seq., p. 143 et seq. 
306 Brahn 1988, p. 176, Van Mierlo 1988, p. 182, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 
116, p. 130. 
307 Art. 3:246(5) BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 115, p. 129, more detailed 
see Rank-Berenschot 1997, p. 237 et seq. 
308 On Ownership for security purposes see above; 2. The Right of Ownership, but also Van 
Mierlo 1988. 
309 Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 65, p. 75, Van Mierlo 1988, p. 175.  
310 HR 17 February 1995, NJ 1996, 471 (Mulder q.q./CLBN). 
311 More will be stated about this below in 4.5. After-Effects of Property Rights. 
312 Arts. 3:227(1) and 3:10 BW, see Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 169, p. 198. A 
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includes those property rights that are created on these objects.313 The right of 
hypothec is a property right for security that grants the person holding the right of 
hypothec, the ‘hypothecee’, the right to sell the registered object serving as security. 
Similar to the right of pledge, the right of hypothec entitles the holder to a prefer-
ential treatment over other creditors in case of insolvency of the debtor. The right of 
hypothec is an accessory right, connected with the obligation creating the debt the 
payment of which the property right seeks to secure.314 However, there are special 
types of hypothec where this accessority of the right of hypothec does not apply, or 
at least in a different way than with a regular right of hypothec.315 
Because the right of hypothec is mainly used for immovable objects, compared 
with the right of pledge, additional requirements exist for the creation of the right. 
The right of hypothec can only be created by a notarial deed, which is subject to 
several requirements.316 These include the identity of the parties, the identity of the 
notary, a description of the object serving as security, the explicit use of the word 
‘hypothec’, but also specifically mentioning the obligation creating the debt for 
which security is given, as well as the amount of the debt.317 In case the sum of the 
debt is not yet certain, the potential maximum amount of the debt will have to be 
mentioned.318  
One of the principal characteristics of the right of hypothec is that the hypoth-
ecee will only have a right of hypothec and will not have physical control over the 
object under hypothec itself. The owner will only have to give up his power over 
the object from the moment the hypothecee executes his right of hypothec. This is 
the reason why the right of hypothec is so often used in practice.319 However, the 
fact that the hypothecee cannot exercise any power of the right creates a more risky 
position than if the hypothecee had such power, for example, if the object decreases 
in value once the hypothecee decides to execute. In order to avoid this, the owner is 
usually obliged to take care of the object under hypothec. In principle, an owner 
who causes a devaluation of the object will be liable for the devaluation.320 This lia-
bility is not part of the right of hypothec and is usually created by general terms and 
conditions applying to the right of hypothec. These terms and conditions can also 
impose limitations on the owner, such as the duty to ask permission before the 
 
used to separate the ownership of the land from the ownership of the building. The right of 
superficies will then be subject of a right of hypothec, not the ownership of the building itself. 
See Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, Nos. 171, 174, p. 201, 203.  
313 These are the main categories of registered objects. For more examples see, inter alia, Heuff & 
Huijgen 2000, p. 10. 
314 Arts. 3:7 and 3:227 BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 201, p. 232, Heuff & 
Huijgen 2000, p. 13. 
315 These will be dealt with in this section. 
316 Art. 3:260 BW. 
317 Art. 40 Law for the office of notaries (Wn), Art. 24(2)(b) Law for the Cadaster (Kw), Arts. 
3:260(1), 24(2)(a) Kw, and 24(2)(a)(2) Kw. 
318 Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 202, p. 233, Heuff & Huijgen 2000, p. 18. 
319 See, inter alia, Heuff & Huijgen 2000, p. 3. 
320 Although the law does not explicitly state this, it does mention a liability for devaluation 
resting on a third party in Art. 3:233 BW. The basic duty of care for the owner is read into this 
article, see Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 256, p. 288. 
 295 
Chapter 5 
purpose for which the object is used can be changed, or they may contain additional 
agreements on the conditions of execution of the hypothecee.321 The duty of care of 
the owner includes the duty to insure the object.322 In order to strengthen the posi-
tion of the hypothecee, Article 3:229 BW, as in a right of pledge, creates a right of 
pledge by operation of law on any claim for compensation, which substitutes the 
object, including claims for devaluation of the object.323 This right of pledge will 
rank over any other right of pledge created on such a claim.324 
When the owner defaults on his payments, the hypothecee can execute his 
right of hypothec.325 The execution of the right of hypothec is effected through a sale 
of the object serving as security. The sale is compulsory, a clause that entitles the hy-
pothecee to keep the object for himself is void.326 Similar to the powers of execution 
of a pledgee, the hypothecee may sell the object once the owner defaults on the 
payments. Furthermore, in case of insolvency of the owner, the hypothecee may act 
as if there were no insolvency.327 The right of hypothec gives the hypothecee the 
power to sell and transfer the object and to keep sufficient of the proceeds of the 
sale to satisfy the debt.328 The sale of the object will have to be concluded in the 
presence of a notary who will fulfil the formalities and receive the purchase price.329 
The costs of the execution will be deducted from the price and the notary will pay 
the hypothecee and, when there is any money left after the hypothecee has received 
his part of the proceeds, the owner.330 
The rules on the right of hypothec leave freedom for the parties to decide on 
the content of their relation. Apart from general terms and conditions, book 3 of the 
Civil Code offers rules on certain clauses that the parties may include in the deed of 
creation and which aim at protection of the hypothecee.331 One of these clauses, the 
lease-clause, deserves some attention.332 A contract of lease of an immovable object 
in Dutch law can be invoked against a new owner.333 This would normally include 
the situation in which the object under hypothec is sold by way of execution. The 
new owner would then be forced to recognise the lease agreement. This would 
 
321 See Stein 2004, p. 89-90. 
322 Heuff & Huijgen 2000, p. 33. 
323 Heuff & Huijgen 2000, p. 34. 
324 Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, Nos. 25, 179, p. 22, 209. 
325 Art. 3:268 BW. The terms and conditions will usually describe when the owner will be in 
default, see Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 302, p. 337. 
326 Art. 3:235 BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 291, p. 328. This article pro-
vides another example of the prohibition on the lex commissoria in Dutch law. 
327 Art. 57 Fw, although Art. 58 Fw entitles the curator in insolvency the power to set a reason-
able time limit for the execution. Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 342, p. 369. 
328 Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, Nos. 298, 322, p. 333, 354, Heuff & Huijgen 2000,  
p. 48-49, 55. 
329 Arts. 3:268 and 3:270(1) BW. 
330 Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 344, p. 372, Heuff & Huijgen 2000, p. 55. 
331 Stein 2004, p. 105 et seq. 
332 For a detailed overview of these clauses see, inter alia, Stein 2004, p. 105 et seq., Asser, Mierlo, 
Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, Nos. 262 et seq., p. 295 et seq. 
333 Art. 7:226 BW, Stein 2004, p. 105, more will be stated on this rule of sale does not break lease 
below in 4.3. Lease of Immovable Objects. 
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result in a considerable devaluation of the object. The lease-clause contains a prohi-
bition to lease the object under hypothec without permission of the hypothecee.334 
An agreement of lease concluded after the lease-clause was created will be valid in 
general but not against the hypothecee. Upon execution the hypothecee can, be-
cause of the lease-clause, terminate the lease agreement. The termination will have 
to be respected by the lessee. Without the lease agreement in force the hypothecee 
can then sell and transfer the object under hypothec without burdens.335 
Like a right of pledge, a right of hypothec can be created for a current claim, 
usually a debt, but also for a future, not yet existing, claim.336 However, unlike a 
right of pledge, the right of hypothec cannot be created on a future registered 
object.337 As a result of this complication, objects that are in existence are used as a 
security object for a debt that has to arise in the future. This is specifically so with a 
so-called credit-hypothec.338 This special type of hypothec is used to secure a credit 
facility, usually provided by a bank. This credit facility comprises an account with 
the bank from which the client can take money until a certain maximum sum. Once 
the client withdraws money from the credit account, a debt will come into existence 
and the bank will have a claim for repayment. However, the client might not 
withdraw the maximum amount immediately; the claim of the bank will therefore 
depend on the withdrawal of the client. The debt the credit facility creates can there-
fore be a future debt, which can still be secured by creating a right of hypothec.339 
The right of hypothec will come into existence at the moment the deed that creates 
the right is registered, regardless of whether the client has withdrawn money and 
the debt has arisen.340  
The complication of this type of hypothec comes with the freedom of the client 
to do as he wishes within the limits set by the bank. This includes the possibility 
that the client fully repays his debt to the bank before he withdraws money again. 
This type of hypothec therefore creates a doctrinal difficulty with regard to the 
principle of accessority. If the debt and the right of hypothec are dependent on each 
other, the repayment of the debt will cause the right of hypothec to terminate. The 
purpose of this type of hypothec is to use a property right to secure the debt the 
client will have and the termination of the right of hypothec is therefore the oppo-
site of what the parties want. Because of the practical relevance of credit-hypothecs 
this doctrinal difficulty is put aside. Van Velten concludes that, in fact, there are two 
different types of hypothecs.341 He distinguishes rights of hypothec that are depend-
ent on the debt for which it is created, and those rights of hypothec that are inde-
 
334 See Art. 3:264 BW. 
335 Stein 2004, p. 106, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 264, p. 298-299. 
336 Art. 3:231 BW, Timmerman 2002, p. 412. 
337 Arts. 3:97(1) and 3:98 BW, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 186, p. 214-215, 
Polak & Van Mierlo 1998, p. 106. 
338 See Stein 2004, p. 91-92. 
339 See Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, Nos. 205 et seq., p. 237 et seq., Polak & Van 
Mierlo 1998, p. 11 et seq.  
340 HR 25 February 1955, NJ 1955, 711 and HR 16 June 2000, NJ 2000, 733. Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 572-
573, Stein 2004, p. 90, different see Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 205, p. 237. 
341 Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 209, p. 243. 
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pendent from the debt and will exist as long as the relation between the owner and 
the hypothecee exists.342 The credit-hypothec is an example of the second type of 
hypothec.343 The principle of accessority seems to apply in a different way to these 
rights of hypothec than to a normal right of hypothec. If accessority exists at all in 
these cases, the right is more connected to the relation between hypothecee and 
owner in general than to the content of this relationship, the debt.344 
Finally, in legal practice the right of hypothec is also used for major trans-
actions where more than one bank is involved. In these situations the banks will 
have to share the right of hypothec. This sharing is done through the general prin-
ciples of gemeenschap or community in which each of the creditors holds an indivisi-
ble share.345 Through an agreement, the holders of the shares in the community can 
decide on the management of the security right. For instance, they can appoint one 
of them to act as a representative of the creditors. A right of hypothec granted to a 
community of creditors is also known as a trust-hypothec.346 
Using the concept of community is not always the best solution. In practice, 
the so-called security-trustee construction is also used, in which a special-purpose 
vehicle (SPV), commonly a foundation, is used to act as holder of the security right. 
This includes situations in which an SPV is founded, banks give credit to the SPV, 
which, in its turn, gives credit to a client who will grant the SPV a right of hypothec. 
Moreover, it includes a situation in which a SPV is used to function as a guarantor 
in a surety agreement. In this last situation the debtor grants a personal security 
right to the SPV to secure the amount of money that creditors need to receive.347 
Another solution is offered through the use of a bewind, a construction where 
entitlement and management powers over an object are separated. The SPV can act 
as an administrator or manager, in Dutch bewindvoerder, of the security right on 
behalf of the creditors.348 These solutions open the possibility of creating a security 
right for as yet unknown creditors. The trust-hypothec is used, for instance, in case 
of a bond loan.349 
The development of the use of the right of hypothec illustrates the search for 
practical solutions. In the case of credit-hypothecs this is visible in the flexible use of 
 
342 See also Heuff & Huijgen 2000, p. 56-57, Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 572-573. 
343 See also Timmerman 2002, p. 410. 
344 Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 209, p. 243, but also see Timmerman 2002,  
p. 423-424. 
345 Art. 3:166 BW. The community is the same concept as used with rights of apartment, see 
above; 3.5. Right of Apartment. See also Van Weverwijk 1995, p. 257, Timmerman 2002, p. 416 
et seq., Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 218, p. 252, Asser & Perrick 2007, No. 
78, p. 105-107. See above; 2.2. Co-Ownership. 
346 The term confusingly invokes connotations with the English trust. Nevertheless, the Dutch 
trust-hypothec is a different legal instrument. The term is used because a third party is used 
to represent the common interest of the creditors. On this see Polak & Van Mierlo 1998, p. 22 
et seq. 
347 On this complicated structure see Polak & Van Mierlo 1998, p. 24 et seq., Van Weverwijk 1995, 
p. 259-260. A combination of a community and a SPV is also very possible. On this see Polak 
& Van Mierlo 1998, p. 27. 
348 Stein 2004, p. 92-93, Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, Nos. 220 et seq., p. 254 et seq. 
349 Stein 2004, p. 93. 
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the principle of accessority. Furthermore, trust-hypothecs open the possibilities for 
syndicate security solutions. The trust-hypothec searches for the boundaries of what 
is possible with the Dutch system of property law and creatively uses different 
concepts such as community and bewind to allow a security system with multiple 
creditors. 
4. Borderline Cases in Dutch Property Law  
The third section of this chapter dealt with the standard set of recognised property 
rights in Dutch law. However, because of both historical and current developments 
there are some other relations that should be examined. Some of these are actual 
property rights, whereas others are relations that bear so many property characteris-
tics that, although not recognised as such, they might be treated as a property right.  
4.1. Priority Rights 
Like French law, Dutch law recognises a set of rights that arise by operation of law 
and that provide the holder of such a right with a preferential position over other 
creditors. These rights are known as priority rights, or in Dutch voorrechten.350 
Article 3:278 BW specifically mentions priority rights as one of the grounds for 
preferential treatment over other creditors.351  
Priority rights in Dutch law are divided into two categories. First, general 
priority rights are held on a full set of assets and debts of a person or company. 
These rights include rights in respect of the reimbursement of costs of insolvency 
proceedings, the costs of burials, pension claims of employees and former em-
ployees, and claims of employees for salary.352 Second, specific priority rights are 
held on a specific object. These rights are more common in Dutch law. They include 
claims for costs that were incurred in order to prevent the physical destruction of an 
object, both immovable and movable, claims for costs incurred as a result of work 
on a certain object based on a contract of work, and claims from the association of 
co-owners or all the holders of a share in a community of apartment rights together 
on the payment of the costs by one of them.353  
In Dutch law priority rights are not property rights, even though they provide 
the holder with a preferential position over other creditors. At the same time, be-
cause of the same effect, priority rights are not purely personal rights either.354 Most 
priority rights end when the object on which they rest is transferred to someone 
else.355 However, under certain conditions some of the priority rights can also have 
a right to follow, a droit de suite. For example, Article 3:287 BW which provides for a 
 
350 In the old Dutch Civil Code these rights were still known as privileges, resembling the French 
term privilège. Fesevur 1992, p. 9. See Chapter 3; 3.7. Priority Rights. 
351 Art. 3:278 BW. The other grounds are through the right of pledge or the right of hypothec. 
352 Art. 3:288 BW. See Fesevur 1992, p. 20 et seq. 
353 Arts. 3:281(1) BW, 3:285(1), 3:286(2), and 3:286(1) BW. Fesevur 1992, p. 17-18. 
354 Fesevur 1992, p. 25-26. 
355 HR 22 May 1931, NJ 1931, 1429, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 3 1981, p. 843. 
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priority right in respect of a claim for damages, which is intended to provide 
priority over the claim of the debtor on his insurance, still rests on that claim after 
assignment. When the claim is assigned the priority right will transfer with it.356  
Priority rights are therefore best characterised as situated between personal 
and property rights. They have characteristics of both. In any case, they are not in-
cluded in the closed list of property rights, and therefore, at least in Dutch doctrine, 
they should not be considered as a property right.357 
4.2. Old Property Rights 
Besides the menu of property rights recognised by the Dutch Civil Code, there are 
also property rights that were created before the entry into force of the property law 
part of the new Civil Code in 1992, sometimes even before the entry into force of the 
old Civil Code in 1838.358 When the new Civil Code was introduced, the transitional 
legislation dealt specifically with these old property rights. 
These rights include; pootrecht, the right to plant trees on another’s land, weide-
rechten, rights to let cattle graze on another’s land, recht van eendenkooi, the right to 
catch ducks with a special device on another’s land, recht van windvang, the right of 
an owner of a windmill to stop anyone from building or planting constructions or 
plants that would interfere with the flow of wind, cijnzen, the right of an owner to a 
periodic performance, in money or in natura, recht van de 13e penning, the right to 
receive 1/13 share (7.69%) of the purchase price of another’s land, visrecht, the 
exclusive right to catch fish in another’s water, veerrecht, the exclusive right to trans-
port people and objects over the water, recht van aanwas, the right to the part of a 
river- or seabed that becomes visible when the tide is low, stuwrecht, the right to a 
certain level of water and the right to use this water, recht op kerkgestoelte, the right to 
have a set seat in a church, and recht van beklemming, the right to use another’s land 
for a long duration of time and have buildings on that land.359 
Whereas, at first, these rights had been abolished as a result of developments 
after the French Revolution, after the occupation of the Netherlands by the French at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, the sovereign ruler reinstated them by 
sovereign decree.360 This sovereign, William I, was petitioned to reinstate them by 
many holders of former seigniorial rights, which included these old property rights, 
but also by others who believed the reinstatement of these property relations would 
help structure the rural areas.361  
 
356 Fesevur 1992, p. 26. 
357 Different in French law, see Chapter 3; 3.7. Priority Rights. 
358 Ketelaar 1978, p. 1, this book provides a detailed overview of old property rights in Dutch 
law, their development, recognition and abandonment. See also Meijers 1907, p. 272, 
Struycken 2007, p. 50-52. 
359 Descriptions taken from Ketelaar 1978, p. 154, 163, 174, 192, 198, 206, 219, 234, 250-251, 262 
and 267. The last mentioned right, the right of beklemming, is best seen as a combination of a 
right of emphyteusis and a right of superficies. It was also mentioned in Art. 1654 of the Old 
Dutch Civil Code, but not further dealt with. 
360 SB 26 March 1814, Ketelaar 1978, p. 57-58. 
361 Ketelaar 1978, p. 57. 
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However, recognition of old property relations did not include the automatic 
application of the old law. The new legislation, after 1838 the old Dutch Civil Code, 
would recognise them, but would not allow the creation of these rights.362 The Hoge 
Raad supported this decision with several judgements stating that these old proper-
ty rights had returned as vermogensrechten, but also allowed old law to apply in 
certain situations.363  
The new Civil Code also allows for the continuation of old property rights.364 
In order to deal with old property rights, Article 150 of the Transition Act, in Dutch 
Overgangswet, stipulates specific rules and requirements. A right that existed under 
the old Civil Code or which was recognised under the old Civil Code as an old 
property right, remains in existence and takes effect as a registered object as de-
scribed in Article 3:10 BW.365 Although no new ‘old’ property rights can be created, 
old rights still exist and function within the legal system. The courts do not have the 
authority to abolish them, this is a sole competence of the legislature.366 Article 3:24 
BW allows the old property rights to be registered, but even without registration 
these property rights have an affect against the world.367  
4.3. Lease of Immovable Objects 
As in other civil law systems, in Dutch law lease is a personal right.368 A lease is 
created by contract and only creates personal rights and claims. The relation be-
tween lessor and lessee is strictly personal. By application of the general rules on 
contract law, in case another person substitutes either the lessor or lessee, the con-
tract of lease ceases and a new contract should be concluded. This situation is the 
result of the fact that personal rights do not work against third parties. However, in 
case of lease, as in other civil law systems, these effects are sometimes considered 
undesirable, especially in case of a sale of the leased object by the owner. By appli-
cation of the rules on contract law, the new owner would not be bound to the lease 
and could evict the lessee. Therefore, the position of the lessee has become protected 
by legislation.369 To this effect Article 7:226 BW states: 
1. The transfer of an object to which a lease agreement applies and the creation or 
transfer of an independent right of usufruct, emphyteusis or superficies on the object 
 
362 Art. 1 Overgangswet 1829, Ketelaar 1978, p. 3, 133, Struycken 2007, p. 50-51. 
363 Ketelaar 1978, p. 133-134, HR 28 March 1890, W 5858 and HR 13 November 1914, W 9810 and 
HR 20 February 1931, W 12314. See also HR 17 March 1981, NJ 1981, 338. 
364 Art. 69 Overgangswet, under (a). Struycken 2007, p. 50. See also, for example, HR 27 April 
2007, RvdW 2007/469 concerns a right of emphyteusis created in 1741. 
365 Art. 150(1) Overgangswet. With this Article, property rights become incorporeal objects. 
366 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 208, p. 225. 
367 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 208, p. 225, Art. 150 Overgangswet (Transition Act) 
368 Art. 7:201 BW. On the origins of lease in Dutch law and the origins of the protection central in 
this section, see Schrage 1984. 
369 Art. 7:226 BW. For an overview of the development protecting the lessee under the adagium 
sale does not break lease, in Dutch koop breekt geen huur, see Westrik 2001, p. 189 et seq. 
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to which the lease agreement applies by the lessor transfers the right and claims of 
the lessor … to the acquirer.370 
Because this provision protects lessees, it cannot be deviated from by the lease con-
tract.371 The Article codifies the maxim that a sale does not break a lease.372 Different 
from other civil law systems, the description of the object that is leased in Article 
7:226 BW is so broad that it not only includes immovable objects, specifically land 
and buildings on land, but may also apply to movable objects.373 
The provision of Article 7:226 BW also deals with the effects of a lease agree-
ment in respect to the creation of a property right. This part of the Article refers to 
the creation of a right of usufruct, which will transfer the lease contract to the 
usufructuary. When a right of usufruct is created the owner will therefore be free of 
his obligations against the lessee. The result of the rule of Article 7:226 BW is that a 
contract of lease will have effect against the holder of a newly created property 
right. In the system of property law this is a normal effect, as older rights go before 
new rights.374 However, to award such effect to a contract, or, better, to a personal 
right, does not fit in the system in which the law of property and the law of obliga-
tions are separated.375 Mainly because of this systematic problem it has been sug-
gested to transform lease into a property right.376  
Furthermore, with the introduction of the protection of lessees, the Dutch 
legislature awards effects to a contract that, although it is a special contract, it can-
not have. Hartkamp has described this effect as a transfer of the contract prescribed 
by law.377 However, the effect could also be described in property law terms as a 
droit de suite effect.378 In property law terminology, the possibility that the contract 
of lease becomes enforceable against a third party is in effect a droit de suite effect. 
 
370 Art. 7:226 BW ‘1- Overdracht van de zaak waarop de huurovereenkomst betrekking heeft en 
vestiging of overdracht van een zelfstandig recht van vruchtgebruik, erfpacht of opstal op de 
zaak waarop de huurovereenkomst betrekking heeft, door de verhuurder doen de rechten en 
verplichtingen van de verhuurder uit de huurovereenkomst … overgaan op de verkrijger’. 
371 Art. 7:226 (4) BW. 
372 Like in German law, because of the tradition transfer system in which the contract underlying 
the transfer and the transfer of ownership itself are separated, the better way to describe the 
maxim is a transfer does not break a lease.  
373 See also HR 15 June 2007, NJ 2007/445. On the protection of the lessee in French and German 
law see Chapter 3; 4.6. Lease, and Chapter 4; 4.4. Lease of Immovable Objects. 
374 Prior tempore potior iure, see Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 3, Van Erp 
2006b, p. 16. 
375 See below; 5. A Numerus Clausus in Dutch Property Law? 
376 Asbreuk-van Os 2000a, p. 32 et seq., in reaction Van Erp 2000b, p. 465 et seq., with a contra-
reaction by Asbreuk-van Os 2000b, p. 458 et seq. and on the fiscal implications of such a 
development see Thomas & Ziepzeerder 2000, p. 859 et seq. 
377 Or wettelijke contractsovername, HR 25 January 1991, NJ 1992, 172, Asbreuk-van Os 2000a,  
p. 32. 
378 Westrik 2001, 27-28. 
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Nevertheless, systematically, the contract of lease, although a special contract, 
remains a contract and not a property right.379  
4.4. Registration of a Consumer Contract of a Sale of a House 
In the Dutch system of transfer of ownership the agreement between the parties to 
transfer and the actual transfer itself are separated. In this so-called traditio system, 
property law provides its own rules on the transfer of the right of ownership.380 
Therefore, when a contract of sale is concluded, but a deed has not yet been made 
and registered, the seller cannot be stopped in property law from a sale and trans-
fer, including, registration to another person.381 
In respect to consumers, the strict rules of property law do not always have a 
fair effect. In 2003, after a lengthy legislative procedure, Article 7:2 BW was added 
to the Dutch Civil Code to help consumers in the acquisition of an immovable object 
that is used for habitation.382 Article 7:2 BW states: 
1. The sale of an immovable object or a part of that object that will be used to live in, 
when the buyer is a natural person not acting in the exercise of a business or pro-
fession, is made in writing. 
2. The deed made between the parties, or a true copy thereof, must be delivered, on 
demand, to the buyer, in return for, on demand, a dated receipt. Within three days 
of this having been delivered to him, the buyer has a right to terminate the sale. 
Where, after the buyer has made use of this right, a new sale is made in respect to 
the same object or part of that right, the right does not arise anew …383 
This Article introduces aspects of consumer protection through requiring the con-
tract of sale to be in writing and by providing the buyer a period of three days to 
think about the sale.384 This aspect of the reform therefore interfered with the 
consensus principle of contract law. There was also an aspect of the reform that 
interfered with basic property law rules. Now that the contract of sale of a consumer 
 
379 HR 15 June 2007, NJ 2007/445. Book 7 BW deals with special contracts, lease is dealt with in 
Title 4 (Arts. 7:201 et seq. BW). 
380 Art. 3:89 BW requires a notarial deed and registration of that deed in the public register. Pitlo 
et al. 2006, p. 166-169. On the Dutch transfer system see Van Vliet 2000, p. 133 et seq. 
381 Van Velten 2005, p. 29. 
382 On the legislative procedure see Van Velten 2005, p. 29-31. 
383 Art. 7:2 BW, ‘1.- De koop van een tot bewoning bestemde onroerende zaak of bestanddeel 
daarvan wordt, indien de koper een natuurlijk persoon is die niet handelt in de uitoefening 
van een beroep of bedrijf, schriftelijk aangegaan. 2.- De tussen partijen opgemaakte akte of 
een afschrift daarvan moet aan de koper ter hand worden gesteld, desverlangd tegen afgifte 
aan de verkoper van een gedateerd ontvangstbewijs. Gedurende drie dagen na deze terhand-
stelling heeft de koper het recht de koop te ontbinden. Komt, nadat de koper van dit recht 
gebruik gemaakt heeft, binnen zes maanden tussen dezelfde partijen met betrekking tot 
dezelfde zaak of hetzelfde bestanddeel daarvan opnieuw een koop tot stand, dan ontstaat het 
recht niet opnieuw. …’. 
384 Especially the requirement for the contract of sale to be in writing was not evident in Dutch 
law. See Van Velten 2005, p. 29-30, Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 166. 
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transaction of a house had to be made in writing, registration of that agreement 
became possible. Article 7:3 BW provides to this effect: 
1. The sale of a registered object can be entered into the public register, as mentioned 
in Section 2 of Title 1 of Book 3, unless, at the time when such registration is made, 
no delivery of the object by the seller would have been possible yet due to the 
exclusion made in Article 97 of Book 3 on the anticipated delivery of future 
registered objects. On a sale of an immovable object or a part thereof which is 
destined to be used to live in, there may be no derogation from the provision in the 
preceding sentence to the detriment of the buyer who is a natural person and does 
not act in the conduct of a profession of business.…385 
Article 7:3 BW is reminiscent of the technique of the German Vormerkung, which 
also enables the registration of a personal right.386 The Article allows the consumer, 
after the reflection period of Article 7:2 BW, to register the contract of sale in antici-
pation of the transfer of the right of ownership to him.387  
Unlike the effects of a German Vormerkung, the effects of the registration of 
Article 7:3 BW are mentioned by the Article itself. Registration makes it possible for 
the buyer to invoke the sale in case of a transfer of the same object or the creation of 
a property right in respect of that same object; against the administrator when the 
object is placed under administration, in Dutch bewind, after the registration, against 
a contract of lease concluded after the registration, against a qualitative duty created 
after the registration, and, most importantly against the insolvency administrator in 
an insolvency procedure.388 
Registration, in other words, provides the contract of sale with a limited third-
party effect by creating the possibility, directly based on the Civil Code, of invoking 
the contract against persons who were not party to it. Especially in case of insol-
vency of the seller, the buyer can invoke the agreement against the administrator 
and claim performance of the agreement through a transfer of the right of owner-
ship.389 Because of these effects, the registration will only be valid for a period of six 
months.390 When these six months have passed, the registration will end with retro-
active effect. Nevertheless, within this six-month period, the registered consumer 
contract for the sale of a house is awarded effects that the personal right that follows 
from the contract would normally not have. Like its German equivalent, the tech-
nique of registration awards the personal rights some property effects.  
 
385 Art. 7:3 BW, ‘1.- De koop van een registergoed kan worden ingeschreven in de openbare 
registers, bedoeld in afdeling 2 van titel 1 van Boek 3, tenzij op het tijdstip van de inschrijving 
levering van dat goed door de verkoper nog niet mogelijk zou zijn geweest wegens de in 
artikel 97 van Boek 3 vervatte uitsluiting van levering bij voorbaat van toekomstige register-
goederen. Bij de koop van een tot woning bestemde onroerende zaak kan, indien de koper 
een natuurlijk persoon is die niet handelt in de uitoefening van een beroep of bedrijf, van het 
in de vorige zin bepaalde niet ten nadele van de koper worden afgeweken. …’. 
386 Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 165. See Chapter 4; 4.2. Pre-emptive Registration (Vormerkung). 
387 Art. 7:3(2) BW, Van Velten 2005, p. 42. 
388 The grounds are mentioned in Art. 7:3(3) BW. See also Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 173-178. 
389 Van Velten 2005, p. 46, Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 174-175. 
390 Art. 7:3(4) BW. 
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4.5. After-Effects of Property Rights 
Dutch property law adheres to the theory of démembrement to describe the relation 
between the right of ownership and other property rights.391 In this method of 
creation of property rights, these rights are considered as a part of the mother rights 
from which they were derived.392 Consequently, once a property right and the 
mother right fall into the same hands, the powers resulting from the property right 
and of the mother right mix, the right of ownership becomes complete again, and 
the property right ceases to exist.  
This method of creation of rights forms the foundation of the Dutch system of 
property law and has several important consequences. For one, as a property right 
is seen as a part of the right from which it was derived, it is impossible to have a 
property right in respect of one’s own object or right.393 Connected to this is the 
accessoriness of property security rights. When the claim a property security right 
secures ceases to exist, the property right returns to the owner. When this happens, 
the property right and the right of ownership fall into the same hands and the 
property right will cease to exist when the powers of that right mix with the powers 
of the right of ownership.394 However, to this general rule, Dutch law makes one 
general exception. Article 3:81 BW, which deals with ways in which a property right 
can end, states: 
3. Renunciation and mixing of property rights do not have effect against those who 
have a property right in respect of the property right that ceases to exist. Mixing of 
property rights also does not have effect against those who had a property right in 
respect of the same object as the property right that ceases to exist and they should 
respect that property right.395 
The result of the general rule, following from the method of démembrement, is that a 
right of emphyteusis ceases to exist when the holder of the right becomes the owner, 
or the holder of a right of usufruct inherits the bare ownership.396 However, if an-
 
391 On this concept in Dutch law see above; 3. Other Property Rights. 
392 Art 3:8 BW. 
393 This is different in German where one could have a property right in respect of his own 
object or right such as a Grundschuld. See Chapter 4; 3. Other Property Rights. 
394 Another theory would be to state that property security rights in Dutch law, because of their 
accessory nature, simply cease to exist from the moment the claim they secured ceased to 
exist, as one cannot exist without the other once the property rights is created. 
395 Art. 81(3) ‘-1 Afstand en vermenging werken niet ten nadele van hen die op het tenietgaande 
beperkte recht op hun beurt een beperkt recht hebben. Vermenging werkt evenmin ten voor-
dele van hen die op het bezwaarde goed een beperkt recht hebben en het tenietgaande recht 
moesten eerbiedigen’. 
396 Another effect of the article is that the property right that was created on the property right 
that ceases to exist should not just also cease to exist. If the destruction of the property right is 
to the disadvantage of the holder of the property right in respect of the property right, the 
right can, in certain circumstances, continue to exist on the object itself and no longer on the 
property right, which has, after all, cease to exist. See Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 
2006, No. 15, p. 14-15. Examples taken from Pitlo et al. 2006, p. 468-469. 
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other property right had been created on the property right that ceased to exist, the 
effect of Article 3:81(3) BW is a re-activation of the property right. If, for instance, a 
right of hypothec was created on a parcel of land that was burdened with a right of 
servitude and the dominant and servient land fall into the same hands, the right of 
servitude will cease to exist. However, the right of hypothec will continue to rest on 
one of the parcels of land. If the holder of the right of hypothec executes his right 
the right of servitude will revive for the benefit of the new owner.397 Another 
example would arise where more than one right of hypothec is created on the same 
object. When the holder of the first right of hypothec becomes owner of the object, 
the right of hypothec mixes with the right of ownership and ceases to exist. How-
ever, this mixing will not work to the advantage of the second hypothecee, who will 
remain to hold a right of second hypothec in respect to the holder of the first right of 
hypothec.398 
The effect of a termination of a property right through mixing with the powers 
of the owner is therefore a relative effect. It is no surprise that in Dutch property law 
this effect causes some doctrinal difficulties. These difficulties especially concern the 
relative nature of the effect. The leading opinion is that the property right ceases to 
exist but that this has no effect against the holder of a property right in respect of 
such a property right.399 Effectively this means that a property right can have a 
‘second life’, even after it has ceased to exist.400 
The right of pledge offers another example of an after-effect of property rights. 
The end of the discussion on the right of pledge made notice of the landmark 
decision of the Hoge Raad in Mulder q.q. v CLBN.401 This case dealt with a right of 
silent pledge created on several claims for the benefit of a bank. The pledgor became 
insolvent, and the bank wanted to execute the right of pledge. Since the pledge had 
not been notified to the debtors, it was a silent pledge, the debtors could pay their 
debts to the pledgor.402 Because the right of pledge is an accessory right, the pay-
ment of the claims caused the right of pledge to cease to exist. The bank therefore 
lost its security right in respect of the pledgor regarding the paid claims.  
Following the strict rules laid down in case law of the Hoge Raad, the result of 
this was that the bank became a normal creditor in the insolvency procedure and 
could not use its preferential position anymore than the right of pledge would have 
 
397 Example from Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 13, p. 15-16 and Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan 
& Van Dam 2006, No. 19, p. 18-19, see also Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 3 1981, 
p. 311, Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 235 et seq.  
398 In other words, the mixing of the right of first hypothec with the right of ownership must not 
have an effect to the advantage of the holder of a second right of hypothec. However, this 
situation only arises when the claim for which the right of first hypothec was created remains 
in existence. Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 3 1981, p. 840-841, Asser, Mierlo, 
Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 353, p. 378, Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 
19, p. 18-19. 
399 Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 18, p. 17-18. 
400 See also Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 238. 
401 See above; 3.6. Pledge. 
402 Art. 3:246 BW. 
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granted it.403 However, the Hoge Raad intervened against this effect and decided 
that, although the right of pledge had ceased to exist because the claims had been 
paid, the bank continued to hold the preferential position it had when the right of 
pledge had still been in existence. 
With this very interesting decision the Hoge Raad has provided for an after-life 
of the right of pledge, in which, although doctrinally the right of pledge ceases to 
exist when a debtor pays the claims the right secures, the preferential position of the 
bank remains. In the system of security rights such a preferential position can only 
be achieved by establishing a property security right or by having a priority right 
prescribed by law.404 The judgment in the case Mulder q.q. v CLBN has added a third 
possibility. 
4.6. Privative Mandate 
The systematic nature of Dutch property law creates some undesirable rigidity in 
respect to the power of disposal over another’s assets. The inclusion of Article 
3:84(3) BW, the fiducia-ban Article, and the limitations of its application by the Hoge 
Raad, still prohibit a legal construction whereby one person brings his objects in the 
power of another who deals with the administration of these objects.405 Such a legal 
relation is considered a transfer for management purposes where the actual acquirer 
does not become the owner of the assets.406 The other person is only administrator. 
Such relations invoke a regime that resembles an Anglo-American trust concept, 
which the system of Dutch property law fiercely resists.407 
Consequently, solutions to provide for management of the object of another 
are found in contract law, specifically in the law on representation. In these situa-
tions a certain person, mandatory, acts on behalf of another person, mandator. In 
respect to representation the new Dutch Civil Code introduced a new concept that 
best translates as privative mandate. Article 7:423 BW states: 
When it is agreed between the mandator and mandatory that the mandatory will exer-
cise a right of the mandator in his own name and with the exclusion of the mandator, 
the mandator will lack the power to act on his own for the duration of the agreement 
also against third parties. The exclusion cannot be invoked against third parties who 
did not know, nor ought to have known about it.408 
 
403 HR 10 January 1975, NJ 1976, 249 (Giro-case), HR 7 October 1988, NJ 1989, 449 (AMRO-
Curators THB), see also HR 17 February 1995, NJ 1996, 471 (Mulder q.q./CLBN), Para. 3.4.3. 
404 Art. 3:278 BW. 
405 See above; 2. The Right of Ownership. 
406 Or a so-called fiducia cum amico. See above; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
407 Van Erp 2000b, p. 456, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 17-18, see below; 
4.9. EC and International Influences. 
408 Art. 7:423 BW ‘-1 Indien is bedongen dat de lasthebber een aan de lastgever toekomend recht 
in eigen naam en met uitsluiting van de lastgever zal uitoefenen, mist deze de bevoegdheid 
tot deze uitoefening voor de duur van de overeenkomst ook jegens derden. De uitsluiting 
kan niet worden tegengeworpen aan derden die haar kenden noch behoorden te kennen’. 
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This mandate is created when the stipulator, or mandator, agrees that he will not 
exercise his power over a certain object for the duration of the agreement.409 This 
power can be twofold. Either it concerns acts that create obligations, such as the 
lease of immovable objects, or acts that have property law consequences, such as the 
transfer of the right of ownership of immovable objects.410  
Depending on the act from which the stipulator agrees to refrain, he will lose 
his power to act, or his power to dispose.411 The power to dispose is a concept in 
property law and therefore only applies in case of acts in the area of property law.412 
Consequently the agreement to refrain from taking acts concerning obligations will 
result in a prohibition to act for the stipulator.413 The effect of the agreement, in 
particular the third-party effect, has been debated. Under the old Civil Code the 
Hoge Raad held that there was no third-party effect.414 The Court stated that, because 
of the contractual nature of the agreement, no so-called ‘privative effect’, the exclu-
sive power of the mandatory to act that could also be invoked against third parties, 
could be awarded.415 Nevertheless, the legislature chose a different way in the new 
Civil Code. Article 7:423 BW awards this ‘privative effect’ when the parties agree 
that the mandatory will act in his own name and the stipulator will refrain from 
taking acts concerning the object. Such agreement will have effect against all who 
knew or ought to have known about its existence.416 A third party who did not have 
such knowledge can rely on the third-party protection rules of Articles 3:86 and 3:88 
BW. In Struycken’s view the distinction between acts resulting in obligations and 
also having property effect remains relevant, because in the system of Dutch law no 
privative effect can be awarded to property law acts outside those dealt with by 
property law itself.417 
Van der Grinten has named the introduction of the provision introducing the 
privative mandate in the new Civil Code ‘opportunity legislation’.418 He states that 
under pressure from private organisations, the Minister of Justice has opted for a 
concept that is situated between contractual and property solutions. Especially the 
fact that a privative mandate can now be registered means that it is almost impossi-
ble to prove lack of knowledge of its existence, and make successful use of the third-
party protection provisions mentioned earlier.419 In effect, therefore, the privative 
 
409 Aertsen points out that this concept has been specifically mentioned as an alternative for 
trusts in Dutch law, see Kamerstukken II 1992-1993, 23 027, No. 3, p. 5, Aertsen 2004, p. 128. See 
also Struycken 2007, p. 586. 
410 Worst 2002, p. 195. 
411 Worst 2002, p. 197. 
412 Worst 2002, p. 197. 
413 Although in effect there is almost no difference, the system of property law forces the 
distinction to be made.  
414 HR 29 September 1989, NJ 1990, 397. 
415 Van der Grinten 1993, p. 12. 
416 Van der Grinten 1993, p. 12, Worst 2002, p. 197, Rank 1997, p. 469.  
417 Struycken 2007, p. 591-592. 
418 Van der Grinten 1993, p. 13, see also Rank 1997, p. 474, Snijders 1993, p. 236-238, Struycken 
2007, p. 612. 
419 Rank 1997, p. 470, Worst 2002, p. 198. 
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mandate creates a relation that has effect against third parties. Third parties that 
deal with the stipulator of such an agreement should realise that the mandator lacks 
the power to act or even the power to dispose. In other words, with the inclusion of 
this provision in the Civil Code, like the lease of immovable objects, the privative 
mandate offers another example of property-like effects granted by the Dutch Civil 
Code to what is, in essence, a contractual relation.420 
Finally, the usefulness of the privative mandate to legal practice is shown by 
its application in fund investments. Investors transfer their money to a third party 
who is known as a ‘keeper’, who will hold the money in a separate set of assets 
from his own. The ‘keeper’ creates a contract creating a privative mandate with a 
‘manager’ who will invest the money by using the power over the money of the 
‘keeper’. The ‘manager’ agrees to act in his own name so that the privative mandate 
will have effect against third parties.421 The terms of the contract will limit the 
powers of both the ‘keeper’ and of the ‘manager’, safeguarding the interest of the 
investors.422 
4.7. Obligations as Part of Property Rights 
The discussion of the Dutch system of property law in this chapter shows that, 
although at the outset the system of property rights is closed, within the closed 
system parties have, depending on the right in question, some freedom to decide on 
the content of those rights.423 This freedom is visible in case of rights of servitude 
and rights of emphyteusis, but certainly also in case of rights of usufruct or rights of 
apartment.424 Parties are left to make agreements that deal with the exact contents of 
their relationship. These agreements, as far as they are included in the deed of 
creation, can become part of the property right.425  
The criteria for when these agreements are an inherent part of the property 
right was developed in relation to the right of emphyteusis. The Hoge Raad held that 
agreements between parties would be part of the property right itself if they have a 
sufficient connection to the emphyteusis and are not contrary to the nature of the 
right.426 The criterion of sufficient connection was introduced by the legislature in 
the discussion on the introduction of the new Dutch Civil Code.427 Struycken has 
 
420 See also Rank 1997, p. 469. 
421 Example taken from Worst 2002, p. 196. 
422 See Worst 2002, p. 200. 
423 For a perspective on this same problem from Belgian law see Verbeke & Snaet 2007, p. 365 et 
seq. 
424 In case of servitudes the legislator explicitly stated that it kept the definition of Art. 5:71 BW 
as open as possible. See Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 253. 
425 The interesting suggestion that a burden could both comprise a personal obligation as well as 
a property obligation was put forward by Eggens, see Eggens 1960, p. 4 et seq. However, this 
suggestion is generally rejected, see Van Opstall 1966, p. 398, Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 
2002, No. 176, p. 202. In respect to French law see Chapter 3; 4.2. Real Obligations. 
426 HR 16 March 1977, NJ 1977, 399, Plantenga & Treurniet 1957, p. 177, Van Velten 1995, p. 47, 
De Jong 1995b, p. 17, Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 110-111. 
427 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 3. 
 309 
Chapter 5 
examined this criterion and shown that the Dutch legislature intended to leave 
parties freedom to give shape and content to their own property relations.428 In his 
view the criterion of a sufficient connection is vague and most likely the legislature 
intended to set boundaries that parties must stay within. If such a requirement were 
to be fulfilled Struycken considers the agreement is awarded the same effect as the 
rights and duties that follow from the description of the property right in the Civil 
Code.429 However, it is also possible to argue that, once an agreement has a suf-
ficient connection to the property right to which it relates, the agreement becomes 
an inherent part of the property right itself. 
These open criteria of sufficient connection and the nature of the right make it 
difficult to establish which agreements are included in the property right and which 
are not. Struycken has held that the addition made by the Hoge Raad of the require-
ment for an agreement not to be contrary to the nature of the right offers a more 
objective view and allows the court to take the property relation and the intention of 
the legislature as a starting point.430 
It has been argued that agreements that are part of a property right can be 
both negative and positive.431 The possibility for parties to impose positive burdens 
is not open with respect to every property right. The system of Dutch property law 
also imposes restrictions on the content of certain rights. Especially rights of servi-
tude are subject to this restriction. Article 5:71 BW stipulates that a duty imposed by 
a right of servitude can, in principle, only be negative.432 The right of emphyteusis 
offers more extended possibilities for parties to impose positive duties. A right of 
emphyteusis can include a duty to erect a building as a principal duty, whereas in 
case of a right of servitude such a duty can only be imposed insofar as the erection 
of a building is necessary for the performance of the principal duty.433 However, 
because of the broad criteria to establish which agreements are inherent parts of a 
property right, the inclusion of any of these duties remains the subject of debate. 
An agreement that falls within the criteria of the Hoge Raad will be an inherent 
part of the property right. In other words, the scope of the property right can be 
extended, be it within the limits set by the law, through party agreements. Dutch 
law, contrary to German law, follows the principle of démembrement to explain the 
relation between ownership and property rights.434 In strict application this 
approach considers property rights as temporarily separated parts of the right of 
ownership. Suijling and Van Opstall defended the principle, known in Dutch law as 
the principle of deduction, or aftrekprincipe.435 These authors argued that because a 
property right consists of parts of the right of ownership, it can never comprise 
 
428 Struycken 2007, p. 386-387. 
429 Struycken 2007, p. 387. 
430 This requirement was additional besides the requirement of sufficient connection provided 
by explanation of the Civil Code, Struycken 2007, p. 394. 
431 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 217, p. 241, De Jong 1995b, p. 17-19. Of a different 
opinion see Van Velten 1995, p. 49, Struycken 2007, p. 412-415. 
432 See above; 3.1. Real Servitudes for a more detailed explanation. 
433 Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 217, p. 241, See above; 3.3. Emphyteusis.  
434 This is, inter alia, expressed by Art. 3:8 BW. 
435 See Van Opstall 1966, p. 383 et seq., Suijling 1940, No. 345, p. 363. 
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more than the right of ownership itself. The owner cannot be under a duty to erect a 
building; ownership cannot easily be burdened with a positive duty, so the holder 
of a right of emphyteusis cannot either.  
The new Dutch BW does not follow this strict approach. In modern Dutch law 
a property right can consist of more than just parts of the powers of the owner.436 
However, the principle of démembrement does still exist; once a property right and 
ownership come into the same hands, the property right ceases to exist.437 Never-
theless, the arguments of Suijling and Van Opstall can still be found. Van Velten has 
argued that a positive duty imposed by conditions in an emphyteusis can only exist if 
there is a specific legal basis.438 Van Velten also extends this argumentation to 
agreements included in deeds of creation of property rights in general.439 In this 
approach any agreement made by the parties, which cannot be classified as a part of 
the right of ownership, and which does not have an explicit legal basis, is a separate 
contract. Any rights and claims created by these contracts are personal. 
Struycken also has argued that the possibility for parties to create an agree-
ment that becomes part of a property right should be interpreted restrictively.440 He 
focuses upon the method in which property rights are created, in Dutch law the 
démembrement method, and concludes that following this method most agreements 
cannot be part of the property right itself.441 Perhaps some party agreements can 
have third-party effect as ‘qualitative’ or real obligations, but never as a part of the 
property right itself. When the mother right from which the limited property right 
was derived did not contain the powers now contained in the agreement, the lim-
ited property right cannot contain these either.442 As a primary example, Struycken 
mentions that positive burdens can therefore certainly not be created as a part of a 
property right.443 
Vonck has argued for a much more broader view of possible party agreements 
as a part of property rights.444 In his view, which centres on the right of emphyteusis, 
the criterion of the Hoge Raad should be relaxed, and all agreements that are used to 
support the agreements that can be made directly based on the Civil Code itself, 
should be allowed as part of a property right.445 As an example Vonck provides the 
agreement that parties can make, directly based on the Civil Code, on the right of 
 
436 Art. 3:8 BW, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 3, 257, Asser, Mijnsen, De 
Haan & Van Dam 2006, Nos. 44-45, p. 38-41. 
437 However, a property right will not always cease to exist in relation to those who already had 
a property right in respect of the property right that falls into the hand of the owner. Art. 
3:81(3) BW, see above; 3. Other Property Rights. 
438 Van Velten 1995, p. 49, see also Snijders 1995, p. 155, contra see De Jong 1995a, p. 525, Asser, 
Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, No. 217, p. 241. 
439 This would include rights of servitude, superficies, usufruct and apartment, Van Velten 1995, 
p. 49. 
440 Struycken 2007, p. 412-413. 
441 Struycken 2007, p. 404-405. 
442 Struycken calls this the subtraction model. Struycken 2007, p. 401 et seq. 
443 Struycken 2007, p. 414-415. 
444 Vonck 2007, p. 598 et seq. 
445 Vonck 2007, p. 599-600. 
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the holder of the right of emphyteusis to take the fruits the object produces. He sees 
no reason why parties should not be allowed to agree that those fruits may be 
enjoyed by the owner, instead of the holder of the right of emphyteusis, and why that 
agreement should not be part of the property right.446 Such inclusion would allow 
parties considerable freedom to include party agreements in property rights. 
In order to restrict parties and to uphold the closed system of property rights 
in Dutch law, Vonck suggests that, when his criterion would be adopted, only those 
agreements that are in direct relations to the object as to which the right of 
emphyteusis is created, can be allowed as part of the right itself.447 
The categorisation of party agreements as a part of a property right is relevant 
for its enforcement. The first approach, the property approach, will treat agreements 
that fulfil the criteria as parts of the property right. In my opinion such an agree-
ment will lose its status as a contract and will be considered a property right. The 
agreement will have effect against the world, will transfer together with all the 
other rights and claims the property right entails, and property law remedies will be 
available. That means that interference will lead to a claim for damages based on 
Article 6:162 BW, and a claim based on unlawful action, but not a claim based on 
Article 6:74 BW and further, which deal with breach of contract. The possibility to 
include agreements in property rights offers an example where, not based on legis-
lation, but based on case law, a contract can achieve a property effect. Its develop-
ment shows the possibilities to use the current legal framework to its maximum 
extent. Practice will constantly search for the border between property and contract 
and a vague criterion of sufficient connection and non-contrariness to the nature of 
the right will indeed be very helpful. 
Consequently, a theory like Struycken’s in which these party agreements are 
not considered as parts of the property right will not allow the parties access to 
proprietary remedies. This second approach is more of a contractual approach. 
Here, the parties will be left with the law of obligations to enforce their legal 
relation.448 In some circumstances these agreements will still have third-party effect. 
However, this will only be so when they can be characterised as a qualitative right 
or a qualitative duty, which will be dealt with below. Only then will third-party 
effect in the law of obligations be ensured.449 
4.8. ‘Qualitative Duties’ and Chain Clauses 
With the introduction of the new Civil Code, the Dutch legislature has introduced a 
concept situated between the area of contract and property, the qualitative duty of 
Article 6:252 BW. The qualitative duty allows the creation of a negative burden on a 
registered object that is transferred to successive acquirers. The duty will not only 
 
446 Vonck 2007, p. 600. 
447 Vonck 2007, p. 603. 
448 Arts. 6:74 et seq. BW, Struycken 2007, p. 422-425. 
449 A qualitative right is dealt with by Art. 6:251 BW, which grants third party effect to a right 
that is connected to an object held by a creditor and is only of use as long as the creditor 
holds that object. Struycken 2007, p. 423-424. 
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bind the parties that agreed to its creation, but will also bind acquirers of the land 
on which the qualitative duty is created, not by contract but by operation of law. In 
other words, qualitative duties have a droit de suite effect. It was exactly with this 
argument that many authors opposed the introduction of the qualitative duty into 
Dutch law.450 Nevertheless, the qualitative duty was included in the Civil Code and 
forms an intermediate category between the law of obligations and the law of 
property.451 Article 6:252 BW states: 
1. It can be agreed by contract that the duty of one of the parties to tolerate or not to 
do something in respect to a registered object that belongs to him will transfer to 
those who acquire the object under special title, and that also those who will have a 
right to use that object will be bound. 
2. In order for the contract mentioned under sub 1 to have this effect, the agreement 
must take the form of a notarial deed and be registered in the public registry… 
4. When, in exchange for the duty, the performance of another duty for compensation 
has been agreed upon, this duty for compensation will transfer with the duty when 
this duty for compensation relates to the period after transfer and was also 
registered. 
5. This Article does not apply to duties that restrict the holder in his power to transfer 
or create limited property rights.452 
A qualitative duty is an agreement between two parties, one of whom is the owner 
or holder of a property right in respect of a registered object, an immovable, ship or 
aircraft, who will be bound by its terms in his capacity, ‘quality’, as owner.453 The 
other party to the agreement will be bound by its terms not in his capacity as owner 
or holder of a property right, but in his personal capacity. The qualitative duty will 
transfer with the property right in respect of the registered object over which the 
 
450 See, inter alia, Van Opstall 1966, p. 471, Pitlo 1968, Maeijer 1966, p. 80, Rijtma 1969, p. 229, 
Stein 1976, p. 650, in favour see Smalbraak 1966, p. 110, Asser & Hartkamp 2001, No. 411,  
p. 430. 
451 See Sagaert 2005a, p. 343, Asser & Hartkamp 2001, No. 411, p. 430, Van Oostrom-Streep 2005,  
p. 786. 
452 Art. 6:252 BW, ‘1.-Bij een overeenkomst kan worden bedongen dat de verplichting van een 
der partijen om iets te dulden of niet te doen ten aanzien van een haar toebehorend register-
goed, zal overgaan op degenen die het goed onder bijzondere titel zullen verkrijgen, en dat 
mede gebonden zullen zijn degenen die van de rechthebbende een recht tot gebruik van het 
goed zullen verkrijgen. 2.-Voor de werking van het in lid 1 bedoelde beding is vereist dat van 
de overeenkomst tussen partijen een notariële akte wordt opgemaakt, gevolgd door inschrij-
ving daarvan in de openbare registers. … 4.-Is voor de verplichting een tegenprestatie over-
eengekomen, dan gaat bij de overgang van de verplichting het recht op de tegenprestatie mee 
over, voor zover deze betrekking heeft op de periode na de overgang en ook het beding 
omtrent deze tegenprestatie in de registers ingeschreven is. 5.-Dit artikel is niet van toepas-
sing op verplichtingen die een rechthebbende beperken in zijn bevoegdheid het goed te 
vervreemden of te bezwaren’. 
453 Art. 3:10 BW, Cahen 2004, p. 34-35. 
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duty is established. Subsequent acquirers of the object will then be bound by the 
terms of the agreement.454  
The qualitative duty is dealt with in the Dutch Civil Code in the law of obliga-
tions. However, because of the effects of the qualitative duty, it could possibly also 
be a property relation. In respect to the legal nature of the duty, Van Oostrom-
Streep recognises two different obligations; one between the parties with regard to 
the content of the duty, and one between the parties with regard to the duty to 
register the agreement in order to make it qualitative, to give it third-party effect.455 
Making this distinction permits the explanation of which provisions of contract law 
apply to which agreement and in which way. In other words, the main agreement, 
the agreement in respect to the duty, is governed by the ordinary rules on contract 
law. The agreement in which parties express their intention to provide their relation 
with third-party effect is subject to more formalities.456  
Because of this third-party effect there are several requirements for the duty to 
exist. First, the contents of the duty are limited to a negative burden.457 Contrary to 
the requirements for a right of servitude, parties may include a prohibition to take 
legal acts as well. In Dutch law a right of servitude can only comprise factual acts, 
for example, a duty to tolerate that the holder of the right walks over the owner’s 
land.458 A qualitative duty can also contain a prohibition to lease the object.459 Differ-
ent from a right of servitude, the Dutch Civil Code does not explicitly provide for 
specific situations where a positive duty can be imposed.460 Hartkamp considers 
that the broader scope of qualitative duties, which can be used for more purposes 
than just rights of servitude because of the possibility of creating the right on behalf 
of a person not holding a property right, is compensated for by the restriction on 
parties to impose positive duties.461 Secondary positive duties, as these can exist in 
relation to a right of servitude, can, in principle, not be made with respect to a 
qualitative duty.462 The only exception is that of a penalty clause to strengthen the 
qualitative duty, which was specifically mentioned by the legislature during the 
drafting of the Article.463 Van Oostrom-Streep has examined this prohibition and 
shows that the legislature intended to be careful not to reintroduce feudal rela-
tions.464 She argues that the introduction of the Civil Code was a missed chance for 
the legislature actually to allow the creation of positive duties, and that there can be 
 
454 This droit de suite effect is not applicable in case of transfer under so-called general title (alge-
mene titel). This would include the acquisition through an inheritance. See Pitlo et al. 2006, 
No. 382, p. 335.  
455 Van Oostrom-Streep 2005, p. 786, Van Oostrom-Streep 2006, p. 218. 
456 Van Oostrom-Streep 2006, p. 220-221. 
457 Art. 6:252(1) BW. 
458 Cahen 2004, p. 34, Asser & Hartkamp 2001, No. 407, p. 427. See above; 3.1. Real Servitudes. 
459 Cahen 2004, p. 33-34. 
460 Art. 5:71 BW. 
461 Asser & Hartkamp 2001, No. 407. 
462 Van Oostrom-Streep 2006, p. 55-57. See also, but less specific, Asser & Hartkamp 2001, No. 
407, Du Perron 1999, p. 246 et seq. 
463 Van Oostrom-Streep 2006, p. 59-61, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 6 1981, p. 944. 
464 Van Oostrom-Streep 2006, p. 54-59, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 6 1981, p. 944. 
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situations where a positive secondary duty can be useful.465 One example of a useful 
positive duty would be an obligation for an owner against the holder of the qualita-
tive duty to inform this holder of the identity of person to whom he granted a right 
to use the immovable object, so that the holder of the qualitative duty does not have 
to find out for himself.466  
Secondly, the agreement will only have effect against third parties when it is 
made by notarial deed and registered in the public registry.467 This requirement 
shows another difference in comparison with a right of servitude. A right of servi-
tude will only come into existence upon registration of the notarial deed of creation, 
whereas a qualitative duty will exist between the contracting parties from the 
moment of agreement. Also here the explanation by Van Oostrom-Streep of the 
qualitative duty as two agreements is insightful. The main agreement can already 
have come into being, even if the agreement, in which the parties agree to provide 
for third-party effect, will not. Until the moment of registration of the notarial deed 
the qualitative duty will therefore only have effect between parties.468 There is no 
other possibility to see the legal nature of the qualitative duty as contractual.469 A 
failure to comply with the duty will result in a breach of contract and contractual 
remedies should be used.470 
Nevertheless, the qualitative duty fulfils the main criteria for a property right; 
it has effect against third parties upon registration and it will transfer to subsequent 
acquirers of the object on which it is created.471 Also in situations of insolvency the 
qualitative duty remains in force. If it has been registered before the holder of the 
object became insolvent, the Insolvency Act stipulates that the duty will remain in 
existence. The object will then have to be sold burdened with the duty.472 
In effect the Dutch legislature has created a relation that takes effect against 
third parties and remains in existence in case of insolvency. Although it fulfils the 
main criteria for a property right, the relation is contractual in nature. The duty 
itself is personal and only takes effect against third parties upon registration. 
Furthermore, the question of the nature of this qualitative duty remains a point of 
academic debate, since the legislature has decided that the answer lies in the law of 
obligations.473 Because of its place in the Civil Code an interference with the quali-
tative duty will result in a claim for damages based on Article 6:74 BW and further.  
Besides the qualitative duty, contract law offers another possibility for parties 
to provide for third-party effect of their relation. In fact, this last method allows 
parties also to impose positive duties. In return, the enforcement of the agreement 
in respect to third parties is more difficult.  
 
465 Van Oostrom-Streep 2006, p. 218-219. 
466 Van Oostrom-Streep 2006, p. 113-115. 
467 Art. 6:252(2) BW, Van Oostrom-Streep 2005, p. 786. 
468 Asser & Hartkamp 2001, No. 411, p. 430, Cahen 2004, p. 39. 
469 Asser & Hartkamp 2001, No. 412, p. 431. 
470 Art. 6:74 BW, Cahen 2004, p. 35. 
471 See also Van Oostrom-Streep 2006, p. 234. 
472 Art. 35a FW. 
473 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 6 1981, p. 942 et seq., Du Perron 1999, p. 250, Van 
Oostrom-Streep 2006, p. 217-219. 
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The principle of party autonomy in contract law allows the parties, as long as 
they stay within the limits of the law, to create any relation they desire.474 In return, 
the doctrine of privity of contract prevents general third-party effect of such an 
agreement. However, parties can agree to impose the same rights and duties on 
subsequent parties upon occurrence of a set event. For example, the owner of a 
shopping centre may agree with the owner of a restaurant that the latter will be the 
only restaurant in the shopping centre, and subsequently include a contractual 
clause in all agreements with other businesses trading in the shopping centre which 
prescribes a duty not to establish a restaurant, plus an obligation to impose the 
same duty on subsequent acquirers of these businesses. Such an agreement is con-
cluded under a penalty clause to pay damages to the original restaurant owner per 
day of violation.475 These agreements are accepted in Dutch law and are known as 
chain clauses.  
The result of the use of a chain clause is the creation of a third-party effect. The 
effect is relative because the original agreement will only take effect against those 
third parties that agree to the chain clause. In other words the duty transfers ex 
contractu and not by operation of law, as in case of property rights and the qualita-
tive duty.476 The penalty clause allows the original party to take action in case of 
violation. However, only contractual remedies will be available, so the original 
party can only sue for performance and damages.477 In very limited circumstances 
only, the original party may claim for a reinstatement of the clause by way of 
specific remedy as a part of a claim in tort.478 The Hoge Raad has exercised extreme 
caution not to allow reinstatement of the clause through the law of tort, as that 
would effectively grant the chain clause the status of a property right.479 
Chain clauses offer the possibility to provide for a specific third-party effect of 
an agreement, but only through another act, which is the agreement of a third party 
to the terms of the agreement. Because it is necessary to act in order to transfer the 
chain clause, and, once the agreement is violated, only limited possibilities exist to 
claim for specific performance of the clause, this solution is usually considered 
undesirable and unnecessarily complicated in Dutch legal practice.480  
4.9. EC and International Influences 
The last part of this Section deals with the influences of European and international 
law on the Dutch system. Under pressure from both European law and internation-
al law, the Netherlands is forced to recognise and implement alterations to existing 
concepts as well as concepts completely foreign to the system. Although these influ-
 
474 Art. 3:40 BW. 
475 HR 10 May 1996, NJ 1996/537 (Coscun/Van Sommeren). 
476 See Art. 6:155 BW, Wijting 2001, p. 937 et seq. 
477 Arts. 6:74 et seq. BW. 
478 HR 17 May 1985, NJ 1986/760 (Curaçao/Boyé), Asser & Hartkamp 2001, No. 413, p. 432, Rank-
Berenschot 1992, p. 83-84. 
479 HR 17 May 1985, NJ 1986/760 (Curaçao/Boyé), Van Oostrom-Streep 2006, p. 219. 
480 See, inter alia, Van Opstall 1966, p. 471, Heyman 2003, p. 10, Wijting 2001, p. 938 et seq. 
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ences also exist in French and German law, in Dutch law, because of the rigidity of 
the legal system, serious problems arise. Two of these influences are of great impor-
tance; the implementation of the EC Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive 
and the international Hague Convention on Trusts.481 
The Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive creates two additional prop-
erty relations; a collateral transfer and a collateral pledge.482 The Directive is intend-
ed to provide rules for the market in equities and money.483 It applies to security 
rights created by companies or organisations that have a connection to the financial 
market. These include governments, banks and other financial institutions.484 In this 
respect there is a difference between these and normal property rights which can 
generally be used by anyone and applied to all objects, or to a general set of objects 
as immovable or registered objects. The security rights that the Financial Collateral 
Directive introduces are, in principle, only available for financial institutions and 
large companies, but they still have a significant impact on the Dutch system of 
property law.485 From a systematic point of view, the most remarkable development 
is the introduction of the collateral transfer. This security instrument enables one 
party to transfer his equities or money to another party for security purposes in 
return for finance. However, the transfer for security purposes, which was formerly 
recognised under the old Dutch Civil Code, is now clearly prohibited in Article 
3:84(3) BW.486  
Regardless of Article 3:84(3), several property law authors, among whom are 
Keijser, Westrik and Van Erp, have argued that the Directive re-introduces the 
possibility of a transfer for security purposes.487 At the end of the legislative process, 
the Minister of Justice felt the need to respond specifically to the last two of these 
authors. The Minister argues that the prohibition of Article 3:84(3) BW was intro-
duced to stop the old fiduciary transfer of ownership that resulted in a fragmen-
tation of ownership.488 The Minister recalls that is was the specific intention of the 
legislature to supplement the ownership for security purposes with a right of silent 
pledge.489 The prohibition in Article 3:84(3) BW should therefore be read as pro-
hibiting this relative and fragmented type of security ownership. As was dealt with 
 
481 Directive 2004/47/EC of 6 June 2002 on Financial Collateral Arrangements and the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition. 
482 On this Directive see Chapter 8; 2.1.2. Legal Framework: Secondary Community Law. 
483 Article 1 Directive 2004/47/EC. Keijser 2004, p. 761, Van Vliet 2005, p. 190. 
484 Van Erp 2004c, p. 540. 
485 The original proposal of the Minister of Justice was to extend the application of the Directive 
to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). The legislative proposal made it through 
most of the legislative process but was put to a halt by the First Chamber of Parliament 
(Senate) who voted against the proposal. See First Chamber of Parliament proceedings of 8 
March 2005, Handelingen I 2004-2005, No. 18, p. 781-782, Van Vliet 2005, p. 190. 
486 See above; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
487 Keijser 2004, p. 765-767, Van Erp 2004c, p., 541-543, furthermore in reaction to inter alia Keijser 
see Van Erp 2004d, on which see Meulman 2005, and Van Erp in a final reaction in Van Erp 
2005. 
488 Nadere Memorie van Antwoord 5 January 2005, p. 7-8 and 22-23. More detailed see above; 2. The 
Right of Ownership. 
489 See above; 3.6. Pledge. 
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above, following the Hoge Raad in its Sogelease judgment, an actual transfer of 
ownership for security purposes is possible in Dutch law.490 In such a transfer the 
full right and not a fragment of the right of ownership is transferred to the acquirer. 
The Minister emphasises that there should be no mistake about this and that the 
collateral transfer is such an actual transfer.491  
However, the acceptance that a collateral transfer is an actual transfer leads to 
complications for the transferor. The security ownership of the old Civil Code only 
comprised those powers of the right of ownership that were necessary for the trans-
feree to exercise his security right. Over time, the provisions on the right of pledge 
became applied by analogy.492 The result was that the security owner could only sell 
the object serving as security and satisfy his claim with the proceeds of the sale.  
An actual security transfer as introduced by the Collateral Directive transfers 
the full powers of the transferor to the transferee. Consequently the transferee will 
have full right of ownership and will be under no obligation to sell the object 
serving as security.493 Even more so, Van Vliet has emphasised that the Dutch 
implementation act does not contain a rule stipulating that any excess value of the 
object is for the transferor and that the transferee will be under no obligation to 
return this excess value.494 A mere personal obligation to remedy this will not be 
enough. Van Vliet uses a comparative example from Germany to show that in 
German law also a property law solution or a Verdinglichung of personal rights is 
used to strengthen the position of the transferor.495 
Secondly, the collateral pledge also creates complications with regard to the 
general rules of property law.496 The implementation act provides special provisions 
on a right of collateral pledge. Only when these special rules do not apply will the 
general rules on pledge be applicable.497 These general rules include the provisions 
in book 3 of the Civil Code, but also the Dutch Insolvency Act. Under these provi-
sions, the pledgee may act as if there was no insolvency and execute his right of 
(collateral) pledge. The result is that at the outset the legislature has chosen to 
implement the collateral pledge as a species of the normal right of pledge.498 One of 
the most specific characteristics of the collateral pledge is that the pledgee will have 
the power to dispose and the right to use the object serving as security.499 A transfer 
of the objects under collateral pledge will lead to substitution. Therefore, a right of 
collateral pledge will come into existence by operation of law on the substituted 
 
490 See above; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
491 Art. 7:55 BW and Nadere MvA I, Kamerstukken I 2004/05, 28 874, E, p. 9-10. 
492 HR 3 January 1941, NJ 1941, 470 (Boerenleenbank Hazerswoude/Los), Van Mierlo 1988, p. 15, 
Van Vliet 2005, p. 198. 
493 Van Vliet 2005, p. 198. 
494 Van Vliet 2005, p. 198-199. 
495 Van Vliet 2005, p. 200. 
496 See Van Vliet 2005, p 196. 
497 Lieverse & Wiggers-Rust 2005, p. 60, Keijser 2004, p. 761. 
498 See Van Vliet 2005, p. 191, 196, but also Lieverse & Wiggers-Rust 2005, p. 60. 
499 Art. 5 Directive 2004/47/EC, Keijser 2004, p. 767, Van Vliet 2005, p. 193-194. 
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object.500 At the end of the relationship between pledgor and pledgee, the pledgee is 
under the obligation to return the objects or objects comparable to the originals.501 
Furthermore, the Directive provides specific rules on the execution of the col-
lateral pledge. The general rules on execution of a right of pledge force the pledgee 
to sell the object and to satisfy his claim with the proceeds of sale.502 However, the 
Collateral Directive allows the pledgee to keep the object for himself and does not 
require such a sale.503 In order to protect the position of the pledgor in such a situa-
tion the pledgee will be under a duty to transfer any excess value to the pledgor.504  
The implementation of the Financial Collateral Directive shows the influence 
of EC legislation on the Dutch legal system.505 Although the collateral pledge shares 
many characteristics with the normal types of pledge, in effect a new type of pledge 
is added to the catalogue of property rights. The right created is a limited security 
property right to which special rules apply.506 The implementation shows the effect 
EC legislation can have on the Dutch property law system and raises the question of 
whether Dutch law is ready for these developments.507 
Another strong influence on the Dutch property law system comes from inter-
national law. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their 
Recognition introduces the Anglo-American concept of a trust into the Dutch 
system of private law.508 A trust is a legal instrument whereby one person, the 
settlor, transfers objects to another person, the trustee, who will be under the obliga-
tion to manage these assets, separately from his own, for the benefit of a third per-
son, a beneficiary. Although Dutch law itself does not recognise a trust, the Hague 
Convention allows persons to set up a trust under a foreign law that does recognise 
a trust, and thereby forces the contracting states to recognise the foreign trust.509  
Although the Convention especially deals with rules of private international 
law, the Convention itself is not intended to supply a legal basis for the creation of a 
trust. It merely opens the possibility of choosing an applicable law that does 
provide such a basis, which consequently has to be recognised.510 Article 2 of the 
Convention states: 
 
500 Art. 7:52(4) BW, Keijser 2004, p. 767, Van Vliet 2005, p. 194. 
501 Art. 7:53(2) BW, Van Vliet 2005, p. 194. 
502 Art. 3:250 BW, see above; 3.6. Pledge. 
503 Art. 7:54 BW, Keijser 2004, p. 768, Van Vliet 2005, p. 195. 
504 Art. 7:54 BW, Nadere MvA I, Kamerstukken I 2004/05, 28 874, E, p. 16-17, Van Vliet 2005, p. 196. 
505 See Van Erp 2004c. 
506 Van Vliet 2005, p. 196. 
507 Van Erp 2004c and in reaction the Minister of Justice in MvA I, Kamerstukken I 2004/05, 28 
874, E, p 22-23. This issue is returned to below in 5. A Numerus Clausus in Dutch Property 
Law? 
508 The Convention was signed by the Netherlands on 1 July 1985 and was ratified on 28 
November 1995. The Convention entered into force in the Netherlands on 1 February 1996. 
The Netherlands is one of the only countries that is Contracting Party to the Convention. 
Other Contracting Parties include England and Italy, but not Germany and France. 
509 Art. 11 Hague Convention. The Hague Convention entered into force in the Netherlands on 1 
January 1996, Aertsen 2004, p. 103. 
510 See also Graziadei 2002b, p. 336-340. 
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For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘trust’ refers to the legal relationship 
created – inter vivos or on death – by a person, the settlor, when assets have been 
placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified 
purpose. 
A trust has the following characteristics: 
(a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not part of the trustee’s own estate; 
(b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of another 
person on behalf of the trustee; 
(c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is accountable, to 
manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance with the terms of the trust 
and the special duties imposed upon him by law. 
The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and the fact that the 
trustee may himself have rights as a beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent 
with the existence of a trust.511 
Article 2 states the material scope of the Convention. Legal relations that fall 
under this definition of a trust are covered by it. These basic criteria create a dif-
ficulty for the Dutch legislature. Specifically the recognition of a trust under Dutch 
law, but also the obligation to make sure that the trust objects constitute a separate 
set of assets from the assets of the trustee, causes problems.  
The creation of a trust requires a transfer of objects from the settlor to the 
trustee, who will not acquire a right of ownership of the objects for himself but 
actually for the beneficiary. The purpose of a trust is not to have the beneficiary, but 
the trustee, receive ownership of the objects, although the beneficiary still has an 
entitlement to the trust objects. In Dutch law, such a transfer is considered as a 
transfer whereby the object does not fall in the set of assets of the acquirer, which is 
strongly opposed to by the second part of Article 3:84(3) BW.512 Furthermore, the 
trust objects being treated as a set of assets separate from the assets of the trustee 
interferes with the provision of Article 3:276 BW, which allows creditors to seize all 
assets of the debtor if they are not paid. A separate set of trust assets would disable 
the creditors from having access to these assets.513 
In order to solve these problems, new legislation on the private international 
law aspects of trusts, the Wet Conflictenrecht Trusts (WCT), was introduced. Article 4 
WCT states: 
Provisions of Dutch law concerning the transfer of ownership, security rights or pro-
tection of creditors in case of insolvency do not affect the legal effects of a recognition 
provided by Article 11 of the Convention.514 
 
511 Art. 2 Hague Convention. 
512 Koppenol-Laforce 1997b, p. 547, also see above; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
513 Art. 3:275 BW and Art. 20 Fw. 
514 Art. 4 WCT ‘Bepalingen van Nederlands recht inzake eigendomsoverdracht, zekerheidsrecht 
of de bescherming van schuldeisers in geval van insolventie laten de in artikel 11 van het 
Verdrag omschreven rechtsgevolgen van de erkenning van een trust onverlet’. On the effects 
of Art. 4 WCT see Koppenol-Laforce 1997b, p. 545. 
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The effect of the Hague Convention is not to make it possible for everyone to create 
a trust. The Hague Convention explicitly states that a trust under the Convention 
only has to be recognised if significant elements, specifically the habitual residence 
of the trustee, are closely connected to a legal system that does recognise a trust.515 
Therefore, the creation of a trust by a Dutch national using trust assets located in the 
Netherlands is not a trust under the Hague Convention.516 
Once a trust is recognised by Dutch law, the result of the Hague Convention 
and the WCT is that several essential elements of Dutch property law no longer 
apply. Dutch law will be forced to recognise a legal relation where both the trustee 
and the beneficiary have a claim with regard to the trust objects. General Dutch 
property law does not know what to do with it.  
5. A Numerus Clausus in Dutch Property Law? 
The parliamentary history of the fifth book of the Dutch Civil Code states that the 
system of property rights in Dutch law is closed.517 The parliamentary history 
presents this as a clearly established fact. It states: 
In continental legal systems the system of property law is, different than in the area of 
contract law …, a closed system.518 
Under the old Civil Code this was not as certain as the parliamentary history 
suggests. A very clear example was provided in 1914, when the Brotherhood of 
Notaries had an official meeting to discuss the question of whether property rights 
could be created outside the list of recognised property rights.519 During the debate, 
the answer seemed not at all clear. At the centre of this debate was Article 584 old 
BW. This Article, which is based on Article 543 of the French Civil Code, mentioned 
several property rights: 
One can have, on an object, a right of possession, or a right of ownership, or a right of 
hereditary title, or a right to enjoy fruits, or a right of servitude or a right of pledge or 
hypothec.520 
Meijers, in an influential article in 1907, emphasised that this Article was a result of 
an historical development and invoked Hahn’s Pentarchy to explain its origin.521 On 
 
515 Art. 13 Hague Convention. Aertsen 2004, p. 104-105. 
516 This is different in Italian law, where an internal trust is recognised. See Graziadei 2002b,  
p. 336-340, Lupoi 2005, p. 10 et seq., Braun 2006, p. 795 et seq. 
517 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 3. 
518 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 3 states ‘3. In de continentale rechtstelsels 
vormt het Zakenrecht, anders dan het contractenrecht …, een gesloten stelsel’. 
519 Broederschap der Notarissen in Nederland 1914. See also Struycken 2007, p. 161-166. 
520 Art. 584 Old BW stated ‘Men kan op zaken hebben, hetzij een recht van bezit, hetzij een recht 
van eigendom, hetzij een recht van erfgenaamschap, hetzij een vruchtgenot, hetzij een recht 
van erfdienstbaarheid, hetzij een regt van pand en hypotheek’.Further underlined by the 
Council of State (Raad van State) and the affirmation of this by the Minister of Justice, see 
Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 6 and 9. 
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the question whether this list provided a limitation to the number of property rights 
recognised under the old Civil Code, he stated that, although the Hoge Raad had not 
dealt with any new property rights outside the recognised list in the Civil Code, in 
lower instances this question had been decided.522 Meijers concluded that property 
rights can only exist when there is a specific legal basis for their existence, and that 
this was possible outside the scope of Article 584 old BW.523 At the end of the meet-
ing of the notaries, the questions of whether any new property rights, other than 
those recognised by law, could be created, and whether it is desirable that there 
should be a power to create new rights in Dutch law, were answered negatively.524 
Struycken has examined this period of Dutch history closely and has shown 
that, possibly under the influence of German legal thinking, around 1900 the system 
of Dutch property rights was considered closed.525 Struycken invokes several pro-
posals for a Dutch Civil Code that were drafted in the second half of the nineteenth 
century to show that, at least in the eyes of the Dutch legislators, the system of 
property rights in Dutch law was not open.526 However, these proposals never made 
it into a Civil Code and Dutch practice remained divided over the question. The 
1914 meeting of the Brotherhood of Dutch Notaries only confirms this.527 
The starting point in Dutch law is the landmark decision of the Hoge Raad in 
Blaauboer v Berlips, in which the Court firmly established the separation between the 
law of property and the law of obligations.528 Moreover, the Hoge Raad refused to 
classify the agreement made in the case – the duty to construct a road – as a right of 
servitude, because the agreement lacked some of the characteristics of a servitude 
prescribed by the Civil Code. Struycken explains this final part of the reasoning of 
the Hoge Raad as an expression of Typenfixierung.529 
Since 1905 the Dutch legal system has been based on a strict separation 
between the law of property and the law of obligations, in particular the law of con-
tract.530 Before that, it had been possible to create contracts with a property effect.531 
The decision of the Hoge Raad reinstated the strict separation and prohibited these 
effects.532 In legal literature, the separation between the law of contract and the law 
of property became linked to the different rules applying to these two areas. The 
law of contract was considered an area in which parties were as free as possible. The 
 
521 Meijers 1907, p. 271 et seq. See Chapter 2; 4.4. Other Property Rights. On this theory in Dutch 
law see, inter alia, Nève 1996, p. 231, Feenstra 1982, Ketelaar 1978, p. 140. 
522 Meijers 1907, p. 10. 
523 Meijers 1907, p. 10, 24. He mentions the rights of genot van weide and recht van ettinge. 
524 Broederschap der Notarissen in Nederland 1914, p. 345. 
525 Struycken 2007, p. 170 et seq. On the influence of German legal scholarship in the 19th century 
in France see Bürge 1991. Possibly the influence of German legal thinking in Dutch law has 
had similar effects. See, in this respect, Struycken 2007, p. 169, 205. 
526 These include the proposals of 1816 and 1820, see Struycken 2007, p. 129-131. 
527 See also Struycken 2007, p. 161-166. 
528 HR 3 March 1905, W 8191, see above; 1. Introduction. 
529 Struycken 2007, p. 41-42. 
530 HR 3 March 1905, W 8191 (Blaauboer/Berlips), see above; 1. Introduction. 
531 See Struycken 2007, p. 42-50. 
532 On this development see Struycken 2007, p. 40-50. 
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law of property, in contrast, was characterised by its strictness and the closed 
system of property rights.533 
The system of property rights and the separation between the law of property 
and the law of contract are connected. A less strong separation between contract 
law and property law could result in the possibility for parties to create contracts 
with property effects. It is exactly against this development that the Hoge Raad 
delivered its 1905 decision in Blaauboer v Berlips.534 
The opinion in the Netherlands in the twentieth century was that there could 
be no new property rights created outside those prescribed by law. Nevertheless, in 
1929 the Hoge Raad, under pressure to help Dutch legal practice to solve growing 
problems caused by the strict provisions on the right of pledge, recognised a trans-
fer for security purposes resulting in a new type of ownership known as security 
ownership. From that moment until the entry into force of the new Dutch Civil 
Code, besides the already recognised types of ownership, a right of security owner-
ship existed.535 The result of these decisions was that the list of property rights was 
extended with the right of security ownership which found no exact legal basis, 
either in the Civil Code, or in another legislative provision. 
The decisions of 1929 and the subsequently developed ownership for security 
purposes were heavily condemned. Meijers especially heavily criticised the devel-
opments and argued that security ownership was nothing more than an attempt to 
create a right of pledge without the obligation to transfer the object under pledge to 
the pledgee.536 When Meijers was asked to develop a new Civil Code he made cer-
tain that the system would not know any property rights other than those recog-
nised by law. Therefore, Article 3:81(1) BW states: 
1. He who is entitled to an independent and transferable right can, within the limits of 
that right, create the limited rights that are recognised by law.537 
If the Article was not clear enough, the parliamentary history adds to this Article 
that the Civil Code only recognises those property rights that are dealt with by law 
and that this applies both to the limited rights, in Dutch beperkte rechten, as well as to 
the property rights in respect of corporeal objects, in Dutch the zakelijke rechten.538 
This limitation by the legislature applies not only to the number of rights, but also 
to their content. Only those rights that fulfil the criteria of one of the recognised and 
described property rights can be a property right in the sense of Article 3:81(1) BW. 
With that the Dutch legislature has firmly set a rule of numerus clausus in Dutch law. 
 
533 See Kisch 1932, p. 5-11, Suijling 1940, p. 1-2, Asser & Scholten 1913, p. 31-35. 
534 See also Pitlo 1968 and Heyman 2003. 
535 HR 25 January 1929, NJ 1929, 616 (Beer brewery) and HR 21 June 1929, NJ 1929, 1096 (Luxury 
car-lease), on delivery constitutum possessorium see Van Vliet 2000, p. 51, Van Mierlo 1988, p. 7-
9. 
536 Meijers 1937, p. 65, Meijers 1948, p. 89 et seq. 
537 Art. 3:81(1) BW ‘-1 Hij aan wie een zelfstandig en overdraagbaar recht toekomt, kan binnen 
de grenzen van dat recht de in de wet genoemde beperkte rechten vestigen’. 
538 On limited rights and zakelijke rechten see above in 3. Other Property Rights. Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 3. See also Snijders 1997, p. 88 and Snijders 2002, p. 28. 
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However, within the limits of this definition, parties are free to decide on the con-
tent of the property right.539 
At the outset of the system the creative activity to find new solutions will 
therefore have to take place within these boundaries. The system of the Civil Code 
does not explicitly prohibit the creation of one property right in respect of another 
property right.540 This so-called stacking of rights creates interesting possibilities for 
parties that want to create certain specific legal relations. Many provisions in the 
Civil Code explicitly create this possibility.541 These include the possibility that can 
be found in Article 5:84 BW to create a right of servitude on a right of emphyteusis, 
superficies or usufruct, or the possibility of Article 5:93 BW to create a right of 
emphyteusis on a right of emphyteusis.542 Moreover, stacking of property rights is also 
possible with security property rights.543 These property rights in respect of prop-
erty rights will, except for the situation described in Article 3:81(3) BW, be depend-
ent on the existence of the mother right. When the mother right therefore ceases to 
exist, so, generally, will these property rights.544 
Another possibility is to create several property rights in respect of the same 
object. Specifically in the case of security rights this can create certain doctrinal 
difficulties. Parties can agree that the pledgee will have a right to create a second 
right of pledge for the benefit of himself on the object under pledge. This so-called 
re-pledging, in Dutch herverpanding, is a special power for which a specific clause in 
the deed of creation is needed.545 Theoretically, this power would include the crea-
tion of a new property right, but the pledgee will never have the power to transfer 
more rights than he already has. However, the new right of pledge will take rank 
above his own right and will therefore be a stronger right than the original right of 
pledge.546 The most sensible doctrinal justification for this is that holders of security 
rights in respect of the same object have the right to renounce their rank for the 
benefit of another holder of a security right.547 In this respect it could be held that by 
inserting the clause that authorises the pledgee to re-pledge, the pledgee agrees to 
give up his rank on behalf of the newly created property right. However, the new 
right of pledge comprises more than the holder of the original right of pledge could 
theoretically transfer.  
 
539 The agreement will be part of the property right if it fulfils set criteria. See Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 3, but also above; 4.7. Obligations as Part of Property 
Rights. 
540 See in particular Struycken 2007, p. 368-378. 
541 Although at the outset the rights dealt with in book 5 of the BW were intended to be excluded 
from this possibility, see Heyman 1999, p. 53. 
542 The application of Art. 5:104 BW allows the same possibility for the right of superficies. See 
Heyman 1999, p. 53. 
543 See e.g. Arts. 3:212 and 3:223 BW on the establishment of a right of hypothec on a right of 
usufruct. On this see also Asser, Mierlo, Mijnsen & Van Velten 2003, No. 174, p. 203. 
544 See above; 3. Other Property Rights. 
545 Art. 3:242 BW, see Breken 2002, p. 365, Snijders 2002, p. 30-32. 
546 Breken 2002, p. 372-373. 
547 Breken 2002, p. 386-387. 
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Moreover, Article 3:84(3) BW restricts the freedom that parties have within the 
set of recognised property rights. The prohibition, known as fiducia-ban, which has 
been dealt with on several occasions in this Chapter, is intended to prevent a 
separation of powers included in a property right that does not fit within the system 
of property law.548 The inclusion of the Article recalls the strong words of Meijers 
who used to condemn the ownership for security purposes.549 The transfer of 
ownership for security purposes did not constitute a transfer of the full powers of 
the owner, but merely those powers required for the protection of the transferee. 
The interpretation of the Hoge Raad in its Sogelease judgement requiring an actual 
transfer of ownership, a transfer of the full set of powers of the owner, to pass the 
test of Article 3:84(3) BW was a reiteration of Meijers’ views. 
One of the principal instances in which not all powers of an owner are trans-
ferred is the creation of a trust. A trust requires a separation of powers between a 
trustee, who holds the trust objects separate from his own objects and who manages 
them, and a beneficiary, who is entitled to the benefits and proceeds of the trust 
objects. In the past few decades the discussion about whether a trust should be 
implemented in Dutch law has been the subject of a lively debate.550 However, it has 
been the specific intention of the legislature to exclude a trust, which, at least in the 
eyes of the Dutch legislature, would result in a separation of powers that, according 
to the system of Dutch property law, should be in one hand.551 The prohibition of 
any attempt to create a situation where not all the powers of the right of ownership 
are transferred is strengthened by Article 3:276 BW.552 This article states that a 
debtor will be liable with his full set of assets unless the law provides otherwise.553 
The creation of a trust whereby the objects included in the trust are separated from 
the private objects of the trustee is therefore generally not possible.554 The Hoge Raad 
indeed held in 1937 that such a separate set of assets can only exist insofar as there 
is a specific legal basis.555 According to the Hoge Raad, allowing this would introduce 
the possibility for parties to create a position in which they have a preferential 
position, to the disadvantage of other creditors. Effectively a creditor to a separate 
set of objects of person X would not have to deal with a possible insolvency of the 
private objects of person X. 
 
548 Snijders 1997, p. 91, in the same sense Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, p. 22. 
549 See above; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
550 See, inter alia, Raaijmakers 1994, Koppenol-Laforce 1997b, Koppenol-Laforce 1997a, Snijders 
1997, Snijders 1999b, Hayton, Kortman & Verhagen 1999, Vriesendorp 2003 and Aertsen 2004. 
551 Final report on Art. 5.1.1 (now Art. 5:1 BW). See Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 
1981, p. 18. 
552 The creation of property rights is a general exception to this rule. However, property rights 
can only be created when specifically authorised by the Civil Code, Art. 3:81 BW. 
553 The exceptions are dealt with by Art. 3:278 BW that mentions the right of pledge, hypothec 
and priority rights. On the (non) applicability of Art. 3:276 BW outside the scope of property 
law, in particular in respect to a contractual security on bank accounts see Wibier 2007, p. 99-
104. 
554 Although such results can be achieved in Dutch law by, e.g. creating a legal person that will 
manage the assets. 
555 HR 4 January 1937, NJ 1937, 586, Snijders 1997, p. 95. The reasoning of the court became, once 
more, established in HR 13 June 2003, NJ 2004/196 (Pro-Call). 
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The result of these three provisions, Articles 3:81, 3:84 and 3:276 BW, is that, at 
the outset, the system of Dutch property law is built on a closed list of property 
rights. This is widely accepted, and most basic handbooks on property law state 
that the system of property rights is closed.556 Based on the general theory on 
‘normal types’ of Meijers, the system of Dutch private law makes a distinction 
between relative rights and absolute rights. Among the absolute rights are the 
property rights that are dealt with in a system separate from the law of contract. 
The reason for such a closed system in Dutch law is also clear – allowing 
parties to create their rights would burden the right of ownership and create legal 
uncertainty in respect to which rights apply to which objects.557 With a clear refer-
ence to the reasons stated by the Hoge Raad in the Blaauboer v Berlips decision on the 
separation between property law and contract law, the parliamentary history brings 
the discussion on the nature of the system of property rights in Dutch law to an 
end.558 
Nevertheless, this Chapter has dealt with several situations in which the Dutch 
system of property law is under pressure. Legal relations such as leases, privative 
mandates and qualitative duties bear many characteristics of property rights, except 
that they are dealt with in other areas of the Civil Code than in the parts dealing 
with property law.559 Moreover, even within the parts on property law, security 
rights can, after their existence has ended, still have after-effects against third 
parties.560 Also, new types of property relations under the influence of European 
law and international law create doctrinal difficulties. The Collateral Directive intro-
duces both a right of pledge as well as a security ownership, but it is still imple-
mented in book 7 and therefore considered a contract in Dutch law.561  
It appears to be the system of Dutch property law itself that withholds these 
personal legal relations from becoming what they essentially and effectively already 
are – property rights. A trust recognised under the Hague Convention creates so 
many problems with the system that Article 4 WCT declares Article 3:81(1) and 
Article 3:84(3) BW, the basis of the system of Dutch property law, not applicable. At 
the same time, a similar relation that cannot be brought under the definition of the 
Hague Convention will fall under these same provisions and will be prohibited. It 
can be questioned why an international obligation would be a sufficient reason to 
deviate from the foundations of Dutch property law, where the same type of 
arrangement under Dutch law as such is rejected on grounds of legal certainty.  
 
556 See Snijders & Rank-Berenschot 2001, p. 56-57 (using the ‘term more or less closed’), Pitlo et 
al. 2006, p. 459-460 and Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, No. 39, p. 34-35 (using the 
definition no other property rights than those recognised by law). 
557 With a reference to the old law prior to the Old BW, where such a creation of rights was 
possible, see Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 13. 
558 Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, p. 13. 
559 See above; 4.3. Lease of Immovable Objects, 4.6. Privative Mandate and 4.7. Obligations as 
Part of Property Rights, respectively. 
560 See above; 4.5. After-Effects of Property Rights. 
561 See above; 4.9. EC and International Influences. 
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The strongest arguments against such a development are put forward by 
Snijders.562 As one of the founders of the system of the new BW, Snijders, in a series 
of articles, puts forward that the system of Dutch private law was designed to cope 
with new developments and that there is no need to change it.563 He argues that the 
drafters of the Civil Code made a legal-political choice to prohibit a separation of 
powers that does not fit within the system of property law.564 Consequently, a sepa-
ration of powers that can be brought within the system can be allowed. Snijders’ 
reasoning is primarily based on an analogy with the theory of sources of obligations 
dealt with in Article 6:1 BW. This Article states that obligations can only arise if this 
follows from the law. In 1959 the Hoge Raad rendered a landmark decision in Quint 
v Te Poel in which the Court held that an obligation can also arise in circumstances 
other than as prescribed by law, if that obligation fits into the system and is in line 
with cases that are already dealt with.565 Consequently, Snijders argues that a fiduci-
ary relation that has no basis in the law could be recognised if it fits in the system 
and is in accordance with the property rights already dealt with.566 As an example 
he mentions forms of bewind, a type of administration or management, that are not 
dealt with specifically by the Civil Code but which he considers should be recog-
nised if demanded by practice. 
Furthermore, Snijders searches for developments in other areas than the right 
of ownership and other property rights. In his articles, Snijders looks specifically at 
Article 3:6 BW on patrimonial rights, in Dutch vermogensrechten. This concept is, as a 
consequence of Meijers’ normal-types theory, an open concept under which Snijders 
argues new rights can be brought. In his view, these new patrimonial rights include, 
for instance, domain-names and licences.567 Snijders argues that the BW should be 
read in a free and not overly legalistic way. When practice and societal develop-
ments require the recognition of new legal relations he considers that they should 
be recognised.568  
In a strict approach to the system of Dutch private law, these new legal rela-
tions should be either personal or property rights, in traditional terms, relative or 
absolute rights. Snijders does not agree with this strict approach and points out that 
Meijers, the founder of the Dutch Civil Code, also intended to leave room for inter-
mediate forms.569 Snijders proposes to characterise new legal relations, which could 
be patrimonial rights under Article 3:6 BW, in terms of exclusivity and not in terms 
 
562 Snijders was commissioner responsible for the introduction of books 3, 5 and 6 of the New 
Civil Code, vice president of the Hoge Raad and is Professor of Private Law at the University 
of Amsterdam. See, inter alia, Storme, De Theije & Delbecke 2004. 
563 Snijders 1991, Snijders 1993, Snijders 1997, Snijders 2002, Snijders 2005a and Snijders 2005b. 
564 Snijders 1997, p. 91. 
565 HR 30 January 1959, NJ 1959, 548 (Quint/Te Poel). 
566 Snijders 1997, p. 91-92. 
567 Snijders 2005a, p. 81, 84, Snijders 2005b, p. 96. As such, these patrimonial rights can be an 
object of a property right. The interesting part of this development is that because of these 
new objects of property law, the existing property rights might no longer offer sufficient 
possibilities for parties to deal with their affairs. 
568 Snijders 2005b, p. 101, see also Van Erp 2006a, p. 1057. 
569 Snijders names these sui generis. Snijders 2005a , p. 81. 
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of relative or absolute rights. Also here, Snijders proposes to search for connections 
to the cases that are already dealt with by the Civil Code under the Quint v Te Poel 
doctrine mentioned above.570 In this approach a domain-name is an exclusive right, 
not dealt with by law, but which, according to Snijders, fits in the system of the 
Dutch Civil Code. A right to a domain-name is transferable, but does not answer to 
the characterisation between relative and absolute rights well. It should therefore, in 
Snijders’ words, be an exclusive right under Article 3:6 BW.571 
In her dissertation, Rank-Berenschot emphasises that the distinction between 
personal rights and property rights should not be taken as the essential characteris-
tic of the system of private law.572 Partly based on the works of Ginossar, she ex-
plains private law as a system of relations between persons, where a property right 
is a personal right with qualitative or property effects.573 Rank-Berenschot states that 
partly because the distinction between personal rights and property rights is less 
strong than is often suggested, the new Dutch Civil Code introduced several ele-
ments, mainly personal rights with third-party effect, that blur the distinction.574 
However, at the outset the system remains based on the distinction between prop-
erty law and contract law, whereby the former provides rules on a limited set of 
relations in a closed system of rights that are derived from the right of ownership. 
In a system, as suggested by Rank-Berenschot, where the basis is a personal 
right, the distinguishing element is third-party effect. She proposes a scale where on 
the one side there is a pure personal right and on the other side a pure property 
right. In order to place a certain relation on the scale several questions have to be 
answered.575 Starting with the closed system of property rights, parties must use one 
of the provided property rights if possible, ending with the doctrine of privity of 
contract. When the first question is answered positively there is a property right and 
therefore also third-party effect. A negative answer to the first question, in the 
theory of Rank-Berenschot, will bring the matter of third-party effect into the realm 
of personal rights.576 In the latter situation the starting point will be no third-party 
effect unless provided otherwise. In this system the law of property becomes the 
primary system and contract the leftover category.577 
The dissertation of Struycken primarily deals with the closed system of prop-
erty rights.578 Struycken’s analysis of the numerus clausus brings him to the conclu-
sion that in Dutch law numerus clausus is a question of who is entitled to develop the 
law of property. In his view this is either the legislature or the judiciary.579 
 
570 HR 30 January 1959, NJ 1959, 548 (Quint/Te Poel), Snijders 2005a, p. 81-82. 
571 Snijders 2005a, p. 84-85. 
572 Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 309-310, see also Snijders 2002, p. 28-29.  
573 Ginossar 1960, p. 121 et seq., Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 313, Sagaert 2005b, p. 996-997. On 
Ginossar see also Chapter 3; 4.2. Real Obligations. 
574 Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 318, see also Snijders 2002, p. 29. 
575 Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 320-321. 
576 Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 321. 
577 Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 335. 
578 Struycken 2007, p. 1-2. 
579 Struycken 2007, p. 753-761. 
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Struycken makes a firm choice for the legislature.580 At the same time he recognises 
that, bringing the responsibility for the development of the law of property fully 
back to the legislature, an active legislature is required.581 In this approach the case-
law based approach of Snijders is rejected, but replaced by an active legislature that 
should adapt the law of property to changes in society.582 
Struycken’s approach has consequences for the system of Dutch property law. 
Especially in respect to the influence of party autonomy in the law of property, his 
theory makes a firm decision. When the primacy, which refers to the rule-making 
power, of the numerus clausus is with the legislature, a rule of numerus clausus exists 
in Dutch law. Under this rule the legislature is the only actor that decides on the 
freedom of the judiciary, but also of parties, in the law of property. Struycken is 
unequivocally against the development of the law of property through case law.583 
Consequently, he sees little role for party autonomy in the development of the law 
of property.584  
Parties are allowed, within the boundaries set by the legislature in the exercise 
of its primacy to shape the law of property, to provide content to their legal rela-
tions. The boundaries set by the legislature are part of the rule of numerus clausus in 
Dutch law, either explicitly in Articles of the Dutch Civil Code dealing with the 
various property rights, or through the principle of sufficient connection and what 
Struycken calls the subtraction principle, the model in which a property right is 
derived from a more extensive right, both of which were also created by the legis-
lature.585 Struycken therefore affirms the choices made by the legislature with the 
introduction of the property and contract parts of the new Dutch Civil Code in 
1992.586  
It is interesting that the new Dutch Civil Code allows for the creation of 
several situations where the law provides legal relations, other than property rela-
tions, with some proprietary effect. These quasi-property relations include the lease, 
the privative mandate and the qualitative obligation. Regardless of the theory on 
the nature of the Dutch law of property, these legal relations exist and must be dealt 
with. 
The explanation of the system as proposed by Rank-Berenschot opens possi-
bilities for the argument of Snijders that new relations can be recognised if they fit 
within the system of the law. The system of property rights remains closed, in other 
words there is a pure rule of numerus clausus, but the number of other relations with 
third-party effect can be extended if there are good reasons to do so. Whether these 
new relations are characterised as other absolute rights, as proposed by Snijders, or 
 
580 Struycken 2007, p. 762-764. 
581 Struycken 2007, p. 770-771. 
582 Struycken 2007, p. 778-779. 
583 Struycken 2007, p. 762. 
584 Struycken 2007, p. 779-780. 
585 Struycken 2007, p. 779. On Struycken’s subtraction principle see above; 3. Other Property 
Rights and 4.7. Obligations as Part of Property Rights. 
586 On Struycken’s opinion on numerus clausus see Chapter 7; 3.4. Struycken: Why we Need a 
Numerus Clausus. 
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as other relations with third-party effect in the area of contract law, does not matter. 
The legislature or the judiciary could equally effect the inclusion of such a legal 
relation in the system of Dutch private law.587 In my view, a choice such as that sug-
gested by Struycken does not necessarily have to be made. When the inclusion of a 
new right is made by case law, the line of reasoning of the Hoge Raad as created in 
its case law on chain clauses should be followed, and restraint should be exercised 
when recognising third-party effect of personal rights.588 
The system of Dutch private law remains founded on the distinction between 
personal and property rights, but this distinction is not sacrosanct. The deciding fac-
tor on whether a relation is a property right or a personal right is primarily offered 
by the rule of numerus clausus to which the property system of Dutch law seems to 
adhere. After the introduction of the new Dutch Civil Code, it is common opinion 
that only the legislature has the authority to recognise new types of property rights. 
However, at the same time there are already many quasi-property relations that 
operate in the grey area between property law and contract law. The doctrinal pro-
blems these quasi-property relations create, in combination with a strict separation 
between property and contract, has led several authors to search for better distin-
guishing criteria. Snijders proposes using exclusive rights, Rank-Berenschot third-
party effect.589  
In any event, the question remains whether any other rights besides those 
recognised by the rule of numerus clausus should be awarded third-party effect. 
Within the Dutch rule of numerus clausus, parties have an extensive freedom to 
decide on the content of their relations which, if the appropriate criteria are fulfilled, 
will have property-right and therefore third-party effect.  
 
587 This suggestion is also in line with Snijders’ theory, see Snijders 2005b, p. 101. 
588 HR 17 May 1985, NJ 1986/760 (Curaçao/Boyé). Also see Rank 1997, p. 471. 
589 Snijders 2005a, p. 81, Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 320. 
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Chapter 6 
ENGLISH LAW 
1. Introduction 
The law of England is traditionally seen as a system distinct from the other legal 
systems in Europe. The difference between the common law system of England and 
the civil law systems of France, Germany and the Netherlands is most visible in the 
Civil Codes that the civil law countries have adopted. In these Civil Codes, each of 
the civil law systems has, after the development of a system of feudal landholding 
from the time of the fall of the Roman Empire, returned to a Roman-law basis of 
property law. This does not only apply to land, but to the property law systems in 
general. However, English law, after the famous battle of Hastings in 1066, contin-
ued to develop the common law through decisions of the judiciary whilst maintain-
ing a system of feudal landholding.1  
The property law system of English law is therefore different from civil law 
and is often used in support of the argument that no common ground between the 
legal systems in Europe can be found. However, the two traditions of civil law and 
common law are not completely separate, there have been many influences from 
continental systems on English law and vice versa.2 
Because of the origin of English law and the absence of a clear break with the 
legal system of the past, no separate account of the development of property rights 
in English law will be given. To the contrary, the development of property rights in 
English law is English law in force at this moment. Therefore the historical develop-
ment is part of the discussion of English modern property law in this chapter. 
In English law, property law is not a subject that is usually considered as a 
whole. Based on the historical development of property relations, a distinction 
between personal property law and land law is made. The concepts that are used in 
these two different systems of property law are different depending on which divi-
sion of property law applies. This chapter will therefore start with a description of 
the common law, its specific terminology, and some important doctrines and 
 
1 Holdsworth 1927, p. 10 et seq. 
2 Many of these cross influences in the area of property law will be dealt with in this study. 
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concepts necessary to explain the content of the currently recognised property 
rights. 
1.1. Terminology 
English law uses different words from the civil law systems to describe the objects 
on which property rights can be created. First and foremost, there is a general dis-
tinction between land and chattels.3 As a very general definition, ‘chattels’ are those 
things that are not land. Because of the development of the system of property law 
in England, property law comprises two areas of law in line with the distinction 
between land and chattels. These areas are land law and personal property law.  
The common law has developed since 1066, and the common law terminology 
has evolved over time. In old terminology, land is also known as realty and land 
law as real property law. This specific terminology refers to the real action, or actio 
in rem, that, under old procedural law, could be used to protect a legal interest in 
land.4 Chattels are also known as personalty, which refers to the personal action or, 
actio in personam, that could be used to protect a legal interest in a chattel. The differ-
ence in the availability of these actions has determined some of the most fundamen-
tal differences between land law and personal property law today. Briefly stated, 
only real actions could result in a specific remedy, personal actions could only lead 
to damages.5  
Another word used for chattel is the French word chose. With this term, 
English law, with the law of Normandy in force from 1066, and French law share a 
common basis. Of chattels types, there are two; choses in possession, which are all 
chattels that can be held in possession, and choses in action, which are chattels that 
cannot be held in possession.6 In other words, choses in possession are tangible 
objects on which factual control can be exercised. Consequently, choses in action are 
those objects on which no factual control or power can be exercised, usually intangi-
ble or incorporeal objects.7 Choses in action comprise basically any object that is not 
real or a chose in possession. The main examples are shares in a company, bills of 
exchange, intellectual property and debts.8 A separate category, mainly used in 
commercial transactions, is an intangible, which are rights one person can exercise 
against another for a certain performance.9 A last term for chattel is a ‘good’, when 
it comes to a sale of objects that fall under the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Because of the 
 
3 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 3, Bridge 2002, p. 1-2. English law therefore does not follow a general 
distinction between immovable and movable objects, see Freke v Lord Carbery (1873), L.R. 16 
Eq. 461 and Re Hoyles [1911] 1 Ch. 179. 
4 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 6-7, Simpson 1986, p. 25 et seq., Holdsworth 1927, p. 11 et seq. 
5 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 6-7, Holdsworth 1927, 3-4, 10, Pollock & Maitland 1898b, p. 150-151. 
6 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 11, Bridge 2002, p. 3. 
7 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 11-14, Bridge 2002, p. 4-12. 
8 Bridge 2002, p. 4-5. 
9 See Goode 2004, p. 29. 
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important position tangible things and in particular sale of these objects take in 
commercial settings, in commercial law, the word ‘good’ is normal terminology.10  
Other distinctions exist, but are for the purposes of this study less relevant. 
These include hereditaments, which is another word for all types of real property, 
but also the term chattels real.11 A chattel real is an old category that mainly 
comprised leasehold interests.12 Originally, the feudal system of landholding did 
not recognise leases as a proprietary interest and therefore leases were treated as 
chattels, but with a special status as chattels real.13 
When the object of property law has been defined and the relevant property 
law regime can be determined, the question remains as to what right or interest a 
person can exercise on these objects. In general, the terms interest and right are both 
used, interest as a slightly more general term.14 Depending on the area of property 
law, land law or personal property law, the terminology differs.  
In the area of land law, the terminology is very specific. It is in particular in 
land law that the remains of the feudal system can be seen from the use of terms 
such as estate, landlord and tenant. An estate is a feudal grant that can be made by 
the Crown or another estate holder, which entitles its holder to immediate posses-
sion, known as ‘seisin’.15 Based on this possession the holder can protect his land, 
and grant a further estate to another person, for example, to a tenant.16 Even today, 
although numerous reforms have been made, the relation between landlord and 
tenant remains feudal in character.17 The landlord holds an estate that is known as a 
‘fee simple’, which is the only remaining freehold estate at common law. The term 
freehold refers to the fact that the holder of this type of estate holds freely, without 
any condition or collateral limitation. In the old feudal system, tenants were those 
people who held an estate from the crown.18 In other words, anyone but the king 
was a tenant. In modern terminology the term tenant is used, as mentioned above, 
for the relation between a landlord and a tenant, but is also used to deal with situa-
tions of co-ownership, where both parties to a community are also known as ten-
ants, whatever right they hold.19 
The term ownership should be used with care in English law, in particular 
land law. English law does not know a concept of ownership as is used in civil law 
systems, but uses the term ownership in a very broad sense to describe the most 
 
10 Lawson and Rudden 2002, p. 26-27, See Goode 2004, p. 29. 
11 Swadling 2007, p. 227. 
12 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 8-9, Bridge 2002, p. 3. 
13 Pollock & Maitland 1898b, p. 115-116, Holdsworth 1927, p. 19-21. For a more detailed 
discussion on the origin of leasehold interests see below; 2.2. Lease of Land. 
14 See, inter alia, Honoré 1961, p. 108. 
15 See Pierre 1997, p. 242-244. On possession see Harris 1961, p. 69 et seq. 
16 See Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 31-33. For a more detailed discussion on land law see below; 
2. Property Rights in Respect of Land. 
17 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 27. 
18 Those who held directly from the Crown were known as tenants in chief. People who held 
from them were known as tenants. 
19 See below; 2.1. Fee Simple. 
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extensive entitlement.20 When it comes to land, this right is usually the fee simple, 
which was mentioned above. When the holder, in English law terminology, rather 
than the owner, of a fee simple grants part of his estate to another person for what is 
known as a ‘term of years absolute’, he grants a leasehold estate to that person.21 
Leaseholds are entitlements to land for a limited period of time. At the end of this 
period the right that was granted will revert back to the holder of the fee simple. 
This right to the return of the grant is known as ‘reversion’ and can, as a right, be 
granted to other parties. When the holder of a fee simple grants his reversion to 
another person the right granted is called remainder.22 To provide an example, A is 
holder of a fee simple and has granted a term of years absolute for ten years to B 
with remainder to C. As a result, B will be in possession of the land for ten years, 
after which C will be entitled to take possession of the land. First B and later C will 
have seisin. 
Personal property law terminology is even more complicated. Personal prop-
erty law is, compared to land law, an underdeveloped area of law.23 In particular 
conceptually there are still many uncertainties. In general, the term ownership in 
the civil law sense of the word does not exist in personal property law either.24 
Instead, personal property law talks of entitlement to a chattel, in short ‘title’.25 The 
concept of title therefore usually describes the person with the best right, which is 
the right to hold possession forever. However, in certain settings, in particular com-
mercial law, the term ownership is freely used, but should be understood to mean 
title.26 
When it comes to a term of years, the concept is, because of its connection to 
the feudal system and to land, unknown in personal property law. Instead, the 
general term ‘bailment’ is used, which describes the situation when possession of an 
object is transferred from one party to another for a limited duration of time. 
Whether bailment creates a property right is debatable and is discussed below.27 
Again, in certain settings, in particular commercial law, the term lease is also used. 
However, this should not be automatically understood as giving bailment the status 
of a property right. 
1.2. Common Law and Equity 
English law as a common law system is considered to have started to develop after 
the Norman Conquest in 1066.28 William the Conqueror became King of England 
 
20 See below; 2. Property Rights in Respect of Land. 
21 See below; 2.2. Lease of Land. 
22 See Holdsworth 1927, p. 65 et seq., Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 510 et seq. 
23 See Birks who states that ‘With the exception of a few specialisms, our law of personal prop-
erty is in a bad state’. Birks 2000, p. 1. 
24 See below; 3.1. Title / Ownership. 
25 Swadling 2006a, p. 280. 
26 Swadling 2006a, p. 280-282. 
27 See below; 3.2. Leases / Bailment? 
28 Also before 1066 there was a legal system in existence, but 1066 is usually chosen as a starting 
date. See, inter alia, Pollock & Maitland 1895, p. 57, Simpson 1986, p. 2-3, Pollock & Mailand 
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and succeeded to all the rights of the previous Anglo-Saxon kings, and became the 
supreme landholder in England.29 From this time onwards, the common law was 
developed through decisions of the centralised jurisdiction of the king’s court and, 
occasionally, legislation issued by the king.30 In the area of property law this mainly 
concerned land law, which was of a feudal nature. However, English land law was 
strict and sometimes led to unjust or unwanted results. 
Under the feudal system the king granted estates to his major supporters in 
certain types of tenure from him for which he received various incidents.31 In their 
turn, these supporters of the King would grant estates to others. This process is 
known as subinfeudation and was, because of its fragmenting effect on English land, 
banned by the statute Quia Emptores in 1290.32  
The common law rules on landholding prohibited women and children from 
holding land in tenure. When the holder of such tenure was absent, for example, a 
knight who went on crusade with the king, he would have to leave his land with his 
wife and children.33 However, under the strict rules of the common law, women 
and children were not allowed standing in court, and were therefore unable to pro-
tect the land against interference by other parties.34 To remedy this and to protect 
his wife and children, the knight was forced to convey his land to another man, one 
of his friends who stayed behind, for instance. The friend would promise the knight 
to protect the land against interference and take care of the land on behalf of the 
wife and children of the knight.  
Problems arose at common law when, for instance, the friend had burdened 
the land with another estate, or had conveyed it to another person. At common law, 
the knight’s wife and children would be helpless because the knight had conveyed 
the land and all his rights in the land to his friend, be it for the benefit of the 
knight’s wife and children, but this was not recognised by the common law. In these 
instances, the wife and children would petition to the king claiming that it was 
unfair that they could not protect themselves. The king would refer such a petition 
to the Chancellor, the King’s closest advisor and head of the secretarial division.35 
The Chancellor would then decide on the case. At first this power was delegated 
but from 1473 onwards the Chancellor passed judgment alone.36 As the number of 
cases and the importance of his work increased, the Chancellor came to sit in what 
became known as the Court of Chancery or Chancellor’s Division, which began to 
systematically develop its own rules.37 These rules developed into a separate system 
 
1898a, 79 et seq., Digby focuses on the influence of pre-1066 legislation on the beginning of the 
common law, Digby & Harrison 1897, p. 26 et seq. 
29 Digby & Harrison 1897, p. 27. 
30 See Pollock & Maitland 1895, p. 57 et seq. 
31 Hayton 1998, p. 9. 
32 Hayton 1998, p. 9. The Law abandoning this is called Quia Emptores 1290, a statute that 
remains in force today. 
33 See Biancalana 1998, p. 114-115, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 18-21, Swadling 2007, p. 234-235.  
34 Biancalana 1998, p. 113. 
35 One could say that the Chancellor was a kind of royal secretary of state. 
36 Biancalana 1998, p 142. 
37 Hayton 1998, p 10. 
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of law known as equity which came to exist alongside the common law.38 Until 1875 
common law and equity were administered in different courts, but were eventually 
joined.39 Now, common law and equity are both dealt with before the same courts. 
It is the system of equity that has been very important for the development of 
property law in England. The common law has generally been reluctant to recog-
nise new property relations. One of the basic starting points in equity, known as a 
maxim, is that ‘equity follows the law’ and therefore property rights that exist at 
common law also exist in equity. However, the special nature of equity allows it to 
go beyond the common law. Equity, under the development of maxims like ‘equity 
looks upon that as done which ought to be done’, has awarded proprietary rights to 
certain parties that have a ‘mere’ personal right at common law.40 It has in particular 
done so where equity, contrary to common law, awards specific performance of a 
certain agreement. Specific performance is an exceptional remedy in English con-
tract law, which usually awards damages in case of non-performance. Equity can, 
while anticipating the coming into existence of a property right at common law, 
award a property right in advance of the common law right.41 Furthermore, equity 
is the source of the law of trusts, enabling parties to hold several property rights in 
the same object at the same time.42 
Finally, through the operation of law of trusts, equity can remedy a wrong 
done to a holder of a right. For instance in Macmillan Inc v Bishopgate Investment 
Trust a gratuitous transfer of Macmillan’s shares had been made by a Mr Maxwell.43 
Macmillan tried to argue that the shares were held on trust for him, giving him a 
right in equity to the shares as a beneficiary. According to the Court of Appeal, 
under the rules of equity, the circumstances of the case gave rise to the coming into 
being of a specific type of trust, a resulting trust. The transferee of the shares had 
therefore become resulting trustee. Birks has emphasised that this creates a de facto 
vindicatio of the assets, a remedy that is not possible at common law.44 He argues, 
this remedy is a vindicatio, because under the rules of Saunders v Vautier the benefi-
ciary can ask the trustee for a transfer of the object and thus assert his property right 
in respect of the assets directly.45 
However, there is a disadvantage to the interference of equity in property law. 
The rights that equity creates are not as strong as the property rights at common 
law. In general, property rights in equity are to be respected by anyone, with one 
major exception. A bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the right will not 
 
38 For a short and concise overview see Lawson and Rudden 2002, p. 15-16. 
39 The Judicature Acts 1873-1875 comprised two acts: the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, 
36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77. 
40 See below; 2.7 Estate Contracts, 2.8. Options to Purchase and for a discussion see below; 4. A 
Numerus Clausus in English Property Law? 
41 See Swadling 2007, p. 231-233. 
42 Civil lawyers tend to characterise this as fragmentation of entitlement to an object. See 
Lawson and Rudden 2002, p. 90-91, 97-100, Parlementaire Geschiedenis NBW – Boek 5 1981, 
p. 17, contra see Swadling 2008, p. 99-100. 
43 Macmillan Inc. v Bishopgate Investment Trust [1996] BCC 453, CA. 
44 Birks 2000, p. 4-5, see also Swadling 2000a, p. 218-219. 
45 Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115, Birks 2000, p. 5. 
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be bound by equitable property rights.46 This is usually not the case with common 
law property rights, which are therefore stronger. 
1.3. Personal Property Law and Land Law 
Another distinction made in English law is the distinction between the law of prop-
erty with respect to land, usually named land law or real property law, and the law 
of property with respect to movable objects or chattels, usually referred to as 
personal property law. In English doctrine these areas are distinct and, apart from 
distributing property rights to private parties, have little to do with each other.47  
The explanation for this difference with civil law systems can be found in the 
historical development of the legal system. When the common law began in 1066, 
the customary law of Normandy, which was feudal law, started to apply to all land 
in England.48 William the Conqueror, as the King of England, owned all land, and 
all others held from him. The area of law that developed around this system of 
property law only applied to land.49 Chattels were considered to be of such a differ-
ent nature that they were not subject to feudal law.50  
The difference between land and chattels therefore caused the creation of two 
separate property law systems; land law and personal property law. In respect to 
land law, the common law developed by awarding a real action to the holder of a 
right in a piece of land allowing him to regain seisin of the land.51 A holder of a 
right in a chattel was only awarded a personal action allowing him to claim dam-
ages, but not the specific return of seisin, as this was only possible for freehold 
land.52 Therefore, in contrast with civil law systems, personal property law uses 
actions in tort, in other words the law of obligations, to protect property interests.53 
It was only from the nineteenth century onwards that personal property law 
became more important. The objects that are subject to personal property law grew 
in value and now, usually within the setting of commercial law, form a great source 
of value, usually exceeding the value of land.54 Amongst these objects are claims 
that companies have on their debtors. 
It is the distinction between the availability of real and personal actions that 
still forms the difference between land law and personal property law today. This 
chapter will deal with this distinction as the available property rights in land law 
and personal property law differ greatly. 
 
46 Swadling 2007, p. 275. 
47 See Pretto-Sakmann 2005, p. 3-4, Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 3, Lawson and Rudden 2002, p. 13-
14. 
48 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 4. 
49 Holdsworth 1927, p. 3-9. 
50 See Pollock & Maitland 1898b, p. 149 et seq. 
51 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 6, Pollock & Maitland 1898b, p. 570. 
52 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 6-7, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 36. 
53 On the protection of personal property rights see Bridge 2002, p. 47 et seq. 
54 See below; 1.4. Commercial Law. 
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1.4. Commercial Law 
A third area of law, besides land law and personal property law, deserves to be 
dealt with separately. Generally stated, commercial law is the law dealing with 
trade.55 In civil law classification, commercial law deals with contract, tort and prop-
erty law. In English law, commercial law is a distinct area of law that , at the same 
time, overlaps with personal property law and land law to a large extent. Goode 
states that commercial law deals with rights and duties that arise from the supply of 
goods and services in the way of trade.56  
It is in the area of commercial law that mainly aspects of personal property 
law are dealt with in a different way than in the traditional personal property law.57 
In this separate area of law, different terminology applies. In fact, terminology is 
used that is much more closely connected to everyday language than the old, some-
times archaic, terms of personal property law. In commercial law, no one speaks of 
chattels, but instead of goods.58 Where in personal property law, many are hesitant 
to speak of ownership, in commercial law the term is more easily employed.59 And 
where personal property law retains the term choses in action, commercial law 
rather uses the generic term intangibles.60 Furthermore, the term lease, which is a 
property right in land law, is used instead of bailment.61 
In the last century commercial law has developed as one of the most important 
areas of property law.62 In many cases the value of goods and intangibles now 
exceeds the value of land and commercial law is used in particular for security to 
obtain finance.63 Moreover, objects of property law that were difficult to deal with 
by personal property law, for example, claims, have also found their place in com-
mercial law. It is, in other words, the area of commercial law that deals with these 
developments. Therefore, when in this chapter rules of commercial law are used, 
connection will be sought to the terminology used in commercial law. Where 
commercial law is absent, the terminology of personal property law will be used. 
1.5. Trust Law 
Trust law is a final area of English law that should be dealt with in this introduc-
tion.64 In order to understand the law of trust, the history of equity has to be taken 
into account. Referring back to the earlier example of a knight going on a crusade 
 
55 See Goode 2004, p. 3 et seq. 
56 Goode 2004, p. 8. 
57 See Birks 2000, p. 1-2. 
58 Goode 2004, p. 24. 
59 See Goode 2004, p. 31 et seq. 
60 See Goode 2004, p. 29. 
61 See below; 3.2. Leases / Bailment? 
62 See Holdsworth 1927, p. 6. 
63 Birks 2000, p. 2. 
64 For an account of English trust law in Dutch see Aertsen 2004, p. 11 et seq. For a short account 
of the elemental principles of trust law in English see Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, HL, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
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with the king, leaving his land entrusted to a friend until he returned, the king, 
through the Lord Chancellor, awarded a remedy to the wife and children against 
the entrusted friend.65 The remedy the Lord Chancellor, or better, Chancery, gave in 
equity eventually formed an interest in equity.66 In equity, the standing in court of 
the wife and children became recognised and Chancery made the agreement 
specifically enforceable.67 
Through this development, tenants could use this legal instrument to leave 
their wives and children behind safely. The instrument became known as a ‘use’, 
and came to be employed in a wide variety of situations to avoid the strict rules of 
the common law.68 In the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, most persons 
were in the feudal hierarchy, holding land in tenure. In case of death of the right-
holder of the land, inheritance taxes had to be paid to the feudal lord.69 An heir who 
was an adult, before he could claim his inheritance, would have to pay a fixed sum 
to the feudal lord. An heir who was an infant was in an even worse position. In that 
case the lord would be entitled to use the land for his own benefit until the heir 
reached the age of majority.70 Furthermore the infant had to either submit to the 
feudal lord’s choice of a spouse or, if he could not live with the choice of the feudal 
lord, pay the lord for the value of the marriage.71  
All of these cases, but also problems with the common law on, for example, 
wardships, could be avoided if the person in tenure conveyed the land, during his 
life, to third parties for the use of himself during the remainder of his life and there-
after for the use of his heir.72 In other words, he would declare the land on use for 
himself.73 The holder of the land would then enjoy all the benefits from the land, 
without the feudal restrictions, and upon his death the third parties would transfer 
the land to the heir, or when the heir reached the age of majority. The heir would 
receive the land as if he himself held the land in tenure, but did not technically 
inherit it, so the feudal lord could not claim taxes. 
This avoidance of common law rules was prohibited by the Statute of Uses of 
1536.74 The king, who felt he was losing his control of the land, had passed the 
Statute to prevent this. Nevertheless, after the Statute of Uses 1536, legal practition-
ers continued to search for possibilities to work around the strict rules of the com-
mon law. Therefore, situations kept arising in which one person entrusted assets to 
 
65 Biancalana 1998, p. 111, Yale 1961, p. 93-94. 
66 Biancalana 1998, p. 141. 
67 Biancalana 1998, p. 149-151. 
68 See Pollock & Maitland 1898b, p. 230-239. 
69 At first to all Lords, but after the Statute of Marlborough 1267, c. 16, only to one feudal lord. 
Oakley 1998, p. 3-4, Swadling 2007, p. 271-272. 
70 See Oakley 1998, p. 4, note 20: ‘21 for males, 14 for women (unless death occurred when the 
woman was already over 14 and unmarried, in which case she came of age at 16 or upon 
earlier marriage)’. 
71 Oakley 1998, p. 4. 
72 Most of the time land was conveyed to multiple parties to avoid the risk of death of the third 
party. Biancalana 1998, p. 131-137. 
73 Swadling 2008, p. 79. 
74 Maitland 1936, p. 34-42, Holdsworth 1927, p. 151-161. 
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another person on behalf of a third party, which did not fall under the prohibition 
of the Statute of Uses.75 These creations became known as trusts. It is especially 
these trusts that the Lord Chancellor and his Court of Chancery protected in equity. 
In modern times, trusts are much desired for management, security and succession 
purposes, in all cases attempting to keep taxes as low as possible.76  
The relevance of trust law from the point of view of property law is that trusts 
are a way of holding a property right. In a normal situation a property right is, as 
Swadling puts it, held outright.77 This term is used to explain that the holder of the 
right holds a property right for his own benefit whilst managing it at the same time. 
Another possibility is, by making use of equity, to hold a property right on trust.78 
When a property right is held on trust, the right holder at common law is under the 
obligation to hold the property right for the benefit of another person in equity. 
Holding a property right in this way gives rise to a new property right in equity. 
This method of holding the property right is therefore different from holding out-
right. The holder on trust, also known as trustee, must respect and take into account 
the right in equity of the person on whose behalf he is holding the property right, 
also known as the beneficiary. Through the workings of equity, the trustee is there-
fore limited in his powers over the property right. The trustee is manager and the 
beneficiary benefits.79 
Through a trust objects can be held for the benefit of another. These objects 
can, in principle, be anything. Examples are shares in a company, other equities and 
land. One of the most interesting aspects of a trust is the right in equity that is 
awarded to the beneficiary. Once a trustee receives trust objects he is under the 
obligation to keep these objects separate from his own.80 Furthermore, the trustee is 
under the obligation to manage the trust assets as a ‘prudent man of business’. In 
other words, the trustee must take the interest of the beneficiary seriously.81 The 
protection for the beneficiary, who does not have management powers over the 
trust object, is that he is entitled to claim damages from a trustee who acts in breach 
of trust. Additionally, under certain criteria, when objects are sold from the trust in 
what is known as breach of trust by the trustee, the beneficiary has the right to 
follow any trust objects which end up in other hands.82 This right to follow is known 
as tracing and provides the beneficiary with some rights against third parties that 
were not part of the bargain. In this approach, a trust is an intermediate form be-
tween the law of obligations, which covers the relation between the beneficiary and 
the trustee, in particular the duties of the trustee, and the law of property, which 
enables the beneficiary to claim from the trust assets which are held separate from 
 
75 Swadling 2007, p. 271-272. 
76 Swadling 2007, p. 276. 
77 Swadling 2007, p. 270-271. 
78 Swadling 2007, p. 271-272. 
79 Swadling 2007, p. 272 et seq. 
80 Another possibility is that the trustee declares himself trustee for the benefit of another. The 
effects in English law are the same. Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] 
AC 669, HL, Swadling 2007, p. 279, Hayton 1998, p. 132. 
81 Speight v Gaunt (1882) 22 Ch D 727, 739. 
82 Lawson and Rudden 2002, p. 88-89. 
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the assets of the trustee, even in case of insolvency of the trustee, and to follow the 
trust objects to third parties.83 
In order to create a trust three requirements must be fulfilled. First, it must be 
clear for whose benefit the trust is made.84 This requirement is known as certainty of 
object. As a minimum standard, a trustee should be able to identify the beneficiaries 
in order to know which beneficiary takes which share in the trust objects.85 When a 
trustee is given more discretionary powers to appoint beneficiaries, at least a certain 
class of beneficiaries must be identified from which the trustee may choose.86 
Secondly, the objects that are in the trust must be identifiable. This requirement is 
known as certainty of subject matter.87 When the objects cannot be identified, a trust 
cannot come into existence. The trustee will hold the property rights outright, and 
not on trust.88 But like the certainty of object, a class of objects, for instance 5% of a 
share capital, has been held sufficiently precise for a trust to come into existence.89 
Thirdly, there must also be certainty of intention.90 When a trust is created, the 
initiator, known as the settlor, must declare his intent to be bound by the trust or to 
bind the trustee.91 In normal situations, certainty of intention is established by 
looking first and foremost at the words used, but the words should be interpreted in 
the context of the whole and external circumstances should be taken into account.92 
A trust relation can easily come into existence, but it remains subject to 
requirements of specificity. This also justifies the proprietary elements connected to 
the trust. A specific person benefits from specific objects that are held on trust for 
him or her. Therefore, this beneficiary can claim his or her share in these specific 
objects from the trustee and, if necessary from a third party who knew or should 
have known about the trust as well.93 
Finally, trusts can come into existence not only by agreement or declaration, 
but also by operation of law. These trusts are known as constructive trusts. In par-
ticular the way in which they are used, which is also outside the sphere of private 
law, forms an important element of English law.94 One famous example of a con-
structive trust was when a high official in Hong Kong accepted bribes from crimi-
nals. The Privy Council held that the official breached his fiduciary duty towards 
the government of Hong Kong and decided that the official held the bribes on 
 
83 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, HL, Swadling 2007, p. 296, 
322-327.  
84 Swadling 2007, p. 280. 
85 Swadling 2007, p. 281-284. 
86 Re Gulbenkian’s Settlement Trust (No. 1) [1970] AC 508, HL and even wider for so-called 
discretionary trusts, McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424, HL. 
87 Swadling 2007, p. 285. 
88 See Palmer v Simmonds (1854) 2 Drewry 221, 61 ER 704. 
89 Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452, CA. 
90 Swadling 2007, p. 286. 
91 Richards v Delbridge (1874) LR 18 Eq 11. 
92 Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 264, 45 ER 1185, Swadling 2000a, p. 291-293. 
93 This exception is for the bona fide purchaser for value without notice, see Swadling 2007,  
p. 264. 
94 Birks 1996, p. 92-96, Swadling 2007, p. 321 et seq. 
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constructive trust for the government.95 This trust had to be constructive because no 
one declared the trust or agreed on it. Instead, its existence was presumed. 
Another type of trust is known as a resulting trust, which comes into existence 
through a presumption of law. In particular when objects are transferred gratui-
tously between persons, under particular circumstances, this can give rise to a pre-
sumption that the transferee will hold the rights conveyed on trust for the trans-
feror.96 This presumption can be rebutted by a clear and expressed intention to the 
contrary.97 
According to a widely-held view, a resulting trust can also arise when objects 
are transferred on trust and for some reason the creation of the trust is void.98 This 
could happen in the event that the trust lacks objects.99 Also in such a case a 
resulting trust could arise whereby the transferee holds the objects on trust for the 
transferor. Swadling has shown that this type of resulting trust, which he names a 
‘failed trust resulting trust’, creates very interesting problems in respect of its 
creation.100  
The other type of resulting trust arises because of a presumption that when 
certain facts are proven, the transferor is considered to have declared a trust in his 
own favour.101 However, the failing trust resulting trust, Swadling argues with 
reference to the House of Lords, operates without a presumption.102 In this case, 
Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commission, Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce con-
sidered the question of where the right in equity of the transferor comes from in 
case of a failed trust resulting trust.103 In their view, the right in equity was with the 
transferor all along, besides his right at law, and the resulting trust arises because 
the transferor fails to give the right in equity away. Swadling is very critical of this 
decision and refers to a later statement made by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in another 
case, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, to prove this ‘retention 
theory’ is false.104 In this case Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated: 
‘A person solely entitled to the full beneficial ownership of money or property, both at 
law and in equity, does not enjoy an equitable interest in that property. The legal title 
carries with it all rights. Unless and until there is a separation of the legal and equitable 
estates, there is no separate equitable title. Therefore to talk about the [transferor] 
 
95 A-G for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324, PC. However see Halifax Building Society v Thomas 
[1996] Ch 217, CA, Pretto 2002, p. 76-77. 
96 Swadling 2008, p. 72-73. 
97 Re Vandervells Trust (No 2) [1974] Ch 269, CA, at 294 per Megarry J. On other types see 
Swadling 2007, p. 329-330, Swadling 2008, p. 98-99. 
98 Swadling 2008, p. 73. 
99 Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399. Swadling 2008, p. 94.  
100 Swadling 2008, p. 94-96. 
101 Swadling 2008, p. 101-102. 
102 Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commission [1967] 2 AC 291, HL, at 329 per Lord Wilberforce. 
Swadling 2008, p. 96-99. 
103 Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commission [1967] 2 AC 291, HL at 313 per Lord Upjohn, and at 
329 per Lord Wilberforce. See Swadling 2007, p. 329-330, Swadling 2008, p. 99-100. 
104 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, HL, per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. Swadling 2008, p. 100. See also Swadling 2007, p. 272-273. 
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‘retaining’ its equitable interest is meaningless. The only question is whether the 
circumstances under which the money was paid were such as, in equity, to impose a 
trust on the [transferee]. If so, an equitable interest arose for the first time under that 
trust’.105 
Apart from attempting to settle an important point for resulting trusts, this state-
ment by Lord Browne-Wilkinson explains the approach of English law to trusts in 
general. It is not the case that the right in equity of the beneficiary is formed out of 
the legal right of the settlor of the trust. In other words, a trust does not create a 
fragmentation of a title or estate that previously existed at common law.106 Swadling 
emphasises that in this respect the use of the word ‘separation’ is unfortunate and it 
seems to conflict with the other part of the statement.107 Under the rule formulated 
by Lord Browne-Wilkinson an equitable right comes into existence from nothing 
and is added onto the right at common law, which will now be in the hands of the 
trustee.108 
2. Property Rights in Respect of Land 
English land law is an area that is closely connected with its history. As on the con-
tinent of Europe, England was also governed by the feudal system of landholding. 
However, contrary to the development in other European legal systems, the impact 
of the French Revolution, the abolition of the feudal system and a resulting return to 
the Roman law concepts in property law, did not occur in England. 
From the beginning of the common law, English land law has been governed 
by feudal law.109 When all land was feudal land, the Crown was entitled to all land 
and, consequently, all others must have a lesser right than the Crown.110 Further-
more, English law did not concern itself with the attempt to explain feudal law in 
terms of Roman law concepts such as dominium directum or dominium utile.111 It is 
because of these reasons that English land law does not have a concept of 
ownership in the civil law sense of the word.112 The lack of a ‘revolution’ in English 
land law does not imply that no reforms have been made to land law since the 
eleventh century. To the contrary, English land law has continued to develop and 
has modernised the sometimes unjust application of the law to bring the law into 
conformity with modern needs. 
 
105 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, HL, at 706 per Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson, Swadling 2008, p. 99-100. 
106 See Swadling 2007, p. 271-273. 
107 Swadling 2008, p. 100, note 144. 
108 This approach to the creation of an equitable right that burdens the trustee is similar to the 
original German conception of property rights. On this German approach see Chapter 4; 3. 
Other Property Rights. 
109 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 11 et seq., Holdsworth 1927,p. 3-4, Swadling 2007, p. 233-235. 
110 See Lawson and Rudden 2002, p. 101, who describes the title of the Crown in land as ‘de-
mesne’. Holdsworth 1927, p. 4-5. 
111 See Chapter 2; 4. The Ius Commune. 
112 However, see Honoré 1961, p. 107 et seq., Burn & Cartwright 2006, p, 27. 
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Originally, the relation between the landlord and tenant was strictly personal, 
resulting in a return of the feudal grant to the lord when the tenant died. However, 
already in the early common law the lord would accept the heir of the tenant, allow-
ing the grant to continue.113 When the grant could pass to the heir of the tenant, it 
lost some of its strictly personal status. Over time this grant became known as an 
estate.114 In a normal situation, the tenant would be allowed to use and enjoy the 
land freely. This type of estate therefore became known as fee simple estate.115  
When the concept of estate developed, the possibility of leaving the estate to 
heirs, or to even conveying it to another person, became tested. Only through the 
Statute of Wills 1540 could estates be left by will.116 Before that, this restriction was 
avoided through a ‘use’ as dealt with above.117 Furthermore, tenants tried to grant 
estates to other persons, usually family members, in an attempt to keep the estate 
within the family.118 At first, courts interpreted these attempts as a conditional gift, 
requiring the existence of heirs, but allowing the holder of the estate to freely con-
vey it to other persons as well. This undesired result was remedied by the statute De 
Donis Conditionalibus of 1285, under which it became possible to grant a different 
type of estate, the estate tail, which would pass on to the heirs of the tenant.119  
Another of the first land reforms was mentioned above, the statute Quia 
Emptores of 1290 which restricted the possibilities of feudal lords to give further 
feudal grants to others.120 This practice, known as subinfeudation, was disadvanta-
geous to landlords who owned large pieces of land, because subinfeudation frag-
mented the entitlements to the land. As a result of the statute, only the full estate 
that was granted could be conveyed to another party.121 Combined with the statute 
De Donis Conditionalibus it remained possible to grant a lesser estate in land, some-
times made for the life of a tenant. These estates became known as life estates.122 
When conveyed, these estates remained dependent upon the life of the grantee, and 
meant that the tenant granted an estate pur autre vie.123 
English land law developed into a complicated system in which these three 
estates; the normal fee simple estate, the estate in tail, and the estate for life, were 
the standard types. However, adapting this system to developments in society 
 
113 Swadling 2000a, p. 224-225. Simpson emphasises the fact that already in early feudal law 
freehold tenurial disputes became exclusively considered in Royal courts, rather than in local 
seignorial courts, and that this transfer of jurisdiction changed the nature in which freeholds 
were protected from personal to real actions. See Simpson 1986, p. 36-37. 
114 Holdsworth 1927, p. 50 et seq., Swadling 2007, p. 234-235. 
115 See Pierre 1997, p. 244-246. 
116 Swadling 2000a, p. 224. 
117 See Para. 1.5. Trust Law. 
118 Swadling 2000a, p. 224-225. 
119 13 Edward I, st. 1, C. 1, Holdsworth 1927, p. 55-60, Swadling 2000a, p. 225-226, Simpson 1986, 
p. 66-68. 
120 18 Edward I, c. 1, Holdsworth 1927, p. 104-109. See above; 1.2. Common Law and Equity. 
121 Holdsworth 1927, p. 106-107. 
122 Holdsworth 1927, p. 60-65. 
123 Holdsworth 1927, p. 62, Swadling 2000a, p. 226. 
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consequently meant mixing some of these categories, depending on the wording the 
parties had given to the grant. As a result a large variety of estates existed.124 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, land law continued to use these 
feudal concepts of estates. However, when society developed from being mainly 
agricultural and land-based to a society based on cities and industries, reforms in 
the land law were necessary.125 From the beginning of the nineteenth century, law 
reforms were made, eventually resulting in a major property law reform in 1925 
with the Law of Property Acts.126 The Law of Property Acts include the Settled Land 
Act 1925, the Trustee Act 1925, the Land Registration Act 1925, the Land Charges 
Act 1925, the Administration of Estates Act 1925, the Universities and College 
Estates Act 1925 and, the most important for the subject of this study, the Law of 
Property Act 1925. The Law of Property Act 1925 limited the types of estate that 
could be held, and registered, at common law. Section 1 of the Law of Property Act 
1925 provides: 
‘1. Legal estates and equitable interests 
The only estates in land which are capable of subsisting or of being conveyed or 
created at law are – 
a) An estate in fee simple absolute in possession; 
b) A term of years absolute.  
(2) The only interests or charges in or over land which are capable of subsisting or of 
being conveyed or created at law are— 
(a) An easement, right, or privilege in or over land for an interest equivalent to an 
estate in fee simple absolute in possession or a term of years absolute; 
(b) A rentcharge in possession issuing out of or charged on land being either per-
petual or for a term of years absolute; 
(c) A charge by way of legal mortgage; 
(d) . . . and any other similar charge on land which is not created by an instrument; 
(e) Rights of entry exercisable over or in respect of a legal term of years absolute, 
or annexed, for any purpose, to a legal rentcharge. 
(3) All other estates, interests, and charges in or over land take effect as equitable 
interests’. 
Consequently, there could only be two estates at common law, and other estates, 
which included the estate in tail and the life estate, could only be created in 
equity.127 The result of this provision is that, since equity must be used to create 
these estates, the law of trusts must be used to create these last two types of estates. 
Moreover, in 1996, the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 ended 
the possibility to create an estate in tail.128 
 
124 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 7 et seq. 
125 Holdsworth 1927, p. 302 et seq., Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 7-8. 
126 Examples of reform include the Reform Act 1832, the Partition Act, the Vendor and Pur-
chasor Act, the Conveyancing Acts and the Settled Land Acts (1882), see Holdsworth 1927,  
p. 316. 
127 Swadling 2007, p. 234-235. 
128 Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, s. 5, sch 1. See Swadling 2000a, p. 226-
227, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 9-10. 
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The most important recent English land law reform is the Land Registration 
Act 2002, which repealed the Land Registration Act 1925.129 The Land Registration 
Act 2002 creates a mandatory registration system for all entitlements in respect to 
land in England, which had not existed before.130 Behind the Act is the idea that the 
entitlements to any geographically described piece of land are registered, so that a 
prospective purchaser can investigate the rights registered on a certain piece of 
land.131 As a result the conveyance of an unregistered right to land will now lead to 
registration.132 
It could be held that the law therefore limited the possible estates that can be 
held at common law. Furthermore, the Law of Property Act 1925 also limited other 
property rights which can exist at common law. As Section 1 (3) shows, all other 
rights and estates can only exist in equity.  
At common law, therefore, the Law of Property Act 1925 creates a closed sys-
tem of property rights, to which parties cannot add a new property right. Swadling 
has argued that therefore at common law a numerus clausus of property rights 
exists.133 Whether such a closed system also exists in equity is a matter of debate. 
This section will discuss the various property rights that can exist at common law 
and in equity. Although equity follows the law, some property rights can only exist 
in equity. The subject of numerus clausus will be returned to at the end of this 
chapter.134 
2.1. Fee Simple 
The estate in fee simple absolute in possession, after 1925 also known as freehold 
estate, is the most extensive entitlement a person can have on land in English law.135 
This most extensive entitlement is meant both in time and in space. A holder of a fee 
simple is allowed to exercise his right to possession forever and, in principle, 
exclusively. The term ‘fee’ refers to the feudal grant, which is the origin of this 
estate.136 The term ‘simple’ refers to the fact that the estate will pass to the heirs of 
the holder, not of any particular category, as was the case with a fee tail or estate in 
tail.137 The right is ‘absolute’ in the sense that the estate is not subject to any 
condition.138 ‘In possession’, finally, refers to the requirement that the holder of the 
 
129 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 10. 
130 Compulsory registration of entitlements to land had existed before the LRA 2002 already, but 
with the new Act, all conveyances, including gratuitous transfers, must be registered. See 
Swadling 2007, p. 390-391. 
131 Gray & Gray 2005, p. 160-161. 
132 There are a few exceptions to this rule, but most entitlements will be subject to a compulsory 
registration. See Gray & Gray 2005 , p. 164-166. 
133 Swadling 2007, 223-224. 
134 See below; 4. A Numerus Clausus in English Property Law? 
135 Before 1925 more types of freehold were available. See Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 167, 
Holdsworth 1927, p. 52. 
136 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 167. 
137 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 167. 
138 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 168-170. 
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estate must have control over the land. This control is there, even if the factual con-
trol is with someone else for the time being. In that respect the term ‘in possession’ 
refers to the control over the fee simple that allows the holder to receive payments 
of rent or profits.139 
The most extensive entitlement also refers to the fact that, under the rules of 
the common law, the holder of the estate is entitled to everything in, on or above the 
land according to the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos.140 
Any objects that are on the land as so-called fixtures belong to the holder of the fee 
simple. Moreover, any mines or minerals under his land are also his, except for 
silver and gold, coal and petroleum.141  
As a general starting point, a holder of a fee simple may take action against 
any interference with his right. However, that does not imply that the holder of a 
piece of land can sue those who fly over his land but do not interfere with his use of 
the land in trespass.142 The right can therefore not be held to actually extend from 
the heavens to the centre of the earth.143 However, when such an invasion of air-
space does interfere with the use of the land, the holder of the fee simple may claim 
an injunction to stop such interference.144 Generally, holder of a property right in the 
land may use an action in trespass to protect his right is another characteristic 
feature of English land law. Trespass is a tort and should be placed in the law of 
obligations and not property, it will therefore lead to a claim of damages. However, 
because the right-holder holds an entitlement to land, he may also ask for a specific 
order for possession. This specific claim is available to right-holders of land only. A 
successful order will return the possession of the land or allow the holder to 
continue his possession.145  
This specific recovery is a central characteristic of land law, making it distinct 
from personal property law where specific recovery is, in principle, impossible.146 
The specific recovery of possession as opposed to the recovery of the abstract legal 
title in the land is another feature of English law, which distinguishes it from the 
civil law tradition where a specific recovery in the form of vindication returns the 
object of ownership to the owner and not possession to the possessor.147 
 
139 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 170. 
140 ‘To whomsoever the land belongs, to him also belongs [the space] up to heaven and down to 
the deepest depths’. Translation taken from Swadling 2007, p. 235. See also Burn & 
Cartwright 2006, p. 173. Or ‘everything under the sky down to the centre of the earth’ Poutney 
v Clayton (1883) 11 QBD 820 at 838 per Bowen LJ. 
141 Swadling 2007, p. 235. Silver and Gold and petroleum belong to the Crown. Coal to the Coal 
Authority. 
142 Lord Bernstein v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479. 
143 See also the Privy Council in Commissioners for Railways v Valuer-General [1974] AC 328, 351. 
144 Anchor Brewhouse Developments Ltd v Berkley House (Docklands Development) Ltd [1987] 2 EGLR 
173. 
145 Swadling 2007, p. 228. 
146 Bridge 2002, p. 47. 
147 Only when possessor and owner are the same person, the results of the action will coincide. 
See Simpson 1986, p. 37-38, Swadling 2006a, p. 283. On revendication in civil law see Chapter 
2. The Development of Property Rights; Para. 2.3 Ownership. However, see e.g. Art. 5:2 in the 
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In a model situation the fee simple will be held by only one person. However, 
in reality there are numerous situations where people share entitlement to objects, 
for instance, marriage or partnership. Rather confusingly, in English law this co-
entitlement is known as co-ownership, although English law does not recognise 
ownership in the civil law sense of the word.148 In English law there are two types of 
co-ownership; joint tenancy and tenancy in common.149  
Joint tenancy is a situation in which two tenants hold rights together. In case of 
a co-ownership of a fee simple the result is that the two tenants together hold the fee 
simple.150 A joint tenancy is created when the fee simple is conveyed to more than 
one person.151 The connection between the co-owners is such that none of the 
tenants can be held to hold a share. Instead, they can only dispose of the fee simple 
by acting together. However, for a situation of joint tenancy to arise, more is needed 
than just two persons entitled to a right in the same piece of land. As described 
above, through the working of common law and equity, it is possible for multiple 
parties to have different rights in the same piece of land at the same time.152 In order 
for a joint tenancy to arise the so-called four unities must be present:153 
First, there must be unity of possession. This means that each tenant must be 
entitled to the full possession of the land concerned. In other words, one tenant 
must not be able to exclude the other tenant by bringing an action in trespass 
against him.154 Without this requirement, the tenants can never be held to share the 
whole of the fee simple among them. 
Secondly, there must be unity of interest. Because the tenants hold one right or 
interest between them, the content of that interest must be the same. This require-
ment excludes simultaneous interests with different content, such as a fee simple 
held on trust, from the rules on tenancy in common.155 
Thirdly, there must be unity of title, which usually refers to the document 
under which the tenants acquired the fee simple.156 This requirement ensures that 
the tenants became entitled to the fee simple under the same conditions. 
Fourthly, there must be unity of time. English law allows the possibility to 
divide an interest or right in time. For example, A can grant a lease to B and, after 
B’s death to the heirs of C. Under English law, the right of C is also a property right 
known as the remainder.157 These interests that are created are called concurrent, as 
 
Dutch Civil Code that allows the owner to vindicate his right of ownership by claiming 
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148 See above; 1.1. Terminology. 
149 Swadling 2007, p. 342, Lawson & Rudden 2002, p. 92-93. 
150 See Hammersmith & Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478, 492, HL per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
151 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 453. 
152 See above; 1.5. Trust Law. 
153 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 454-455, Swadling 2007, p. 343-344. 
154 Martyn v Knowllys (1799) 8 Term Rep 145, 101 ER 1313, Wilkinson v Haygarth (1847) 12 QB 837, 
116 ER 1090. See Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 454, Swadling 2006a, p. 284-285. 
155 Swadling 2007, p. 343-344. 
156 Swadling 2007, p. 344. 
157 Swadling 2007, p. 344. 
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they do not give a right to possession at the same time. A joint tenancy can only 
exist if the interest that is shared is held at the same time.  
The interest of a single tenant cannot be identified as the tenants hold the 
whole of the property right together. Therefore, when one of the tenants dies, the 
interest cannot pass on to his heirs and therefore ceases to exist. The interest of the 
remaining tenants will remain until there is only one left. The last surviving tenant 
will hold the property right, in this case the fee simple, outright once more.158 This 
last rule is known as the right of survivorship or ius accrescendi.159 
Whether a joint tenancy comes into existence depends on the wording with 
which it was created. If a fee simple is conveyed to A and B, a joint tenancy will 
result.160 However, when words of qualification, such as restriction, exclusion, or 
another explanatory statement, are added, the result might also be a tenancy in 
common. 
Tenancy in common is the second type of co-ownership in English law. In a 
tenancy in common, each of the tenants holds a share that can be identified. The 
share itself is indivisible, but it can be conveyed or left by will to other persons.161 
Because of this possibility to pass the interest on by will, there is no survivorship 
rule here. Also, the requirements of unity apply in a different way. First, there must 
be unity of possession, as without that no common interest can exist. Secondly, the 
interest of the tenants must also coincide in time in order to exclude a situation 
where a remainder has been assigned.162  
Traditionally, common law has favoured joint tenancy, because this would 
eventually lead to a property right held outright in relation to the feudal incidents 
that had to be paid.163 A tenancy in common could, theoretically last as long as the 
property right in respect of which it was created and was therefore considered less 
desirable. Equity, however, has shown a preference for tenancy in common because 
of the sometimes undesirable results of the rule of survivorship.164 It is therefore 
possible that in equity a different situation of co-ownership arises than is the case at 
common law. 
In cases where land is acquired and the purchase money is provided in un-
equal shares common law would, unless otherwise provided, assume a joint tenan-
cy. However, in equity a tenancy in common is the result, unless parties particularly 
provide otherwise, as was the case in Goodman v Gallant.165 In this case the parties 
explicitly provided that a conveyance had been made as ‘joint tenants at law and 
equity’.166 Another situation where equity has deviated from common law is where 
two or more persons holding shares, irrespective of whether these shares are equal, 
 
158 Swadling 2007, p. 343. 
159 Swadling 2007, p. 343, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 455. 
160 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 453, Swadling 2007, p. 345. 
161 Swadling 2007, p. 344. 
162 Swadling 2007, p. 344. 
163 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 41-42, 455. 
164 R v Williams (1735) Bunb 342, 145 ER 694, see Swadling 2007, p. 345-346. 
165 Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam 106, CA. 
166 See Swadling 2007, p. 346, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 456. 
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advance money on mortgage. These creditors will, at law, hold the interest they 
receive as joint tenants, but in equity as tenants in common. Finally, also in case of 
partnerships, equity prevents the rule of survivorship from operating so that the 
surviving partner does not receive the part that belonged to the deceased partner 
and, instead, this share can pass on to the heirs of the deceased.167  
Finally, apart from holding a fee simple outright, on trust or as a co-owner, the 
Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, which entered into force on 27 
September 2004, created a fourth way: commonhold.168 The commonhold allows 
private parties to have a freehold estate in a separate space that could, without that, 
not be held in fee simple alone. This in particular applies to a part of a building that, 
under the rules of common law, could only be held in fee simple in full. Holding a 
fee simple on commonhold provides a means of apartment ownership, although it 
can be used for other purposes than apartments as well.169  
Before the introduction of commonhold, tenure of apartments was managed 
through the use of leases. However, although in English law a lease in land is a 
property right, its existence is limited in time.170 Many leases granted for 99 years in 
the 1930s are now approaching their end, making it increasingly difficult to obtain 
finance on the purchase of such a lease.171 A commonhold therefore allows a free-
hold estate in a certain piece of land under certain conditions. In this respect Section 
1 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 states: 
‘(1) Land is commonhold land if— 
(a) the freehold estate in the land is registered as a freehold estate in commonhold 
land, 
(b) the land is specified in the memorandum of association of a commonhold asso-
ciation as the land in relation to which the association is to exercise functions, 
and 
(c) a commonhold community statement makes provision for rights and duties of 
the commonhold association and unit-holders (whether or not the statement 
has come into force). 
(2) In this Part a reference to a commonhold is a reference to land in relation to which a 
commonhold association exercises functions. 
… 
(4) Sections 7 and 9 make provision for the vesting in the commonhold association of 
the fee simple in possession in the common parts of a commonhold’. 
For the creation of commonhold land three requirements must be fulfilled. First and 
foremost, the land must be registered as a freehold estate held in commonhold. 
After the registration, the common parts of a building are held by an association, 
and the parts of a building that are to be used privately are held by so-called unit-
 
167 Hamond v Jethro (1611) 2 Brownl & Golds, 97, 99, 123 ER 836, 839. See Burn & Cartwright 2006, 
p. 457, Swadling 2007, p. 346. 
168 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 183, Swadling 2007, p. 244. 
169 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p 183-184. 
170 On lease of land see below; 2.2. Lease of Land. 
171 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 184. 
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holders, who hold a fee simple on their exclusive part.172 Consequently, the unit-
holders are also registered as holders of a fee simple in their respective unit.173 
The second requirement is the mandatory creation of a commonhold associa-
tion. This association is a private limited company under English law, capable of 
holding the freehold estate in commonhold.174 The unit-holders are members of the 
association for the duration of their entitlement to the fee simple in their unit. When 
the fee simple is conveyed to another person, this other person replaces the old unit-
holder as a member.175 The purpose of the commonhold association is to manage 
the commonhold scheme, including maintenance and repairs of the common parts. 
Furthermore, the association will also function as holder of the fee simple in the 
total land when the commonhold comes to an end.176 When the commonhold ends, 
the unit-holders no longer have a fee simple in their unit. Instead, they will have a 
share in equity, they are equitable tenants in common, proportional to their contri-
bution or according to a previously arranged division. The fee simple in the land 
will be held on trust for the former unit-holders.177 
Thirdly, a commonhold community statement must make provisions for the 
distribution of rights and duties between the commonhold association and the unit-
holders. These rights and duties include payment of fees, maintenance duties, but 
also duties to refrain from causing nuisance or to refrain from any specified behav-
iour.178 Provisions contained in this community statement, also covenants, will bind 
the unit-holders and their successors.179 
The unit-holders therefore have a fee simple that approaches a normal fee 
simple in land as much as possible. Their interest can be leased, transferred and 
even charged in order to obtain finance.180 However, the existence of the fee simple 
will remain, and this is different from a normal fee simple in land, connected to the 
existence of the commonhold. 
2.2. Lease of Land 
Leases of land or leasehold interests or term of years absolute began life as personal 
rights.181 Unlike the holder of a freehold estate, a lessee of land was awarded posses-
sion, but not seisin, which refers to actual control of the land.182 It is most likely 
because of this that an evicted or dispossessed lessee was not given access to the 
 
172 S. 9 Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 (CLRA 2002). 
173 S. 7 CLRA 2002 states that registration of the fee simple of the unit-holders can also occur at a 
later moment. See also Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 186. 
174 S. 34, Sch 3, CLRA 2002. 
175 Sch 174 3, CLRA 2002. 
176 S. 49 (3) CLRA 2002. 
177 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 184. 
178 See S. 31 CLRA 2002. 
179 Such obligations can be enforced in court. See S. 37 CLRA 2002. 
180 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 187-188. 
181 Simpson 1986, p. 71-74, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 36. 
182 On the concept of seisin see above; 1.1. Terminology. 
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real action protecting freeholders.183 In practice, leases developed and were used to 
circumvent the medieval rules against usury. These rules prohibited a creditor from 
lending money with interest.184 Instead a person who needed money would grant a 
lease to a creditor who would enjoy the profits the land produced as interest for a 
loan.185  
A lease of land was therefore used to circumvent some of the strict real proper-
ty law rules. However, in doing so, parties could only create a strictly personal rela-
tionship. The lessee, in early law also known as termor, would be in a weak 
position. Around the twelfth century a writ was introduced that allowed the termor 
a remedy against the holder of the fee simple by which land could be recovered.186 
However, when a third party interfered the termor remained dependent on the 
holder of the fee simple to use his real action.187 Around 1235 a new writ, quare ejecit 
infra terminum, gave the termor a remedy against third parties who ejected him from 
the land after a sale made by the lessor.188 However, soon a writ, ejectione firmae, 
which created a form of tort of trespass, allowed the termor a remedy against any 
ejector.189 However, this remedy was only in damages, not in specific performance. 
It was not until the fifteenth century that this changed and the lessee could recover 
possession of the land in ejectione firmae.190 The availability of this remedy changed 
the legal nature of the lease from a personal to a property right. However, these 
developments were too late to fit the lease into the feudal system and for it to be 
recognised as a legal estate.191 Already before the fifteenth century, the legal nature 
of the lease of land had been considered. Leases were commonly made to a person 
and his heirs to ensure that the lease would not come to an end upon the death of 
the lessee. Instead the heirs, when this wording was used to create the lease, con-
tinued to enjoy it until the term of years ended.  
Furthermore, a lease, as it did not fit in the feudal system, was subject to 
different rules than those regulating the feudal estates. In particular the right of the 
lessee to leave his interest by will to a third party, which was at that time not 
allowed at common law at all, became recognised by the ecclesiastical courts. How-
ever, the lease never became a feudal estate. Instead it was considered as something 
connected to the feudal system, but not part of it. Pollock and Maitland look at the 
way leases were used, in particular to avoid the common law rules on usury, and 
 
183 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 36, Swadling 2000a, p. 232-233, Pollock & Maitland 1898b, p. 110-
111. Simpson offers another possibility: the writ giving access to relevant real action required 
the affected person to have had seisin of a free tenement. Simpson considers the possibility 
that a leasehold was not considered a free tenement. See Simpson 1986, p. 71-74. On this see 
Pollock & Maitland 1898b, p. 113. 
184 Swadling 2000a, p. 233, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 37. 
185 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 37. 
186 Although the remedy was contractual, it did, rather exceptionally, allow specific performance 
of the contract. 
187 Simpson 1986, p. 74. 
188 Simpson 1986, p. 73-75, Holdsworth 1927, p. 71-73. 
189 Simpson 1986, p. 73-74, Pollock & Maitland 1898b, p. 108-109. 
190 Simpson 1986, p. 74-75. 
191 Swadling 2000a, p. 233. 
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consider that the lease was actually a financial investment in land, and they 
therefore consider it situated between land law and personal property law and give 
a lease its classification as a chattel real.192  
A lease is considered personal property with land law characteristics and it 
was this qualification with which the lease ended up in the Law of Property Act 
1925. In that Act it became recognised as one of the possible estates at common 
law.193 However, technically a lease remains a chattel real.194 Moreover, the lease 
also remains partly contractual in nature. It is an agreement between a lessor and a 
lessee that gives rise to its creation, and that continues to set the terms for the 
relation between these parties.195 Depending on whether the lease is created at 
common law or is created in equity, which remains a possibility because equity 
follows the law, these contractual elements will be stronger or less strong.196  
A lease or leasehold interest is a property right entitling a person to exclusive 
possession of land for a limited period of time that can be determined.197 However, 
not every agreement to grant a person possession of a piece of land will constitute a 
lease. It is possible to give a person a personal right, a licence, to have access to the 
land of the holder of the fee simple. The distinctions between leases and licences are 
in particular relevant for the application of the so-called Rent Acts, in particular the 
Rent Act 1977, which only apply to leases.198  
Finding the distinction between leases and licences centres around the ques-
tion of whether there is exclusive possession or not. In the nineteenth century, the 
courts used a rigid test that when an agreement gave a person exclusive possession, 
that person would be tenant. If it did not, the agreement would be a licence.199 In the 
course of the twentieth century this test shifted to a flexible and subjective inter-
pretation of the intention of the parties.200 However, in Street v Mountford the House 
of Lords rejected this flexible test and held that the subjective intentions of the 
parties as such are irrelevant and that the distinction between a lease and a licence 
centres on the intention to grant exclusive possession.201  
Whether such exclusive possession is granted remains a subject of interpreta-
tion. In Street v Mountford, a Mrs Mountford was given exclusive possession of fur-
nished rooms in exchange for the payment of a sum of £ 37 a week. She had 
 
192 Pollock & Maitland 1898b, p. 116-117. See also above; 1.1. Terminology. 
193 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 193-194, Swadling 2006a, p. 233. 
194 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 192-193, Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 8-9, Bridge 2002, p. 3. 
195 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Development Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 at 108 per Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson, Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Body and Others [1992] 2 
AC 386, see also Bruton v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2000] 1 AC 406 at 415 per Lord 
Hoffmann. 
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without notice. 
197 Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809, HL at 818 per Lord Templeman. 
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199 Lynes v Snaith [1899] 1 QB 486, Glenwood Limber Co Ltd v Phillips [1904] AC 405. See Burn & 
Cartwright 2006, p. 198, Swadling 2007, p. 236-239. 
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WLR 374, CA, Marchant v Charters [1977] 1 WLR 1181, CA. 
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accepted and signed a statement that the agreement did not and was ‘not intended 
to give me a tenancy protected under the Rent Acts’. Subsequently, Mrs. Mountford 
attempted to invoke application of the Rent Acts in order to have a fair rent regis-
tered. The Court of Appeal, following the flexible test, concluded this agreement 
could not constitute a lease.202 The House of Lords overturned this judgment and 
discussed the relevant requirements for a lease. 
On the subject of exclusive possession Lord Templeman stated that if an agree-
ment grants exclusive possession to a person, that person is allowed to exclude 
others, including the landlord. When a landlord enters the premises upon specific 
terms made in the agreement, for instance, for maintenance or repair works, this 
only emphasises the fact that exclusive possession has been granted.203 In fact, in 
this case, the fact that Mrs Mountford had exclusive possession was not further 
debated. 
However, in other cases, landlords have attempted to avoid granting exclusive 
possession in order to avoid the application of the Rent Acts by granting a licence to 
occupy, and not a lease. Not granting exclusive possession can be achieved by 
granting permission to use rooms in a house, but not of a certain room or rooms.204 
The case of Westminster City Council v Clarke concerned a special house for single 
men, including those with personality disorders and physical disabilities.205 The 
defendant lived in the house, paid a weekly accommodation charge and had agreed 
that he could be moved to another room from time to time, or could be required to 
share a room with others. The House of Lords, again by way of a judgment of Lord 
Templeman, agreed with the claimant that in this particular case a licence had been 
granted.206 However, when no special circumstances arise, it is very difficult not to 
grant exclusive possession of a space granted to someone to live in.207 
Another difficulty with the requirement of exclusivity arises in case of mul-
tiple or joint occupations. When a couple lives in a certain space, it is difficult to 
prove that each of them has been granted exclusive possession, unless exclusive 
possession is considered to have been granted to both of them together at the same 
time. In other words, a lease in such a situation can only be accepted if it is co-
owned.208 The House of Lords, in two cases heard simultaneously, discussed these 
issues.209 
In AG Securities v Vaughan and others, a four-bedroom flat was occupied by 
four persons at a time, each entering into a separate agreement of licence with the 
landlord, a company holding an interest in the building in which the flat was 
situated. The agreements were almost identical, giving exclusive use of a bedroom 
and common use of common facilities such as a kitchen and bathroom. The defen-
 
202 Street v Mountford (1984) 271 EG 1261. 
203 Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809, HL at 818 per Lord Templeman. 
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205 See Swadling 2007, p. 238-239. 
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207 Swadling 2007, p. 239, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 199-200. 
208 See Swadling 2007, p. 239-240. 
209 AG Securities v Vaughan and Others and Antoniades v Villiers and Another [1990] 1 AC 417, HL. 
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dants tried to argue they were joined tenants and therefore fell under the ruling of 
Street v Mountford. The House of Lords, under careful consideration of whether this 
arrangement was not just intended to avoid application of the Rent Acts, dis-
agreed.210  
However, in Antoniades v Villiers and another, a couple entered into two sepa-
rate agreements of licence with the holder of the fee simple of a house. The couple 
expressed preference for a double bed, which was provided by Mr Antoniades, the 
licensor. The agreement further provided that the licensor did not intend to grant 
exclusive possession of any of the rooms. However, the House of Lords, Lord 
Templeman in particular, argued that in this case the licence agreements were inter-
dependent and that therefore the couple could be considered as joint occupiers.211 
Under the judgment of Street v Mountford, the couple was held to be joint tenants of 
the lease.212 
The second requirement for a lease concerns the certainty of term. The 
requirement of a term of years absolute has no limit in how long it might be, as long 
as there is a definite end.213 The requirement to define the end of the lease with 
certainty has given rise to a series of cases. For example, in Lace v Chantler, a lease 
for the ‘duration of the war’ was held void by the Court of Appeal, and in Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Body, a lease of a strip of land until that land 
was required by the council ‘for the purposes of widening the road’ was held void 
by the House of Lords.214 This reasoning also applies for periodic tenancies, which 
are renewed each week or each year. The certainty in those cases is offered by the 
possibility for each of the parties to determine the lease at the end of the year.215 
The reasoning of the courts in these cases has been that the time at which the 
specified event would take place was uncertain and therefore could not, under a 
rule more than 500 years old, constitute a lease. However, the result of the strict 
application of this rule is not always as fair. Swadling points out that had the lease 
been made ‘to X for the duration of the war or until the land is needed for road-
widening purposes’ it would have been allowed.216 Lord Browne-Wilkinson in his 
judgment in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Body therefore appeals to 
the Law Commission for England and Wales to review this rule and consider its 
abolition.217 The Law Commission has, however, not responded.218 
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A possible third requirement for a lease to arise is a matter for debate. In Street 
v Mountford, Lord Templeman held that a tenancy requires a premium or periodical 
payment.219 However, in Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold, although overruled by the House 
of Lords in Street v Mountford on the ground of uncertainty of term, the Court of 
Appeal held that there was no rule requiring rent to be paid for a lease.220 Leading 
opinion seems to maintain this rule and usually considers the agreement to pay rent 
as a covenant to the lease.221 
When a lease is created, the holder of the fee simple, who will usually be the 
lessor, will not be entitled to use and enjoy the land because he has granted exclu-
sive possession to someone else.222 However, the certainty of term allows the lessor 
to re-enter the land and reclaim exclusive possession at the end of the lease. Such a 
right to a return of possession of the land can also arise when a certain condition, 
under which the lease was made, has been fulfilled.223 This right, under English law, 
has been given a property qualification called reversion. The holder of the fee 
simple can even grant this reversion itself to another person. In that situation that 
other person receives a future interest known as a remainder.224 For example, A, 
holder of a fee simple, grants a lease to B for 30 years, remainder to C. 
Finally, the content of a lease determines the rights and duties of the lessor and 
lessee.225 When no arrangements have been made between the parties, a standard 
set of implied rights and obligations apply. These include the obligation of the land-
lord to ensure that the lessee can enjoy the premises, that these premises are fit for 
habitation, and that a reasonable rent is paid.226 
However, in most situations landlord and tenant will have made explicit 
agreements on the enjoyment of the lease.227 Such agreements are known as cove-
nants and can be both positive and negative in nature. Generally speaking, these 
covenants concern the payment of the rent, of rates, and of insurance premiums, as 
well as agreements on the enjoyment of the premises, and the division of costs and 
duties for maintenance and repair works.228 As already mentioned, in certain cir-
cumstances, legislation has interfered with the common law to introduce rules for 
lessee protection. These interferences comprise the Rent Acts, which interfere in the 
amount of rent to be paid, but also the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988, which forces 
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duties on landlords in respect to applications for consent to an assignment and sub-
leasing of the lease.229 
These covenants, because they are agreements, apply between the landlord 
and the tenant. On the application of the doctrine of privity of contract, the doctrine 
that only the parties to the contract can be bound by the terms of the contract, they 
cannot be enforced against third parties. When, for example, a lessor conveys his 
right to another person, the agreement between lessor and lessee does not automat-
ically transfer. The same applies for the situation when the lessee assigns his right to 
another person. That conclusion therefore raises the question of whether a lease is 
really a property right. In this respect Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated in Linden 
Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd:  
‘A lease is a hybrid, part contract, part property’.230 
Already in the early common law, covenants made through a lease agreement were 
not considered purely contractual.231 Instead, there was an understanding that the 
agreements made through a lease were part of the estate. It is especially because of 
this last argument, that leases in English law, in contrast with leases in civil law, are 
considered property rights. 
Before the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, which resulted in major 
reforms in this area of English land law, a covenant could transfer to a new party to 
the lease when it touched and concerned the land or, under the terminology as 
reformed by the Law of Property Act 1925, had reference to the subject-matter of the 
lease.232 In short, the covenant had to concern the lease itself, the use of land, and 
not the lessor or lessee personally.  
When a covenant was part of a lease agreement and the agreement was fol-
lowed by a grant of a term of years, not only privity of contract applied between the 
parties to the lease agreement, but there was also privity of estate between the 
holders of those legal estates created by the lease.233 It is the concept of estate, as was 
dealt with above, which made it possible to assign the right to another person. The 
landlord could therefore transfer his estate, in this case the reversion, to another 
person, who, under the doctrine of privity of estate, became bound by the lease. The 
same would apply for the lessee who assigned his term of years to another person. 
A covenant which touched and concerned the land would transfer with the estate to 
the assignee. However, liability could and would usually remain with the original 
landlord and tenant.234 
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Those negative effects were remedied by the Landlord and Tenant (Cove-
nants) Act 1995, which came into force on 1 January 1996.235 The objective of the Act 
was to avoid a landlord or tenant from enjoying rights or being under any obliga-
tion arising from the lease after it has been assigned to another party.236 The depar-
ture from the old regime is that all covenants, except those which are personal, are 
binding upon the successors in title of both the landlord and the tenant and no 
contractual liability remains for the original parties.237 A covenant is personal when 
it is not intended to bind successors in title.238 
The effects of the new Act are such that a new set of terminology is introduced 
to enable differentiation between leases under the old regime and so-called new 
tenancies, which fall under the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995.239 
Furthermore, covenants are now divided into landlord covenants and tenant 
covenants.240  
With the introduction of the new Act, the requirement of touching and con-
cerning has been removed. The Act ensures that all covenants, save personal cove-
nants, automatically transfer with the assignment of a lease. Therefore the new 
lessor and lessee will, in principle, become bound by the terms of the lease agree-
ment. However, when the lease is not transferred itself, but a sub-lease is created, 
the Act does not apply. In such a situation the assignor continues to hold a legal 
estate and the Act does not operate. In other words, there is no privity of estate 
effect in the case of a sub-lease. 
The interference in contract law by the Landlord and Tenant Act 1995 is 
severe. Unless parties decide on and formulate their covenants in such a way that 
they are strictly personal and do not bind their successors in title, the covenants will 
transfer with the lease when it is assigned in full to another party. In order to ensure 
the application of the Act, Section 25 prohibits parties from contractually deviating 
from these rules.  
With the Landlord and Tenant Act 1995, leasehold estates have therefore 
become strengthened in their status as property rights. The new rules now provide 
for third-party effect, not only of the lease itself, but also of the majority of the 
contractual provisions agreed to by landlord and tenant. 
Leases mostly exist at common law, but equitable leases are also recognised. A 
lease can arise in equity when parties agree to create a lease but not all the formali-
ties have been fulfilled. In such a case, as will happen in the case of estate contracts, 
where a right in equity comes into existence in anticipation of a right at common 
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law, as will be discussed below, the lease will already come into existence, equity 
anticipating the common law.241 
2.3. Easement 
Apart from estates or interests that grant the holder possession, English law also 
recognises other property rights that grant rights to the holder on the land of an-
other. Burn and Cartwright name these rights in alieno solo.242 In the Roman tradition 
these rights would be known as iura in re aliena.243 Of this category of rights, the 
right of easement is the most important. Easements exist both at common law and 
in equity.244 
An easement is a right attached to one particular piece of land that allows the 
holder of the right in that piece of land to use the land of another or, to a certain 
extent, restrict its use by that other.245 An easement therefore, can be both positive 
and negative. In contrast with the civil law systems, the law on easements is looked 
at from the side of the party benefiting from the right instead of the party that is 
under the burden of the right.246 Although, in particular in this respect, the term 
servitude is sometimes used, English law prefers the term easement.247 In order for 
an easement to arise several requirements must be met:248 
First, there must be two pieces of land. The land on which the easement runs is 
known as the servient tenement and the land that benefits from the existence of the 
easement is known as dominant tenement.249 This requirement ensures that there 
are no easements in gross, which is an easement without a benefiting tenement.250 
Second, the easement must accommodate the dominant tenement. This 
requirement adds to the previous requirement that not only a dominant tenement 
must exist, but that there must also be a benefit to this tenement.251 The reasoning 
behind this requirement is that the use of the land benefits from the existence of the 
tenement, and it is not the holder of the land himself who benefits.252 When such 
benefit for the land does not exist, no easement can come into existence.253 The 
fulfilment of the criterion that the land benefits from the existence of an easement 
will differ from case to case.  
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In Re Ellenborough Park, Lord Evershed MR considered whether a right to stroll 
around a common park, built to serve a group of houses that had no gardens them-
selves but instead were to use the common park, could constitute an easement.254 
Normally, a right to stroll around a garden would not automatically constitute a 
benefit to the dominant tenements, but as in this case the houses on the dominant 
tenements had no gardens, and the park was specifically constructed to allow the 
holders of the dominant tenements enjoyment of the park, in this specific case a 
benefit and therefore also an easement could be recognised.255 The line between 
benefiting the dominant tenement and benefiting the holder of the dominant tene-
ment is sometimes difficult to establish. In Moody v Steggles a right to have a sign to 
indicate that a business was held on the dominant tenement was held to constitute 
an easement.256 However, in Hill v Tupper an exclusive right to put pleasure boats on 
a canal was held to benefit a business and not the dominant land.257 The difference 
between these cases is explained through the relevance of the easement for the 
business. In Moody v Steggles the easement supported the business, whereas the 
easement in Hill v Tupper was the subject matter of the business. Furthermore, the 
right of easement in Hill v Tupper merely prevented others from doing something, 
whereas the right of easement in Moody v Steggles allowed the business to do 
something.258 
Third, there must be both a holder of the dominant tenement and a holder of 
the servient tenement. This requirement prevents an easement from coming into 
existence when both dominant and servient land are held by the same person. 
When two pieces of land are held by the same person and the holder makes use of 
one piece of land to reach the other, he is merely using his own land, not exercising 
an easement.259  
Fourth, the easement must be capable of forming the subject matter of a 
grant.260 This requirement introduces some certainties for the creation of easements. 
A right of easement must be granted by a capable grantor to a capable grantee and 
must contain a clear description of the grant.261 In particular the last requirement, 
the certainty of description, limits the possible easements. A right of easement to 
allow light on the dominant tenement will usually not be allowed, whereas an ease-
ment to allow light through a certain window usually will.262 A right to stroll in the 
park, known as a jus spatiandi, would normally not constitute an easement. How-
 
254 Re Ellenborough Park. Re Davies (deceased). Powell and Others v Maddison and Another [1956] Ch 
131, CA, at 175 per Lord Evershed MR. 
255 See Swadling 2007, p. 252, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 588. 
256 Moody v Steggles (1879) 12 Ch D 261, see Swadling 2007, p. 252-253. 
257 Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121, 159 ER 51. 
258 Swadling 2007, p. 252-253, 255, Re Ellenborough Park. Re Davies (deceased). Powell and Others v 
Maddison and Another [1956] Ch 131, CA, at 175 per Lord Evershed MR. 
259 Bolton v Bolton (1879) 11 Ch D 968. 
260 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 599, Swadling 2007, p. 254-255. 
261 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 591-592. 
262 Harris v De Pinna (1886) 33 Ch D 238, Hunter v Chanary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655, HL, at 709 per 
Lord Hoffmann, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 591. 
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ever, when the jus spatiandi was granted specially to accommodate a certain group 
of houses it can be allowed.263 
When a right fulfils these four requirements it can be an easement. The list of 
easements is therefore not limited to existing easements.264 New easements can be 
recognised, but depending on their nature with more or less scrutiny. When an 
easement forces the holder of the servient tenement to spend money or allow the 
holder of the dominant tenement full or joint use of the land it will most likely not 
be recognised.265 Furthermore, what are known in English law as negative 
easements will not easily be recognised. Negative easements, known in civil law 
systems as positive easements, are easements that give the holder of the dominant 
tenement the right to prevent the holder of the servient land from doing something 
on his own land. Examples include easements of light or of support. 
A right of easement that has validly been created will run with the dominant 
land and continue to bind the servient land.266 When the holder of the dominant 
tenement conveys his estate to another person, the benefit of the easement will 
transfer with the land.267 When the holder of the servient land conveys his estate, 
the burden of the easement will also transfer to the new holder of the estate.268  
However, when an easement exists in equity, the burden will not transfer to 
the new holder of the servient land. In some cases an equitable easement can be 
registered under the Land Charges Act 1972, which will make it capable of binding 
successive holders of the servient land.269 When no such registration has or could be 
made, the equitable easement will not bind a purchaser without notice of its 
existence.270 
2.4. Profit à Prendre 
A profit à prendre is very similar to a right of easement, but allows the holder to 
take something from the burdened land.271 The holder of a profit à prendre may 
therefore enter the burdened land and take something that the land produces from 
 
263 Re Ellenborough Park. Re Davies (deceased). Powell and Others v Maddison and Another [1956] Ch 
131, CA. 
264 Dyce v Lady Hay (1852) (1 Macq 305), per Lord St. Leonards LC, who states ‘the category of 
servitudes and easements must alter and expand with the changes that take place in the 
circumstances of mankind’. See also Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 595. 
265 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 595-596. 
266 See Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 631 et seq. 
267 S. 62 Law of Property Act 1925, S. 11(2) and 12(3) Land Registration Act 2002. 
268 However, in case of registered land the Land Registration Act 2002 imposes some restrictions. 
These include situations in which the land was registered but the easement not and the 
holder of the servient land could not have known about the existence of the easement, see 
Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 633-634. 
269 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 634-635. 
270 S. 199 (1)(ii) Law of Property Act 1925. 
271 Swadling 2007, p. 255-256, Burn & Cartwright 2006, 640 et seq. 
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that land.272 Like rights of easement, profits can exist both at common law and in 
equity.273 Four types of profits are recognised:  
(1) The profit appurtenant is a right that exists for the benefit of an estate in land. 
It therefore very closely resembles a right of easement, but differs in nature 
because it allows the holder to do something on the burdened land.274 
(2) A profit appendant is a right that was created when a feudal lord granted a 
freehold estate to a tenant.275 When such a grant was given, the common law 
automatically assumed a right to pasture on the land, including the right to 
have cattle on the land, as was necessary to plough and work the land.276 
Different from the profit appurtenant, which requires a grant, the profit ap-
pendant came into existence upon the grant of the feudal estate. By the statute 
Quia Emptores, these profits have been abandoned, but they can still exist 
today if they were granted before 1290.277 
(3) A profit in gross is a profit that allows a certain person, or a group of persons, 
to have a profit in land without holding a tenement themselves. Different from 
a right of easement, a profit can therefore exist without a dominant tene-
ment.278  
(4) Finally, a profit pur cause de vicinage is a profit that allows cattle from one piece 
of land to stray and graze upon another piece of land without being treated as 
trespassers.279 
Profits can be held in two ways. They can give the holder a right to the exclusion of 
everybody else, or they can give the holder a right to enjoy the right in common 
with the holder of the servient tenement.280 In particular the second category, 
known as rights of common or commons, is relevant today. Examples are rights of 
pasture, allowing the holder of the profit to have his cattle graze on the land of 
another, rights of piscary, allowing the holder of the profit to catch fish in inland 
waters, or rights to take resources such as turf or wood from the land of another.281 
As in the case of rights of easement, when the profit exists at common law it is 
capable of binding acquirers of the servient land. When the right exists in equity, 
unless a registration under the Land Charges Act 1972 is possible, it will not bind a 
purchaser without notice.282 The benefit of a profit appurtenant to land will transfer 
to a new holder of an estate in the land in the same way as a right of easement 
 
272 Duke of Sutherland v Heathcote [1892] 1 Ch 475, 484. 
273 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 648-649. 
274 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 641. 
275 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 641. 
276 Holdsworth 1942, p. 147 et seq., Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 641. 
277 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 641. 
278 Wickam v Hawker (1840) 7 M & W 63, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 641. 
279 Tyrringhamm’s Case (1584) 4 Co Rep 36b, [1558-1774] All ER Rep. 646. Newman v Bennett [1981] 
QB 726. See Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 641-642. 
280 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 642-643. 
281 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 643-645. 
282 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 651. 
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does.283 Profits that are not connected to a piece of land, profits in gross, can be 
assigned or left by will to other parties.284  
2.5. Restrictive Covenant 
In 1808, Tulk sold and conveyed a piece of land, now known as Leicester Square in 
London, to Elms. The parties agreed in a covenant to ‘maintain the land as a garden 
and pleasure ground in an open state uncovered with any buildings and to allow 
residents, on payment of a reasonable rent, to use the gardens’.285 Elms conveyed his 
land on to several parties until the right in the land ended up with the defendant, 
Moxhay, who, whilst knowing about the covenant, made plans to build on the land. 
Tulk, who still held several pieces of land, sought an injunction, which is an equit-
able remedy, against Moxhay to prevent him from building.286 
Moxhay tried to rely on an earlier judgment, Keppel v Bailey, in which the court 
had held that an agreement that limestone for an ironworks would be bought 
exclusively from a particular quarry, not only by the previous holder of the iron-
works, but also by his successors in title, could not constitute a property right.287 
Lord Brougham LC had emphasised that this was not a property right and that 
parties themselves could not create new property rights as they liked.288  
However, in Tulk v Moxhay Lord Cottenham LC held that it could not be 
justified that the defendant acted in breach of the agreement. If Moxhay paid a pur-
chase price for the land with an equity, in this case the covenant, on it, and would 
be able to sell it the next day without, he would make a considerable profit and this 
could not be allowed. Lord Cottenham LC held that this was therefore not a 
question of whether the covenant ran with the land, as would be the case with a 
right of easement and a profit à prendre, or covenants in case of a lease, but a 
question of whether a purchaser should be allowed to use the land in a manner 
inconsistent with the contract entered into by his seller, while knowing about that 
contract.289  
In doing so, the Lord Chancellor’s Court created a new property right, which 
can only exist in equity, termed a restrictive covenant. An agreement made between 
parties that restricts the holder of an estate in land will acquire third-party effect 
and becomes a property right in equity. However, under the broadly formulated 
rules of Tulk v Moxhay, almost all personal agreements with the holder of a right in 
land would have become property rights.290 
 
283 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 651. On rights of easement see above; 2.3. Easement. 
284 Goodman v Saltash Corpn (1882) 7 App Cas 633, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 641. 
285 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774. 
286 See Swadling 2007, p. 256-257. 
287 Keppel v Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517, 39 ER 1042. On this case see below; 4. A Numerus Clausus 
in English Property Law? 
288 Keppel v Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517, 39 ER 1042, at 535-536 or 1049 per Lord Brougham LC. 
289 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774, at 778 per Lord Cottenham LC, Burn & Cartwright 2006,  
p. 666-668, Swadling 2007, p. 256-257. 
290 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 668-670, Swadling 2007, p. 257. 
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In Haywood v Brunswick Permanent Building Society, the Court of Appeal con-
sidered the scope of the ruling in Tulk v Moxhay.291 In that case, one Charles Jackson 
conveyed a fee simple to an Edward Jackson with a promise that the latter would 
keep the buildings on the land in repair. Brett LJ considered the positive nature of 
the duty this covenant imposed and held that the covenant to repair is not restric-
tive and therefore could not be enforced against the land.292 This reasoning by anal-
ogy to rights of easement therefore restricted the content of restrictive covenants to 
negative covenants.293  
The Court of Appeal introduced another restriction to the ruling of Tulk v 
Moxhay in 1914 in London County Council v Allen.294 In this case, a holder of a certain 
estate applied to London County Council for permission to build a new street on 
the land. London County Council granted permission on the condition that this 
holder entered into a covenant agreeing that that piece of land would not be built 
on, by the holder or by his successors in title. The holder of the land conveyed his 
right to the defendant in this case, who knew about the covenant, but proceeded to 
build on the land. The London County Council argued that under the rules of Tulk v 
Moxhay the defendant was bound by the covenant. Buckley LJ held that London 
County Council had no land that could benefit from the existence of the covenant 
and that therefore a restrictive covenant could not exist.295 Through this judgment 
another analogy with rights of easement had been made. Not only does a restrictive 
covenant require a dominant tenement to exist, there must also be some benefit to 
this dominant tenement in order for the property right to exist.296 In order for the 
benefit to bind third parties, it must therefore touch and concern the land.297 Finally, 
it must be the intention of the parties that the burden of the covenant runs with the 
servient tenement.298 With the introduction of the Law of Property Act 1925, this 
intention is supplied by statute.299 
The rules on the binding effect of restrictive covenants in respect to later 
acquirers, although limited by case law, were further dealt with in the 1925 property 
law reforms. Restrictive covenants created before 1926 bind all persons who acquire 
the land on which the covenant runs, except bona fide purchasers for value of the 
legal estate without notice.300 Covenants entered into after 1925 are void against a 
purchaser for value of the legal estate in the land on which the covenant runs.301 In 
 
291 Haywood v Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Society (1881) 8 QBD 403, Burn & Cartwright 
2006, p. 668-669. 
292 Haywood v Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Society (1881) 8 QBD 403, per Brett LJ. 
293 See also Austerberry v Oldham Corporation (1885) 29 Ch D 750 and Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 
310, HL. On easements see above; 2.3. Easement. Positive covenants can still be made, but 
only as part of leases. On leases see above; 2.2. Lease of Land. 
294 London County Council v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642. 
295 London County Council v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642, at 654 per Buckley LJ. 
296 See Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 669-670, Swadling 2007, p. 258. 
297 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 670. 
298 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 670, Swadling 2007, p. 258-259. 
299 S. 79 Law of Property Act 1925, Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310, HL. 
300 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 673. 
301 Except covenants in a lease, Dartstone Ltd v Cleveland Petroleum Co Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1807. 
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order for a restrictive covenant to bind the holder of a legal estate it must be 
registered as a land charge.302 When the land is registered, notice of the restrictive 
covenant can be registered with the servient tenement.303 
2.6. Rentcharges over Land 
A rentcharge is a right to receive a payment of money that is secured against an 
estate in land.304 When the money is not paid, the creditor has a right of distress, he 
can enter the debtor’s land and seize and sell chattels found there.305 Rentcharges 
originated in cases where there was no tenure between the creditor and debtor, for 
example when A conveyed his fee simple to B and accepted a periodic payment 
instead of the purchase price all at once.306 In such a case no tenure would exist 
between A and B and therefore A, as a creditor to B, could not use the common law 
remedy of distress. Instead, the parties would enter into a separate covenant that 
would entitle A to a similar remedy he would have had in case of tenure.307 
Rentcharges are connected to the legal estates that could exist before 1926. 
After the Law of Property Act 1925 only those rentcharges on land that are held on a 
legal interest, confer a legal right. Rentcharges on other interests in land confer an 
equitable right.308 However, the right on which the rentcharge rests must be a right 
that confers exclusive possession on land. A right of easement cannot be the subject 
of a rentcharge, as an easement cannot entitle the holder to come and seize, for 
instance, a right of way.309  
Rentcharges have been used in cases where, as already mentioned, there is not 
a purchase price in full, but rather an annual payment is made. This could be done 
to secure family annuities and to strengthen the effects of a restrictive covenant.310 
However, with the Rentcharges Act 1977 most rentcharges were abolished. New 
rentcharges made to strengthen the annual payment of a purchase price were 
prohibited and, if existing before 1977, will run until 2037.311 The other two types, 
those for family annuities and restrictive covenants, survived.312 
 
302 SS. 2(5), 4(6) and 17(1) Land Charges Act 1972. 
303 S. 32 Land Registration Act 2002. Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 673-674. 
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305 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 706. 
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307 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 705-706. 
308 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 706. 
309 However, see S. 122 Law of Property Act 1925 which enables a creditor of a rentcharge on a 
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310 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 707-708. 
311 S. 2(1) and S. 3 Rentcharges Act 1977. 
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2.7. Estate Contracts 
The limited recognition of property rights at common law does not necessarily 
result in equity refraining from recognising additional rights. As was seen in the 
case of restrictive covenants, although equity is said to follow the law, protection 
was granted in equity that was not available at common law.313 The rules of equity 
are different from the rules of common law. In view of its origin and function, 
granting remedies where the common law would not, equity often takes a different 
view from the common law. 
One of the prime examples in which equity takes such a different view is in 
the case of estate contracts.314 When one party agrees to sell an interest in land to 
another party, the common law takes the view that this only creates personal rights 
for the buyer. Common law requires a deed to be passed in order for the interest to 
pass.315 Therefore, under the general rule that there is no specific performance of 
contracts, the buyer can only claim damages in case of non-performance of the con-
tract.316 Nevertheless, equity recognises exceptional situations in which specific 
performance of a contract can be allowed. A contract that seeks to transfer land is 
said to have such a specific subject matter, land, that it can be specifically enforced 
in equity.317 The fact that equity holds this contract to be specifically enforceable 
changes the nature of the rights the contract awards to the buyer. At common law 
these rights are only personal, but in equity this is different. Equity takes the view of 
something ‘as done which ought to be done’, meaning that when parties agree to do 
something that requires a formality, in this case passing a deed, and the objective of 
the contract, the conveying of an interest in land, has not yet taken place at common 
law, equity, fictitiously, will see the conveyance as already having taken place.318 
The buyer will acquire an interest in the land in equity and the seller will still 
have the legal interest in the land at law.319 In order to explain this situation where 
two persons hold an interest in the same piece of land, English law uses the law of 
trusts. When an estate contract is concluded, a constructive trust arises under which 
the seller will hold the land on trust for the buyer.320 This trust is constructive 
because the parties have not specifically agreed to the trust coming into existence.321 
Instead, the trust arises by operation of law and is known as constructive.322 The 
interest in equity will remain in existence until the legal interest is also transferred 
to the buyer. Before that, the buyer will hold a property right in equity which he can 
enforce against third parties and assign if he wants to. 
 
313 See above; 2.5. Restrictive Covenant. 
314 See Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 65-66, Swadling 2007, p. 259. 
315 Swadling 2007, p. 259. 
316 Goode 2004, p. 113-123. 
317 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 66, Swadling 2007, p. 259-260. 
318 Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499, Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch D 9. 
319 Furthermore, the seller will have an equitable lien on the land. See e.g. Re Stucley Stucley v 
Kekewich [1904-1907] All ER 281, CA. See Para. 3.6. Liens. 
320 Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499, per George Jessel MR. 
321 Which is known as an express trust. See above; 1.5. Trust Law. 
322 See Swadling 2007, p. 259-260. 
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2.8. Options to Purchase 
Another situation in which equity recognises a property right and the common law 
does not is in the case of options to purchase land. An option to purchase exists in a 
phase before the contract to purchase is concluded. As in the case of estate contracts, 
an option to purchase has land as its subject matter, and is therefore specifically 
enforceable in equity.323  
In London and South Western Railway v Gomm, the Court of Appeal affirmed 
that options to purchase are also equitable property rights.324 The case concerned a 
conveyance that had been made under covenant that the claimant, who conveyed 
the interest in land, could repurchase the land by giving notice and paying the 
purchase price. The buyer of the land conveyed his interest in the land to the 
defendant, who, when the claimant tried to invoke his option to purchase, refused 
to accept that he was bound by the covenant. Jessel MR held that the contract 
created a property right in equity and that therefore the defendant was bound by it, 
even though the contract was made between the claimant and the original buyer 
and the claimant was not a party to that contract. Such a property right would run 
with the land and transfer to a new acquirer of the land such as the defendant.325 
An option to purchase therefore also awards its holder with a property right 
which he can enforce against the owner of the land on which the purchase may be 
exercised, regardless of whether the owner at the moment the purchase is invoked 
was a party to the contract. The equitable property right will not bind an owner 
who had no knowledge of the existence of the purchase and who acquired his 
interest in the land for value.326 
2.9. Mortgage of Land and Equity of Redemption 
As in other legal systems, entitlements to land in English law can be used not only 
for the use and enjoyment of land, but also as security for the performance of an 
obligation. In many cases this obligation will be for the repayment of money.327 The 
primary property security right in English law is known as a right of mortgage. 
Originally the mortgage was a form of pledge of which two types existed.328 A 
lender of money could be entitled to enter the land and be allowed to take the rents 
and profits the land produced as payments of a loan as well as its interest.329 This 
type of agreement was called a living pledge or vivum vadium.330 Another type was 
by an agreement that allowed the lender to take the rents and profits of the land in 
 
323 London and South Western Railway v Gomm (1882) 20 Ch D 562 per Lindley LJ, Swadling 2007, 
p. 260. 
324 London and South Western Railway v Gomm (1882) 20 Ch D 562. 
325 London and South Western Railway v Gomm (1882) 20 Ch D 562, per George Jessel LJ.  
326 The bona fide purchaser for value without notice, see above; 1.2. Common Law and Equity. 
327 Swadling 2007, p. 261, Smith 2000, p. 385. 
328 Pledge is used here in the widest sense of the word, denoting a security right in general. 
329 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 720-721. 
330 See Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 721. 
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order to pay the interest only, which was called a dead pledge or mortuum vadium, 
as it did not result in a complete payment of the debt.331  
In the early common law the mortgage developed and became a conveyance 
of a fee simple or other interest in land, legal or equitable, by the mortgagor to the 
mortgagee.332 Therefore, from the beginning there were legal and equitable mort-
gages.333 This conveyance was made under the condition that when the mortgagor, 
the debtor in a loan agreement, repaid the loan to the mortgagee, the creditor in the 
agreement, the conveyance would be reversed.334 If repayment was not made before 
a certain precise date, the mortgagee would hold the land absolute and the title of 
the mortgagor would be lost.335 However, this would not relieve the debt of the 
mortgagor, but would just deprive him of his property interest.336 
The common law provided strict rules on the repayment of the loan that the 
mortgage secured. For instance, it required the mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt 
on a specific date. The application of this rule would often result in the impossibility 
of the mortgagor redeeming his title to the land, and this led the Court of Chancery 
to intervene with remedies in equity. The term redeem or redemption here 
describes the right to pay off the debt and re-acquire the title in the land because of 
the fulfilment of the condition. 
In equity the rule developed that time is not the most essential matter of the 
transaction. In equity, the mortgagor must be allowed to redeem his property right 
despite his failure to make a payment on the exact date.337 Therefore, where at com-
mon law the right to redeem would be lost after a specific date when no payment 
was made, in equity the right to redeem remained.338 When the mortgagor repaid 
his loan, equity would allow specific performance in order to retrieve the fee simple 
or other estate in land, which had been conveyed on mortgage. It is important to 
recognise that this transaction does not give rise to the creation of a trust, and that 
therefore the mortgagee does not become trustee for the mortgagor.339 Instead, 
equity recognised the position of the mortgagor through a specific property right.  
This recognition in equity awarded the mortgagor what became known as an 
equity of redemption. However, until payment, the mortgagee remained entitled to 
the fee simple or other estate in both common law and equity.340 Equity could 
award the mortgagor an equitable right through the equity of redemption, but 
could not award the mortgagor the legal right to the land. Therefore, as a result of 
the existence of the equity of redemption, which would entitle its holder to retrieve 
 
331 Hence the term mortgage, which refers to the French term mort gage, literally meaning dead 
pledge. 
332 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 717-718, 723, Smith 2000, p. 385-386. 
333 Smith 2000, p. 386-388. 
334 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 721. 
335 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 721. 
336 Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1914] AC 25 at 35 per Lord Haldane. 
337 Burn & Cartwright 2006, 721-722, Smith 2000, p. 386-387. 
338 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 722.  
339 See e.g. Cuckmere Brick Company Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] Ch 949, CA, at 965 per Salmon 
LJ. 
340 Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1914] AC 25 at 48 per Lord Parker. 
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the full equitable title, the entitlements in common law and equity were divided 
between mortgagee and mortgagor.  
With the property law reforms of 1925 the provisions on mortgages changed. 
The 1925 legislation revived another old type of mortgage that had fallen out of use 
since the sixteenth century.341 In this type of mortgage, a mortgagor would grant the 
land to the mortgagee for a short term of years. When the debt was not repaid at the 
end of the lease, the term of years of the mortgagee would automatically enlarge to 
a fee simple that vested in the mortgagee.342 If the subject of this type of mortgage 
had been a lease itself, a sub-lease would create the same result. The mortgage by 
demise for a term of years absolute, the formal term used by the Law of Property 
Act 1925, fitted in the objectives of the law reform project to change the law so that 
the fee simple was vested in the person truly entitled to it.343 This was not the case 
with the other mortgages, as there, through the recognition of the equity of redemp-
tion, actually the mortgagor and not the mortgagee would have the entitlement. The 
use of a right of lease enabled the legal fee simple to remain with the mortgagor. 
In order to solve the unfair situation in respect to the other type of mortgage, 
the mortgage created by a conveyance of the fee simple or other interest in land, this 
type was abolished and replaced by a charge by deed expressed to be by way of 
legal mortgage. After 1925 a mortgage, besides by demise for a term of years abso-
lute, could also be created through a charge, which was a special and new type of 
property right.344 This charge was called a ‘charge by deed expressed to be by way 
of legal mortgage’.345 A charge does not give the mortgagee an estate in the land, 
but instead gives a legal interest equivalent to a position if he had taken a term of 
years.346  
In practice, this last type of mortgage, the charge by way of legal mortgage, 
became the method used to create mortgages. In 2002 the mortgage by way of 
granting a lease was abolished and several reforms were made.347 These reforms 
include the provision that when land is registered, a charge by way of legal mort-
gage can only be made as a legal charge over registered land.348 Since 2002, the law 
on mortgages has become less complicated. However, in order to understand the 
rights and duties of the holder of a charge by way of legal mortgage, the origins of 
the mortgage as a lease given for security should be understood.349  
Although, after the reforms in 1925, the mortgagee did not become holder of 
the legal estate in the land anymore, the equity of redemption of the mortgagor 
 
341 S. 85 Land of Property Act 1925, Smith 2000, p. 387. 
342 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 722. 
343 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 723. 
344 Charges over registered land had been first introduced in 1875 through the Land Transfer Act 
1875, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 724. 
345 S. 85(1) Law of Property Act 1925. 
346 S. 1(2)(c) and S. 87 Law of Property Act 1925, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 724, Smith 2000,  
p. 387. 
347 S. 23(1) Land Registration Act 2002. 
348 See below; 2.10. Charges of Land, Gray & Gray 2005, p. 726. 
349 S. 87(1) Law of Property Act 1925, see Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 725. 
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remained recognised.350 The recognition of the equity of redemption has several 
consequences for the relationship between the mortgagor and mortgagee.351 Al-
though, now the mortgagor no longer conveys his legal estate in the land, the equity 
of redemption limits the holder of the legal estate so that the holder can only keep 
the estate as security, and not use it for himself, and ensures that the interest of the 
mortgagee is only effective as a security right.352 The equity of redemption is 
therefore necessary for the mortgage to work as a security device. Parties are not 
allowed to deviate by excluding or altering or postponing it. As a result of such an 
attempt the transaction will be void.353 The right to redeem may be temporary at 
law; it is indefinite in duration in equity.354  
Furthermore, when parties attempt to go beyond the creation of a mortgage in 
their agreement, beyond the recovery of the debt with interest, a court might 
invalidate the mortgage.355 The equity of redemption, in other words, must be taken 
seriously.356 Parties may not agree on the exclusion of the equity of redemption, or 
on postponing the equity of redemption.357 The interference with the freedom of 
contract is extensive. Therefore, when parties have entered into agreements that are 
made through a separate contract and are not directly part of the contract creating 
the mortgage, the House of Lords has refused to accept the invalidity of that 
contract.358 
When the mortgagor is a company, there is a possibility to alter the way in 
which the equity of redemption works. Under the Companies Act 1983 a company 
may create so-called ‘debentures’, which can be made irredeemable, or redeemable 
only after a certain period of time.359  
When the mortgage contract is created, the mortgagee may take possession of 
the land.360 However, the mortgagee may only do so bona fide as a part of the mort-
gage agreement and not for another purpose, such as to avoid legislation on 
leases.361 In practice the right to take possession is mostly used for purposes of 
enforcement. Before using his ultimate power of selling the land to another party, 
the mortgagee will usually take possession of the land. This enables the mortgagee 
 
350 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 735-736, Smith 2000, p. 388. 
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354 Smith 2000, p. 394. 
355 Smith 2000, p. 396-397. 
356 See England v Codrington (1758) 1 Eden 169, 28 ER 649, Barnhart v Greenshields (1853) 9 Moo PC 
18, 14 ER 204. 
357 Vernon v Bethell (1762) 2 Eden 110, 28 ER 838, Fairclough v Swan Brewery Co Ltd [1912] AC 565. 
358 Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1914] AC 23, HL, Smith 2000, p. 397, 
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361 Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318, CA, Albany Home Loans Ltd v Massey [1997] 2 All ER 609, 
CA. 
 371 
Chapter 6 
to lease the land and enjoy the income from the lease, before the sale is concluded.362 
In order to protect the mortgagor against the use of this power of the mortgagee, the 
parties may contractually exclude it, or the mortgagor may use his statutory right 
under the Administration of Justice Act 1970 to ask the court to postpone the pos-
session in case he can pay off his debt within a reasonable period.363 
When the mortgagor defaults on his payments under the agreement, usually 
after six months, the mortgagee will have a right to sell.364 However, in order to use 
his right to sell, the mortgagor must have received three-month’s notice in writing 
summoning him to pay, the mortgagor must have defaulted on at least two periodi-
cal payments of interest, and there must be a breach by the mortgagor of the mort-
gage agreement or the Law of Property Act 1925.365 The purchaser of the land will 
take the land free of the rights of the mortgagor, who will no longer have his right 
of redemption.366 Finally, if the mortgagee wishes, he may appoint a receiver to take 
control of the land and receive income thereof. Depending on the nature of the 
mortgage, whether the charge is fixed or floating, this appointment can have severe 
consequences.367 
A mortgage is an important security right that can exist both at law and in 
equity. Equitable mortgages arise when a right in equity is the subject of the mort-
gage or when, as in case of leases of land and estate contracts, an agreement to 
create a mortgage has been reached, but the formalities have not yet been fulfilled. 
In that case an equitable mortgage will arise anticipating the coming into existence 
of a legal mortgage.368 
2.10. Charges of Land 
The most important charge on land is the charge by way of legal mortgage dis-
cussed above.369 The term charge, however, is used in a very wide sense and may 
include all cases where land is liable for the payment of a debt.370 The charge in case 
of a mortgage is special because the types of action the mortgagee, as chargee, may 
take, are equivalent to those of a mortgage before 1925. However, ‘normal’ charges, 
in other words non-mortgage charges, do award protection to the chargee, but not 
to the same degree.371 
English law recognises many charges, both on land and on chattels, legal and 
equitable. When charges of land are concerned, the common law only recognises the 
 
362 Smith 2000, p. 401. 
363 S. 36 Administration of Justice Act 1970, Smith 2000, p. 401-402, Burn & Cartwright 2006,  
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364 S. 101 Law of Property Act 1925, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 769-771, Smith 2000, p. 403. 
365 S. 103 Law of Property Act 1925. 
366 S. 104 Law of Property Act 1925, Smith 2000, p. 404. 
367 On fixed and floating charges see below; 2.10. Charges of Land. Smith 2000, p. 407. 
368 Smith 2000, p. 389. 
369 See above; 2.9. Mortgage of Land and Equity of Redemption. 
370 Gray & Gray 2005, p. 724, Smith 2000, p. 423. 
371 The terms mortgage and charge are often used interchangeably. See Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds 
Bank Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 419, at 425 per Buckley LJ. 
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registered charge. Under the Land Registration Act 2002, anyone registered as 
entitled to a registered estate in land may charge this estate at law with the payment 
of money.372 A mortgage of registered land can consequently only be made by regis-
tered charge.373 When a mortgage is made over unregistered land, the mortgage 
itself still must be registered, unless the title deeds are deposited.374 Consequently, 
any other charge created cannot exist at common law and must be equitable. 
When a mortgage is equitable, when an equitable interest is the subject matter 
of the mortgage, or the mortgage agreement was made, but the formalities to create 
a legal mortgage have not been fulfilled, the charge will be equitable and can be 
registered as such in order to give protection to the mortgagee.375 Another type of 
charge arises by operation of law and will always be equitable. These types of 
charges arise without the consent of the holder of the charged object, and are often 
referred to as equitable liens.376 Liens are, in civil law terminology, rights of reten-
tion exercised by someone in possession, in order to ensure payment of a certain 
debt. Situations of equitable liens also arise in order to secure a judgment debt or a 
confiscation order.377  
The most extensive class of charges arise by consent and are also equitable. 
These charges can be either fixed or floating. A charge is fixed when, upon creation, 
it immediately attaches.378 This is the standard way in which charges operate. A 
charge is floating when the moment of attachment is postponed until a certain 
event, usually insolvency.379 Floating charges are mainly created by companies and 
are especially relevant in commercial law. These charges mainly concern chattels, 
but may exist on land as well.380 More will be said on fixed and floating charges in 
the section on charges on chattels.381 
Charges are tailor-made security rights, referring to the fact that their exact 
content will depend on the agreement that gives rise to its creation. However, once 
a charge is created, the chargee has access to a certain number of remedies which 
closely resemble, but are not the same, as those of a mortgagee. The chargee may 
apply for a possession order or appoint a receiver to take possession of the land on 
 
372 S. 24 Land Registration Act 2002, Gray & Gray 2005, p. 726-727. 
373 Gray & Gray 2005, p. 728. 
374 Ministry of Housing & Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 WB 223 per Cross LJ, Sparkes 2003,  
p. 426. 
375 S. 2(4) Land Charges Act 1972, Sparkes 2003, p. 426-427. 
376 On liens see below; 3.6. Liens, Smith 2000, p. 424. 
377 These liens arise, inter alia, under the Charging Orders Act 1979 and the Criminal Justice Act 
1988, see Smith 2000, p. 424. 
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his behalf.382 Furthermore, the chargee may use his ultimate power, the right to sell 
the land.383 
3. Property Rights in Respect of Personalty 
Apart from real property law or land law, English law uses a different system to 
deal with movable objects, known as chattels or goods.384 As a generic term, mova-
ble objects are known as personalty.385 Contrary to land law, this other area of 
property law, known as personal property law, has not been subject to development 
from the beginning of the common law. As a result it has never been subject to the 
feudal system and therefore lacks a central system binding the various elements 
together.386  
For that reason it is also more difficult to provide a list of property rights in 
personalty, and if a list is drawn, it is, as in the other legal systems discussed above, 
considerably shorter. For instance, no property rights can attach to the object in 
order to run with the object to another holder, excluding easements, profits and 
restrictive covenants.387 Personal property law is an area of law under development 
and different from any other system discussed so far. The property law nature of 
some of these property rights is debated.388 Nevertheless, English lawyers consider 
these rights in the area of property law. Therefore, contrary to the content of pre-
vious chapters, these borderline cases between property and contract law, will be 
dealt with in this section and not in a separate section dealing with borderline cases.  
3.1. Title / Ownership 
There is no doctrine of estates in personal property law.389 Therefore, the entitle-
ment to chattels or goods is not expressed in feudal terminology. However, owner-
ship in the sense in which it is used in civil law jurisdictions is not used either.390 
Instead, and this seems comparable to the approach taken in land law, possession 
plays a decisive role. Ownership, if the word is used at all, is taken to describe 
entitlement to possession of a chattel forever. As a short word, the word title is 
 
382 Goode 2004, p. 638. 
383 The chargee does not have the right of foreclosure, which causes the equity of redemption to 
cease to exist as a ‘normal’ chargee is not mortgagee and therefore there is no equity of 
redemption. See Bridge 2002, p. 186-187. 
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form to transfer title. 
385 On the distinction between land law and personal property law, see above; 1.3. Personal 
Property Law and Land Law. 
386 Swadling 2007, p. 267. 
387 See Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 16-17, Taddy v Steropis [1904] 2 Ch 306. 
388 See above; 3.2. Leases / Bailment? 
389 However see Re Swan, Witham v Swan [1915] 1 Ch 829, in which an estate for life was recog-
nised on personal property, no longer possible under the present law. See Swadling 2000a,  
p. 264. 
390 See Swadling 2000a, p. 264-265, Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 39-55, Bridge 2002, p. 28-29. 
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used. This does not seem to be different in essence from the civil law concept of 
ownership, but English lawyers insist on describing what they call relativity of 
title.391 
Relativity of title means that, in a certain procedure, two parties face each 
other and the party with the best possessory right will win. However, this adjudi-
cation of the better right of possession does not establish that the party who won 
this particular case also has the best right of possession.392 Ownership, as the most 
extensive right a person can have, is by nature unitary or absolute as opposed to 
relative.393 Therefore, ownership as a unitary and absolute right is in tension with 
the relative concept of title in English law.394 
However, English personal property lawyers do use the term ownership. 
Especially under the influence of commercial law, which is better connected to 
everyday speech than personal property law, the term ownership is used. In this 
respect ownership should be understood in the light of the concept of relativity of 
title. An owner, Bridge explains, should be seen as the person with the best posses-
sory interest in a chattel.395  
A second reason English lawyers resist the recognition of a civil law concept of 
ownership is that in English law the holder of a title in personal property does not 
enjoy the same protection as the owner in civil law systems.396 Closely connected to 
the civil law concept of ownership is the possibility for an owner to vindicate his 
object in case someone else takes it.397 In English law, personal property interests are 
protected through the law of torts, the tort of conversion being the most impor-
tant.398 The tort of conversion protects possession and is seen as connected to 
possession of the title holder, and not to the title itself.399 However, and that is con-
sidered different from the right of ownership, as a result of the action, the holder of 
a title will recover damages and not possession of the chattel or good he lost.  
The use of the term ownership in English law remains debatable. Already in 
1961, Honoré described the concept of ownership for English lawyers and argued 
that, even though it is traditionally argued that English law does not adhere to a 
concept of ownership, the term could very well be used.400 Honoré argues that in 
English law there are also entitlements that fulfil the criteria for ownership.401 
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A question that remains is what the concept of title comprises. Bridge de-
scribes the content of title in the following way.402 Title, or ownership, comprises the 
right to possession forever, the right to enjoy the thing and the right to take the 
fruits and profits generated by it forever and the right to alienate, bequeath or 
destroy it. Honoré in his 1961 article ascribes a similar content to the right of owner-
ship.403 Although he distinguishes more ‘incidents of ownership’ than does Bridge, 
the general distinction in the right to use, enjoy and dispose can also be seen in 
Honoré’s division.404 After this qualification of ownership he describes the power of 
the owner to grant others parts of his rights and considers that generally these 
granted powers constitute a new property right, less in content than ownership. It is 
in particular here that Honoré explains what he sees as the true nature of the right 
of ownership. In his view ownership is the right that remains at the end and that 
entitles its holder to receive the powers back.405 Therefore, it is the ‘greatest possible 
interest in a thing which a mature system of law recognizes’.406 
This description of title in English law brings to mind the traditional division 
of the right of ownership into usus, fructus and abusus used by civil lawyers.407 The 
creation of property rights by granting parts of the title to another party also resem-
bles the French approach of property rights as a démembrement of the right of owner-
ship.408 These property rights may concern a right to use or enjoy, but certainly also 
a right to transfer in case of property security rights.409 
Like its civil law equivalent, title can also be used for security purposes in two 
ways. First, a transfer can be made under condition that it will only take place when 
a certain payment has been made, or another obligation is performed. This type of 
security is created through a contract with a so-called retention of title clause.410 
When a sale of goods is concerned, the parties are free to decide themselves when 
the title in these goods is transferred between them.411 When, in a standard situa-
tion, the parties do not specifically decide on this matter, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
provides presumptions to determine when title passes.412  
However, parties may specifically deviate from these presumptions and create 
an effective security device.413 Deviation from the standard presumptions may be 
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necessary in case of the manufacture of goods. When a supplier delivers supplies to 
the manufacturer but has not yet received payment, he may retain his title until 
payment. However, when the manufacturer transforms the supplies into new prod-
ucts, the title to the supplies is destroyed and a new title vests in the producer.414 
The retention of title clause cannot be extended to these new products.415 Therefore 
parties, in order to include the new products in the security device, have to create a 
separate and new proprietary security right, usually a charge.416 
Parties may also attempt to create a situation in which a company is author-
ised to sell the products that are under retention of title. In such cases, the agree-
ment may stipulate that the supplier of the chattels, exercising his retention of title, 
shall lose his title to the product but become entitled to the proceeds of sale. The 
courts have qualified this right as an equitable charge, a property right that enables 
the supplier to extend his security to the proceeds of sale.417  
Secondly, another possibility is that, in case a party needs finance, he transfers 
his title to a certain chattel or group of chattels to a financer. Such a transfer creates 
a mortgage in the same way as the conveyance of an estate in land.418 Similarly, the 
creation of a mortgage on chattels gives rise to an equity of redemption, which will 
be dealt with separately later in this section.419  
3.2. Leases / Bailment? 
The possibility in English law for the holder of a title to grant parts of his right to 
another person in the form of a property right for a limited duration of time is 
debated. A term of years absolute, affirmed by the Law of Property Act 1925 as one 
of the two possible legal estates, cannot be used, as it only applies to land.420 How-
ever, the granting of possession of a chattel for a limited duration is possible under 
English law. A general concept of bailment is used to describe these situations. As 
Bridge puts it: 
‘Bailment is a possessory relationship by which a bailor transfers possession of a 
chattel to a bailee. The bailment may be at will, in which case the bailor has the right to 
call for the return of the goods at any time, or it may be for a fixed or terminable 
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period, in which case the bailee has the right to resist a demand for the early return of 
the chattel …’.421 
The relation of bailment is therefore covered by contract in which the bailor and 
bailee agree on the terms.422 A very common example of bailment is the case of hire, 
which is a bailment for value. Furthermore, in a commercial context the term lease 
is even used.423 In any case a bailment creates a relationship between bailor and 
bailee in which both can be liable in case of misconduct or when in violation of the 
terms and conditions agreed upon.424 However, whether bailment or lease of chat-
tels creates a property right, remains unanswered.  
Swadling has attempted to classify bailment.425 Referring to the case law on 
leases of land and licences to occupy, the latter used by landlords in an attempt to 
avoid the application of the Rent Acts, Swadling emphasises that not every 
covenant awarding possession constitutes a property right.426 Even though the pos-
session the bailee receives gives him remedies against third parties who interfere 
with his possession, an action in the tort of conversion, Swadling states that this 
does not make bailment into a property right.427 Also holders of a licence have 
remedies granted through their possession, but do not hold a property right.428  
Furthermore, there is an argument that once a bailor has granted possession to 
the bailee, he no longer is entitled to possession himself and that therefore under the 
nemo dat quod non habet rule, that no one may give more away than he already has, a 
property right must exist. The reasoning behind this is that once the right to 
possession has been given away, it can no longer reside with the grantor. Also in 
respect to this argument Swadling argues that it cannot be maintained, as the nemo 
dat rule only applies to property rights, and in case the right in question is not found 
to be a property right, the title holder will still be allowed to possession himself.429 
Therefore, the fact that a bailment awards possession as such does not make it 
into a property right.430 However, that does not exclude the possibility that a bail-
ment constitutes a property right. When possession of a chattel is transferred to 
another person to serve as security, a pledge is created. The right of pledge is a 
recognised property right, but at the same time is also a type of bailment.431 
The question whether there are other types of bailment that are also proprie-
tary, is very difficult to answer. Because of the granting of possession, a bailee will 
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have access to a claim in the tort of conversion. However, this right to claim follows 
from his possession and not from his status as bailee, and can only be exercised 
against a party with a weaker right of possession than that of the bailee.432 There-
fore, a bailment does not generally create a property right at common law.  
There are also difficulties in equity. From its general maxim that regards that 
as done which ought to be done, equity has awarded specific performance and, with 
that, the status of a property right, in cases of estate contracts and options to pur-
chase.433 Also here Swadling is very careful in explaining that equity only recognises 
a property right when eventually a property right would have resulted anyway.434 
Therefore, Swadling argues, licences to occupy, which are also specifically enforce-
able, do not constitute property rights.435 
In this respect there is a controversial judgement by Sir Nicholas Browne-
Wilkinson V-C in Bristol Airport plc v Powdrill.436 In this case an airline was insolvent 
but was placed in administration in order to allow the business to continue and 
repay the creditors. The Insolvency Act 1986 specifically allowed this under the con-
dition that no steps were taken to enforce any security over the company’s objects, 
except with permission of the administrator or through a leave of the court.437 The 
airline owed landing fees to the company running the airport. This company had a 
statutory power of detention in case of non-payment of the landing fees.438 Follow-
ing this right, the company running the airport blocked one of the aircraft of the 
airline without consent from the administrator or leave from the court. The com-
pany claimed it did not need such consent as the aircraft was leased and therefore 
did not constitute ‘property’, in the meaning of objects, under the Insolvency Act 
1986. On the question of what a lease of an aircraft is, Sir Nicholas Browne-
Wilkinson V-C states: 
‘… But modern commercial methods have introduced chattel-leasing … Although a 
chattel lease is a contract, is does not follow that no property interest is created in the 
chattel. The basic equitable principle is that if, under a contract A has certain rights 
over property as against the legal owner, which rights are specifically enforceable in 
equity, A has an equitable interest in such property. I have no doubt that a court would 
order specific performance of a contract to lease an aircraft, since each aircraft has 
unique features peculiar to itself. Accordingly in my judgment the ‘lessee’ has at least 
an equitable right of some kind in that aircraft which falls within the statutory 
definition …’. 439  
Swadling has argued against this judgment that Sir Browne-Wilkinson misunder-
stood the law of equity.440 Equity, Swadling argues, can only anticipate the existence 
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of a property right in case of specific performance under the maxim that equity 
regards that as done what ought to be done. Chattel leases do not create property 
rights at law and therefore equity cannot anticipate their existence in equity.441 
A bailment, therefore, even if it takes the form of hire or lease, does not gener-
ally constitute a property right. It does, however, award possession, which entitles 
its holder to sue in tort when necessary.442 Bailment as such is a contract, but in 
effect not just a contract either. Tyler and Palmer explain that bailment is sui generis, 
and ‘that most modern writers adopt this view mostly without question’.443 
3.3. Mortgage of Chattels and Equity of Redemption 
A conveyance of chattels for security of payment of a debt creates a mortgage, as it 
did with land until 1925. In 1925, the mortgage by conveyance of an estate or inter-
est in land to a creditor was replaced by a mortgage by demise, now also abolished, 
and by a charge by deed expressed by way of legal mortgage.444 However, these 
changes of the Law of Property Act 1925 only apply to land, so that a transfer of 
chattels as security remains possible.445  
A mortgage of a chattel offers an advantage over a right of pledge because it 
does not require a transfer of possession to the mortgagee. However, not transfer-
ring possession of a chattel creates a false impression of which party has title in the 
chattel. When a mortgagor remains in possession, it is unclear that in fact the mort-
gagee holds title.446 Therefore, courts have resisted a mortgage on chattels without a 
transfer of possession by making such transaction void on the grounds that it 
misleads other creditors.447 It was not until a registration system for mortgages was 
created, that, once more, mortgages without a transfer of possession could be 
created.448  
As in the case of mortgages of land, a mortgage of chattels also gives rise to an 
equity of redemption for the mortgagor, enabling him to redeem the mortgage 
when he fully repays his debt.449 Also in this respect, the existence of the equity of 
redemption strengthens the position of the mortgagor and ensures that the mort-
gagee only uses his right as security.450  
A mortgage of chattels is created by agreement and the transfer of title in the 
chattels. The Bills of Sale Acts 1878 and 1882, which introduced the registration 
system mentioned above, require the document containing the agreement to be in a 
certain form. When the document does not comply with the Bills of Sale Acts, it will 
 
441 Swadling 2000a, p. 273, Swadling 2007, p. 232-233. 
442 Swadling 2000a, p. 273, Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 76-77. 
443 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 77. 
444 See above; 2.9. Mortgage of Land and Equity of Redemption. 
445 Smith 2000, p. 415-416, Bridge 2002, p. 179. 
446 Smith 2000, p. 416. 
447 Smith 2000, p. 416. 
448 Bills of Sale Act 1854, Bills of Sale Act 1878 amended by Bills of Sale Act (1978) Amendment 
Act 1882. 
449 See above; 2.9. Mortgage of Land and Equity of Redemption, Smith 2000, p. 416. 
450 Smith 2000, p. 415-416. 
 380 
English Law 
be void. However, as in the case of land, a mere agreement to create a mortgage will 
give rise to an equitable mortgage, equity anticipating the common law.451 
The requirements for the mortgage document depend on whether the mort-
gage is of tangible or intangible objects. Tangibles require a specific description of 
existing objects.452 Future objects cannot be specified, and therefore cannot be 
included in a legal mortgage. However, an agreement to transfer future tangible 
objects to the mortgagee will give rise to a mortgage in equity when the agreement 
constitutes a binding contract.453 A mortgage of intangibles can be created almost 
without formality.454 When the mortgagee is a company, less restrictive provisions 
apply. A company may create a mortgage of chattels without complying with these 
requirements for a document, but under the Companies Act 1985 will usually have 
to register the mortgage.455  
Finally, the mortgagee of chattels will enjoy almost the same actions as a mort-
gagee of land. When the mortgagor is in default of payment the mortgagee may lift 
the mortgagor’s equity of redemption and acquire full and unrestricted title. He 
may take possession of the chattel, but when the mortgage falls under the Bills of 
Sale Acts 1878 and 1882 this power is restricted, and, if necessary, the mortgagee 
may appoint a receiver.456 Whether the mortgagee also has a power to sell the chat-
tels is debatable. In case of intangibles, the power of sale is recognised.457 However, 
in case of tangible objects, the law may grant the mortgagee a power to sell.458 The 
power to sell is usually considered to be implied in the Bills of Sale Acts. These hold 
that chattels can only be sold after they have been held for five days, or after a 
seven-day notice, which must be issued, has not resulted in the default in the 
payment being made good.459 
3.4. Charges, Fixed and Floating 
Charges can exist both on land as well as on chattels.460 As in respect to land, the 
most common charge is usually used interchangeably with mortgage. However, 
other charges than mortgages may exist. These charges are created by operation of 
law or by agreement and can only exist in equity.461 Charges arising by operation of 
law, sometimes also referred to as equitable liens, arise in case of an unpaid vendor, 
 
451 See above; 2.9. Mortgage of Land and Equity of Redemption, Bridge 2002, p. 180. 
452 S. 4 Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882. 
453 I.e., when consideration has been given. Re Clarke (1887) 36 Ch D 348, Bridge 2002, p. 180-181, 
Smith 2000, p. 419. 
454 S. 4 Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882, Smith 2000, p. 417. 
455 S. 395 Companies Act 1985. 
456 See above; 2.9. Mortgage of Land and Equity of Redemption. S. 101 and S. 205(1) Law of 
Property Act 1925, S. 7 Bills of Sale Acts (1878) Amendment Act 1882. See Smith 2000, p. 419. 
457 Stubbs v Slater [1910] 1 Ch 632, CA. 
458 Smith 2000, p. 419, Bridge 2002, p. 187. 
459 Goode 2004, p. 639. 
460 See above; 2.10. Charges of Land. 
461 Goode 2004, p. 587. 
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or when trust property is disposed of without authority.462 These charges by opera-
tion of law do not need to be registered. 
Nevertheless, most charges will be consensual. Because a charge does not 
involve a transfer of title, the agreement creating the charge is the charge itself. 
These charges may be either fixed or floating. A fixed charge, also known as specific 
charge, attaches immediately to the chattels.463 As a result, the chargor is no longer 
authorised to dispose of any of the charged objects without consent of the 
chargee.464 A floating charge does not attach immediately, and will only do so upon 
the occurrence of a certain event, usually insolvency of the chargor. Consequently, 
the chargor will be authorised to dispose of any charged chattels as he desires until 
the charge attaches and becomes fixed.  
Floating charges were introduced through case law when fixed charges no 
longer fulfilled all the needs commercial practice demanded. As a normal method of 
security, a lender would acquire security by creating a charge on objects of a com-
pany.465 However, when a company could only offer equipment as security and this 
equipment was charged, the charge was only effective until the equipment needed 
replacing. The common law did not allow the creation of a charge by agreement 
over future chattels. Already in 1862 the courts intervened and allowed a charge in 
equity on the new equipment as soon as it was acquired.466 However, this only pro-
vided for security over additional objects of the debtor. Under the rules on charges, 
the debtor was not allowed to dispose of charged objects, unless the chargee 
explicitly agreed. Therefore, stocks could not be used as security.467 
In practice a solution was attempted through the creation of a floating charge, 
which was allowed by the Court of Appeal in Chancery in Re Panama, New Zealand 
and Australian Royal Mail Company.468 In later cases, more content has been given to 
the floating charge. As a guideline Romer LJ offers three elements to help decide 
whether a charge is floating.469 A floating charge would cover a class of objects pres-
ent and future; the content of that class would change over time; and the chargor 
would be at liberty to conduct his business until the charge attaches. It is in par-
ticular the third requirement that is of high relevance for legal practice.470 
The difference between a floating charge and a fixed charge is relevant when it 
comes to the ranking of the security rights. A fixed charge will go before a floating 
 
462 Smith 2000, p. 424. 
463 Although the term specific is somewhat ambiguous, see National Westminster Bank plc v 
Spectrum Plus Ltd (In Creditors Voluntary Liquidation) [2005] 2 AC 680, HL, at 711 per Lord Scott 
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464 Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 BCLC 188, PC, Smith 2000, p. 424. 
465 See Goode 2004, p. 676. 
466 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HL Cas 191. 
467 See also National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd (In Creditors Voluntary Liquidation) 
[2005] 2 AC 680, HL at 716 per Lord Scott of Foscote. 
468 Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Company (1870) 5 Ch App 318. See Goode 
2004, p. 676-677. 
469 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch D 284, at 295 per Romer LJ. 
470 Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 BCLC 188, PC. 
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charge, even when it was created later, without notice of the floating charge.471 Also 
other creditors, such as employees, who have a preference ranking for arrears of 
wages are given priority over an existing floating charge.472 Usually the charge must 
be registered in order to have effect against later creditors.473  
To avoid the company creating a fixed charge during the existence of the 
floating charge, parties may agree on a so-called negative pledge clause.474 Although 
a floating charge allows the company to trade in the ordinary course of business, the 
negative pledge clause prohibits the company from creating a security right in 
respect of the charged objects, which would take priority over the floating charge.475 
It is subject to debate whether such a clause has third-party effect, judicial authority 
holding against it.476 Goode holds that the question of third-party effect depends on 
notice of the third party of the charge.477 
The distinction between a floating charge and a fixed charge is not always a 
clear one.478 In the past, there has been some confusion over the question of whether 
a fixed charge could be created on so-called book debts. These book debts are out-
standing claims a company has, which follow from the company’s administration, 
and which are by their nature liable to change from time to time. In Siebe Gordman & 
Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that a fixed charge could be 
created over a fluctuating body of objects, so long as the chargor was not free to 
deal with the proceeds.479 This case raised many uncertainties, in particular because 
it blurred the distinction between fixed and floating charges, with serious results in 
respect to the ranking of the chargee.  
In National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd, the House of Lords was of 
a different opinion.480 This case concerned a charge given by Spectrum over all its 
book debts to the bank. When the charge that was created was a floating charge, 
under the rules of priority in insolvency, Spectrum’s preferential creditors would be 
entitled to have their debts paid out of the proceeds of the book debts. If the charge 
were a fixed charge, the preferential creditors would have no priority and the bank 
would be entitled to the whole of the proceeds.481 On considering the facts of this 
case, the House of Lords held that this charge by its nature must be a floating charge 
because it was created on a fluctuating set of claims, and overruled the decision in 
 
471 Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1998] Ch 495 per Millett LJ. 
472 S. 386, Sch 6 Insolvency Act 1986. 
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474 Smith 2000, p. 427. 
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478 See Worthington 1996, p. 73-78. 
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Siebe Gordman.482 This last case illustrates the importance of distinguishing between 
fixed and floating charges, especially when it comes to enforcement of the security 
right. A fixed charge will grant the chargee actions equivalent to a mortgagee, 
including a power to take possession, sell the object and appoint a receiver. Further-
more, a fixed charge will give its holder a strong position in the insolvency of the 
debtor. 
When a floating charge is enforced it crystallises. Crystallisation means the 
charge attaches to the objects that are in a company at that specific moment. The 
floating charge will then become a fixed charge and the chargor will no longer be 
allowed to manage the charged objects.483 Crystallisation occurs when a company 
ceases to trade, voluntarily or involuntarily.484 Furthermore, parties may also agree 
that crystallisation takes place at the occurrence of another event, for example, the 
default of a loan, or the exceeding of a certain credit facility.485 This last type of 
crystallisation is known as automatic crystallisation, as it occurs without third 
parties being able to take notice of it.486 Involuntary crystallisation can take place in 
the event of a winding-up petition or the appointment of a receiver by the chargee 
of the floating charge.487 
The chargee will then have become authorised to intervene in the management 
of the company, but must exercise that right in order for the enforcement of the 
charge to become effective.488 Usually, the chargee will appoint a receiver who will 
take over the administration of the company. The chargee will then also be entitled 
to the other actions a charge awards him; the power to take possession and the 
power to sell the charged assets. 
Fixed charges are property rights and take effect against third parties from the 
moment they are validly created. However, the legal nature of floating charges has 
been debated. In this debate there are two problems. First, a floating charge does not 
attach to any objects when it is created, and because of that it could be argued no 
property right can exist. Secondly, the floating charge allows the company to trade 
in the ordinary course of business, which could also imply that a property right 
does not yet exist. Some have held there is no property right at all, until the charge 
crystallises.489 Goode and Worthington have held that a property right already 
exists before crystallisation.490 Goode emphasises that a floating charge is held on a 
fund of objects rather than on specific objects, and that, by the analogy of a trust 
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fund, objects may go in and out until the moment of attachment.491 Also the Court 
of Appeal has held that a floating charge creates a security right from the moment it 
is created.492  
In answer to the second element, Goode holds that it is only by contract that 
the chargor is entitled to manage the fund under the charge.493 Worthington has 
argued that a fixed and a floating charge create the same property right. Only 
through a licence is the chargor of a floating charge entitled to deal with the ob-
jects.494 This view is also endorsed by Smith, and it offers several advantages.495 First 
and foremost, the use of a contractual licence will enable the parties to set the terms 
of the licence and a failure to stay within those terms will immediately result in 
liability for the company.496 Secondly, Worthington argues, this analysis can also be 
used on other security rights, such as liens.497  
Whatever the status of the powers of the chargor to deal with the charged 
objects, it seems convincing to argue that a floating charge creates a property right 
from the moment it is created. Therefore, as a general security right, the floating 
charge is one of the most important property security rights in English law.498 
3.5. Pledge 
A right of pledge is created with a transfer of possession from a pledgor to a 
pledgee to hold as security.499 Because of the requirement of possession, a right of 
pledge can only exist on tangible objects. The pledgee will have possession of the 
chattel and receive a property right.500 As discussed above, a pledge is a special type 
of bailment. It is a special type because, unlike other situations of bailment, it 
confers a property right on the bailee.501  
A right of pledge is created by the transfer of possession without other 
formalities being needed.502 In order to protect third parties, possession fulfils a 
publicity function. This also applies in case a right of pledge was created and pos-
session is in the hands of a third party.503 However, the requirement to transfer 
possession makes the pledge an unattractive security right in most cases. The 
pledgor will often need possession of the chattels under pledge in order to make 
money and repay the loan that the pledge secures.  
 
491 Goode 2004, p. 678. 
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Therefore, English legal practice has attempted to allow the pledgor to remain 
in possession or for a retransfer of possession back to him. For instance, in Dublin 
City Distillery Co Ltd v Doherty, the House of Lords suggested that a pledgor could 
be allowed by attornment to transfer chattels to the pledgee, making him the 
pledgor’s bailee.504 In any case, once a pledge has been validly created, possession 
can be returned to the pledgor, as long as it is for a limited purpose.505 Such a 
limited purpose can arise in the event that the pledgor needs the chattels in order to 
conduct his business. This is done through a ‘trust receipt’ which makes the pledgor 
trustee for the benefit of the pledgee.506  
With its proprietary status, the right of pledge remains one of the most 
powerful security rights in English law.507 When the pledgor can no longer pay his 
debt, the pledgee becomes entitled to enforce his security right. Enforcement in case 
of a right of pledge will usually only take effect as a right to sell the objects under 
pledge.508 The taking of possession is not necessary as a pledgee usually will already 
have possession. Should possession have been transferred to another party, upon 
enforcement the pledgee may re-claim it.509 
3.6. Liens 
There are certain situations where, as a method of security, a party retains posses-
sion of a chattel until a debt is paid.510 The right to do so usually arises by operation 
of law, either common law or statute, but may also arise by agreement.511 The party 
entitled to retain possession of the chattel is known as the lienee, the party against 
whom the right is exercised the lienor.512 Moreover, a lien is different from a right of 
pledge, which is also a type of possessory security, in that there is no transfer of 
possession, and the retaining of possession is usually for another purpose than the 
purpose for which the possession of the chattels was acquired by the lienee.513 A lien 
is therefore more a right used as a remedy than as a right per se.514 
At common law a lien will come into existence when there is a possessory 
relationship between the lienee and the chattel.515 For example, the mechanic who 
operates a garage may exercise a lien against his client who has not yet paid for 
repairs to a vehicle, an innkeeper has a lien on the chattels of guests to secure pay-
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ment for their food and lodging, and common law confers a lien on anyone in pos-
session of a chattel to employ his work or skill on it.516  
In other situations a lien may arise through statute. On example was men-
tioned above in respect to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bristol Airport plc v 
Powdrill.517 In that case, a company managing an airport was granted a statutory lien 
to detain the aircraft of airlines that had not paid their landing fees.518 As a final 
example, a lien will also arise when a seller of goods has not yet been paid.519  
These examples show that a lien can also be exercised when the lienee himself 
does not have possession of the chattels as such, but becomes entitled to prevent the 
party in possession from enjoying the rights he normally has. Therefore, a lien is an 
effective method to ensure payment of a debt. 
In English law, liens may be special or general, depending on their origin. A 
special, or particular, lien is a right exercised on chattels specifically related to the 
claim the lien concerns. This includes the lien on the luggage of guests in an inn for 
payment of a stay in that inn, or the lien on a car that has been brought in for repair. 
A lien is general when there is no such connection to a specific payment. These 
types of liens are rarer, but can be exercised by those who render professional 
services such as lawyers, bankers, factors, stockbrokers and insurance brokers.520 
Liens are special rights and, because of the way in which they originate, they 
are connected to the party exercising the right. This connection does not exist in 
respect of the claim it secures, but neither does it exist in respect of possession. The 
right can therefore not be assigned and when possession is lost the lien ceases to 
exist.521 However, through agreement, parties may alter the conditions under which 
a lien arises. This includes the possibility to make a special lien into a general lien.522  
Finally, liens may also arise in equity. Unlike common law liens, equitable 
liens can only arise through operation of equity. In contrast with common law liens 
they do not depend on the possession of the creditor. Therefore the difference with 
an equitable charge is difficult to find. Equitable liens are therefore usually referred 
to as charges, as most equitable security rights are charges.523 Examples of an 
equitable lien are difficult to find. The equitable lien mostly arises in cases of unjust 
enrichment. One example is the equitable lien of an insurer in relation to an action 
to recover money or money actually recovered by the insured himself from a third 
party.524  
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4. A Numerus Clausus in English Property Law? 
This discussion of the property rights in English law shows how English property 
law is characterised by historical development and its ability to adapt to changes in 
society. This includes the desire to create both new property rights and new prop-
erty security rights. However, that is not to say that parties enjoy an unlimited free-
dom to create new property rights themselves. As in other legal systems, in English 
law parties need authority by judgment or statute for the creation new property 
rights. However, there is one important difference between civil law systems and 
English law. English law does not have a civil code and therefore it lacks a general 
statutory framework in which the law of property is set out. Instead, English law, in 
particular property law, has developed over time and was almost fully formed by 
case law until the legislature intervened and brought limitations in respect to the 
number of estates.525 However, the legislation did not, in principle, create new 
property rights, but merely re-organised the English property law system.526 
In this respect English law is not different from civil law systems, where legis-
lation also re-organised the property law systems, as these existed before the Civil 
Codes, almost without introducing new property rights. A common exception is for 
apartment rights, which were introduced by legislation in all the legal systems 
under study. However, whereas civil law systems with their Civil Codes froze the 
law as it stood at that moment, enabling the possibility to enumerate the available 
property rights in a law code, English courts continue to develop property law until 
they are stopped by legislation.527 
Like the civil law systems, English law adheres to a separation between the 
law of property, which creates property rights that have third-party effect, and the 
law of obligations, in particular contract law, which is governed by the doctrine of 
privity of contract.528 Also in English law, parties are free to provide content to their 
contractual relations, but enjoy a more limited freedom when these relations take 
effect against third parties as property rights. English law therefore must also use 
criteria to determine which rights are property rights and which are not. This 
section will deal with the question of how English law recognises and uses these 
types of criteria and in what way it adheres to a numerus clausus of property rights. 
 
525 Think of, inter alia, the Law of Property Act 1925 and the Land Registration Act 2002. 
526 For instance, under S. 1 Law of Property Act 1925 a term of years absolute, before that a 
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The question of whether English law adheres to a numerus clausus of property 
rights should be answered by taking into account the major distinctions English law 
makes between law and equity and between land law and personal property law. 
However, as eventually law and equity form one legal system, English law, the 
recognition of a property right in one will ultimately also have an effect on the 
other.529 
In 1795 a firm operating an ironworks constructed a railway to enable lime-
stone to be transported from a quarry to the ironworks more efficiently and at less 
expense than before. Upon construction of the railway, the operator of the iron-
works and the operator of the limestone quarry entered into a covenant that the 
former would, for themselves and their ‘heirs, executors, administrators, and 
assigns’, procure all the limestone they might want from that particular quarry. In 
1833, part of the ironworks business came, after a few changes in title-holders, into 
the hands of Joseph and Crawshay Bailey, who had full notice of the covenant. The 
Bailey’s started construction on a railway to other quarries in the area. Upon this, 
the shareholders of the limestone quarry brought an action to prevent the Bailey’s 
from constructing the railway and to force them to use the already constructed 
railway.530 
In 1834, the case came before Lord Brougham LC who considered the question 
of whether Messrs Bailey were bound by the agreement. On discussing whether the 
covenant might have created a property right, which would result in third-party 
effect, and therefore that the Bailey’s were bound by the agreement, even though 
they had no connection to the agreement except that they now held the ironworks, 
he stated: 
‘There are certain known incidents to property and its enjoyment; among others, 
certain burthens wherewith it may be affected, or rights which may be created and 
enjoyed over it by parties other than the owner; all which incidents are recognized by 
the law. In respect of possession the property may be in one, while the reversion is in 
another ; in respect of interest, the life estate in one, the remainder in tail in a second, 
and the fee in reversion in a third. So in respect of enjoyment, one may have the 
possession and the fee simple, and another may have a rent issuing out of it, or the 
tithes of its produce, or an easement, as a right of way upon it, or of common over it ... 
All these kinds of property, however, all these holdings, are well known to the law and 
familiarly dealt with by its principles. But it must not therefore be supposed that 
incidents of a novel kind can be devised and attached to property, at the fancy or 
caprice of any owner. It is clearly inconvenient both to the science of law and to the 
public weal, that such a latitude should be given. There can be no harm in allowing the 
fullest latitude to men in binding themselves and their representatives, that is, their 
assets, real and personal, to answer in damages for breach of their obligations. This 
tends to no mischief, and is reasonable liberty to bestow; but great detriment would 
arise and much confusion of rights, if parties were allowed to invent new modes of 
holding and enjoying real property, and to impress upon their lands and tenements a 
peculiar character, which should follow them into all hands, however remote. Every 
 
529 In respect to the relations between law and equity as debate is sometimes held on the so-
called ‘fusion’ of law and equity. See, inter alia, Lobban 2004a, p. 389 et seq., Lobban 2004b,  
p. 589 et seq. 
530 Keppel v Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517, 520-526. 
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close, every messuage, might thus be held in a several fashion; and it would hardly be 
possible to know what rights the acquisition of any parcel conferred, or what 
obligations it imposed’.531 
Lord Brougham LC is very clear on the subject and not only established that the 
covenant in question cannot be a new property right, he also explains why English 
law cannot allow parties to create new property rights at their ‘fancy or caprice’.532 
In short, legal certainly in English law would not be served with a freedom for 
parties to make new property rights at will. 
In the case of Hill v Tupper, in 1860 a holder of a fee simple in a piece of land 
with a canal on it granted a lease to a boat proprietor stating, inter alia, that it was 
the ‘sole and exclusive right or liberty [of the boat proprietor] to put or use boats on 
the said canal. And let the same for hire for the purpose of pleasure only’. However, 
an inn-keeper who ran a business on the side of the canal also started letting boats 
out for hire. The lessee brought an action against the inn-keeper claiming that this 
inn-keeper violated the property right of the lessee.533 The Court of Exchequer 
considered his claim. Pollock CB held:  
‘This grant merely operates as a licence or covenant on the part of the grantors, and is 
binding on them as between themselves and the grantee, but gives him no right of 
action in his own name for any infringement of the supposed exclusive right. It is 
argued that, as the owner of an estate may grant a right to cut turves, or to fish or hunt, 
there is no reason why he may not grant such a right as that now claimed by the 
plaintiff. The answer is, that the law will not allow it. So the law will not permit an 
owner of estate to grant it alternatively to his heirs male and heirs female. A new 
species of incorporeal hereditament cannot be created at the will and pleasure of the 
owner of property; but he must be content to accept the estate and the right to dispose 
of it subject of the law as settled by decisions or controlled by act of parliament. A 
grantor may bind himself by covenant to allow any right he pleases over his property, 
but he cannot annex to it a new incident, so as to enable the grantee to sue in his own 
name for an infringement of such a limited rights as that now claimed’. 
The other judges agreed and the covenant was not allowed to exist as a property 
right, the decision being reached along the same line of reasoning as used by Lord 
Brougham LC in Keppel v Bailey. However, that does not imply the agreement of 
exclusivity was not allowed. Martin B added to the judgment that the covenant was 
not invalid, but just took effect between the parties.534  
Further, in 1916 the House of Lords dealt with the question of whether an 
agreement granting a right to put up posters at the side of a cinema building was a 
property right. The question arose because the cinema building was leased to 
another party who knew about the agreement, but the lease did not mention the 
agreement at all. This other party, the lessee, did not want to grant permission to 
affix posters. The holder of the right to put up posters sued the title-holder of the 
 
531 Keppel v Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517, 520-526, at 535-536 per Lord Brougham LC. 
532 Keppel v Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517, 520-526, at 546-548 per Lord Brougham LC. 
533 Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121, at 123-124. See Swadling 2007, p. 223. 
534 Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121, at 128 per Martin B. 
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cinema building for breach of contract.535 The title-holder argued that the lessee of 
the building was bound by the agreement because of its proprietary nature. Lord 
Buckmaster LC held: 
‘The matter then is left in this way. There is a contract between the appellant and the 
respondents which creates nothing but a personal obligation. It is a licence given for 
good and valuable consideration and to endure for a certain time. But I fail to see – 
although I have done my best to follow the many authorities which the learned 
Solicitor-General has thought it right to place before our consideration – that there is 
any authority for saying that any such document creates rights other than those I have 
described’.536 
These cases show that the English courts have been very careful in dealing with par-
ties that attempt to give effect to their legal relations beyond the privity of contract. 
While considering the nature of the legal relation the parties have created, the 
courts go over the list of available property rights and, even though sometimes they 
express a dislike of the law in this respect, hold that since the relation in question 
does not fall under any of the recognised property rights, it must be personal.537  
In the area of land law this line of reasoning became confirmed through the 
limiting effect of the Law of Property Act 1925. In this statute, the available estates 
capable of existence at common law as well as other interests capable of existence at 
law were mentioned in one section.538 Although the aim of the 1925 legislation was 
by no means to change the substantive rules of land law, there are some effects that 
should be considered. Before the Law of Property Act 1925 the courts themselves 
had held authority to classify new and existing types of property rights. The intro-
duction of the Law of Property Act 1925 changed this authority in respect to rights 
that could exist at common law, but not in equity. After the Act, the legislature had 
limited the possible estates in land that can exist at common law.  
Although it is not a conclusion an English lawyer may draw, the effects of the 
Law of Property Law Act 1925 very much resemble a standardising effect.539 After 
the entry into force of the Law of Property Act 1925, the two possible estates in land 
at common law were specifically mentioned. When, after the introduction of the 
1925 Act, courts are confronted with an unknown type of property right, they are 
not only restricted by their own case law, but now also by an Act of Parliament. It 
remains to be doubted, whether a common law court could recognise a third, yet 
unknown, type of property right that is not mentioned in the Law of Property Act 
1925. It seems, therefore, that the exclusive authority to recognise new property 
 
535 King v David Allen and Sons, Billposting, Ltd [1916] 2 AC 54, HL. 
536 King v David Allen and Sons, Billposting, Ltd [1916] 2 AC 54, HL, at 61 per Lord Buckmaster LC. 
See Swadling 2007, p. 224. 
537 E.g., ‘My Lords, it is impossible to approach the consideration of this case without feeling and 
expressing great regret for the unfortunate position in which the appellant, Mr. King, has 
found himself’. King v David Allen and Sons, Billposting, Ltd [1916] 2 AC 54, HL, at 57-58 per 
Lord Buckmaster LC. 
538 S. 1 Law of Property Act 1925. See above; 2. Property Rights in Respect of Land. 
539 It is therefore that no authority in this respect can be mentioned. 
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rights at common law, but not in equity, has shifted with the Law of Property Act 
1925 from the courts to the English legislature.  
Finally, a natural consequence of this line of reasoning could that the Law of 
Property Act 1925 effectively established a rule of numerus clausus of property rights 
in land at common law.540 In other words, from 1926 on, the courts of law are 
limited by statute in their ability to create new property rights at law. In terms of a 
numerus clausus of property rights, the courts now apply a Typenzwang, meaning 
that a legal relation must fit within one of the recognised types of property rights in 
land at common law in order to be allowed as such.541  
However, this conclusion is relevant in theory only, as in equity courts remain 
to hold authority to recognise new types of property rights. In this respect, the 
courts are only bound by their own case law and not by a statute equivalent to the 
Law of Property Act 1925.542 
In personal property law the courts have also been reluctant to recognise new 
property rights at law. This is best illustrated when returning to bailment.543 Bail-
ment is a relation that is created when possession of a chattel is transferred to 
another party. The fact that possession is transferred gives rise to actions to protect 
this possession when it is interfered with, but does not create a property right as 
such.544 A personal right granting possession does not make it into a property right 
just because of that.545 As discussed above, bailment does not create a property right 
and, although courts, at certain moments, have been tempted to make it into a prop-
erty right, in general, the relationship between bailor and bailee remains personal.546 
Nevertheless, in some cases that have been discussed above, the courts have 
given rise to the recognition of new property rights. They have done so not at 
common law but in equity. Although common law and equity are connected, and 
property rights at common law exist in equity as well, there are some differences.547 
In some cases the courts have used a different approach to the limited list of avail-
able property rights. Tulk v Moxhay concerned a covenant on the use of a garden.548 
The parties to the covenant had agreed that a garden would be used as a pleasure 
garden only. When Moxhay acquired the land, he attempted to build on the garden 
and Tulk, one of the other residents, brought proceedings against him. Lord 
Cottenham LC recognised a new property right, known as a restrictive covenant, 
which could only exist in equity.549  
 
540 Swadling 2007, p. 233-234, more in general see Gray & Gray 2005, p. 1, Swadling 2006b,  
p. 121-122. 
541 On Typenzwang see Chapter 1. Introduction; 1.2.2. Numerus Clausus of Property Rights. 
542 It is in this way that S. 1 (3) LPA 1925 should be understood in this line of reasoning. 
543 See above; 3.2. Leases / Bailment? 
544 Swadling 2000a, p. 269. 
545 Swadling 2000a, p. 269, Swadling 2007, p. 231-233. 
546 E.g., Bristol Airport plc v Powdrill [1990] Ch 744, CA per Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson. 
547 Swadling 2007, p. 229-231. 
548 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774, see above; 2.5. Restrictive Covenant. 
549 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774, at 778 per Lord Cottenham LC, Burn & Cartwright 2006,  
p. 666-668, Swadling 2007, p. 256-259. 
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Equity has also made other contributions to the recognition of property rights 
in English law. Due to the operation of the maxims of equity, in particular that 
equity considers ‘that as done, which ought to be done’, it can anticipate the coming 
into existence of a property right.550 The first category of these rights comes into 
existence when an agreement is made to create a recognised property right at 
common law, but certain formalities are not fulfilled. For example, an agreement in 
writing is made that is not a deed. In such cases equity recognises the existence of a 
property right before it comes into existence at common law. As discussed above, 
the application of this maxim of equity concerns most property rights, except liens, 
which by their nature are more of a remedy than a property right.551  
A second category of equitable property rights should be distinguished. 
Equity has also given rise to new property rights when certain agreements are 
made. This applies in case of estate contracts and options to purchase, which antici-
pate a conveyance of an estate in land.552 The recognition of these property rights 
became paired with the fact that such agreements would be specifically enforceable 
in equity.553 The result is a constructive trust that enables both seller and buyer to 
have a property right in the same land.554 
The above could indicate that although at law the list of property rights is 
closed, parties are free in equity to create new property rights.555 Especially when 
the law of trusts is taken into account, this conclusion may be reached. Any right 
that can be held outright can also be held on trust.556 The creation of a trust gives 
rise to an additional right in equity for the beneficiary. When the subject-matter of 
the trust is a property right, this equitable right of the beneficiary is also a property 
right, which, in its turn, can be assigned, leased, charged to third parties, and, if 
necessary, can be enforced. Apart from the requirements avoiding fraud, the con-
tent of a trust and therefore also the content of the right in equity of the beneficiary 
can be formed according to the parties’ wishes.  
However, the cases on estate contracts and options to purchase show that, due 
to the exceptional specific enforceability of these contracts, a constructive trust and 
thus an equitable right might arise. Swadling adds to this that these rights remain 
anticipatory in nature. When the agreement, such as an estate contract or option to 
purchase, ultimately does not give rise to the creation or the conveyance of a prop-
erty right it cannot be a property right in equity either.557 In other words, when at 
common law no property right or transfer of a property right results, equity cannot 
just make a property right out of nowhere. Also, when at common law a personal 
 
550 Swadling 2007, p. 231-233. 
551 On liens, see above; 3.6. Liens. 
552 See above; 2.7. Estate Contracts and 2.8. Options to Purchase. 
553 Swadling 2007, p. 259-260, Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 66. 
554 Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499, Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch D 9, London and South 
Western Railway v Gomm (1882) 20 Ch D 562. 
555 Against this, see Swadling 2007, p. 231. 
556 See above; 1.5. Trust Law. 
557 Booker v Palmer [1942] 2 All ER 674, 677, CA, Swadling 2007, p. 262-263. 
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right would result, equity cannot make the entitlement to a personal right into a 
property right.  
In this respect it has been argued that through proprietary estoppel, especially 
after the introduction of the Land Registration Act 2002, a licence of land that comes 
into existence through the workings of estoppel can lead to the creation of an 
equitable property right.558 However, here also equity does not have the power to 
transform what would be a personal right at common law, a licence of land, into a 
property right in equity.559 In other cases, anticipating the law through the recog-
nition of another property right in equity will most likely not occur. When parties 
create an express trust on a property relation, they do create a property right in 
equity, but this does not exist without the legal right existing as well. Therefore, an 
express trust could be considered creating equitable rights in the first category, 
rather than the second. 
These cases show that it might be possible for English courts to recognise new 
property rights. In one case in particular, this possibility was considered. In National 
Provincial Bank v Ainsworth, the House of Lords considered the nature of a right to 
live in the matrimonial home by a wife who had been deserted by her husband.560 
The husband had used the matrimonial home as security for debts and defaulted on 
his payments. The question before the House of Lords was whether the wife had a 
property right to live in the house that would bind the creditor bank as a chargee.  
Lord Hodson, delivering the first judgment, looked into the available property 
rights in respect of land, and came to the conclusion that the right of the wife was 
not one of them. Therefore, he held, the other law lords agreed with him, the right 
of the wife was personal between the wife and the husband and did not bind the 
bank as chargee.561 Moreover, Lord Wilberforce added additional reasoning to 
explain why this right of the wife could not be a property right. He held: 
On any division, then, which is to be made between property rights on the one 
hand, and personal rights on the other hand, however broad or penumbral the 
separating band between these two kinds of rights may be, there can be little doubt 
where the wife's rights fall. Before a right or an interest can be admitted into the 
category of property, or of a right affecting property, it must be definable, identifi-
able by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and have 
some degree of permanence or stability. The wife's right has none of these qualities, 
it is characterised by the reverse of them.562 
With this judgment, Lord Wilberforce implies that the category of property 
rights in equity is open and that, once the criteria he mentions are fulfilled, a new 
property right may come into existence. However, a right not falling under these 
criteria, such as the wife’s right in this case cannot be a property right in any case.563 
 
558 S. 116 Land Registration Act 2002, McFarlane 2003, p. 695-696. 
559 See Swadling 2007, p. 226-227. 
560 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, HL. 
561 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, HL at 1220-1225 per Lord Hodson. 
562 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, HL at 1247-1248 per Lord Wilberforce. 
563 See Swadling 2007, p. 225. 
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Lord Wilberforce’s criteria have not since been followed, not even in cases where 
the court considered the possible existence of a new property right.564  
When it comes to numerus clausus and Typenzwang, after Tulk v Moxhay the 
courts have not created any new independent property rights, even though there 
have been cases attempting to achieve this. In equity, the courts have allowed antici-
patory property rights to come into existence, but these rights are always connected 
to an eventual creation or conveyance of an already recognised type of property 
right.  
A second element of numerus clausus is Typenfixierung.565 The term Typen-
fixierung covers the idea that once a property right from the list has been selected, 
the law prescribes which criteria must be fulfilled. Failure to comply will lead to the 
non-existence of the right in property law. The application of Typenfixierung to 
English property law is, like the application of Typenzwang, not something an 
English property law would undertake. However, in the light of a comparative 
study, some reflections in Typenfixierung by the English courts might offer insights 
that can be used further.566  
In Clore v Theatrical Properties, a lease included an agreement that granted 
‘front of house rights’ to a theatre.567 In this respect the agreement stated that ‘the 
lessor doth hereby demise and grant unto the lessee the free and exclusive use of all 
the refreshment rooms of the theatre for the purpose only of the supply to and the 
accommodation of the visitors to the theatre and for no other purpose whatsoever’. 
The lessor then assigned his interest, and the new holder tried to prevent the lessee 
from exercising his rights under the lease.  
Lord Wright MR, although sympathetic with the ‘lessee’ in this case, held that 
this agreement did not result in exclusive possession because the refreshment rooms 
of the theatre were shared with the title-holder and his licensees.568 Because a lease 
requires the grant of exclusive possession, the right granted in this case could not be 
a property right, and consequently, as a personal right, could not bind the new 
lessor, as he was not a party to the agreement. 
Also in other cases dealing with leases, the courts have considered what 
criteria need to be fulfilled in order to distinguish them from licences to occupy, 
which are ‘mere’ personal rights. These include the decision by Lord Templeman on 
the three criteria required for a lease; exclusive possession, for a term and at a rent, 
in Street v Mountford, and the removal by Fox LJ in Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold on the 
requirement of a rent.569 
 
564 Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold and Another [1989] Ch 1, CA. See Swadling 2007, p. 225, 242-243. 
565 On Typenfixierung see Chapter 1; 1.2.2. Numerus Clausus of Property Rights. 
566 See Chapter 7; 2. The Content of Property Law Systems in Europe. 
567 Clore v Theatrical Properties Ltd and Westby & Co Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 483, CA. 
568 Clore v Theatrical Properties Ltd and Westby & Co Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 483, CA per Lord Wright 
MR. 
569 Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809, HL at 818 per Lord Templeman, Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold 
[1989] Ch 1, CA at 9 per Fox LJ. See also Booker v Palmer [1942] 2 All ER 674 per Lord Greene 
MR on the certainty of term. 
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Also in respect to other property rights, case law has set criteria that must be 
fulfilled for a property right to come into existence. These include Re Ellenborough 
Park setting the requirements for easements, and Rhone v Stevens prohibiting 
positive burdens in case of restrictive covenants.570 These criteria are subsequently 
applied when parties attempt to bring their legal relation under the definitions of 
property rights.  
One clear example of this is offered by the abovementioned case of King v 
David Allen Billposting Ltd, in which the right to put up posters could also not be an 
easement as it did not fulfil one of the criteria set by Re Ellenborough Park, namely 
that there was no dominant tenement.571 Another example is offered by the facts of 
the Hill v Tupper case that could also not amount to an easement, as the right to let 
out pleasure boats benefited one of the parties themselves rather than the land, and 
therefore failed another criterion for easements set by Re Ellenborough Park.572 
As in other legal systems, the degree of party autonomy depends on the prop-
erty right in question. This applies to easements and restrictive covenants, but also 
to agreements made in case of a term of years absolute.573 However, one feature that 
is exceptional in comparison with other legal systems are equitable charges.574 
Equitable charges are tailor-made security rights that can have any content, burden-
ing the object on which they are created with a property right. In this respect there 
is a constant tension with the property law element of Typenfixierung of the numerus 
clausus and the party autonomy the parties enjoy under contract law.575 However, as 
long as parties stay within the boundaries of these property rights, the rights come 
into existence.  
The sources of English law – common law, equity and statute – mean that the 
answer to the question of whether English law recognises a numerus clausus of 
property rights should be approached differently than in civil law systems with 
their Civil Codes. In English law, the primary source of property law is case law 
and it is through case law that the system of property law, both real and personal, 
developed. Statutes fulfil a subsidiary role, usually standardising the common law, 
and only occasionally, in particular the Land Registration Act 2002, altering the 
system.  
Legislation has not created any new property rights, and from an English 
point of view this task should not be for the legislature, but rather for the courts, 
preferably in equity. The courts of equity have shown their willingness to remedy 
novel situations with the recognition of a new property right. However, the result of 
this is not that the system of property law is open.  
 
570 Re Ellenborough Park. Re Davies (deceased). Powell and Others v Maddison and Another [1956] Ch 
131, CA, per Lord Evershed MR, Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310, HL per Lord Templeman. 
571 King v David Allen and Sons, Billposting, Ltd [1916] 2 AC 54, HL, see Swadling 2007, p. 224. 
572 Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121. 
573 See above; 2.2. Lease of Land, 2.3. Easement, and 2.5. Restrictive Covenant. 
574 See above; 2.10 Charges of Land, and 3.4. Charges, Fixed and Floating. 
575 Smith 2000, p. 425-426. 
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To the contrary, unless authorised through one of the sources of law, parties 
cannot create new property rights.576 The courts give good reasons for that and keep 
using the same line of arguments to prevent parties from creating new property 
rights or ‘fancies’.  
Rudden has attempted to analyse English property law and explain why a 
numerus clausus must exist.577 As one of the main reasons why it must exist, he con-
tends that a purchaser of an object would have many problems finding out which 
property rights are created on it.578 Registration, he argues, is not the solution here, 
as notice of the existence of a property right is not enough for it to bind third 
parties. In Rudden’s view the allowance to register any right would make even 
personal rights enforceable against third parties, even without their consent.579 
Another reason Rudden uses is that freedom for parties to create property 
rights would create a pyramid of rights, in which each successive right-holder 
would want to create property rights himself.580 Allowing this, in Rudden’s view, 
would lead to a decrease in the value of the land. 
The result of an examination of English property law is that, from the pers-
pective of private parties, the system of property law in England is closed. Parties 
are not free themselves to create new, as yet unknown, property rights. Only when 
they are authorised to do so by statute, or by a court decision, whether at law or in 
equity, can new property rights that were not recognised before, come into exis-
tence. In those cases it will not be the parties themselves that create the right, 
although the parties do create the legal relation, but the legislature or judiciary 
granting third-party effect, and therefore making it into a property relation. In this 
respect a numerus clausus may be held to exist in English law.581 
 
576 Or ‘fancies’, see Rudden 1987, p. 240. 
577 Rudden 1987, p. 245 et seq. 
578 Rudden 1987, p. 246. 
579 Rudden 1987, p. 247. 
580 Rudden 1987, p. 248. 
581 Rudden 1987, p. 260-261, Swadling 2000b, p. 354 et seq., Swadling 2006b, p. 121-122, Gray & 
Gray 2005, p. 152-154, Sparkes 2003, p. 88-97, Swadling 2007, p. 223. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
397 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 
1. Introduction 
The property law systems of France, Germany, the Netherlands and England 
represent a large part of the legal traditions in Europe.1 In the past, the comparative 
study of the law of France, Germany and England, in particular, consisted of the 
search for similarities and dissimilarities between these legal systems.2 These three 
legal systems have also been used to draw initial conclusions for a European Private 
law.3 Not only have comparative studies led to a better understanding of foreign 
legal systems, they have also led to initiatives providing common rules on the basis 
of comparative analysis.4 
These developments have mainly taken place in an area of private law where 
there is a common basis in Roman law5 – the law of obligations, in particular the 
law of contract. It is also in contract law that the well-known Principles of European 
Contract Law, the UNIDROIT principles on international commercial contracts, 
and, most recently, the Principles of European Law, have been drafted.6 Partly 
based on these comparative law efforts, it is also in this area that the European 
Union has issued a series of Directives, mainly for the purpose of consumer protec-
tion.7 Furthermore, the European Commission continues to work on a ‘more coher-
 
1 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 63 et seq. For a critical view on using European legal traditions as a 
standard in comparative law, see Glenn 2006, p. 434-436. 
2 See, inter alia, Koschaker 1995, Zimmermann 2006, p. 546-547, 549-550. 
3 See, e.g., Zimmermann 1996a, Gordley 1993, p. 498 et seq., Van Vliet 2000, Sagaert 2003. 
4 See Zimmermann 2006, p. 557-560. 
5 See, e.g., Zimmermann 1996a, Gordley 1991, Van Dam 2006. 
6 See Goode 2004, p. xix, Zimmermann 2006, p. 560-564. On the Principles of European Law 
(PEL) see Chapter 8; 2.1.3. European Commission Initiatives for Future Legislation. 
7 See, e.g., Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, and Council Directive 85/577/EEC 
of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from 
business premises. On these Directives see Zimmermann 2006, p. 543-545. 
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ent’ European contract law with the development of a Common Frame of Reference 
(CFR) as the latest issue.8 
In comparison with the law of contract, the law of property has often been 
held to be underdeveloped. The study of comparative law has been considered less 
interesting in this area in Europe because of the major differences between the laws 
of the EU Member States.9 Traditionally, it is held that these differences are due to 
the national character of property law, in particular with respect to land, and the 
role property law plays in taxation issues.10 Property law systems are traditionally 
perceived as very different from each other, and common principles covering the 
whole area of law, such as the Principles of European Contract Law, the UNIDROIT 
principles, or the Principles of European Law, have not been drafted. However, in 
specific areas that touch upon property law aspects, such as trust law and insol-
vency law, attempts to draft common principles have been made.11 
One of the most important reasons for the lack of comparative initiatives is 
that in the area of property law the differences between the civil law and the 
common law tradition have been considered to be unbridgeable.12 Once more, com-
pared with contract law, relatively few studies have been devoted to the compari-
son of these legal systems to determine whether this is actually the case.13 The 
results of studies in comparative property law show two things. First, differences 
between common law and civil law certainly exist. Second, there are also differences 
amongst civil law systems and these are sometimes just as big as the differences 
between common law and civil law. However, these studies also show that differ-
ences in and between both areas, common law and civil law, can be bridged.14 
1.1. Property Law in Development 
The developments in the study of comparative and European property law go hand 
in hand with the changing field of property law. In the last few decades, property 
law has moved itself away from the very static system it has been since the period 
of Roman law. With the exception of the ancien régime, where, under the feudal 
 
8 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
European Contract Law, COM(2001) 398, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council. A more Coherent European Contract Law. An Action 
Plan. COM(2003) 68, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council. European Contract Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward. 
COM(2004) 651, and Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis COM(2006) 744. On 
the Common Frame of Reference (CFR) see, inter alia, Rutgers 2006, p. 217 et seq., Van Erp 
2006b, p. 10-11, Smits 2006, Smits 2007, p. 281 et seq. 
9 See Van Erp 2006a, p. 1044, Sagaert 2007, p. 301. 
10 See also Gray & Gray 2005, p. 1-2. 
11 See Hayton, Kortman & Verhagen 1999, McBryde, Flessner & Kortmann 2005. 
12 See Van Erp 2006a, p. 1044-1046. 
13 See, e.g., Van Vliet 2000, Zwalve 2003, Sagaert 2003. For a similar observation see 
Zimmermann 2006, p. 570-571. 
14 See, e.g., Van Vliet 2000, p. 201 et seq. 
 399 
Chapter 7 
system, new property rights were created, the list of property rights in most legal 
systems remained static and Roman-law inspired. 
On the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the French Civil Code, Libchaber 
took the opportunity to plead for a re-codification of French property law.15 A re-
codification is needed, he argues, because property law has developed in recent 
decades in such a way that the current regulations can no longer be sufficiently 
applied.16 In his view, property law has been subject to three developments; changes 
in concepts, changes in objects and the development of new techniques.17 Although 
Libchaber’s ideas are based on French law and the French Civil Code, his remarks 
are of a general European importance. In fact, it is partly because of the influence of 
ideas from other legal systems, and the increasing Europeanisation as well as inter-
nationalisation of property law, that Libchaber comes to his ideas. Of course, these 
European and international influences are also present in other legal systems. 
The first challenge for property law that Libchaber recognises is the change in 
concepts. This change is visible, in particular, in the changed applications of the 
right of ownership.18 When the French Civil Code was drafted, its drafters had a 
certain idea of society and the function of the law of property, in particular of the 
right of ownership. As a reaction against the fragmentation of ownership in the 
ancien régime, the new definition of the right of ownership created a unitary right.19 
The right of ownership of the makers of the Civil Code was a concept of ownership 
of an immovable object.20 However, in modern property law, the concept of owner-
ship is more and more seen as the paramount set of legal relations in respect of an 
object.21 This includes questions of whether the right of ownership also includes 
intellectual property rights, and whether the right of ownership can also be held on 
other rights.22  
Furthermore, the unitary concept of ownership as a rejection of fragmentation 
is increasingly confronted with types of co-ownership in which either legislation or 
party agreement modifies the relations between the co-owners in such a way that 
the right of ownership in its natural form is no longer recognisable.23 This in 
particular includes the law in respect of apartments. 
Secondly, Libchaber signals that property law is faced with an increase in the 
types of objects that do not fulfil the criteria of the original objects the drafters of the 
Civil Code had in mind, which were immovable objects, and, possibly, movable 
 
15 Libchaber 2004, p. 297 et seq. 
16 Libchaber 2004, p. 297-302. 
17 Libchaber 2004, p. 302-303. 
18 Libchaber 2004, p. 304. 
19 Art. 544 C.civ. see Chapter 3; 2.1. Ownership. 
20 Libchaber 2004, p. 315. 
21 Libchaber 2004, p. 311-314, Zenati 1981, p. 84-104, Zenati 1993, p. 305. 
22 Although this study deliberately excludes intellectual property rights from the spheres of 
property law, in many, mainly Anglo-American systems, intellectual property law is con-
sidered a part of property law. 
23 See Libchaber 2004, p. 315-323. 
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objects.24 More and more incorporeal objects, for example, ideas and other intellec-
tual property rights, as well as claims, are becoming subjects of property law in a 
system that is not specifically intended to deal with them.25 For example, general 
rules on acquisition and transfer might be difficult or sometimes even impossible to 
apply.26 
The third and final challenge Libchaber recognises is the development of new 
techniques of property law. This challenge combines the two former challenges and 
brings the focus on to numerus clausus.27 New techniques of holding property rights 
include modifying existing property rights, as well as possibly creating new types. 
In respect to new techniques, this includes the development of rules on substitution 
or real subrogation, which allow the object of a property right to be replaced by sub-
stituting other objects, for instance, money instead of corporeal objects.28 Changing 
property rights themselves include the law on apartment ownership just mentioned, 
but also the development of real or qualitative obligations, and the development of 
the right of lease.29 Especially in respect of real obligations, usually as a part of a 
recognised type of property right, and rights of lease, there are strong arguments for 
these rights to be recognised as property rights because of the third-party effect 
these legal relations have been granted.30 
1.2. The Increasing Role of Contract Law  
Since the introduction of the Civil Codes in the civil law systems, these legal 
systems have undergone important developments. In the French Civil Code, the law 
of contract was subjected to the law of property, contract law was presented as pro-
viding ways to acquire ownership. In the German Civil Code, contract law achieved 
an equal status with property law.31 In the decades that followed the introduction of 
the Civil Codes, contract law played an increasingly important role, eventually, in 
particular in commercial law, for some purposes thus becoming more important 
than property law.32 
In the area of property law itself, which is traditionally an area of law where 
private parties do not enjoy much freedom, private parties now opt for contractual 
solutions whenever possible. In fact, certain property law systems have allowed 
property law to develop by awarding some contractual relations the status of 
property law. Examples of these include the German Anwartschaftsrechte, in English 
‘acquisition rights’, and the restrictive covenants in English law. Furthermore, 
 
24 See, e.g., Art. 516 C.civ that states that all objects are movable or immovable. See Libchaber 
2004, p. 329. See also Reich 1964, p. 733 et seq., Rudden 1994, p. 83 et seq. 
25 Libchaber 2004, p. 341-350. 
26 Libchaber 2004, p. 329-341. 
27 Libchaber 2004, p. 353. 
28 Libchaber 2004, p. 303, 368-369. 
29 Libchaber 2004, p. 359-364. See also Smits 1996, p. 41 et seq., Sagaert 2004a, p. 353. 
30 Libchaber 2004, p. 364-371, Van Erp 2006a, p. 1052-1053. 
31 See Motive III 1888, p. 1-3. 
32 See Goode 2004, p. 11-20. 
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German and French law give certain property effects to contractual relations 
characterised as Treuhand or fiducie.33 Other legal systems, Dutch law in particular, 
have not followed these developments, not even when an opportunity arose with 
the introduction of a new Civil Code in 1992. 
Within the existing structures of property law, the law of contract plays an 
increasingly important role.34 In those areas where property law allows for party 
autonomy, parties make use of it to the maximum. Examples of these developments 
are in the field of servitudes, emphyteusis, superficies and apartment rights. These 
rights are now used to fulfil functions, for instance, in project development schemes, 
that did not exist in the nineteenth century. This includes possibilities for parties to 
separate ownership of a building from ownership of land, divide the building into 
apartments and grant access to the building and parking spaces. In this sense, 
contract law is used to combine or ‘stack’ property rights to create modern-day 
solutions.  
German law presents an optimal system to make use of contract law in proper-
ty law. In these developments, property law has become the servant of contract law 
– in order to strengthen the performance of an obligation, the Sicherungsdienstbarkeit, 
or security-servitude, is recognised. Here, property law plays a passive role until the 
non-performance of the obligation. Only upon non-performance of the obligation 
are the property right and its strong remedies invoked.35 
Finally, the increasing importance of claims and other rights as objects of 
property rights, as dealt with in the previous section, have influence on the content 
of property rights as well.36 A claim is, in essence, a personal right shaped through 
party agreement. When parties shape their personal right in a certain way and this 
right subsequently becomes the object of a property right, it could be argued that 
these agreements become part of the property right in it as well. Lebon provides an 
example of a non-transferability clause of a claim that makes a property right in 
respect of a claim also non-transferable.37 The impact of this last development is 
such that the underlying object influences the content of the property right. In other 
words, the content of the claim influences the content of the property relation 
created on that claim. In terms of civil law doctrine, with this development the dis-
tinction between the object of a property right and the property right itself becomes 
less clear, and possibly it can no longer be maintained.38 
German doctrine has appropriately named these developments Verdinglichung 
obligatorischer Rechte, which translates as ‘property-isation of personal rights’, and 
Obligatoriserung dinglicher Rechte, ‘obligation-isation of property rights’.39 These 
 
33 See Libchaber 2004, p. 369-371. 
34 See, e.g., Kieninger 2004, p. 656-667. 
35 On German security-servitudes see Chapter 4; 3.1. Real Servitude, and 3.2. Personal 
Servitudes.  
36 See above; 1.1. Property Law in Development. 
37 See, e.g., HR 17 January 2003, NJ 2004, 281 (Oryx), Lebon 2007. See also Wibier 2007, p. 49-51. 
38 Struycken points out the danger of this development for civil law doctrinal thinking, see 
Struycken 2007, p. 117-119. 
39 Dulckeit 1951, p. 7 et seq., Canaris 1978, p. 371 et seq., Weitnauer 1983, p. 705 et seq. Wiegand 
1984, p. 107 et seq. Another example is provided by Wibier, who argues that property security 
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developments have consequences for the property law systems and also for the con-
tent of the recognised property rights. In other words, there is also an effect on the 
numerus clausus of property rights. Therefore, in the course of this Chapter, many 
influences of contract law will be dealt with. 
First, this Chapter will recall the essentials of numerus clausus (Section 1.3), 
then consider the property law systems of France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
England (Section 2) and see to which developments these systems are subject. Only 
after that will the Chapter return to numerus clausus and will deal with if and how it 
functions (Sections 3 and 4).  
1.3. Considering Numerus Clausus 
1.3.1. Requirements of Numerus Clausus 
It is useful to recall the function of the numerus clausus of property rights before 
embarking on a comparative discussion of the various property rights. When it 
comes to general principles of property law, the numerus clausus is the principle that 
decides which legal relations create a property right and which do not achieve this 
status.40 This filtering role the numerus clausus plays is present in each system that 
distinguishes property law from the law of obligations.41 In fact, for most, it is the 
essential function of the principle.42 Following the basic German doctrinal dis-
tinctions, the filter of the numerus clausus comprises of two different elements. First, 
a legal relation must fall under one of the recognised property rights (Typenzwang) 
and, secondly, the rules on that recognised property right will determine how and 
whether the right may exist (Typenfixierung).43  
After considering the origin of numerus clausus it will be easier to place it in a 
comparative overview. In each of the legal systems discussed in earlier chapters, a 
numerus clausus has been found to exist in some form. This Chapter will not there-
fore repeat the search. Instead, it will, through comparison of the legal systems dealt 
with, analyse the property law systems of France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
England, in search of similarities in the existence and content of the numerus 
clausus.44 
 
rights on bank accounts can be replaced with a contractual solution. See Wibier 2007, p. 49 et 
seq. 
40 This role numerus clausus plays has also been named its organisational function (organisato-
rische dimensie), see Struycken 2007, p. 350-356, 759. 
41 See Van Erp 2006b, p. 14, Sagaert 2005b, p. 1030-1031. 
42 Struycken 2007, p. 350-356, Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 335, Van Erp 2006b, p. 14, Wiegand 
1999a, p. 111. 
43 See Chapter 1; 1.2.2. Numerus Clausus of Property Rights. 
44 See below; 2. The Content of Property Law Systems in Europe. 
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1.3.2. Numerus Clausus as a Principle or as a Rule? 
Apart from the basic features of numerus clausus, this Chapter also addresses how 
legal systems deal with numerus clausus. As a general principle, numerus clausus 
ensures that private parties are limited in their freedom to create property rights. 
However, depending on the nature of a legal system, whether it is a civil law or a 
common law system, and within that distinction, a strict or a flexible system, the 
degree of freedom will differ. 
In all legal systems under discussion, the principle of numerus clausus, the idea 
that there are limitations on the number and the content of property rights available 
for private parties, is present. In a system adhering to such a general idea, parties 
are not necessarily prohibited from creating new property rights, but the addition of 
new rights might be subject to serious restrictions. However, in other legal systems, 
such as the strict civil law systems of Germany and the Netherlands, parties may be 
prohibited by law from creating new property rights altogether. In these systems 
the principle of numerus clausus finds expression in such a way that it might be 
called a rule of numerus clausus.  
This distinction between systems using a principle of numerus clausus and 
those using a rule of numerus clausus has consequences for the discussion on wheth-
er a numerus clausus is recognised in a legal system. Although the concept might be 
best developed and most discussed in the systems adhering to the rule of numerus 
clausus, these systems do not necessarily set the norm for a numerus clausus from a 
comparative perspective. Making the rule of numerus clausus into the standard for 
other legal systems should not be the way in which this concept is considered 
comparatively. First of all, it provides an inaccurate view of the reality of legal sys-
tems. As can be seen from the discussion on German law, even though doctrinally 
there is a strictly closed system of property rights, new elements, such as the trans-
fer of ownership for security purposes, and even new property rights, such as the 
acquisition rights, have been added through case law.  
Secondly, numerus clausus as a basic principle of property law should be 
looked at from a comparative point of view. When the system with the highest 
standard is taken as the example for the other legal systems, comparison will not 
lead to results that can be used to develop further thought. Using the minimum 
standard of the principle of numerus clausus enables comparison between the legal 
systems, taking into account the differences and degrees to which the principle is 
adhered. As a result a much more nuanced overview can be gained. 
1.3.3. Historical Origins of Numerus Clausus 
In order to provide a complete overview of numerus clausus, a look at its historical 
origin is necessary. Following the development of property rights in civil law dealt 
with in Chapter 2, one might expect to find the origin of numerus clausus in the 
development of property rights in Roman law. However, in considering Roman law 
as a basis of our current legal system, caution should be exercised. As was discussed 
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in Chapter 2, ancient Roman law used a system of actions, not of rights. Therefore 
Roman law took a procedural rather than a substantive approach to private law.45 
As was also discussed in Chapter 2, the system of actions in Roman law 
formed a closed system, both for property law and contract law. In an approach to 
numerus clausus that takes a system of property rights as opposed to actions as a 
starting point, the fact that the system of property actions in Roman law was closed 
tells us nothing about whether a numerus clausus of property rights was also in 
place. Struycken warns us about this approach and quotes Lokin, who states: 
Concerning absolute rights, in which respect Roman law knew a closed system, 
modern law coincidentally also recognises a closed system, but on the basis of com-
pletely different arguments than those of the Romans. Roman law knew, due to its 
limited number of formulas, nothing but closed systems; in our system, absolute rights 
are limited in number, because with each absolute right, interests of third parties are at 
stake. It could paralyse trade when absolute rights that can be enforced against third 
parties can be created without limitations.46 
Although the argument that the system of actions can be opposed to the system of 
rights should be awarded its place in the reasoning on whether a numerus clausus 
existed in Roman law, it is not the sole factor that should be looked at. First of all, 
modern legal systems also prescribe the actions a holder of a property right may 
take in the case of interference or a threat of interference with his right. The best 
examples of this follow from German law, which, for instance, in the Civil Code, 
provides the actions to protect possession in case of dispossession and interference 
of possession, in case of re-vindication of ownership or in case of interference with 
the right of ownership.47 However, there is not necessarily a closed system at its 
base. In modern law, Lokin seems right in that respect, the decision to recognise 
another property right is not the decision to recognise a new real action. 
Secondly, the fact that Romans thought in concepts of actions and not in con-
cepts of rights should not end the discussion on the closed nature of the property 
law system. Just like in modern law, the recognition of a property right is depen-
dent on its authorisation by the legal system. Depending on the sources of law and 
the hierarchy between them in a legal system, recognition of a new property right is 
achieved through legislation or case law.48 In (pre-) classical Roman law, the sources 
were edicts of Praetors and legal writers, and only in Emperor Justinian’s time was 
 
45 See Chapter 2; 2.5. A Numerus Clausus in (Pre-) Classical Roman Law? and 3.5. A Numerus 
Clausus in the Corpus Iuris Civilis? 
46 Lokin 2003, p. 273, ‘Ten aanzien van de absolute rechten, waar het Romeinse recht natuurlijk 
ook een gesloten stelsel heeft, kent het huidige recht toevallig ook een gesloten stelsel, maar 
op grond van geheel andere overwegingen dan die voor de Romeinen bepalend waren. Het 
Romeinse recht kende door zijn beperkte aantal formula’s niet anders dan gesloten stelsels; 
bij ons zijn de absolute rechten beperkt in aantal, omdat bij ieder absoluut recht de belangen 
van derden op het spel staan. Het zou op het rechtsverkeer verlammend kunnen werken 
wanneer de absolute rechten die tegen derden gehandhaafd kunnen worden in onbeperkte 
aantallen zouden kunnen worden gevestigd’. See Struycken 2007, p. 124-125. 
47 See, §§ 861, 862, 985 and 1004 BGB respectively. 
48 More on this reasoning see below in 3. Numerus Clausus in Comparative Analysis. 
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there legislation that took the form of the Corpus Iuris Civilis. The question of 
awarding an action of course took place in the legal environment of procedural law, 
but awarding a new action to a new situation was not unthinkable. In fact, at the 
time of the development of property rights, new actions were created or old ones 
were modified so as to adapt to the newly recognised situations.49 
Behind this line of argumentation is the question of when a new property right 
is recognised. If the development of property rights is taken into consideration, new 
property rights come with changes in society, and, most of the time, they demand 
adaptation of the already existing rights. When Roman society developed from a 
purely agricultural into a more urban economy, the category of rural servitudes was 
complemented by the development of urban servitudes.50 Whereas a transaction for 
security purposes could function in a small society where everyone knew each 
other, and could survive because of the requirement to have witnesses with a 
mancipatio, the new Roman society, with its larger communities and many peregrini, 
strangers, required a transfer of possession for a new security right, pignus. This was 
originally a contract, but only later became a property right through the develop-
ment of the actio Serviana.51 
Moreover, the real actions awarded in Roman law led to a parallel recognition 
of property rights when Roman law was received, from the twelfth century on-
wards, by the efforts of the jurists Bartolus and Baldus.52 Following this method, the 
rei vindicatio led to the right of ownership, the actio confessoria led to rights of servi-
tude, and the actio Serviana to a right of pledge.53 In this period, the recognition of 
the list of rights became accepted and led to a more or less closed system.54 When 
legal doctrine developed, and concepts became clearer, for instance, the distinction 
between the right of ownership and other property rights in Donellus’ work, new 
property rights were added in a logical system at a time when legal writers could 
do so.  
Finally, in the period of the drafting of the Civil Codes, when the concept of a 
closed system of property rights was dealt with, this led to a change in hierarchy of 
sources of law.55 In the Civil Codes of both France and Germany, it is provided, 
albeit implicitly in the German Civil Code, that only those property rights men-
tioned by the Civil Code could be property rights.56 It is only in this period that a 
rule of numerus clausus surfaced. 
Therefore, the real origin of numerus clausus could very well be found in the 
drafting of the Civil Codes. However, whether the origin of the rule of numerus 
clausus should be found in French or German law remains a subject of debate. 
 
49 See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights, and 3.4. Other Property Rights. 
50 See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
51 See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights, and 3.4. Other Property Rights. 
52 See Chapter 2; 4.4. Other Property Rights. 
53 Furthermore Baldus recognised the right to succession, the ius heriditatis. See Feenstra 1979,  
p. 14, Feenstra 1989, p. 113. 
54 Of course, in the period of the Ius Commune, there was always local customary law that could 
also be the source of property rights. See Chapter 2; 4. The Ius Commune. 
55 In the same sense, see Struycken 2007, p. 169. 
56 Art. 543 CC, Motive III 1888, p. 3. 
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Treilhard, a member of the commission drafting the French Civil Code, made his 
intentions about Article 543 C.civ very clear when he stated that, in his view, the 
Article contained the only ‘modifications to which the owners can be susceptible in 
our political and social organisation’.57 Although, at a later stage, rights have been 
added, and a decision of the Cour de cassation from 1834 has led to a lively debate on 
whether Article 543 C.civ constitutes an exhaustive list, the intention of the legis-
lators with this Article seems clear. 
However, in German law, express limitations on party autonomy are made by 
the legislature which, in the Motive, explicitly stated that ‘the number of property 
rights is … limited’.58 However, the term numerus clausus is not used by either of the 
explanatory memoranda. Struycken mentions he has found the earliest mention of 
the term numerus clausus in a textbook by Heck from 1930.59 I have not been able to 
find an earlier reference to the term numerus clausus before that. In French literature 
the term numerus clausus is not much used either. French writers have written more 
about limiting property rights, or in terms of the private autonomy of the owner.60  
Considering numerus clausus as a principle and not as a rule, the general idea 
of limiting property rights could be as old as law, or at least as old as systematisa-
tion of law. Any right with an effect against third parties deserves special treatment 
and should be approached differently from those rights that do not have this effect. 
Granting a certain legal relation, which we now call a right, an action that enables 
one of the parties to act against any third party, is, although technically perhaps 
different, at least functionally similar to stating that a property right has effect 
against third parties. In order to give effect to these rights an action is also needed 
that enables the holder of the right to react appropriately.  
Reasoning that Roman law can be excluded when looking at the historical 
origin of numerus clausus may very well hold true for the rule of numerus clausus and 
the use of the term numerus clausus, which indeed seems to be a German ‘invention’ 
dating from after the French Revolution, but it does not provide us with a full over-
view of the development of property rights and the system in which they function. 
For that, an understanding of property relations from Roman law and their de-
velopment into those property rights that eventually received their place in the legal 
systems is required as well. 
 
57 ‘… les seules modification dont les propriétés soient susceptibles dans notre organisation 
politique et sociale …’, Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du code civil 11, p. 33. See 
Chapter 3; 5. A Numerus Clausus in French Property Law? 
58 ‘… Die Zahl der dinglichen Rechte ist daher ... eine geschlossene’, Motive III 1888, p. 3. See 
Chapter 4; 1. Introduction. 
59 Heck 1930, Paras. 22 and 23, Struycken 2007, p. 122-123. 
60 Limitation des droits réels or l’autonomie de la volonté. See, inter alia, Hervieu 1981. 
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1.3.4. Numerus Clausus as a Principle of ‘Constitutional’ Property Law, or as a 
Framework Principle 
It is Struycken’s contention that numerus clausus should also be looked at as a 
principle of what I call ‘constitutional’ property law.61 This term does not refer to 
the human rights dimension of property law, but to the organisational function in 
the separation of powers doctrine.62 Another term would therefore be to describe 
numerus clausus as a framework principle of property law. Struycken has shown that 
numerus clausus is also a question of which party or institution has authority to 
create new property rights. He comes to this conclusion after careful analysis of the 
development of Dutch property law in respect to the numerus clausus, and decides 
that numerus clausus shows the primacy of the legislature in this area.63 This primacy 
should not only be seen in respect of private parties, in the sense of limiting party 
autonomy, but also in respect of the judiciary, which, in Struycken’s view, in Dutch 
law has not been given the authority from the legislature to create new property 
rights.64 Struycken finds reasons for this in the legislative process, in which, in his 
view, the interests of all potentially interested parties can be weighed and a decision 
can be made. Furthermore, when a law is promulgated, its existence is made known 
to all, and this is done before the rule enters into effect. Furthermore, it will never 
have retroactive effect.65 Thus, in such a system legal certainty would be optimal. 
Although, in this study, numerus clausus has mainly been considered from the 
point of view of party autonomy, its relation with the legislature or the judiciary has 
also been dealt with. In respect of the hierarchy of sources of law in civil law 
countries, the legislature holds the prime position when it comes to law making. In 
common law jurisdictions, in England in particular, in most areas of property law 
dealt with, the judiciary holds this prime position. The internal struggle between 
legislature and judiciary in a certain system has not been considered explicitly. 
However, examples of judicial activism have been dealt with in the light of co-
ownership, security-ownership and expectation rights.66 In each of these cases, in 
each of the civil law countries, the judiciary gave recognition to a new property 
right, without permission to do so by the legislature. Possibly because in the 
Netherlands a new Civil Code was drafted relatively recently, the question on the 
constitutional division of powers in the area of property law was dealt with more 
specifically than it was in other legal systems. However, the results of the debate 
and the conclusion Struycken draws could be equally applied to other legal 
systems. 
 
61 However, also see Merrill & Smith 2000, p. 58 et seq., Van Erp 2003b, p. 11. 
62 On constitutional property law in the sense of human rights law see Van der Walt 2005, p. 1 
et seq. 
63 Or, primaat van de wetgever, Struycken 2007, p. 91, 350, 753 and 762. 
64 Struycken 2007, p. 764-765. 
65 Struycken 2007, p. 765. 
66 See Req. 13 February 1834, D.P. 1834.I.218, S.1834.I.205 (Caquelard), HR 25 January 1929, NJ 
1929, 616 (Beer brewery) BGH 24 June 1959, BGHZ 28, 16 = NJW 1958, 1133 (Anwartschafts-
recht). 
 408 
Comparative Overview 
On the other hand, still in respect of Dutch law, some have argued that, as a 
result of a development in legal practice, courts are the appropriate actors to 
authorise new property rights, even if there is no explicit legal basis.67 Snijders, who 
is one of the proponents of this approach, bases his arguments on a decision of the 
Dutch Hoge Raad in the area of unjust enrichment. This case, known by Dutch 
lawyers after the parties, Quint v Te Poel, concerned a claim in unjust enrichment 
that was not based on a specific provision in the old Dutch Civil Code.68 Instead of 
rejecting the claim, the Court held that a solution could be found that fitted the 
system of the law, and that was connected with the cases already dealt with in the 
Civil Code.69  
The Dutch Hoge Raad further developed this line of reasoning in other cases 
that were also outside the law of unjust enrichment, including the law of property.70 
Based on this case and its general application beyond unjust enrichment, Snijders 
argues new objects of property law, and possibly also new property rights, can be 
recognised through court decisions.71 Struycken, who sees a clear primacy for the 
legislature in respect to the numerus clausus, remarks that this argument does not 
hold true, as parties only have a (limited) freedom where the legislature specifically 
allows them to have this. Therefore, there can never be so much freedom as to allow 
parties, with permission ex post or ex ante of the judiciary, to recognise new property 
rights.72 
Although this debate seems to concern Dutch law specifically, proposals like 
those of Snijders have been made in other legal systems too. As discussed in Chap-
ter 4, on German law, Hess has made proposals to treat any party agreement that 
falls within the nature of a property right and the legal system as a whole, or the 
gesamtgesetzliches Leitbild, as an agreement with third-party effect.73 The arguments 
of Struycken can also be used against this statement. 
These discussions show the ‘constitutional’ dimension of numerus clausus that 
should be taken into account when discussing the existence of the concept in the 
various legal systems. Not only should the relation between private parties, 
judiciary and legislature be considered, but also the hierarchy of sources of law that 
each of these three produce. 
2. The Content of Property Law Systems in Europe 
The recognition of a numerus clausus is closely related to the separation between the 
law of obligations and the law of property. The separation between the law of 
 
67 Snijders 2005a, p 82, on Snijders’ argument see, in English, Van Erp 2006a, p. 1056-1057. 
68 HR 30 January 1959, NJ 1959, 548 (Quint/Te Poel), see Struycken 2007, p. 774. 
69 ‘… de oplossing moet worden aanvaard, die in het stelsel van de wet past en aansluit bij de 
wèl in de wet geregelde gevallen’. 
70 HR 13 June 2003, NJ 2004, 196 (ProCall). On this case and the application of the Quint/Te Poel 
case, see Struycken 2007, p. 774-775. 
71 Snijders 2002, p. 57-58, Snijders 2005a, p. 82. 
72 Struycken 2007, p. 775, 777-778 and 782. 
73 Hess 1998, p. 513-515. 
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obligations and the law of property is a fundamental starting point of each legal 
system under discussion, although differences exist between them in terms of 
application. It might be useful to recall once more that numerus clausus is the filter 
that determines which right is a property right and which right is not. Only in a 
system where there is a distinction between property rights and personal rights and, 
connected to that, between the law of property and the law of obligations, does 
using such a filter makes sense.74  
The discussion on the division between personal rights and property rights is 
conducted along the same theoretical lines in each legal system. In each system 
there are classical theorists, who see a property right as a relation between a person 
and an object. In other words, they require an object, or a res, to exist on which the 
property right is exercised.75 For classical theorists, a personal right is a right, not 
against a res, but against another person. From the entitlement to the object, the 
classical theorists hold that the holder of the property right has a right to follow the 
object, the droit de suite and the right of preference, the droit de préférence, to take the 
object back before other creditors.76 However, this theory comes into difficulties 
when the object of ownership is incorporeal, especially when it is a right. A relation 
between a person and a right is more difficult to conceive than a relation between a 
person and a corporeal object.77 Furthermore, personal rights can also have a res as 
their object, for example, in case of a right of lease.78  
On the other side are relationalists, who see a property right as a relation 
between two persons in respect of an object.79 They also require a res, but in this 
theory the res has a less prominent place. The way in which property rights differ 
from personal rights, in this view, is that a property right creates an obligation for 
everyone, the whole world, whereas the personal right creates an obligation in 
respect of a particular person.80  
Whether a property right can be held on an object that is corporeal, or whether 
an object can also be incorporeal, is a complicating factor with which each legal 
system deals in a specific way. French law takes the broadest view and considers all 
objects, corporeal and incorporeal, as biens and therefore capable of being the sub-
ject of property rights, in particular, the right of ownership. English law also recog-
nises incorporeal rights as objects capable of being subject to personal property 
law.81 On the other hand, German law and Dutch law recognise incorporeal rights, 
in particular, claims, and these can be the subject of property rights, but the most 
important property right, ownership, is restricted to corporeal objects.82 
 
74 See, along the same line of reasoning, Van Erp 2006b, p. 14. 
75 See Sagaert 2005b, p. 990-991, Smits 1996, p. 54. 
76 See, inter alia, Sagaert 2005b, p. 992. 
77 See Gretton 2007, p. 831. 
78 See Sagaert 2005b, p. 992-993, Reid 1997b, p. 225-226. 
79 In Dutch literature also known as the respect theory, see Smits 1996, p. 54-55, Rank-
Berenschot 1992, p. 42-48, Struycken 2007, p. 707. 
80 In French literature also known as the personalist theory. Sagaert 2005b, p. 993-994, Ginossar 
1960, p. 4-11. 
81 Tyler & Palmer 1973, p. 8-14, Goode 2004, p. 47-50. 
82 See § 90 BGB, Art. 3:2 BW. 
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Moreover, when parties agree on the creation of a new legal relation and wish 
to give third-party effect to that legal relation by making it a property right, they 
create a limited property right, not a right of ownership. In legal systems that 
recognise a right of ownership, the civil law systems, the right of ownership is 
unitary and cannot be fragmented in such a way that two different types or forms of 
ownership come into existence. This rule is a direct result of the rejection of the 
feudal system in which the fragmentation of ownership into dominium directum and 
dominium utile existed. 
Connected to this unitary concept of ownership, but not the same issue, are the 
property rights derived from the right of ownership, the limited property rights. 
These limited property rights are dealt with by the numerus clausus. In this respect 
the right of ownership falls outside the scope of the numerus clausus, as it is the right 
from which the limited property rights are usually derived.83 However, without a 
unitary concept of ownership, there is little use for a numerus clausus of property 
rights. When parties can simply fragment the right of ownership in such a way that 
any desired division of rights and duties between them is created, with third-party 
effect, there is no longer any need to use limited property rights from a closed list.84 
With a unitary concept of ownership, however, the limited property rights are 
needed to allow parties to create some of those legal relations they would otherwise 
create through fragmentation of the right of ownership. The choices the legal sys-
tems have made, in particular, in respect to the number and types of property rights 
they recognise, have an effect on the way in which the numerus clausus operates. It is 
therefore necessary first to analyse the property law systems and see how they 
operate before returning to the subject of numerus clausus. 
2.1. Of Primary Property Rights and Lesser Property Rights  
In order to analyse the property law systems of France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and England, to compare them, and to come to comparative conclusions, a set of 
terminology is needed in which the property law of these systems can be express-
ed.85 Traditionally, most property law terminology is considered to be restricted to 
the legal system that uses it. Without some ‘neutral’ terminology, comparison will 
be burdened by the use of different terms which nevertheless have similar mean-
ings; such as ownership and fee simple, or servitude and easement.86  
 
83 In some legal systems a limited property right can also be derived from another limited 
property right. See, e.g., Gretton 2007, p. 832, 840-841. 
84 It is in this respect that the decision of the Cour de cassation in Caquelard has given rise to a 
discussion on the existence of a numerus clausus in French law. See Chapter 3; 3. Other 
Property Rights, and 5. A Numerus Clausus in French Property Law? 
85 In the same sense, see Jansen 2006, p. 314-318. 
86 Of course, choosing different terminology does not make the analysis objective or the termi-
nology neutral. However, using a set of terminology that is not used by the four legal system 
at hand enables comparison on a different, possibly higher abstract lever, thus enabling to see 
similarities that have until now been hidden under the level of system-specific terminology. 
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On the other hand, we have seen that the civil law systems share a common 
Roman-law basis. As a result of this common basis, civil law systems share similar 
terminology. A good example is the use of the term ownership, which the civil law 
systems all use.87 However, the apparent differences between civil law and common 
law, and the need to find a language in which both of these traditions can be 
expressed might justify the use of a novel terminology. 
In civil law systems, the most extensive right a person may have in an object is 
the right of ownership. The right of ownership entitles the owner to exclude every-
one from his object, to use it, enjoy it and, when he wants to, to transfer the right to 
someone else.88 Moreover, from the right of ownership, limited property rights can 
be derived, which, in civil law systems, share common names, like usufruct, servi-
tude, pledge and hypothec.  
In common law systems, the terminology used is different. Although the term 
ownership is also used in English law, an immediate caveat is required. ‘Owner-
ship’ in English law is that right which grants the best right of possession, whether 
exclusive possession forever, in the case of fee simple in land, or possession forever, 
in the case of title to a chattel. Especially when it comes to personal property law, 
the relativity of title, which refers to the possibility that certain rights of possession 
are stronger than other rights of possession, means that the use of the word owner-
ship can be, and usually is, confusing. 
In English law the term ‘ownership’ is used as a general word denoting 
entitlement as well. Although the verb ‘to own’ a property right is avoided by mak-
ing use of the verb ‘to hold’, the phrase ‘owning a fee simple’ is not uncommon.89 
Ownership in this sense is used as a generic word for entitlement, to whatever 
extent. Therefore, in trust relations, legal ownership and equitable ownership are 
synonyms for legal interest and equitable interest, or for a right at law and a right in 
equity. However, in content these rights at law and in equity are very different from 
the right of ownership in civil law systems.90 
The differences between civil law and common law in respect of terminology 
create difficulties for the comparison between these legal systems.91 However, the 
existence of different terminology should not mislead us into emphasising the dif-
ferences between the civil law and common law systems. The fact that ownership of 
land and fee simple tenure of land have different names does not immediately 
result in a different content between these two rights. The same could be said, for 
instance, of servitudes and easements. 
In order to avoid the impression that property rights in civil law systems and 
common law systems are different, and in order to avoid the traditional assumption 
that difference in terminology is a clear sign of different content, a set of system-
neutral terminology should be used. Describing the legal systems in such neutral 
 
87 In the same sense see Reid 1997b, p. 228. 
88 This is the classical division into usus, fructus and abusus.  
89 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 27-28, 34, Gray & Gray 2005, p. 590 (fee simple ownership). The 
technically correct statement would be holding a fee simple. 
90 On trust law, see Chapter 6; 1.5. Trust Law. 
91 Trying to overcome such difficulties see, e.g., Gordley 2006, p. 46-65. 
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terminology will focus the discussion on the content of property rights and the 
system in which they function, as opposed to differences between these rights and 
systems just because they bear different names. 
In his article on ownership and things capable of ownership, Gretton provides 
valuable neutral terminology with which to analyse property law systems.92 He 
defines property rights in terms of primary rights and limited real rights.93 Primary 
rights are those rights that give persons the most extensive entitlement to an object a 
legal system can provide.94 As a criterion, therefore, primary rights are the rights 
that last for the longest duration of time a legal system can provide.95 When a 
primary right is temporarily limited by the existence of another property right, the 
right remains a primary right, in particular because the limitation will be temporary 
and the primary right will eventually become full and unburdened once more. In 
this sense, Honoré’s residuary character of ownership may be added to Gretton’s 
characteristics of primary rights, although Gretton himself observes that the residu-
ary character is not exclusive to ownership, but belongs to any right from which a 
limited real right is created.96  
The term limited real right, however, is a typical civil law term to denote those 
property rights that are formed from the primary right.97 A more neutral term could 
be used in this respect also. Limited real rights are less extensive in content than 
primary rights and may be termed ‘lesser rights’.98 Lesser rights are those rights that 
are derived from the primary right. The relation between primary and lesser rights 
is such that the primary right functions as a mother right on which the lesser right, 
as a ‘daughter right’, is modelled.99 Traditionally, the characteristics of primary 
rights are defined in terms of prerogatives of the holder of that right. These include 
the rights to use and enjoy and to dispose of objects. 
Corresponding to this division, the lesser rights may be divided into two 
major groups. The first group contains the rights that are modelled after the right to 
use and enjoy objects that is enjoyed by holders of primary rights. The second group 
contains rights that focus on the right of disposal over objects that is enjoyed by the 
holders of primary rights. The right to dispose of objects can be transferred to 
another party who, under certain conditions, will be allowed to exercise this right, 
which will usually in the end also deprive the holder of the primary right of his 
 
92 Gretton 2007, p. 802. 
93 Gretton 2007, p. 831-832, 834-835. 
94 However, the term primary right has also been used in a different context, which is not meant 
here. See Pretto 2002, p. 65 et seq. 
95 Struycken uses the term complete (volledig) right to denote primary rights in this respect. See 
Struycken 2007, p. 237-240. 
96 Honoré 1961, p. 126-128, Gretton 2007, p. 835. In this respect there is an interesting distinction 
in Spanish property law, where the term ‘limits’ is reserved for limits contained in the right of 
ownership, and the term ‘limitations’ for those limits placed upon, or imposed on, property 
rights. See Sáez 2006, p. 281-283. 
97 On this concept of limited real right in a common law jurisdiction, see Hohfeld 1917, p. 710 et 
seq. 
98 In the same sense, see Honoré 1961, p. 124. 
99 Gretton 2007, p. 834-835. 
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right to use and enjoy the object. This second group comprises security property 
rights. 
A third group of rights, that does not correspond to the division of primary 
rights into use, enjoyment and disposal, should also be recognised. This group of 
rights comprises rights that are temporary in nature, existing in anticipation of the 
lesser right of the first two groups to come into existence, or anticipating the 
conveyance of a primary right. This third group of rights is modelled on a right to 
use or enjoy, but contrary to the other lesser rights, not to the right to use and enjoy 
of the primary right that already exists, but the right to use and enjoy of the lesser 
right or the primary right they are anticipating.100 
2.2. Of Ways to Create a Lesser Property Right 
In Gretton’s division, primary rights function as a mother right of what should be 
named lesser property rights.101 He arrives at this conclusion by reference to 
German doctrine on the general concepts of private law, but emphasises that he 
thinks this theory is of European importance.102 The analysis in this Chapter will 
illustrate that all of these legal systems follow this model of ‘mother’ and ‘daughter’ 
rights. Before exploring the content of primary and lesser rights it might be useful to 
see in which ways a primary right can be a mother right.  
Comparative analysis of the civil law systems of France, Germany and the 
Netherlands shows two methods.103 First, the most visible method is used in French 
law, where lesser rights are considered a démembrement of the primary right, which 
is the right of ownership. Démembrement is a term that does not translate well into 
English but could be described as subtraction or taking away part of something 
whole and complete.104 In this method, a lesser right is created by taking parts of the 
right of ownership, the primary right, and by transferring these parts to another 
party. In the hands of the other party these parts of the right of ownership form a 
new property right, a lesser property right, which will burden the right of owner-
ship from which it is derived.105 For the duration of the existence of the lesser right, 
the primary right will not be full and complete; in French law the right of owner-
 
100 In case of a normal lesser right, the content of that right is modelled after the rights and 
powers of the primary right from which it is derived. In case of these ‘anticipatory rights’ or 
lesser rights used to acquire a certain legal position, the content of the right is modelled on 
the right the holder of the anticipatory right is about the acquire. See below; 2.6. Lesser Rights 
used to Acquire a Certain Legal Position (Anticipatory Rights). 
101 See Gretton 2007, p. 838-839. 
102 Gretton 2007, p. 803-804, 838, 851. On the German doctrine, see Larentz 1989, p. 38-40. 
103 Struycken also comes to a division in two methods that he calls aftrekking, or subtraction, and 
afspiegeling, or mirroring. See Struycken 2007, p. 361-363. 
104 The general English term dismemberment, although a literal translation, should be avoided 
as it generally calls into recollection the losing of body parts and not an abstract concept as 
taking parts from another abstract entity, such as a primary right. South African law also 
follows this method under the name subtraction from the dominium, see below; 3.8. A Legal 
System without a Numerus Clausus: South African Law. See also Struycken 2007, p. 361-363. 
105 See Chapter 3; 3. Other Property Rights. 
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ship is known as nude or bare ownership.106 The method of démembrement is 
accompanied by a division of the primary right, the right of ownership, into three 
different parts, which in their turn can each form the content of a lesser property 
right. These three parts are the right to use, the right to enjoy and the right of 
disposal.107 Consequently, a lesser property right may exist out of any of these rights 
of the owner or a combination of them.108 
This method of creating lesser property rights is not only applied in French 
law, but is followed by Dutch law, and also English law. In Dutch law, the Civil 
Code explicitly states that a lesser property right, a limited property right in Dutch 
legal terminology, is derived from a more comprehensive right.109 Furthermore, the 
general distinction of the elements of the primary right, the right of ownership, into 
rights to use and enjoy, and of disposal, is also followed. Dutch law also uses the 
term nude or bare ownership to denote the primary right when a lesser property 
right is created.  
English law follows this same method when it comes to creating lesser 
property rights at common law. When a holder of an estate in fee simple grants a 
term of years absolute to another party, he conveys part of his rights to the tenant. 
The tenant will now enjoy some of the rights that previously belonged to the holder 
in fee simple.110 The holder in fee simple will still hold the fee simple but its content 
will be less. English law uses a specific term for the right granted to the holder in fee 
simple remaining after the lease, the reversion. The reversion itself is a right that the 
holder of an estate in fee simple may grant as a remainder to a third party.111 
The method of démembrement creates certain difficulties with the existence of 
lesser rights. To start with, legal systems have difficulties explaining how the holder 
of a lesser right may enjoy a right that the holder of the primary right is still entitled 
to enjoy as well. For example, when a right of servitude is created, the holder of this 
lesser right may walk over the owner’s land, but the existence of the right does not 
necessarily deprive the owner, the holder of the primary right, of his right to walk 
over his own land as well. In order to solve this, the legal systems answer that the 
transfer of rights to use and enjoy that form the right of servitude is not necessarily 
a transfer of all the rights to use and enjoy of the owner.112 
 
106 See Grotius who considered these rights gebreckelicke eigendom, De Groot 1926, II.3.11, p. 34. 
107 Or the classic terms usus, fructus and abusus. 
108 The use of the method of démembrement by a legal system does not necessarily result in a 
numerus clausus of property rights. However, French, Dutch law and English law, which 
follow this method, do recognise a numerus clausus and have therefore made a choice for 
private parties in what way they may combine these elements. In other words, the menu for 
private parties has been set; it is build out of these three different ingredients. 
109 Art. 3:8 BW. See Chapter 5; 3. Other Property Rights. However, also in Dutch law, most likely 
under influence from German Pandectist writers of the nineteenth century, another model 
has been defended in which property rights do not comprise parts of the primary right from 
which they are derived. See Diephuis 1880, p. 474, Land 1901, p. 7, Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 
105-107. 
110 See Chapter 6; 2.2. Lease of Land. 
111 See Chapter 6; 1.1. Terminology. 
112 Asser, Mijnsen, De Haan & Van Dam 2006, p. 10-11. 
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Furthermore, as a consequence of the way in which lesser rights are created, 
when the lesser right and the primary right fall into the same hands, the two rights 
will merge and the lesser right will no longer exist. The reason for this is that the 
lesser right can only exist because certain rights of the holder of the primary right 
are temporarily in the hands of another person. When the rights return to the holder 
of the primary right, these rights merge with the rights that remained, and it can no 
longer be established which rights belonged to the primary right, and which to the 
lesser right. The same will also apply when the holder of the lesser right acquires 
the primary right. 
The way in which lesser property rights cease to exist is recognised in the civil 
law systems of France and the Netherlands.113 Although the method of démembre-
ment is primarily a civil law method it can be applied to English common law as 
well. Evidence for this may be taken from the surrender of a lease. When a lease is 
surrendered and the landlord agrees, the lease will merge with the landlord’s rever-
sion and cease to exist.114 The same will happen when the lease and the reversion 
fall into the same hands.115 
Whether this method is also followed in German law is not entirely clear. In 
German law, a primary right and a lesser right can exist at the same time in the 
hands of the same person.116 In other words, the holder of a primary right may cre-
ate a lesser property right on his own behalf on his own object. Under the method of 
démembrement the creation of a lesser property right without a transfer of rights to 
another person is theoretically not possible. In this respect it seems that German law 
cannot adhere to this method.  
The drafters of the German Civil Code in fact offered another solution in the 
method of limitation.117 Limitation as opposed to démembrement does not require a 
transfer of rights from the primary to the lesser right, but involves the creation of 
additional rights, which are modelled after the content of the primary right. Under 
this method, the primary right remains full and complete. Its exercise will be limited 
by the existence of a lesser right, but not because certain rights have been taken out 
of the primary right.118 
This method of limitation seems also to be followed by English law when it 
comes to the creation of lesser rights in equity. When, in English law, a right is cre-
ated in equity, that right is additional to the right that already exists at common law. 
This is best observed in the case of trusts, on which Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated 
in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC that when a property right 
grants the full right of use and enjoyment to a person at common law, no equitable 
 
113 In the Netherlands there is even a special provision in the Civil Code that deals with this 
method of destruction of property rights: Art. 3:81(2)(e) BW. 
114 Swadling 2007, p. 393. 
115 Swadling 2007, p. 393. 
116 See § 889 BGB. 
117 See Chapter 4; 3. Other Property Rights. 
118 See, in this respect, Thibaut who also does not consider lesser rights as parts of the primary 
right. See Thibaut 1817a, p. 62, Thibaut 1817b, p. 86-87, 91, 92-93. I owe gratitude to André 
van der Walt for drawing my attention to this and the contrast with Grotius’ gebreckelicke 
eigendom. 
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right exists.119 Instead, when a trust is created, a new additional right in equity 
comes into existence on behalf of the beneficiary that burdens the right of the trustee 
at common law. This reasoning holds for trusts, but there is no reason why it could 
not be applied to other property rights in equity.  
However, where in English law the limitations method continues to apply for 
rights in equity, modern German property law literature writes in terms of démem-
brement as opposed to the traditional method of limitation.120 It seems, therefore, 
that German doctrine might be moving away from its limitations theory in favour of 
the démembrement approach. However, it is difficult to explain how a lesser property 
right and the primary property right, from which the lesser right was formed, can 
exist at the same time with the same right holder.121  
In German law especially the possibility for a right-holder of a primary right 
to create a lesser property right in respect of his own immovable object is recognised 
and has drawn the attention of the European legislators.122 In fact, this method of 
creation, the creation of an Eigentümergrundschuld, is a model for developments on a 
European level towards a Euro-mortgage, a European right of hypothec.123  
The method by which a lesser property right is created is of relevance to the 
numerus clausus as it determines the boundaries of the content of lesser property 
rights. However, it does not automatically result in a numerus clausus of property 
rights.124 In a démembrement system, the lesser property right can never have a 
different content than the primary right from which it is derived.125 In a limitation 
system, which traditionally requires the property right to be modelled after the 
primary right, but does not take away rights of the right-holder of a primary right, 
this is in principle the same. 
Modelling an additional right as opposed to using an already existing part of a 
primary right creates possibilities to deviate from the rights of the holder of the 
primary right. These possibilities are twofold. It could be argued that, because a 
primary right does not contain a positive duty, no positive duty can be part of a les-
ser right that is derived from that primary right.126 A system that models additional 
 
119 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, HL, at 706 per Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson. Swadling 2007, p. 271-272. See Chapter 6; 1.5. Trust Law. 
120 For examples see Chapter 4; 3. Other Property Rights. 
121 One explanation is offered through the Doppelwirkung under which a person can hold proper-
ty rights in two capacities; once as holder of the primary right, and once as holder of a lesser 
rights. See Kipp 1911, p. 211 et seq. On other explanations, see Chapter 4; 3. Other Property 
Rights. 
122 § 889 BGB. 
123 Green Paper Mortgage Credit in the EU COM(2005) 327. See also White Paper on Mortgage 
Credit Markets COM(2007) 807 final, where the right of Euro-mortgage has disappeared from 
the proposals of the European Commission. More about these developments in Chapter 8; 
2.1.3. European Commission Initiatives for Future Legislation. 
124 South African law with its subtraction from dominium test is held not to recognise a numerus 
clausus, but still follows the method of démembrement (subtraction) to decide which rights are 
property rights. See, inter alia, De Waal 2004, P. 83 et seq. 
125 Struycken calls this the subtraction principle that limits the content of lesser rights to negative 
duties. See Struycken 2007, p. 404-405. 
126 Struycken 2007, p. 404-405. 
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rights on the content of primary rights, however, is not entirely restricted to limiting 
the content of lesser rights to negative duties. Of course, systems adhering to a 
limitation method are very cautious about recognising these positive burdens. 
Secondly, legal systems following the limitations method have taken a more lenient 
approach to the recognition of additional property rights, best seen in the case of 
anticipatory rights. In these systems, German and English, anticipatory property 
rights are more developed than in French and Dutch law, which follow a démembre-
ment method of creation. Systems adhering to a limitations model award proprie-
tary status to an expectation right, because the recognition of property rights does 
not require these systems to express the content of a property right in terms of 
powers of the primary right. Under a liberal interpretation of the requirement to 
model the lesser right on the content of a primary right, expectation rights have 
been given a place as a third category of lesser rights. For now, legal systems 
adhering to the démembrement method have not taken this step.127 
2.3. Primary Property Rights 
The analysis of property law as a system of primary rights and lesser rights can be 
applied to the Roman system of property law. Although Roman law did not work 
with property rights as such, the primary entitlement to an object, dominium, was 
that right protected with the rei vindicatio, enabling an owner to get his object back if 
it had been taken or interfered with.128 Lesser rights, such as servitudes, were 
modelled on the powers of the dominus and were protected with the respective 
action. 
This analysis also holds true for the modern legal systems, the civil law 
systems, with their Roman law basis, as well as the English common law. In civil 
law systems, like in Roman law, there is only one primary right – the right of 
ownership. Ownership, with its paramount entitlement to an object, forms the 
foundation for the law of property in French, German and Dutch law. The right of 
ownership entitles its holder to do with an object what he wants, as long as this is 
not contrary to law or public order. When a lesser right is created, the right of 
ownership, sometimes referred to as bare or nude ownership, remains into existence 
and will return to its full and unburdened scale when the lesser right ceases to exist.  
In English law this analysis is more difficult to apply. Traditionally English 
law does not recognise a right of ownership in the civil law sense, either in land law 
or in personal property law. Instead, as a starting point English law uses the right to 
possession. In English property law, the person with the stronger right to posses-
sion will succeed against the person challenging his right.129 This concept is known 
 
127 See below; 2.6. Lesser Rights used to Acquire a Certain Legal Position (Anticipatory Rights). 
128 See Chapter 2; 2.3. Ownership. 
129 Interesting in this respect are the land law reforms in Ireland, that, like English law, knows a 
feudal system of land holding. See Land and Conveyancing Reform Bill 2006. See also the 
preparing report of the Irish Law Reform Commission No. LRC 70-2003 to be found at 
<http://www.lawreform.ie>. 
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as relativity of title, and in this sense English property law takes its viewpoint from 
procedural law.130  
However, the exercise of searching for the best right of possession results in 
two property rights, one for land law and one for personal property law. In land 
law the person with the best right is the holder of an estate in fee simple. The holder 
in fee simple is entitled to exclusive possession of land forever.131 Other rights in 
respect of land also give a right to possession, but never one as strong a right as fee 
simple. One exception to this might be the demesne title of the Crown, which owns 
all land.132 Allodial land, which is land that is not subjected to the feudal system of 
landholding, is therefore subject to its own primary title. However, for the system of 
land law and the search for primary rights that can be used by private parties, this is 
of less relevance. In personal property law, a right to possession forever is also 
recognised. Title to a chattel grants its holder possession forever. Also here, other 
rights exist which give right to possession, but these are never as strong as a title to 
a chattel.  
The division of English law into land law and personal property law therefore 
has consequences for the recognition of a primary right. In fact, technically there 
must be two primary rights, one corresponding to each area of property law.133 
However, the difference between the two primary rights, fee simple to land and title 
to chattels, the last including claims, should not be overstated. Both rights entitle the 
holder to exclusive possession for an unlimited period and are, like the right of 
ownership in civil law systems, the paramount entitlement a person can have in an 
object. 
Granting the paramount entitlement to the holder, primary rights are mostly 
intended to provide use and enjoyment. The holder of a primary right is therefore 
entitled to use and enjoy an object to the exclusion of everyone else. By its nature, as 
this analysis shows, there can only be one primary right in a legal system. In that 
sense there is no competition between holders of primary rights and usually, if at 
all, the holder of a primary right will compete with a holder of a lesser property 
right. 
A primary right can also be used for different purposes than for use and enjoy-
ment. As the right is the most important property right, it is interesting for banks 
and other financers to use it for security purposes. In French, German, Dutch and 
English law, primary rights can be used for security purposes in two ways.  
First, a conveyance of a primary right can be postponed until a certain obliga-
tion has been fulfilled, usually the payment of a purchase price. This postponement 
 
130 See Chapter 6; 1.1. Terminology. 
131 Theoretically, the Crown holds all land and therefore the demesne-title of the Crown should 
be mentioned. However, as this right can only be held by the Crown and not by a private 
person it is functionally outside the area of property law. See Lawson and Rudden 2002,  
p. 78. Sparkes states on this matter: ‘It is much easier to bring together the English and 
civilian systems than would have been the case with the pre-1925 common law (that is to say 
Irish and American Systems). … whereas the 1925 scheme for the undivided freehold estate is 
quite close to the civilian conception of absolute propriété or Eigentum’. 
132 Burn & Cartwright 2006, p. 955-956, Lawson and Rudden 2002, p. 78. 
133 This is, for sake of clarity, excluding the demesne-title of the Crown. 
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can be achieved by making a condition of suspension in the contract that underlies 
the conveyance of the primary right, or by making the conveyance itself under 
condition of suspension. As a result a strong security right is created. Civil law 
systems speak of reservation of ownership, and common law systems of retention of 
title.134  
The reservation or retention of a primary right provides the holder reserving 
or retaining the right with the most powerful security right. Although the buyer of 
the object will usually already have the right to use and enjoy the object, he has not 
yet received the primary right and will usually only have a personal right against 
the holder of primary right.135 When the buyer does not perform his obligation, the 
seller remains the holder of the primary right. 
A second method is using the primary right as security by conveying it under 
resolutive condition to another pending the performance of a certain obligation. In 
contrast to the transfer under suspensive condition, this conveyance takes imme-
diate effect, but only until the obligation is performed. Such a conveyance, modelled 
on the Roman rule fiducia cum creditore, is also used in all legal systems.136 In civil 
law systems it is known as a transfer of ownership for security purposes. It includes 
a transfer of ownership with an additional contract, called a security agreement, in 
which the rights of the transferee are limited. These limitations are not only 
contractual but have some property effects, through the working of the law on trust-
like devices, Treuhand and fiducie. In many situations a third party dealing with the 
transferee with knowledge of the additional contract, the security agreement, will 
be bound by the terms of the agreement on acquiring the object which was trans-
ferred for security purposes.137 In Dutch law, a transfer of ownership for security 
purposes is also recognised, but only if the full right of ownership is transferred, 
leaving the transferor relatively unprotected with only personal rights.138 There are 
also no trust-like devices, as in the common law, to strengthen the position of the 
transferor. The primary right for security purposes is therefore not used as much as 
in other civil law systems. 
English law also recognises a conveyance of a primary right for security pur-
poses in the form of a mortgage. However, the Law of Property Act 1925 abolished 
this method in land law. In personal property law the creation of a mortgage 
remains possible through a transfer of the primary right. Although for civil lawyers 
the use of the term mortgage invokes the lesser right for security, in particular 
hypothec, a mortgage was created when a property right, including a primary right, 
was conveyed to secure the performance of a certain obligation.139 In civil law sys-
 
134 See Chapter 3; 2.3. Security Ownership; Chapter 4; 2.5. Security Ownership, Chapter 6; 2.3. 
Security Ownership, and Chapter 6; 3.1. Title / Ownership. 
135 German law provides the exception where the buyer under reservation of ownership is 
awarded an Anwartschaftsrecht. See Chapter 4; 3.4. Expectation Rights. 
136 However, Dutch law prohibits the most common form of transfer of ownership for security 
purposes in Art. 3:84(3) BW. See Chapter 5; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
137 Art. 2023 CC, Dupichot 2007, p. 5-8. 
138 Struycken 2007, p. 504-508. See Chapter 5; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
139 See Chapter 6; 2.9. Mortgage of Land and Equity of Redemption. 
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tems, a right of hypothec is deliberately used to allow a private person to keep his 
house, while the bank will have a right to sell the house in case of non-payment of 
the loan the right of hypothec secures. Also in English law the creation of a mort-
gage gave rise to the recognition of a property right for the former holder of the 
house, the equity of redemption. Since 1926, the mortgage in English law is, like in 
civil law systems, created through a lesser right, namely a charge by deed by way of 
legal mortgage.140  
A third way, next to usage and security, in which primary rights are used, is 
through co-entitlement. By sharing the primary right between several parties under 
special provisions, the legal systems enable parties to have exclusive rights to use 
and enjoy as well as to dispose of specific parts of a piece of land, usually of a build-
ing in the form of an apartment. The effect, however, of such ‘apartment ownership’ 
is that the normal rules on the primary right hardly apply anymore and are quali-
fied through the existence of other rights. In that sense effectively a lesser right is 
created that will be dealt with later. However, a few remarks in respect to the 
primary right should be made here.141  
A remarkable resemblance between the systems exists. Although some legal 
systems provide a specific right, whether a primary or a lesser right, and some solve 
apartment rights through a deviation of the rules on the primary right, each solu-
tion consists of three elements; a right to exclusive use and enjoyment of a certain 
space, a right to common use and enjoyment of certain joint space, and compulsory 
membership of an association of ‘co-owners’. Even when a lesser right is created, it 
still contains these three elements, making the lesser right an atypical property 
right.142 
2.4. Lesser Rights to Use 
Most of the property rights that grant a right to use in French, German, Dutch and 
English law are derived from the Roman category of servitudes, but exceptions do 
exist. The lesser rights to use are based on the right to use and enjoy the object of the 
holder of the primary right, whether exclusively or not.143 The lesser right is catego-
rised depending on its content. In civil law systems there is a strong division 
between rights to use for a limited period of time, usually a person’s life, and rights 
granted forever. The property rights to use from English law can also fit into this 
division. 
 
140 See Chapter 6; 2.9. Mortgage of Land and Equity of Redemption. 
141 The rest of apartment ownership is dealt with below in 2.4. Lesser Rights to Use. 
142 In Dutch law this is also recognised by the statement in the Asser handbook that an apart-
ment right is a property right but not a limited property right (zakelijk recht, geen beperkt recht). 
See Asser, Van Dam & Mijnsen 2002, Nos. 347, 348, p. 371-372. In comparative law, the work 
of Van der Merwe offers invaluable information on the law on apartments. See Van der 
Merwe 1994. 
143 Of course, also depending on the method of creation, on the actual parts of the primary right 
or on rights modelled after the content of the primary right. See above; 2.2. Of Ways to Create 
a Lesser Property Right. 
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2.4.1. Lesser Rights to Use for a Limited Period of Time 
The first right to use for a limited period of time is a right of usufruct, recognised in 
all civil law systems but, as such, unknown to modern English law. Before the intro-
duction of the Law of Property Act 1925 a holder of a fee simple could grant a life 
estate to another person. After 1925, and until 1996, a holder of a fee simple could 
do the same, but only in equity.144 If, before 1925, the holder of the fee simple did 
this, he would carve out parts of his rights and grant those rights as an estate at 
common law to another person. This method of creation makes the life estate a 
lesser right. The life estate was a fully-fledged property right that could even be 
assigned to another person. When the holder of the life estate assigned his estate to 
another person, the estate remained in existence, but would be known as an estate 
pur autre vie, always remaining connected to the life of the person to whom the right 
was granted. The life estate, whether pur autre vie or not, gave exclusive possession 
to its holder, thus depriving the holder of the estate in fee simple completely of his 
right to use, but always for a limited period of time. 
In the other estate at common law, the term of years absolute, the exclusive 
possession of land is also given to another person for a limited duration of time.145 
The holder of the fee simple cannot use his land for the duration of the lease. How-
ever, the limited duration of a lease should be looked at with care, as a lease for a 
million years is also a valid lease.146 When a lease is created, the lesser right of lease, 
which remains a lesser right as it is derived from the primary fee simple right, 
achieves almost the status of a primary right. The holder of such a long lease will 
have exclusive possession as well as the possibility to assign the lease to another 
person or make it subject to another lesser right. The reversion of the lease, which is 
the right that eventually entitles the holder of the fee simple to enjoy the object once 
more, will be practically worthless.  
In civil law also the creation of a right of usufruct may be combined with the 
possibility to assign the usufruct.147 When the right of usufruct was created for the 
duration of its holder’s life, and the holder assigns the property right to another 
person, the legal effects are usually the same as in English law; the existence of the 
right of usufruct remains connected to the life of the person on whose behalf the 
right was created.148  
The right of usufruct in civil law systems is influenced by the increasing 
importance of contract law. The owner and the holder of the right of usufruct may 
shape their relation in any way they wish through an agreement, staying within the 
 
144 Swadling 2007, p. 234. See Chapter 6; 2. Property Rights in Land. 
145 Swadling 2007, p. 236, 238. 
146 See Swadling 2007, p. 241-242. 
147 In German law the starting point is that a right of usufruct cannot be assigned. When it is 
created for the benefit of a legal person, this rule can be lifted. See § 1059 BGB, § 1061 BGB 
and § 1059a, BGB, Art. 595 CC, Terré & Simler 1998, p. 616-617, Art. 3:223 BW, Asser, Van 
Dam & Mijnsen 2002, p. 329-330. 
148 In French law there is specific case law on this point, see Cass. 3e civ. 26 January 1972, D. 1975, 
p. 22, JCP 1972, éd. G, II, 17104. 
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boundaries of the provisions on usufruct.149 This contractual freedom allows parties 
to shift some additional rights of the owner to the holder of the usufruct, making 
the usufruct into an effective management device. An example of this is the usufruct 
on shares in a company. In a normal situation, the owner will profit from an 
increase in value of the shares, but the holder of the right of usufruct will have the 
voting rights and will be entitled to the dividend the shares produce. In this way the 
owner of the shares does not need to bother with administration and merely profits 
from the arrangement. By agreement the parties may give content to the standard of 
a good usufructuary by imposing a duty to invest and re-invest the shares on the 
right holder. Shares leaving the usufruct will be freed from the property right, but 
will be substituted with the new shares or money received in exchange for them.150 
It is this way of using rights of usufruct that shifts the similarities of the right of 
usufruct away from a right of lease, and in the direction of the law of trusts.151 
Other civil law property rights also resemble leases in English law. These are 
the rights of emphyteusis and superficies. These two property rights, already known 
in Roman law, were not part of the law of property as introduced by the Civil Codes 
in each legal system. In French law, these rights were not mentioned by the Civil 
Code at all, but survived and were developed through case law before the legis-
lature intervened.152 Consequently, the old Dutch Civil Code, which was heavily 
based on the French Civil Code, did not mention these rights either. In the 
Netherlands a special law applied.153 In German law, the right of emphyteusis is not 
recognised at all because of its connotation of the feudal system, and the right of 
superficies was introduced by special legislation.154  
The right of emphyteusis grants exclusive use of a piece of land for a long time, 
in Dutch law even potentially forever.155 However, traditionally, as can be seen in 
French law, the duration of the right of emphyteusis is limited to ninety-nine years. 
The right of superficies grants a right of ownership of a building to its holder, while 
the right of ownership of the land remains with the original owner. This property 
right is atypical because it awards the holder of the right a right of ownership by 
breaking with the rule of superficies solo cedit, that what is on the land follows the 
land.156 Depending on the agreement between the parties that gives rise to the 
creation of the right of superficies, the right may be perpetual in nature. However, 
like the right of emphyteusis, traditionally the right of superficies is limited to ninety-
nine years.157 
Although these rights are usually considered together, they differ in content. A 
right of emphyteusis grants an exclusive right to use land, but does not grant a right 
 
149 As a result of the Typenzwang of the numerus clausus of property rights. 
150 Bos 2005, p. 31-39. 
151 See Bos 2005, p. 176 et seq.  
152 See Chapter 3; 3.3. Superficies, and 3.4. Emphyteusis. 
153 See Chapter 5; 3.3. Emphyteusis, and 3.4. Superficies. 
154 See Chapter 4; 3.4. Superficies. 
155 The right of Emphyteusis is not recognised in German law. 
156 See Chapter 2; 2.4. Other Property Rights. 
157 See Chapter 3; 3.3. Superficies. 
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of ownership of buildings on that land. In order for the holder of a property right to 
acquire ownership of buildings on a piece of land, a right of superficies is needed. It 
is therefore not uncommon for both rights to be created together. In French law, 
with its consensual system of transfer, and therefore also of creation, an agreement 
is sufficient to give rise to the creation of a property right, even on land.158 Under 
that system of creation, a right of superficies may, for instance, come into existence as 
part of an agreement creating a lease, a personal right in French law, or a right of 
emphyteusis. 
With these special characteristics, the rights of emphyteusis and superficies are 
situated between rights granted for a limited period of time and those granted 
forever. Nevertheless, they are recognised as typical lesser property rights in civil 
law, although a right of emphyteusis very much resembles an English term of years 
absolute. Both give the holder the right to use land for a limited period of time. The 
right of superficies does not really have an equivalent in English law. With the intro-
duction of the commonhold, it becomes possible to separate entitlement to land 
from the entitlement to part of a building.159 However, commonhold schemes more 
resemble apartment rights than they resemble the right of superficies.160 
2.4.2. Lesser Rights to Use for an Unlimited Period of Time 
The second type of lesser rights that entitle the holder to the use of an object are 
rights that are usually granted for an unlimited period of time. In turn for their 
longer duration, these rights are less extensive in content. Civil law systems call 
them servitudes, English law easements.161 The criteria used to create these rights 
are derived from Roman law and comprise, in all cases, the requirement of two 
pieces of land, with two different persons holding a right in those pieces of land, the 
description of a burden on one of the pieces of land known as the servient tenement 
and, thus, constituting a right in respect of the other piece of land known as the 
dominant tenement, and, last, the requirement that the burden that is imposed on 
the servient land must not result in a positive duty for the holder of the servient 
tenement. Furthermore, the burden that is imposed should benefit the land and not 
the owner himself, except in Dutch law, where this requirement was abolished in 
1992 when the relevant part of the new Civil Code entered into force. These require-
ments are Roman in nature and apply in all civil law systems, but they have also 
been adopted in English law by the Court of Appeal in Re Ellenborough Park. There-
fore, they also apply to rights of easement.162  
What exactly comprises the burden imposed by the servitude or easement 
depends on the agreement that the parties made. Especially in German doctrine, a 
 
158 Van Vliet 2000, p. 73-74. 
159 Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002. See Chapter 6; 2.1. Fee Simple. 
160 On entitlement to apartments see below; 2.4.3. Lesser Rights to Use of an Apartment. 
161 Although also in civil law, especially in comparative law the term easements are also used for 
servitudes. See, e.g., Sagaert 2004b, p. 51. 
162 Re Ellenborough Park. Re Davies (deceased). Powell and Others v Maddison and Another [1956] Ch 
131, CA. 
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threefold distinction has been developed that provides a useful analysis of the law 
on servitudes.163 First, there are servitudes or easements that entitle the holder of the 
dominant tenement to do something on the land of the holder of the servient tene-
ment.164 Secondly, there are servitudes or easements that impose a burden on the 
holder of the servient land to refrain from doing something on his land.165 Thirdly, 
there are servitudes or easements that impose a burden on the holder of the servient 
land not to exercise some of the rights he has, as holder of a primary right, against 
the holder of the dominant land.166 Usually, this third type of servitude or easement 
concerns the actions or remedies the holder of the primary right in respect of the 
servient tenement has to protect his right. For example, the servitude or easement 
may concern the right to claim removal of a fence that has been placed on the 
servient land. When there is indeed a fence on the servient land, the servitude or 
easement may contain the duty for the holder of the primary right in respect of that 
land, the servient tenement, to refrain from initiating an action for removal against 
the holder of the primary right of the dominant tenement.  
Rights of servitudes or easement are special lesser property rights in the sense 
that the parties creating the right are free to give content to their relation as long as 
they stay within the general criteria of servitudes or easements mentioned above.167 
The right that is created is held by two parties, one whose land benefits and one 
whose land is burdened. Therefore, there are two parties to this property right, one 
who holds the right, one who holds the duty. These parties are not necessarily both 
holders of a primary right in respect of the land on which the right of servitude or 
easement was created. Other lesser property rights are created between a holder of 
a primary right and a holder of a lesser right. They can also affect parties other than 
the holder of a primary right, but this is because these rights must be respected. 
The freedom that the parties enjoy to provide content to their right of servi-
tude means that servitudes or easements are rights that are very suitable to be 
adapted to modern conditions. English law has recognised this in particular. In the 
words of Lord St Leonards LC: 
‘The category of servitudes and easements must alter and expand with the changes 
that take place in the circumstances of mankind’.168 
When it comes to developments in servitude or easement law, it is especially the 
second type of servitude or easement, the right imposing the duty to refrain from 
doing something, which has developed. In French and German law, a right of servi-
tude may be used to restrict the holder of the servient tenement from conducting a 
 
163 See, e.g., De Waal 1995, p. 193 et seq. 
164 German doctrine names these types Benutzungsdienstbarkeiten, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999,  
p. 366, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 257 et seq. 
165 German doctrine names these types Unterlassungsdienstbarkeiten, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, 
p. 366, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 262. 
166 See Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 369, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 272 et seq. 
167 Again, this is due to the Typenzwang of the numerus clausus of property rights. 
168 Dyce v Lady Hay (1852) (1 Macq 305), per Lord St. Leonards LC, Burn & Cartwright 2006,  
p. 595. 
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certain business activity on his premises. However, these non-competition servi-
tudes are used in a different way in both systems. Dutch law and English law do not 
allow these servitudes or easements.  
In French law the non-competition servitude is used to restrict the use of a 
piece of land when the neighbouring piece of land is used in the same way. For 
example, if a certain business, such as a supermarket, is established on the domi-
nant tenement, the holder of the servient tenement may be under a restriction not to 
open a similar business on his land.169  
In German law, the non-competition servitude is used to ‘secure’ the perform-
ance of an obligation arising from a contract.170 There, the non-competition clause 
will stipulate that a certain business activity cannot be employed on the land, when 
in reality there already is such a business activity, or there will be in the near future. 
For example, a clause will state that no petrol station can operate on the land, when 
in reality a petrol station is there already. Through contract law the parties will 
enter into a contract in which the holder of the dominant tenement promises not to 
invoke the servitude as long as the holder of the servient tenement fulfils the terms 
of the contract. To follow the example, as long as the holder of the servient tenement 
buys the petrol for his petrol station from the holder of the dominant tenement, a 
petrol company, the petrol company will not invoke the servitude. 
This specific use of the non-competition servitude creates a new type of servi-
tude, in German known as Sicherungsdienstbarkeit, which translates into English as 
security-servitude.171 Technically, the security-servitude falls within the second 
category of servitudes mentioned above, but by making maximum use of the party 
autonomy the law on servitude allows, parties can almost achieve the creation of a 
new property right that, contrary to the requirement for servitudes and easements, 
imposes a positive duty, the performance of the contract, on the right holder of the 
servient tenement. In any case, by making optimal use of contract law, the parties 
avoid the provisions on servitudes that restrict these rights to negative duties.172 
Although this development has not taken place in other legal systems, it is not 
inconceivable that in these systems also parties may attempt to achieve similar 
results. The use of contract law, not only to give form and content to property 
rights, but also the use of contract law in addition to property law, is a concept 
which is much more developed in German law in comparison with other legal 
systems. More will be said on this below.173 
Furthermore, several legal systems recognise other types of servitudes that do 
not fully fit in this main division. First, German law recognises a right of servitude 
 
169 See Chapter 3; 3.1. Real Servitude. 
170 See Chapter 4; 3.1. Real Servitude, and 3.2. Personal Servitudes. 
171 See also De Waal 1995, p. 201-207. 
172 And therefore work around the Typenzwang of the numerus clausus of property rights. Note 
that in English law generally the term negative easement is used for a right of easement that, 
in civil law terms, imposes a positive duty. The reason for this difference is the different 
perspective that a legal system takes on rights of servitude or easement. Civil law systems 
look at the servient land, whereas English law looks at the dominant land. On this difference 
see Chapter 6; 2.3. Easement. 
173 See below; 3. Numerus Clausus in Property Law Systems in Europe? 
 426 
Comparative Overview 
without a dominant tenement. With this right, a person can benefit from the exis-
tence of the servitude. This type, known as beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeit, or 
limited personal servitude, should be placed between a right of usufruct and a right 
of servitude. The right authorises the specific use of a piece of land like a right of 
servitude, but the right benefits not a piece of land, but a person, as does a right of 
usufruct. In that sense, the limited personal servitude has been named as a real 
burden. In the other legal systems, such burdens may exist as well, but they are not 
part of the law of property.174 
The limited personal servitude is in particular useful as a security-servitude. 
Because this type of servitude does not require the existence of a dominant tene-
ment, a company burdening a piece of land that is remote from its own location can 
still use the right. The effects of the limited personal servitude are the same as a real 
servitude and therefore enable the holder to enforce the burden the servitude 
imposes on the servient land.  
Secondly, English law recognises restrictive covenants, which impose a restric-
tion on the use of the land of another. These covenants are different from easements 
as they benefit a person and not a dominant tenement. These property rights were 
first recognised and developed by case law. A restrictive covenant is a contract and 
therefore awards the maximum freedom to the parties. However, although original-
ly allowed, a restrictive covenant may not impose a positive burden.175 
The parties may prevent the holder of a piece of land from conducting a 
certain business on his land. However, ‘security’ restrictive covenants, like the 
German security-servitudes, are unknown in English law, and it is not very likely 
the courts will recognise them. The reason for that is that restrictive covenants are 
created by contract in equity, and, when a separate contract is made, it is very likely 
that the courts under the law of equity will consider these two contracts as a whole 
and hold that a positive covenant has been created. Even though they technically do 
not grant a right to use, but only restrict it, restrictive covenants fit into the category 
of lesser rights to use in the same way as servitudes of the second type do. They 
have effect on the right to use and are not intended per se to serve as security for the 
performance of an obligation. 
Thirdly, German law recognises another type of real burden. This type, known 
in German as Reallast, imposes a positive burden on the holder of the servient tene-
ment. The burden the Reallast imposes must consist of returning benefits of the land. 
The Reallast creates a duty on an owner to give these benefits to the holder of the 
real burden. However, because of its positive nature, when the duty is not per-
formed, the holder of the real burden cannot specifically enforce it. Instead, he will 
be entitled to the value of the objects.176 This is different from a right of servitude 
that can be specifically enforced under German law.  
It is this difference that gives rise to the German classification as a right for the 
value, a Verwertungsrecht, and not a right to use. This difference, however, is a very 
 
174 E.g., Dutch qualitative duties of Art. 6:252 BW. On these duties see Chapter 5; 4.8. ‘Qualita-
tive Duties’ and Chain Clauses. 
175 Haywood v Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Society (1881) 8 QBD 403, per Brett LJ. 
176 See Amann 1993, p. 222 et seq. 
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fine and technical distinction. Although French and Dutch law do not recognise an 
equivalent right, English law does, under the name profit à prendre, and characterises 
it as a right to use. A profit under English law creates the same burden as the 
German Reallast, but is formulated from the perspective of the other party.  
Profits, which form the fourth type of servitude- or easement-like rights, are 
rights to take something from another’s land. In order to take something from the 
land of another, the profit includes a right of access to the land of another. These 
rights can be held by a holder of a dominant tenement, like an easement, but also by 
a person for his own benefit. In the last case the profit is said to be held in gross. 
The right to take something from another’s land in civil law systems is covered 
by a right of usufruct, but in German law, although formulated from the point of 
view of the other party, it can be formed as a Reallast as well. A piece of land that 
produces fruits, which are by their nature returning benefits, such as turves or 
fishes, can be made subject to a right of usufruct and Reallast, entitling its right 
holder to enter the land and take these fruits.  
2.4.3. Lesser Rights to Use of an Apartment 
A third type of rights to use was mentioned above as a special species of primary 
rights, but it should also be dealt with separately. These rights concern the entitle-
ment a person can have in respect of an apartment. Apartments create specific 
problems for legal systems. Apartment buildings become part of the ownership of 
the land they are constructed on, not only through application of the superficies solo 
cedit rule, vertical accession, but also through the general rules on horizontal acces-
sion, apartments themselves cannot be considered as objects separate and individu-
al from the building in which they situated, and are therefore they are incapable of 
being the subject of a primary right.  
In order to solve this problem, legal systems have come up with a solution that, 
although different in technicalities, comprises of three elements. First, the possibility 
is created for a party to be entitled to the exclusive use of a certain space in an apart-
ment building. Secondly, all the parties entitled to exclusive use are co-entitled to 
use the common parts of a building. Thirdly, an association is formed in which all 
these parties are members, usually called an association of co-owners, which makes 
decisions, preferably by majority decision. 
In French law apartment rights are created by making use of a special type of 
co-ownership. Through the application of special provisions, an apartment in a 
building can be co-owned but with rights of exclusive use.177 Dutch law follows a 
different approach and has recognised a separate and distinct property right, 
known as ‘apartment right’.178 German and English law, on the other hand, make 
use of the general primary right and have created specific provisions to enable the 
primary right to be capable of granting exclusive use of an apartment and joint use 
 
177 See Chapter 3; 2.2. Co-Ownership including Apartments. 
178 See Chapter 5; 3.5. Apartment Right. 
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of the common parts of a building.179 However, should the apartment rights cease to 
exist, the primary right that existed before the creation would return to its full state. 
In that sense, apartment rights could be categorised as lesser rights, although in 
many systems they are not considered as limited property rights.180 
2.4.4. Evaluation 
In the past few decades, under the influence of contract law, the use of each of these 
three different types of lesser rights to use has been further developed. Servitudes 
are no longer employed just to provide use of a certain part of another’s land, but 
they are also used to secure performance of an obligation. Usufructs are more and 
more used as management devices. A usufruct on shares enables an owner to profit 
from an increase in value of the shares, substitution included, but without the 
investment duties, which are on the holder of the usufruct.181 Also apartment rights, 
an invention of the last two centuries, make use of contractual freedom. The legal 
provisions dealing with apartments set the boundaries, but parties are free to design 
the content of their relation. This includes agreement on which parts of a building 
are exclusive, which are common, and how these parts should be dealt with, as well 
as the rules on the association of co-owners, how votes are cast, how decisions are 
made, and how costs are divided. Those agreements are not just contractual agree-
ments, but because they are part of the apartment right structure as a whole they 
will also bind new holders who acquire apartment rights. 
With the increasing influence of contract law, the lesser rights to use, apart 
from their traditional use, have received a new dimension that suits the develop-
ment of property law in general. Before this new property law is dealt with, the 
other lesser property rights should be examined. 
2.5. Lesser Rights as Security 
Apart from lesser rights to use, each of the legal systems also recognises lesser 
rights for security purposes, sometimes however under different names. French law 
divides lesser rights into principal and accessory lesser rights. In this division the 
principal rights entitle the holder to the use of object, which corresponds to the first 
category of lesser rights, and the accessory rights are security rights, which corre-
spond to the second category. German, Dutch and English law, although they make 
divisions into rights to use and for security, are less strict in their categorisation. 
Partly this is so because not all property rights for security purposes in these sys-
tems are accessory rights. In other words, the existence of the property rights is not 
necessarily dependent on the existence of an obligation.  
 
179 See Chapter 4; 2.3. Ownership of an Apartment, and Chapter 6; 2.1. Fee Simple. 
180 E.g., in French and German law, apartment rights are seen as types of ownership and not 
limited property rights. In Dutch law, the apartment right is a property rights, but is seen as 
an exception to the rule and is not characterised as a limited property right. 
181 See Bos 2005, p. 28. 
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When it comes to security rights, the division into movable and immovable 
objects is much more relevant than in the case of rights to use, where in civil law 
systems certain rights to use can be held both in movable and immovable objects.182 
However, security rights are divided along the lines of movable and immovable 
objects or, in case of English law, land and chattels.  
2.5.1. Security Rights in Respect of Movables and Chattels 
When it comes to security rights in respect of movable objects and chattels, all of the 
legal systems recognise the same lesser property right. In order to secure the per-
formance of an obligation, possession of a movable object or of a chattel can be 
transferred to another party. That other party, known as the pledgee, will hold 
possession of the object until the party, known as pledgor, performs the obligation. 
If the obligation, usually the repayment of a loan, is not performed, the pledgee has 
the right to take the object and sell it. It is this last power that makes this right, 
known as pledge, a property right. The right is usually held to comprise or to be 
modelled after the right of disposal, the abusus, of the holder of the primary right. In 
each of the legal systems this right, once validly created, has third-party effect. 
The use of the right of pledge requires a transfer of possession, which makes it 
less usable as a security right in practice because most of the time the pledgor will 
need to retain possession of the pledged objects in order to carry on trading and so 
be able to repay his loan. Therefore, all of the legal systems have found solutions to 
provide security on movable objects or chattels that do not require the transfer of 
possession. 
German law uses the primary right in respect of movable objects, which is a 
transfer for security purposes in a fiducia cum creditore as dealt with above.183 This 
transfer of the primary property right also provided an alternative in the 
Netherlands before the introduction of a new Civil Code.184 In a transfer of the 
primary right for security purposes, the factual control over the object remains with 
the transferor so that he can trade and perform his duty under the obligation the 
transfer secures.185 Once the duty the transfer secures is performed, a retro-transfer 
will return the primary right over the objects to the original transferor, the debtor in 
the agreement.  
After the introduction of the main part of the new Civil Code in the 
Netherlands in 1992, a new lesser right, a right of pledge without the transfer of 
possession, was introduced. This lesser property right functions in the same way as 
an ordinary right of pledge, in Dutch law referred to as a classic right of pledge, but 
does not require the transfer of possession. Consequently, in case of non-perform-
ance by the pledgor, the pledgee will have an additional right to take possession of 
the objects before selling them.186 
 
182 E.g., a right of usufruct. 
183 See above; 2.3. Primary Property Rights. See Chapter 4; 2.5. Security Ownership. 
184 See Chapter 5; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
185 In German law the transferor retains possession, in Dutch law this is a type of detention. 
186 See Chapter 5; 3.6. Pledge. 
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English law also makes use of another lesser right that exists in equity. 
Through a charge that is either fixed or floating, the parties can create a property 
right that enables the chargee to take possession of the objects and sell them, or 
appoint a receiver over them in case of non-performance of the obligation by the 
chargor.187 The charge is a lesser property right in equity, so not as strong as a prop-
erty right at law, but is still made use of in most situations.  
Finally, French law did not have a general alternative for movable objects until 
2006, when a new non-possessory right of pledge, similar to the Dutch lesser 
property right mentioned above, was introduced as part of a series of reforms.188 In 
French law also a right of pledge can be created without the transfer of possession. 
Upon non-performance by the pledgor, the pledgee may take possession and sell 
the objects.189 
Furthermore, in 2007, the French legislature introduced a fiducie, which may be 
used by companies, banks and financial institutions to transfer the primary right 
over objects for security purposes. This transfer, as in German law, creates a fiducia 
cum creditore in which the holder of the primary right is limited in his power over 
the object and must re-transfer it when the obligation the transfer secures has been 
performed. 
These developments towards non-possessory security rights also enable the 
application of these lesser property rights to claims instead of corporeal objects. The 
possession of a claim needed for the creation of a traditional security right would 
require notice of the transaction to be given to the debtor of the claim. However, 
preferably, the debtors of claims subject to lesser security rights are left alone until 
the lesser security right is executed. As a development of non-possessory security 
rights, security rights and assignment of incorporeal objects, usually claims, without 
notice to the debtor, have become possible.  
In German law, both an assignment for security purposes and a right of pledge 
of claims can be created.190 In Dutch and French law, the non-possessory right of 
pledge can also be used with regard to claims. Additionally, in French law a transfer 
of claims for security purposes, known as a cession Dailly, now a type of fiducie, is 
recognised.191 In English law a claim, as a chose in action, can be the subject of an 
equitable charge.  
2.5.2. Security Rights in Respect of Immovables and Land 
Security rights in respect of immovable objects or land in French, German, Dutch 
and English law are very similar. Each of these legal systems recognises a lesser 
property right connected to the performance of an obligation.  
 
187 See Chapter 6; 3.4. Charges, Fixed and Floating. 
188 French law did know a pledge on cars and a life rent pledge through special legislation. See 
Loi 29 décembre 1934, (pledge on cars), Art. 2354 C.civ (life rent pledge) and Art. L521-1 Code 
de Commerce (commercial pledge). See Legeais 2006a, p. 359-361. 
189 See Chapter 3; 3.5. Pledge. 
190 See Chapter 4; 3.6. Pledge. 
191 See Chapter 3; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
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In French law this right is the right of hypothec, which is a property right in 
respect of an immovable object that enables the holder to sell the object when the 
obligation is not performed. However, until that moment the owner is entitled to 
use, enjoy and dispose of his immovable object. When the obligation is performed, 
the lesser property right will cease to exist and the ownership will be full and 
complete again. In other words, the right of hypothec in French law is a strictly 
accessory right. It cannot exist without the obligation it secures.  
The 2006 reforms of securities law in France introduced new types of hypothec 
that deviate from the ordinary, traditional, type of hypothec, in particular, from the 
accessory nature of the traditional right. First, a rechargeable hypothec is created 
that enables parties to reuse an already created right. In order to achieve this, the 
right of hypothec is not accessory to the obligation it secures in the traditional 
meaning. The obligation remains necessary to create the right, but once the obliga-
tion is performed, usually a loan has been repaid, and the parties have specifically 
so agreed, the right of hypothec will remain in existence. When the owner of an 
immovable object wants to re-use his right of hypothec to secure another obligation, 
the right of hypothec is re-charged. Until that moment, the right of hypothec exists 
without a corresponding obligation. Secondly, a reversed hypothec, or life-rent hy-
pothec, is recognised, which enables an owner to build up a loan in instalments.192 
At the moment this right of hypothec is created no obligation to secure exists. In 
other words, the claim the right secures is a future claim.  
In German law, a traditional type of hypothec also exists. It is a similar 
property right to the French ordinary hypothec and cannot exist without an obli-
gation. However, German law recognises another, non-accessory, lesser property 
right, the Grundschuld. This property right grants the same rights to its holder as a 
right of hypothec, a right to sell the object in case of non-performance, but is not 
dependent on the existence of an obligation. Therefore, and differently from French 
law, a right of Grundschuld can also be created by an owner on his own immovable 
object, and then transferred to another party in exchange for finance.193 
The terms under which the right of Grundschuld may be exercised are mostly 
for the parties to determine. In fact, because the property right itself will usually 
already be in existence, a separate contract will deal with the transfer of the lesser 
property right and the terms and conditions. These terms and conditions are not 
subject to the law of property and therefore parties enjoy maximum contractual 
freedom. If a right of Grundschuld is transferred by this method, under the conclu-
sion of a security contract, it becomes a security-Grundschuld.194 The legal technique 
used for this is the same as a transfer of ownership for security purposes and the 
creation of a security-servitude, making use of the law on Treuhand, the law on 
fiduciary relationships.  
Dutch law recognises only one lesser property security right, in the form of the 
right of hypothec. As in French law and German law, the Dutch right of hypothec is 
 
192 See Chapter 3; 3.6. Hypothec. 
193 See Chapter 4; 3.8. Grundschuld. 
194 It is this type of Grundschuld that has been model for the security servitudes to develop. 
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an accessory security right, incapable of existing without the obligation it secures. 
However, in legal practice an important deviation from this principle has devel-
oped. Although the Dutch Civil Code does not expressly deal with it, a right of hy-
pothec can be created for a future obligation, usually a future claim. This is the case 
when a bank gives credit to a company and the company does not make immediate 
use of that credit. Until the company does make use of that credit, but also when it 
repays the credit during the agreement, no claim will exist, and therefore the 
obligation the right of hypothec secures will not exist either, or will have been 
performed. This special type of hypothec, known as credit-hypothec, will continue 
to exist until the end of the agreement between the bank and the company.195 
English law also recognises a lesser security right in respect of land, the 
charge. Contrary to its equivalent on chattels, this charge is capable of existence at 
common law. When the conveyance of a fee simple for security purposes was pro-
hibited in 1925, it was replaced by a charge by deed by way of legal mortgage. In 
this transaction, the land is charged with a lesser property right granting its holder 
the same rights as if the holder of a fee simple had granted a lease for security 
purposes, a different type of mortgage that existed until 2002.196 The holder of the 
charge is therefore entitled, in case of non-performance of the obligation, to take 
possession, sell the land or appoint a receiver over it. The English solution very 
much resembles the civil law use of hypothecs as security rights over land.197 
2.5.3. Evaluation 
Property security rights have also been under the influence of the increasing role of 
contract law. As in the case of other property rights, contract law has always been 
used to provide content to property security rights. The increasing influence is best 
seen in Germany where the Grundschuld is used as the subject of a security contract 
setting the terms and conditions under which the property right is transferred, 
almost without interference from property law. Also the French new rechargeable 
hypothec will make it possible to use the rights in a similar way.  
In these cases property law is used to strengthen what would otherwise be a 
personal right. It is in this respect that a final category of rights that are used as 
security should be mentioned. These rights are created by law and arise in a factual 
situation where a creditor holds possession of an object of a debtor as a method to 
strengthen his claim for performance. Here, the legal systems use different solu-
tions. French and Dutch law recognise a right of retention, which in French law 
alone is recognised as a property right.198 German law also uses a property solution 
 
195 See Chapter 5; 3.7. Hypothec. 
196 See Chapter 6; 2.9. Mortgage of Land and Equity of Redemption. 
197 Furthermore, civil law systems recognise the right of antichresis in respect of land. A property 
security right to the movables on the land for payment of a sum of money. In civil law 
systems this right is considered less relevant. On the origin of the right see Chapter 2; 2.4. 
Other Property Rights. 
198 See Chapter 3; 4.1. Right of Retention. 
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through the recognition of a right of pledge by force of law in certain cases.199 
Finally, English law also recognises a category of special property rights that come 
into existence by force of law, the liens.200 
In connection with this, civil law systems also recognise priority rights. 
English law recognises similar rights in case of statutory liens. The legal nature of 
priority rights is debated and only in French law are they explicitly recognised as 
security property rights.201 
2.6. Lesser Rights Used to Acquire a Certain Legal Position (Anticipatory 
Rights) 
Contract law and property law must work together in order to transfer property 
rights, but also in order to create lesser property rights. Depending on the legal 
system, the effects of concluding a contract will differ. In French law, with its con-
sensual system of transfer, the conclusion of a contract will normally result in an 
immediate transfer. In the case of land, registration is required for third-party effect, 
but between the parties the transfer takes effect upon agreement.202 The same sys-
tem generally applies for the creation of property rights. A lesser property right is 
created by agreement. In the case of immovable objects, in order to achieve third-
party effect, registration is required.203 
German and Dutch law have a traditio system of transfer that starts from the 
general idea that contract law and property law are separate. Besides a contract, 
which functions as the cause for the transfer, a real agreement is needed to result in 
a transfer of a property right. In the case of immovable objects, registration is a 
constitutive requirement.204 The same rules apply for the creation of property rights.  
When it comes to the transfer of property rights or the creation of lesser 
property rights in English law, the division in consensual and traditio systems does 
not seem to be a subject of debate.205 As in the other systems, the transfer and 
creation of property rights is initiated by contract. At common law these transfers or 
acts to create lesser rights may be subject to certain formalities. Equity generally re-
sists formalities and will give proprietary effect at an earlier stage than the common 
law.206 It is in particular in the different requirements between law and equity that a 
separate category of property rights arises. 
For the creation of property rights in respect of land at common law, such as 
leases and rights of easement, the common law requires certain formalities to be 
 
199 See Chapter 4; 3.6. Pledge. 
200 See Chapter 6; 3.6. Liens. 
201 See Chapter 3; 3.7. Priority Rights, Chapter 4; 3.6. Pledge, Chapter 5; 4.1. Priority Rights, and 
Chapter 6; 3.6. Liens. 
202 See Van Vliet 2000, p. 73 et seq. 
203 The exception is the right of hypothec that without registration cannot come into being. See 
Chapter 3; 3.6. Hypothec. 
204 See Art. 3:89 BW, Van Vliet 2000, p. 30, Baur, Baur & Stürner 1999, p. 202 et seq. 
205 Briefly, see Swadling 2006a, p. 287-290. 
206 Swadling 2007, p. 233. 
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fulfilled. Mostly these concern the requirement to make a deed. However, when an 
agreement is made to create a lease or a right of easement, equity will give effect to 
these rights, anticipating their existence at common law. Because the property rights 
are already recognised in equity as equitable leases or equitable easements, parties 
do not necessarily have to conclude a deed. They will usually do so, however, be-
cause rights in equity are less strong than rights at common law.207 
Moreover, another category of equitable rights may come into existence, which 
does not mirror the property rights at common law. Instead, these equitable proper-
ty rights exist separately from the common law rights and, by their nature, only 
until the common law rights have come into existence. It is this category of equit-
able rights that can be considered as a distinct group of lesser property rights. 
In order to transfer an estate in land, a deed and, after 2002, registration is 
required.208 However, when parties conclude an agreement to sell, make a deed, and 
send this deed for registration, the process may take some time. The courts of 
equity, by reference to the fact that the contract to convey an estate in land can be 
specifically enforced in equity, and that equity looks at ‘that as done which ought to 
be done’, have recognised a property right in equity for the transferee. Until regis-
tration of the deed is completed, the transferor will remain entitled to the estate at 
common law.209 As a result, another person will have a right in equity on the land 
through the workings of the law of trusts. From the moment the agreement to con-
vey an estate, known as an estate contract, is concluded, the holder of the property 
right at common law will hold it on trust for the transferee. With reference to the 
same arguments the courts of equity have also recognised the property effect of an 
option to purchase.210  
Similarly, in German law, the courts have intervened in the property law sys-
tem in cases where the Civil Code awards additional protection to a person waiting 
for a property right to be transferred to him. This occurs in the case of reservation of 
ownership clauses where the transferee will only become owner upon full payment 
of the purchase price. Until that moment, the Civil Code offers additional protective 
measures for the transferee against the transferor, but not in the form of a property 
right. With reference to this special protection, the German federal court introduced 
an additional property right known as an Anwartschaftsrecht or acquisition right.211  
The acquisition right is also recognised in other situations, the most important 
being when an agreement to sell and transfer a primary right in land has been made 
and a deed is passed that is sent for registration. In that case, the German Civil Code 
 
207 See Chapter 6; 1.2. Common Law and Equity. 
208 Swadling 2000a, p. 256. 
209 See Chapter 6; 2.7. Estate Contracts. 
210 London and South Western Railway v Gomm (1882) 20 Ch D 562 per Lindley LJ, Swadling 2007, 
p. 260-261, 334. 
211 BGH 24 June 1958, BGHZ 28, 16, 21, BGH 25 February 1966, BGHZ 45, 186 (192). See Chapter 
4; 3.4. Expectation Rights. 
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also offers additional protection to the transferee, and the courts, with reference to 
that protection, have recognised an acquisition right.212  
Furthermore, German law recognises the dingliche Vorkaufrecht, which literally 
translates as a pre-emptive property right to a sale. The right is created through an 
agreement between an owner and another person containing a right for the latter to 
claim the sale and transfer of the ownership under certain conditions. In compari-
son with other systems, therefore, the pre-emptive right to sale is effectively an 
option to purchase with property law effects, as in English law. The effect of the 
German option to purchase is that it enables the holder to invoke the right against a 
third party who made an agreement of sale with the owner, contrary to the option 
to purchase and, in certain circumstances, to demand the transfer of ownership to 
himself.213 However, once the sale and transfer is concluded with that third party, 
the option ceases to exist and a personal claim for damages remains. 
Finally, German law recognises the possibility to provide certain rights with 
third-party effect through Vormerkung or pre-emptive registration. Any claim that 
involves a change in the legal situation of a property right in respect of an immova-
ble object can be registered.214 The registration changes the effect of the pre-regis-
tered claim, and makes it possible for its holder to invoke it against third parties. 
Doctrinally, the registration does not transform a personal right into a property 
right, but the effects are the same.215 
Moreover, certain property rights that are less strong in nature, such as the 
German option to purchase, can be pre-emptively registered. Upon the pre-emptive 
registration, the holder of the right will not only be able to invoke his right against 
the owner, but also, albeit under conditions, against a third party who entered into a 
sale and transfer with the owner.216 
In Dutch law pre-emptive registration also exists, but it can only be used to 
register a contract of consumer sale of a house.217 When such a contract of sale is 
registered and the owner enters into another contract of sale, transfers ownership of 
the house to a third party, or becomes insolvent, the holder of that pre-emptively 
registered personal right may invoke his right against the third party or against the 
insolvent estate.218 
Both German and Dutch doctrine insist that pre-emptive registration does not 
transform personal rights into property rights. Nevertheless, registration does give 
these personal rights property law effects. If a right is created in respect of an object 
and it can be invoked and specifically enforced against a third party who did not 
 
212 § 873 (2) BGB, further protected by §§ 130 (2), 979 BGB and §§ 17 and 45 Grundbuch Ordnung 
(GBO), Wolf 2005, p. 216-217. See Chapter 4; 3.4. Expectation Rights. 
213 § 1098 BGB, Staudinger et al. 2002, p. 796. 
214 Furthermore, the claim must concern a private law relation. See Chapter 4; 4.2. Pre-Emptive 
Registration (Vormerkung). 
215 A similar discussion is held in South African law where personal rights can sometimes be 
registered under Art. 63 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. See, inter alia, Sonnekus 1991, 
p. 173 et seq., Van der Walt 1992, p. 171 et seq. 
216 See Chapter 4; 4.2. Pre-Emptive Registration (Vormerkung). 
217 See Chapter 5; 4.3. Lease of Immovable Objects. 
218 Arts. 7:2 and 7:3 BW. 
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agree to it, it fulfils the main criteria for a property right and it is difficult to 
maintain that it is a special type of personal right.219  
From a comparative point of view, this category of rights contains rights that 
are temporary in nature. They anticipate events, usually the creation or transfer of 
primary and lesser rights, and will cease to exist once the event takes place. In that 
sense, it could be held that these rights form a general category of anticipatory 
rights. Anticipatory rights are subject to different requirements compared with 
lesser property rights. 
In order to create these rights a contract is usually sufficient, but sometimes 
registration is required. However, the effect of these rights is that they can be in-
voked against third parties, which makes them different from personal rights. 
Anticipatory rights are therefore situated between the law of obligations and the 
law of property.  
However, as all of these legal systems operate on a distinction between these 
systems of law, a choice should be made. By stating that anticipatory rights are 
rights sui generis or invoking the old category of iura ad rem, no real solutions are 
achieved and the dynamic side of property law is neglected. Anticipatory rights 
should be part of property law and enable property law systems to develop. The 
fact that contract law is used to develop the law of property, and provide new uses 
for it, should not hinder, but stimulate its development.220 
3. Numerus Clausus in Property Law Systems in Europe? 
Now that a categorisation of property rights in the various legal systems has been 
made, and a model is developed that makes use of terminology in which the charac-
teristics of each of the legal systems can be expressed, the concept of numerus clausus 
can be revisited. First, we will take another look at why legal systems operate a 
numerus clausus. From within the legal systems, legal arguments are used to justify 
the existence as well as the maintenance of the closed system of property rights.221 
Moreover, numerus clausus has also received attention from Law and Economics 
scholars, who provide explanations for why a numerus clausus exists.222 
When the arguments that justify and clarify the existence of a numerus clausus 
are taken into consideration, the question can be asked whether a legal system 
needs numerus clausus to function.223 There are legal systems in the world that do 
not adhere to a closed system of property rights, in other words, where parties 
enjoy freedom to create new property rights themselves. One of these legal systems, 
South African law, will be examined to see if a legal system can function without a 
closed system.224 
 
219 See Chapter 1; 1.1. Personal Rights and Property Rights. 
220 This topic will return in below in 3. Numerus Clausus in Property Law Systems in Europe? 
221 See below; 3.1. Justifications for a Numerus Clausus from within the Legal System. 
222 See below; 3.2. Law and Economics on Numerus Clausus. 
223 See below; 3.3. Numerus Clausus in Comparative Analysis. 
224 See below; 3.8. A Legal System without a Numerus Clausus: South African Law. 
 437 
Chapter 7 
Finally, when the reasons for and against a closed system have been discussed, 
we can return to the numerus clausus in the property law systems in Europe. Nume-
rus clausus as a principle of property law is adhered to by all of the legal systems 
under consideration, albeit to different degrees. The final section of this Chapter 
will therefore be devoted to the place of the numerus clausus of property rights in the 
European legal systems.225  
3.1. Justifications for a Numerus Clausus from within the Legal System 
There can be several reasons for the fact that even in an open system of property 
rights, in a system where no numerus clausus exists, there is not unlimited freedom 
to create new property rights. First, the primary reason for a numerus clausus to be 
recognised is to ensure legal certainty. A system that does not recognise a numerus 
clausus does not, however, desire a system of legal uncertainty. Therefore, even in 
such a system, criteria exist with which property rights must comply. Examples of 
these criteria are the ‘subtraction from dominium test’ of South African law, and also 
the requirements for new property rights of Lord Wilberforce from National 
Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth in English law.226 A numerus clausus offers optimal 
legal certainty in the sense that it ensures no other property rights can exist than 
those recognised by the legal system and, therefore, when parties are confronted 
with a property right they can establish what property right they are dealing with. 
However, even in a system without a numerus clausus, parties should not be con-
fronted with a group of unknown property rights. 
Only a few authors have searched for the reasons behind the numerus clausus. 
Rudden has offered several legal reasons why a numerus clausus might exist.227 First 
of all, he offers an argument that the current list of property rights might offer all 
the property rights that are needed. Under the heading of absence of demand, 
Rudden almost immediately rejects this argument, mentioning some attempts to 
create new property rights such as in Clore v Theatrical Productions, which was dealt 
with in Chapter 6 on English law.228 Other examples, such as the German acquisi-
tion right, or the new French lesser security rights introduced by the 2006 reforms, 
also show that there can be much demand for new property rights. 
A second reason Rudden mentions is the absence of notice.229 By this Rudden 
means the argument often used, that third parties dealing with the right will not 
know about its existence. However, although this is a valid argument, Rudden 
focuses attention on the fact that notice by itself will not suffice as a reason to create 
 
225 See below; 4. Conclusion: Numerus Clausus in Property Law Systems in Europe. 
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228 Clore v Theatrical Properties Ltd and Westby & Co Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 483, CA. 
229 Rudden 1987, p. 246. 
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new property rights. In other words, just the fact that other parties know about the 
existence of a right does not automatically make that right into a property right.230 
Knowledge about a property right is therefore not as such a requirement for the 
validity of a property right. 
A third reason is offered in the form of absence of consent. Property rights 
bind parties beyond privity of contract. Therefore when it comes to property rights 
imposing positive duties on the right-holder, these rights should not be allowed. 
Parties, when they acquire a property right, should not be compelled to do some-
thing they did not agree to. A new property right would result in another right to 
which parties can be bound without their consent. 
A final reason is what Rudden calls pyramiding. By this Rudden refers to the 
idea that if one owner is allowed to create new property rights in respect of his land, 
his successors in title will expect to be able to do the same. As a result a pyramid of 
obligations will rest on the land, which is generally considered an undesirable 
effect.231 Rules prohibiting this type of pyramiding include, for instance, the statute 
Quia Emptores which prohibited sub-infeudation.232 In mentioning these reasons, 
Rudden does not explain numerus clausus as such, but provides arguments he has 
come across in legal writings.233  
In a thesis on Swiss law, Foëx examined the numerus clausus of property rights 
in respect of movables, and also provided legal arguments for why a numerus clau-
sus might exist.234 First, Foëx examines the publicity function of the numerus clausus. 
Property rights are rights against the world and therefore the world should know 
about their existence in order to justify this effect. Therefore, the law prescribes the 
number of these rights that have an effect against third parties, as well as the rules 
of publicity they are subject to.235 Second, numerus clausus ensures that the available 
property rights and their content are clear. Under the heading of simplicity and 
predictability, Foëx holds that parties must know which legal relations they might 
have to confront, and what the content of these relations is.236 Third, the limited 
number of property rights is there to protect the freedom of ownership, the idea that 
the right of ownership is such an important right that it deserves special protec-
tion.237 This is a typically French-inspired argument, which holds that after the 
unitary concept of ownership was introduced, as an effect of the French Revolution, 
fragmentation of this right was only allowed by law in the form of a démembrement 
of the right of ownership. If parties were free to fragment the right of ownership, 
either into different types of co-ownership, or in the form of new, as yet unrecog-
nised, lesser property rights, the reason the right of ownership was made a unitary 
right would be taken away. The legal system would then return to the feudal 
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system of fragmentation of ownership.238 Fourthly, in Foëx’s view, numerus clausus 
also serves an ethical purpose.239 In Foëx’s view, numerus clausus refers to the idea 
that only the legislature may add property rights.240 Therefore, the legislature has 
made choices on which property rights to recognise and which not. In that respect, 
the choice and all its elements, the ethical dimension Foëx seems to refer to, is part 
of numerus clausus as well.241 Finally, Foëx mentions that numerus clausus also serves 
a function of support to other principles and rules of property law.242 In this respect 
Foëx seems to adhere to a strict interpretation of numerus clausus as a rule that limits 
the number and content of the lesser property rights. In my view, he refers to the 
filtering-function of numerus clausus as dealt with above.243 In this respect, when 
under the rule of numerus clausus the legislature decides that a certain legal relation 
is a property right, the law of property and the specific rules of the law of property, 
and even more specific rules on a certain property right, apply. 
Struycken has analysed Foëx’s arguments and concludes that the first function 
is more about the principle of publicity than the numerus clausus, and that also the 
second function, that of simplicity and predictability, can be brought under the 
heading of publicity.244 Furthermore, according to Struycken, the ethical objective is 
not a part of numerus clausus as such, but a general principle of good legislation in 
which the legislature takes into account as many relevant dimensions as possible. In 
that respect, these arguments show that in a system adhering to the rule of numerus 
clausus, the legislature takes prime position and numerus clausus serves to organise 
the law of property and decide which rules apply.245 
In my view, these arguments seem to justify the existence of numerus clausus 
more than to explain why it must be there. Possibly, legal arguments alone do not 
clarify or even justify the existence of a numerus clausus. What appears certain is that 
the law of property needs legal certainty and that therefore publicity and numerus 
clausus go together to a large extent.246 The legal certainty argument could be seen as 
a leading consideration behind the existence of a numerus clausus. Possibly, looking 
more to the effects of the property law system and of numerus clausus in particular 
will offer more clarity. It is in particular in this respect that Law and Economics can 
offer assistance. 
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3.2. Law and Economics on Numerus Clausus 
The study of Law and Economics is concerned with an economic analysis of the 
law, not so much on what ought to happen and what ought to be done, but more an 
analysis to explain the functioning of the law.247 In this respect, Law and Economics 
offers explanations of the workings of the law that lawyers who only consider law 
might overlook, or simply ignore. In the law of property, and in respect to property 
rights in particular, Law and Economics is concerned with scarcity of resources and 
individual choice.248 Property law concerns objects that are resources for which 
there is more demand than supply. Because of that, the law offers rules on the al-
location of these resources. Individuals, natural persons, subsequently have a choice 
as to which resources they want. The study of Law and Economics recognises the 
costs to individuals of choices they may make.249 The way in which individuals 
make decisions can be expressed in terms of weighing the benefits and costs of a 
certain decision. In property law, this decision concerns the choice to acquire or not 
to acquire a certain scarce resource.250 
In order to analyse property law there are three basic concepts of relevance; 
externalities, transaction costs and efficiency. First, externalities are the effects a 
decision has on parties other than the decision maker. When looking at a decision to 
use a certain resource, where the effects against third parties are not taken into 
account, the effects are external to the decision.251 In an optimal situation a decision 
maker would take all externalities of his decision into account. However, the world 
is far from optimal and therefore externalities may be neglected and a resource may 
be inefficient, because costs and benefits were not taken fully into account. Second, 
transaction costs are costs incurred with making a decision to act and the costs that 
come with the act.252 An important part of transaction costs are information costs, 
which are the costs incurred in gathering information that would normally lead to a 
decision. Depending on the decision to be made, these information costs will be 
higher or lower. Other transaction costs may include the costs of acquiring an object 
or of failing to reach an optimal bargain with the seller. Third and finally, the 
concept of efficiency in relation to property law means that for economists the value 
of a resource is maximised. It is this concept that law should strive for, although it 
might, in reality, never achieve this.253 Analysis towards an efficient use of a 
resource, so that its value is maximised, leads to interesting insights in the workings 
of the law. In respect to numerus clausus, Law and Economics theorists have offered 
several explanations that will be dealt with in this section.  
Before entering into three different theories, there are some general concepts 
that need clarification. When it comes to property rights, Law and Economics is also 
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concerned with the efficient allocation of these property rights, particularly to 
ensure that entitlements to objects are not fragmented. When the entitlement to an 
object becomes so fragmented that decision making over that object, or protection of 
that object, becomes so difficult that the costs are larger than the benefits the 
fragmented entitlements to the object earn its holders, the object is no longer held 
efficiently.254 
When it comes to numerus clausus, Law and Economics can tell us something 
about the reasons for its existence. Rudden has offered several economic explana-
tions for the existence of a closed system. His approach is to look at why a legal 
system does not want to recognise a new, as yet unknown, property right, which he 
names, after Lord Brougham VC in Keppel v Bailey, a ‘fancy’.255 In doing so, Rudden 
discovered legal reasons that have been dealt with above.256 Apart from these legal 
reasons, Rudden also offers a scheme of economic explanations, without going into 
detail. By way of introduction to the subject, Rudden’s economic reasons will be 
dealt with here, before three specific economic theories on numerus clausus are dealt 
with. 
First of all, Rudden argues that the existence of too many property rights 
would decrease the marketability of land. Land could no longer be freely transfer-
red, which would have an effect on its value.257 Secondly, Rudden signals that 
economists point out that a market would benefit from a standardisation of proper-
ty rights.258 Trading in a non-standard commodity, in this case a property right, 
would increase the costs of other market participants. Standardising the market 
would reduce these externalities. Thirdly, Rudden mentions the market economy.259 
In order to ensure trade, objects of property law should be as unrestricted as pos-
sible. Imposing too many burdens would restrict the ‘free circulation of things’.260 
Fourthly, Rudden mentions information costs.261 In Rudden’s view these costs occur 
in two ways; when parties are at the ‘screening stage’, looking at what entitlements 
are available on the market, and when parties have made a selection and are faced 
with the application of their entitlement to specific circumstances. In particular 
these information costs are of high importance for numerus clausus and have been 
further elaborated on by other Law and Economics scholars.262 Fifthly, Rudden 
mentions there are transaction costs that are incurred by parties if they have to 
negotiate the terms of their legal relation.263 When, at the initial stage, parties have 
screened the rights available, which in an optimal situation would have been 
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standardised by the market, they are unlikely to be confronted with surprises when 
they do acquire the entitlement they have been looking at. Transaction costs thus 
will be at a minimum level. Sixthly, Rudden suggests land utilisation is ensured by 
the idea that entitlements to land are limited to ensure efficient development.264 Too 
many ‘fancies’ on the land will hinder this development and lead to, in economic 
terms, non-efficient use of the resource. Seventhly, and finally, Rudden emphasises 
that property relations are static, in the sense that they are durable, intended to last 
for a long time.265 In the law of obligations, to the contrary, relations are dynamic in 
the sense that they are intended to last only for a limited period. Therefore, numerus 
clausus also ensures that there are not too many rights that last for a very long time, 
possibly forever, and that, a contrario, dynamic relations must be renegotiated.266  
These basic concepts can be summarised under two different headings; first, 
fragmentation issues and, secondly, costs incurred from property transactions. Both 
of these provide an economic answer for why numerus clausus might be useful, and 
they are dealt with in the next sections. 
3.2.1. Fragmentation: Not too Many Rights; on Commons and Anti-Commons 
In his influential article, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968), the biologist Garrett 
Hardin drew attention to what he called problems for which there is no technical 
solution.267 In relation to the debate on the threat of nuclear war, and the conclusion 
of many that there is no technical solution to this, Professor Hardin focused on a 
concept called ‘commons’. A commons is a situation in which the privilege to use an 
object is shared between several persons in the absence of any rules or agreements 
in respect of the right of exclusion.268 Hardin offered the example of a pasture on 
which several herdsmen attempt to have as many cattle as possible. There are no 
specific rules or agreements on the use of the pasture. The herdsmen cannot exclude 
each other and the pasture is therefore a commons. The problem Hardin identified 
is that each herdsman will gain for himself by adding cattle to the pasture, but all 
the herdsmen will share the cost of adding an animal to the pasture together. On 
this he states: 
‘Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase 
his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination towards 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all’.269 
The example shows what has become known as the tragedy of the commons, a 
situation in which a destructive situation is created through over-use.270 In later 
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writings, the commons problem described by Hardin has been divided into two 
types of commons.271 First there are public commons, such as national parks, forests 
and other public areas. These areas generally allow access to the public and are sub-
ject to problems of over-use. Such over-use can occur through physical use of land, 
but also by pollution, for instance.272 Other commons are known as private com-
mons, and have been mostly described as common-pool problems, describing the 
effects of a group of tenants or landowners sharing a swimming pool together.273 In 
those situations, too, in the absence of rules or agreements, the pool is subject to 
dangers of over-use. 
However, a tragedy does not occur automatically, and even if it does, the 
result is not necessarily disadvantageous.274 In the case of public parks, Central Park 
in New York City is a prime example, where a ‘tragedy of the commons’ may 
prevent the land from being used as a building development site.275 There, the land-
owners neighbouring the park have a clear incentive not to allow the park to be 
developed as their interest clearly benefits from the presence of the park. Although 
they do not have a right to exclude others, including a developer coming in to build 
commercial buildings in the park, these neighbouring owners have a clear incentive 
to prevent development from taking place by ensuring everyone exercises their 
privilege to use the park.276 
Nevertheless, the analysis offered by Hardin shows that when too many 
people enjoy a privilege to use, without the necessary right to exclude others, the 
drive for maximisation of personal gain will lead to a situation of over-use of a 
scarce resource. It is there that Hardin sees the tragedy occurring. Therefore, theo-
rists have offered private ownership as a solution to prevent the tragedy from hap-
pening.277 In a private ownership regime, specific parties will receive rights to ex-
clude others and to make decisions in respect of the object that is no longer strictly a 
commons.  
Creating rights of ownership in such a situation will prevent a tragedy of the 
commons from occurring, but will not necessarily solve the problem. At the other 
end of the spectrum, too many ‘ownership rights’ with a power to make decisions 
over an object will lead to another phenomenon in Law and Economics – an anti-
commons.278 ‘The tragedy of the anti-commons’ was formulated in 1998 by a legal 
scholar, Michael Heller.279 Anti-commons is a situation in which the power to make 
decisions over an object is divided between so many actors that no decision can be 
 
271 Munzer 2006, p. 150-151. 
272 Heller 1998, p. 624, Hardin 1968, p. 1245. 
273 Munzer 2006, p. 150-151. 
274 Heller 1998, p. 676-677, Hansmann & Kraakman 2002, p. 160-161. 
275 Parchomovsky & Bell 2006, p. 138-141. 
276 Parchomovsky and Bell name these rights anti-property interests. Parchomovsky & Bell 2006, 
p. 142-146. 
277 Heller 1998, p. 678, Munzer 2006, p. 151-152. 
278 Of course, in terms of property law the term should not be ownership rights, i.e., in plural, 
but rather property right as the right of ownership, as a primary right, is a unitary right. 
279 Heller 1998, p. 622. See also Parisi, Schulz & Depoorter 2005, p. 579, Fusaro 2001, p. 3-4. 
 444 
Comparative Overview 
made. As an example, Heller mentions the shops in post-Soviet Russia.280 As part of 
the transition from a socialist property regime to a system of private ownership, 
ownership in Russia remained partly fragmented among several actors. Fragmenta-
tion of ownership therefore remained in the sense that the power to make decisions 
over an object was divided between several actors. As an example Heller shows 
how for a right to sell an object, six actors are involved.281  
A tragedy of the anti-commons occurs because the actors cannot come to a 
decision. As a result the object is not over-used, as is the case with a tragedy of the 
commons, but under-used.282 In the case of the Moscow shops, these remained 
empty, and meanwhile small kiosks selling goods erupted in the streets in front of 
the shops. Law and Economic analysis shows that fragmentation of decision-
making power leads to under-use and this can only be solved through ‘[unification] 
of fragmented property rights into a usable bundle’.283 As a final remark Heller 
states: 
‘Property theory and transition practice have given insufficient weight to the role that 
the bundling of rights plays in avoiding anti-commons tragedy. Both theorists and 
practitioners assume that the key to creating private property is to define rights clearly, 
enforce contracts predictably, and let the market sort out entitlements. The experience 
of anticommunist property in transition suggests that the content of property bundles, 
and not just the clarity of property rights, matters more than we have realized. We pay 
a high price when we inadvertently create anticommunist property’.284 
The examples of the commons and anti-commons illustrate a danger each property 
law system faces. When through either not enough or too many rules an object 
becomes over-used or under-used, the system fails and inefficiency results. 
In respect of numerus clausus it has been argued that this reasoning applies 
directly.285 Through the existence of too broadly formulated, or too many, property 
rights, a tragedy of the commons or anti-commons may occur.286 When, in other 
words, the list of property rights is examined, the system of property law must 
ensure there are not too many rights granting a privilege to use without a right to 
exclude others from using on the one hand, but, on the other hand, these rights 
should not divide the decision-making powers over the object amongst too many 
right-holders. The danger of fragmentation of property rights lies in a tragedy 
occurring.287  
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The effect of this theory on numerus clausus is debated. Merrill and Smith 
challenge the fundamental nature of the fragmentation argument.288 Although they 
do not challenge the relevance of the analysis of the danger of fragmentation of 
property rights for many areas of property law, they challenge the assumption that 
dangers of fragmentation can explain the existence of a numerus clausus.289 In the 
view of Merrill and Smith, fragmentation is fragmentation in respect of the number 
of right-holders, not in respect of the types of property rights. Therefore, the danger 
of fragmentation is part of the discussion of numerus clausus, but does not explain its 
existence. 
3.2.2. Numerus Clausus as Optimal Standardisation of Property Rights 
If fragmentation does not provide the answer for the existence of the numerus clau-
sus, additional analysis could offer help. Merrill and Smith argue that the answer 
lies in the view of numerus clausus as a standardisation of property rights. In 
creating this view they discuss the costs and benefits of standardisation and to what 
extent government should be involved in standardisation.290  
They come to this view through an analysis of the judgment by the Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Brougham, in Keppel v Bailey, dealt with in Chapter 6 on English 
law.291 In that judgment Lord Brougham LC stated that no new property rights 
should be recognised because third parties would hardly be able to know what 
rights and duties would be included when they acquired a piece of land. According 
to Merrill and Smith, recognising new property rights ‘would create unacceptable 
information costs to third parties’.292 They argue that costs incurred by third parties, 
which refers to parties other than those creating the right, are the deciding factor. 
These costs, which they call information costs, can be divided into two types; meas-
urement costs and frustration costs. 
Measurement costs are those costs that individuals face when they encounter 
property rights. As these are not costs faced by the parties creating a property right, 
but by third parties confronted with the right, they are an ‘externality involving 
measurement costs’.293 Merrill and Smith therefore distinguish between the origi-
nating parties, who were participants in the transaction creating the property right, 
potential successors in interest of the object in which the property right is created, 
and other market participants.294 Each of these three groups is affected by the crea-
tion of a new property right. The parties creating the property right mainly enjoy 
benefits and will usually not take the measurement costs they impose on third 
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parties into account. Potential successors in interest are confronted with the specific 
property right that was created by the originating parties. This ‘internal’ effect of 
numerus clausus, which does not include the costs imposed on other market partici-
pants, is also covered in other explanations of numerus clausus, such as fragmen-
tation as dealt with above.295 
In Merrill and Smith’s view, their explanation of measurement costs also 
affects market participants other than just the parties dealing with the property 
right. As an example they describe a situation in which one hundred people own 
watches and one of them, A, sells and transfers his watch to B. He does not transfer 
it fully, but only the right to use the watch on Monday.296 Not only are A and B and 
their respective successors in interest affected by this transfer, but also all other 
market participants will now be confronted with a situation where not only a 
‘normal’ property right in watches exists, the right to use the watch, but also a 
‘time-share’ of watches. Now that another property right exists, anyone acquiring a 
watch will have to investigate whether such a watch does not include a ‘time-share’ 
or ‘Monday-right’. 
With these costs of numerus clausus, which they term ‘external costs’ and which 
I would call the ‘external’ effect, taking other market participants who are not 
directly confronted with the existence of the property right into account, Merrill and 
Smith claim their explanation of numerus clausus is different from others. This differ-
ence can best be seen in solutions proposed to solve the problems created by the 
example of ‘Monday-rights’ in watches. Theories that focus on the ‘internal’ effects 
of numerus clausus, which are those theories that do not take the other market 
participants into account, seek solutions to this problem in concepts such as notice 
and other forms of specific publicity. When it comes to the other market partici-
pants, notice cannot provide a solution, because other market participants are not 
party to the transaction creating the property right, nor do they intend to acquire 
the property right in question. 
Translated into costs, Merrill and Smith show that when the price of ‘Monday-
right’ is 10, but the existence of this right raises the processing costs for all other of 
the hundred watch owners by 1, A’s net benefit will be 9, however, the social cost 
will be 90. In other words, the benefit for A to create a ‘Monday-right’ is much more 
than the increase in costs for him. There is no incentive to prevent A and any other 
watch-owner creating ‘Tuesday-rights’, ‘Wednesday-rights’ and so on. A tragedy of 
the commons, a private common in this case, may result.297 As a solution Merrill 
and Smith offer the following: 
‘One way to control the external costs of measurement to third parties is through 
compulsory standardization of property rights. Standardization reduces the costs of 
measuring the attributes of such rights. Limiting the number of basic property forms 
allows a market participant or a potential violator to limit his or her inquiry to whether 
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the interest does or does not have the features of the forms on the menu. Fancies not on 
the closed list need not be considered because they will not be enforced. When it comes 
to the basic legal dimensions of property, limiting the number of forms thus makes the 
determination of their nature less costly. The ‘good’ in question here might be con-
sidered to be the prevention of error in ascertaining the attributes of property rights. 
Standardization means less measurement is required to achieve a given amount of 
error prevention. Alternatively, one can say that standardization increases the 
productivity of any given level of measurement efforts’.298 
However, the proposed standardisation solution of Merrill and Smith comes at the 
price of an increase of other costs. The authors realise this and deal extensively with 
the additional costs a regime of standardisation creates.299 These costs, which they 
term ‘frustration costs’, occur because parties can no longer create any property 
right they wish to create, but they must make use of the ‘building blocks’ the prop-
erty law system offers. In this respect, a standardised regime creates an unequal 
position for market participants. Parties with money and knowledge can afford to 
spend both time and money on the optimal ‘stacking’ of building blocks so that the 
most optimal combination of property rights for their specific situation results.300 
Although the increase in frustration costs limits the party autonomy that exists in a 
completely open system, the standardisation into building blocks also makes these 
complex combinations of property rights easier to process for third parties, thus 
lowering measurement costs.301 Nevertheless, the situation remains one of balancing 
costs. Therefore Merrill and Smith do not strive for maximum, but rather for 
optimal, standardisation. Their attention is therefore to the middle range of the 
spectrum between no standardisation and complete standardisation. 302 
When this equilibrium between the number of types of property rights and the 
measurement costs for third parties, both successors in interest and other market 
participants, is reached depends on the degree of publication of property rights.303 
The more third parties can acquire knowledge about possible property rights, the 
more property rights can exist in a system of optimal standardisation. In other 
words, a lesser degree of standardisation is required with more publicity of proper-
ty rights. However, just creating a property right with a publicity requirement, such 
as notice, does not necessarily allow it onto the market. As the example of the ‘Mon-
day-right’ in a watch shows, even with notice, the costs might be higher than the 
benefits, and a tragedy of the commons, with all the costs related to that, is likely to 
occur.304 
 
298 Merrill & Smith 2000, p. 33-34, footnotes omitted. 
299 Merrill & Smith 2000, p. 35 et seq. 
300 This in the words of Merrill and Smith is a form of price discrimination or, by analogy, a sort 
of ‘pollution tax’, Merrill & Smith 2000, p. 35. 
301 Merrill & Smith 2000, p. 37. 
302 Merrill & Smith 2000, p. 38. 
303 In their article, Merrill and Smith provide two figures that show that when the degree of 
publication is higher, the number of property rights in a situation of optimal standardisation 
may be larger than in an system with a lesser degree of publicity. See Merrill & Smith 2000,  
p. 39, 41. 
304 Merrill & Smith 2000, p. 44. 
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Finally, in Merrill and Smith’s view, standardisation is not something the 
market achieves on its own, but something for which intervention from rule makers 
is necessary. Because they see the role of courts more in maintaining the status quo 
of the current system of property rights, they argue the legislature should ensure a 
system of property rights at the optimal rate of standardisation.305 Furthermore, 
new property rights created by the legislature produce much more information to 
third parties at less cost than a property right created by the judiciary. Such a 
system would reduce information costs, in particular measurement costs, for new 
property rights.306  
The views of Merrill and Smith have been criticised, in particular by other Law 
and Economy scholars.307 Their focus on costs for third parties and therefore nume-
rus clausus as a standardisation of property rights especially has raised questions. If 
costs for third parties are relevant, why should the system of property law offer 
standardisation and not just ensure that information costs for third parties are 
reduced through notice or other forms of publication?  
3.2.3. Numerus Clausus as Verification of Property Rights 
One criticism of the views on numerus clausus as the optimal standardisation of 
property rights has been offered by Hansmann and Kraakman.308 These authors 
agree with Merrill and Smith that third-party information costs are relevant, but 
they propose a different view on how these affect the system of property law. 
In the view of Hansmann and Kraakman, the law does not take the form of 
standardisation of property rights to reduce information costs for third parties, but 
it offers a set of rules enabling parties to verify property rights.309 In this respect this 
theory differs from the standardisation theory that focuses on the communication 
between the parties about the existence of (new) property rights. Hansmann and 
Kraakman emphasise that verification rules are closely connected with the existence 
of property rights and that some property rights require different verification rules 
than others. It is in this relation, they argue, that the explanation for numerus clausus 
can be found.310 
In the view of Hansmann and Kraakman, a property right is a right that ‘runs 
with the object’. The question they focus on is therefore why the law limits the 
possibility for parties to create a property right that runs with an object.311 When 
two parties are dealing with a potential property right they need, in their view, a 
method to verify the other party’s understanding of the parties’ respective rights.312 
 
305 Merrill & Smith 2000, p. 58. 
306 Merrill & Smith 2000, p. 61, Van Erp 2003b, p. 9. 
307 See Munzer 2006, p. 156-157, Hansmann & Kraakman 2002, p. 373 et seq., Parisi, Schulz & 
Depoorter 2005, p. 588-590. 
308 Hansmann & Kraakman 2002, p. 373. 
309 Hansmann & Kraakman 2002, p. 374. On this theory see Baffi 2007, p. 19-21. 
310 Hansmann & Kraakman 2002, p. 375. 
311 Hansmann & Kraakman 2002, p. 379. 
312 Hansmann & Kraakman 2002, p. 383. 
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In the case of a contract, verification lies in the mutual consent the parties give to the 
conclusion of the contract. However, when a property right is at stake, the parties in 
question might not be bound through privity of contract.313 An example is a situa-
tion in which A sells most of his rights in an object to B, while retaining some rights 
in respect of the object for himself. In the contract of sale A and B deal with this 
division, and stipulate that B may assign his own rights in the object to another 
party, but not A’s right in the object. When B subsequently contracts with C, there is 
no means by which A can verify that C shares the understanding of A and B on the 
division of the right to which they agreed.314 
It is, in particular, in situations such as these that Hansmann and Kraakman 
search for the existence of numerus clausus. On this they state: 
‘A central problem of property is to provide mechanisms for solving these verification 
problems – or, as it is more commonly put, to assure effective notice. To solve these 
problems, property law employs a variety of verification rules. A verification rule sets 
out the conditions under which a given right in a given asset will run with the asset. 
There is a strong relationship between verification rules and the types of property 
rights – or, rather, the forms of ownership – that the law is prepared to recognise. 
Indeed, the two are inextricably intertwined in any legal regime for property rights’.315 
These authors argue that a prime example of this theory can be found in the concept 
of possession. A strict rule of possession in a theoretical system could indicate that 
he who has physical possession of an object holds the complete property right in 
that object and that a transfer of possession will transfer that property right to 
another party.316 In a more realistic and complicated world, different verification 
rules apply, imposed by legislation as either an opt-in or an opt-out rule, parties can 
have the choice whether to add a form of publicity to their legal relation or not. An 
example is an artist who may choose to add some form of information on his work 
of art to assert his intellectual property right in respect of the piece of work, or 
legislation might impose such an intellectual property right through a mandatory 
system.317 
In Hansmann and Kraakman’s view, property law systems rarely offer a set of 
well-defined property rights, but rather a set of property categories for which addi-
tional verification rules may apply.318 In this respect they differ in opinion from 
Merrill and Smith, who focus their theory on types of property rights and not cate-
gories. A property law system is therefore not closed because no new rights can be 
created, but because, especially in common law systems, for the creation of new 
property rights, such difficult and costly verification rules apply that parties do not 
make use of this possibility.319 
 
313 Hansmann & Kraakman 2002, p. 383-384. 
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As in the case of the optimal standardisation theory, there seems to be a link 
between the number of rights and the costs for third parties. On this Hansmann and 
Kraakman state: 
‘… there is a great discontinuity between permitting a single form of property rights 
and permitting more than one. Verification is simple and cheap when a single form of 
property rights is mandated for a given type of claim in a given type of asset. As soon 
as choice is permitted – even if that choice is only between two well-defined alterna-
tives – much more costly verification rules are generally required. On the other hand, a 
verification rule that is adequate for a choice between even a small number of different 
property rights will commonly be adequate for a choice among an indefinitely number 
of alternatives’.320 
A new property right therefore should only be created if the benefits to users of the 
right exceed the costs a new property right creates for non-users of the right. These 
costs for non-users will comprise a new or extended verification rule. The law there-
fore does not limit the kinds of property rights that can be created, but only affirms 
certain property rights.321 Numerus clausus, in the view of Hansmann and 
Kraakman, can therefore be explained as the balance between these costs and bene-
fits.322 
3.2.4. Critical Analysis of the Approach to Numerus Clausus in Law and 
Economics 
The reasons behind a numerus clausus of property rights have not been discussed in 
legal writings in great detail. It can therefore be no surprise that Law and Econom-
ics has only recently given attention to the subject.323 In the writings of Law and 
Economics scholars three approaches can be distinguished. First, the fragmentation 
argument focuses attention on the limitation of the law of property in respect of the 
number of property rights, showing that too many property rights with the wrong 
content, too many or too few rights to exclude others, can lead to economically 
inefficient results in a tragedy of the commons or anti-commons.324 Secondly, when 
not looking at the property rights themselves, but at third parties, the problem of 
information costs created by a new property right leads to a legal system standard-
ising the available property rights or, thirdly, leads to the legal system only affirm-
ing certain property rights with verification rules.325 On these approaches, a number 
of observations can be made. 
In general, each of these three approaches brings highly relevant arguments to 
the discussion on the reasons for a numerus clausus, but none of them provides a 
 
320 Hansmann & Kraakman 2002, p. 399. 
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324 See above; 3.2.1. Fragmentation: Not too Many Rights; on Commons and Anti-Commons. 
325 See above; 3.2.2. Numerus Clausus as Optimal Standardisation of Property Rights and 3.2.3. 
Numerus Clausus as Verification of Property Rights. 
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conclusive answer. 326 The explanation for this can partly be found in the fact that all 
of the authors behind these approaches are American lawyers, and they primarily 
attempt to clarify numerus clausus doctrine in US law. Since US law differs from 
European legal systems, even English common law, the arguments these authors 
use are not automatically applicable to civil law or English common law.  
A second explanation is closely connected to this last statement. Heller, Merrill 
and Smith, and Hansmann and Kraakman, renowned Law and Economics scholars, 
are all American lawyers and not civil law property lawyers.327 As discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, the debate on numerus clausus, although in principle 
applicable to all legal systems, finds its origin in civil law systems.328 Therefore, pos-
sibly, the understanding of these authors of what exactly numerus clausus is might 
be different from the civil law approach. 
When looking at this Law and Economics analysis of numerus clausus from a 
property law point of view, several remarks can be made. First of all, the discussion 
on the fragmentation of property rights is highly relevant in respect of the method 
in which property rights are created.329 A lesser right or limited property right is a 
property right derived, either through subtraction, démembrement or limitation, from 
a primary right. Consequently, a property right will have characteristics similar to 
the primary right after which it was modelled. In systems that use the démembrement 
or subtraction method, creating a limited property right is regarded as a fragmenta-
tion of the primary right.330 In some cases, for example, when a lesser right to use, 
such as a right of servitude of way, is created, both the holder of the primary right 
and the holder of the lesser right have a right to walk over a certain piece of land. 
Theoretically, the holder of the primary right may create as many lesser rights to 
use as he wants.331  
The criticism of the fragmentation theory, that it would look only at the num-
ber of right-holders and not at the types of property rights, in this respect, does not 
seem completely accurate. When parties want to create a new, as yet unknown, 
property right, such as a right to take minerals from a piece of land, as occurred in 
South Africa, the question can be raised whether not too many privileges to use, 
without the right to exclude others, are created, and the threat of a tragedy of the 
commons is more imminent with the new property right.  
Even when it comes to the fragmentation of a single property right among 
multiple holders in a co-entitlement or co-ownership regime, the danger of under-
use and over-use occurs. Theoretically, when several co-holders of a primary right 
want to transfer the object on which they have a right, they must all agree to the 
transfer. When one party refuses his consent, in the absence of any rules, a tragedy 
 
326 See Van Erp 2003b, p. 10-12. 
327 E.g., Van Erp who states that for him the analysis of Merrill and Smith comes (very) ‘close to 
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328 See above; 1.3. Considering Numerus Clausus. 
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330 See above; 2.2. Of Ways to Create a Lesser Property Right. 
331 However, see Fusaro 2001, p. 7. 
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of the anti-commons occurs. Even more, when, as was the case in France until very 
recently, permission is needed from the other co-holders to assign a co-entitlement 
share to another party, the danger of a tragedy of the anti-commons arises.332  
The Law and Economics scholars do not make the distinction between Typen-
zwang and Typenfixierung. They therefore ignore the principle that both of these 
elements are part of numerus clausus.333 The first example, the recognition of new 
lesser rights to use without sufficient regulations, is a question of recognising new 
rights or Typenzwang. The second, the question of whether a specific property right, 
whether primary or lesser, can be shared in a co-entitlement regime, is also a 
question of Typenfixierung, an element that these American authors seem to miss. 
Although generally all legal systems allow parties to create such a co-entitlement re-
gime, in respect of some lesser rights that are closely connected to a specific person, 
a right of usufruct, for example, a co-entitlement regime might be denied. 
Secondly, in the Law and Economics analysis of numerus clausus, the discus-
sion about costs for third parties when new property rights are created is entangled 
with a discussion on the publicity principle. As was set out in Chapter 1, the subject 
of numerus clausus should be distinguished from that of the publicity of property 
rights.334 Although these two elements are very closely connected, a system of prop-
erty rights is not closed because there are certain rules on publicity. The order of 
reasoning is the other way around. Because there are property rights that have 
effect against third parties, in some cases the legal system demands publicity in 
order to justify the effect of these property rights against third parties.335  
What these two elements share with each other is their desire for legal cer-
tainty. In particular, civil law systems start from the presumption that the list of 
available property rights is closed because it concerns rights that have effect against 
third parties. Therefore, in order to ensure legal certainty, the number and content 
of property rights should be as standardised as possible. In case of publicity, the 
reasoning is connected, but not the same. Some property rights have effect against 
third parties even if these parties do not know about the existence of these property 
rights. In order to justify this effect against third parties, the legal system demands 
publicity. The principle of publicity therefore justifies the effect of property rights 
against third parties, but not the closed nature of the system of property rights.  
The counter-arguments of Hansmann and Kraakman on the analysis of Merrill 
and Smith should be reviewed in the light of the distinction between numerus 
clausus and publicity. Verification rules, or rules that enable a party to investigate if 
a property right exists are, at least in my view, rules of publicity and not of numerus 
clausus.336 Explaining the existence of numerus clausus through a system of publicity, 
which, in my view, results from the nature of property rights more than from the 
fact that the list of property rights is closed, does not answer the question posed by 
 
332 On French law see Chapter 3; 2.2. Co-Ownership including Apartments. 
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334 See Chapter 1; 1.2.1. Principles of Property Law. 
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Hansmann and Kraakman. Instead, it offers insight in how the property law system 
functions and how numerus clausus and publicity are connected.337 
Finally, the explanation of Merrill and Smith seems to be the one that most 
closely connects to the way in which continental lawyers perceive the closed system 
of property rights.338 This could possibly be explained because Merrill and Smith 
connect their theory to the traditional distinction between property rights and 
personal rights, and the different effects these rights have in respect to third parties. 
Their presumption therefore seems to be that, because of the third-party effect, 
property rights should be limited.339  
What Merrill and Smith have done is qualify the effect against third parties 
that deserves limitation in terms of measurement costs, externalities and frustration 
costs.340 Their explanation of a system of property rights as the search for the opti-
mal balance between these two types of costs and therefore a search for the optimal 
standardisation of property rights might explain the tension civil lawyers feel 
between legal certainty and party autonomy. 
The analysis of Merrill and Smith certainly connects to the marketability argu-
ment put forward by Rudden.341 An optimal standardisation of property right will 
ensure that not too many property rights are recognised in a legal system. Too 
many property rights make it difficult to execute transfers in particular primary 
rights, as it is more difficult and more costly to find out what lesser property rights 
burden the primary right. In this respect the marketability argument might be fur-
ther specified into a ‘finance-ability’ argument. When, in order to offer finance for 
the acquisition of a primary right, the party offering the finance has to undertake a 
disproportionate effort to find out with what property rights the primary right is 
burdened, in order to estimate the risk of the transaction, the primary right loses not 
only value, but also transferability because finance is more difficult to obtain. 
3.3. Numerus Clausus in Comparative Analysis 
The analysis above shows that it is possible to analyse the property law systems in 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and England in terms of primary rights and 
three categories of lesser rights.342 However, a common analysis does not result in 
four similar legal systems. To the contrary, many technical differences between the 
legal systems exist, in particular when it comes to the requirements for the creation 
of property rights.  
However, technical difficulties, although highly relevant, should not be the 
main concern when considering the topic of numerus clausus from a comparative 
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point of view. The numerus clausus of property rights is a principle of property 
law.343 It is this principle that is a filter through which legal relations pass on their 
way to becoming property rights. The numerus clausus decides which relations can 
have property effect and which cannot. 
Numerus clausus operates in a twofold manner. First, the legal relation is ana-
lysed and characterised as one of the property rights a legal system recognises. This 
function is known as Typenfixierung. Secondly, when the type of property right has 
been created, the provisions on that type of property right will be applied to the 
legal relation. This function is known as Typenzwang. The method by which numerus 
clausus operates is to require both elements to be fulfilled. When this occurs, the 
legal relation passes the ‘test’ and property law will be applicable.344 It is only after 
this ‘test’ that other principles, and also ground rules such as the nemo dat principle, 
apply.345 
In each of the discussions on the different national legal systems in the chap-
ters above, the conclusion has been reached that each legal system adheres to a nu-
merus clausus. However, in each legal system developments can be seen which put 
the traditional numerus clausus under pressure. When the Civil Codes were adopted 
in the civil law systems, the legislators claimed these codes to be the primary source 
of law. In these legal systems, legislation comes before case law and doctrine.346 In 
common law systems the hierarchical order between the sources of law is different – 
case law takes the primary place unless the legislature has intervened by statute.  
Property law is a very important area of law, which in each of these systems is 
dealt with primarily by the most important, primary, source of law. As a result the 
way in which the property law system operates is different between civil law and 
common law countries. In civil law, the Civil Code, by its nature as a code of law, 
stipulates which rights are property rights and what provisions apply to these. In 
common law, with its case-law nature, rules have been made through court 
decisions, on a case-by-case basis, to decide which property rights exist and what 
provisions apply to these rights.  
This difference does not necessarily result in a legal system different from the 
civil law. In English law too, over time, a standardisation of rights at common law 
was achieved, which eventually became affirmed by the Law of Property Act 1925. 
By statutory intervention, but in fact already before that, the number of estates that 
could exist at common law had been reduced to three types. Through legislation in 
this area of law, the hierarchical order between the sources of law shifted and 
Section 1 of the Law of Property Act 1925 became an expression of the numerus 
clausus of property rights in land at common law in the same way as the Civil Codes 
became such an expression in the civil law systems. Equity, in English law, remains 
different. In equity, analysis of the case law on equitable property rights is needed 
to come to a list of property rights. No case or statute provides a list of all equitable 
property rights. Theoretically, a new case could arise tomorrow and, with case law 
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being the primary source of law in this area, the courts could recognise a new prop-
erty right. However, here the House of Lords has restricted itself to criteria that 
must be fulfilled for a new equitable property right to be created, if at all.347  
In all these legal systems, therefore, private parties are prevented from cre-
ating new property rights themselves.348 In other words, in order for private parties 
to create a new property right, they require either legislative or judicial permission 
in the form of a statute or a decision. The numerus clausus of property rights pro-
vides that only the legislature or the judiciary has the power to authorise new 
property rights. Since the nineteenth century, this is exactly what has happened. 
Originally outside the Civil Codes, all legal systems have in some form recognised a 
right to an apartment. Furthermore, in all of the legal systems, the judiciary has also 
intervened by recognising new property rights. These include the French retention 
of title and real suretyship349, the German security ownership and acquisition 
right350, the Dutch security ownership, although later abolished in the new Civil 
Code351, and the English restrictive covenants, estate contracts and options to pur-
chase.352  
In particular, under the increasing influence of contract law, parties have 
attempted to create new property rights and have found authorisation from courts 
in three areas. First, in respect of the anticipatory lesser property rights, mentioned 
above as the third category of lesser property rights, the influence of contract law 
has led to a series of new property rights. Second, contract law has also enabled 
parties to combine property rights, either with each other or with general contract 
law. Although these developments do not technically and doctrinally create new 
property rights, they provide new uses for existing property rights that were, thus 
far, unknown. These include the stacking of rights, the combination of property 
rights to achieve a specific situation. Examples include a right of apartment on a 
right of superficies, combined with a right of emphyteusis, on a right of ownership of 
land. Although doctrinally three lesser property rights are created, it is the combina-
tion of rights that are enjoyed by the holder of an apartment that provides a unique 
situation that could not be achieved without the stacking of these rights.  
Property rights are also combined with contract law to create new situations in 
which these property rights can be applied. As mentioned above, in particular, 
German law is highly developed when it comes to security-Grundschuld and securi-
ty-servitudes. This use of these lesser property rights does not doctrinally create a 
new property right, but in fact achieves a result that could not have been created 
with these lesser property rights alone. For example, in respect to a security-
Grundschuld, the addition of contract law is the re-introduction of accessority to the 
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property right. The German legislature explicitly removed accessority in respect of 
the right of Grundschuld, but through conclusion of the security contract, accessority 
to a claim that the right of Grundschuld secures is created. In property law, the right 
of Grundschuld remains non-accessory, but in effect an accessory property right is 
created.353 Moreover, in case of a security-servitude this is the creation of a de facto 
positive burden on the holder of the servient tenement.354 
Third, in contract law itself, several rights can be created that have more effect 
than just between the parties themselves. These rights include contractual relations 
already mentioned such as Treuhand and fiducie, but also rights of lease in civil law 
systems that, through special protection measures for the lessee, create a personal 
right that can be invoked against a new owner of the leased object. These rights 
have been dealt with under the heading of borderline cases because they are 
situated between the law of obligations and the law of property.355 
This analysis shows that, compared with the nineteenth century, when the 
Civil Codes were first introduced, property law is now a more open system. Even in 
Germany, where property law and contract law are strictly separated, the influence 
of contract law has opened up the system of property law considerably. The fear of 
the creation of disproportionate and unnecessary burdens on the primary right, and 
so also the fear of the recreation of feudal relations, has not fully stopped the 
development of property law. Several lesser property rights can be enjoyed by a 
person without the requirement of that person being a holder of a property right of 
the object on which it is created, for instance, limited personal servitudes and real 
burdens in German law.356 Moreover, several property rights can be enjoyed almost 
perpetually.  
Property law in the twenty-first century faces completely different challenges 
than the property law of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the catalogue of 
property rights that all these legal systems use is almost the same as in Roman law 
2000 years ago. Of course, the law of property has been adapted to suit modern-day 
business, but this has led to an increase in party autonomy in the existing catalogue 
of property rights. No new property rights have been created and private parties are 
still not authorised to create new property rights themselves. This line of argumen-
tation can be used against property law as well. Because private parties do not get 
sufficient freedom in property law to create the legal relations they want, they resort 
to the law of contract and attempt to achieve similar results. They do this either by 
making creative use of property law or by abandoning property law altogether.  
When Civil Codes were introduced in the civil law systems, the legal systems 
were recovering from the effects of the French Revolution. The feudal system of 
landholding, which had resulted in a fragmentation of ownership into dominium 
directum and dominium utile, was abolished and replaced by a unitary, Roman-law 
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4. A Numerus Clausus in English Property Law? 
356 See Chapter 4; 3.2. Personal Servitudes, and 3.5. Real Burden. 
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based, concept of ownership. Furthermore, in the feudal system, property rights 
that were held by lords had forced tenants or vassals to provide labour and give up 
large parts of their income, just because they held a feudal interest in the land of the 
lord. Therefore, the abolition of the feudal system not only resulted in a return to a 
unitary concept of ownership, but also in the abolition of feudal burdens that had 
forced positive duties on landholders. In France, Germany and the Netherlands, 
although different Civil Codes applied, these two elements were included. In the 
name of legal certainty, a unitary concept of ownership was established that would 
be protected by the legal system. Unlike the feudal burdens, which could be many, 
only a selected group of property rights could burden the ownership of a land-
holder. The selection of which property rights could exist was made by the legisla-
tors under the inspiration of Roman law, and was taken into the Civil Code. In this 
way, the freedom of ownership became protected. Moreover, third parties dealing 
with an owner and possibly acquiring the right of ownership were also protected, 
because only a limited number of property rights affecting the use and the value of 
the land could exist. Once a third party found out which of the selected property 
rights existed on the land, that party would know the contents of that right because 
the Civil Code offered explicit provisions on it. 
The numerus clausus therefore fulfilled a contra-feudal function and enhanced 
legal certainty. It is possibly therefore that the French Cour de cassation in 1834, when 
considering an old feudal relation, was more concerned with the characterisation of 
the right of ownership than when considering the possibility that the right the 
parties wanted to create could have been a lesser property right.357 In modern 
property law, the feudal system, although not forgotten, is less of relevance. Land is 
no longer the sole source of wealth and more and more movable and incorporeal 
objects are gaining importance. English law, although technically still adhering to a 
feudal system of landholding, long ago abolished its negative effects and, as was 
discussed above, also developed a restricted set of property rights.  
In order to adapt property law to modern developments, the focus today is 
more on party autonomy than on fear of feudal relations, and more on lesser prop-
erty rights than on the right of ownership. The role numerus clausus therefore plays 
in modern-day property law is different from the role it played in the nineteenth 
century. It still seeks to provide legal certainty and protect the law of property, no 
longer against feudal law, but in order to maintain the separation from the law of 
contract.  
With the development of movable and incorporeal objects, especially claims, 
into separate subject matters of property law, the catalogue of property rights or the 
content of the numerus clausus, which is mainly focused on land, has not always 
proven to be sufficient. Therefore, in the most recent law reforms, the traditional 
requirements for some property rights have been relaxed by allowing for more 
party autonomy. This is the case with security rights, in particular, which in the 
Netherlands and France can also be non-possessory rights or, in case of a security 
 
357 Req. 13 February 1834, D.P. 1834.I.218, S.1834.I.205. See Chapter 3; 5. A Numerus Clausus in 
French Property Law? 
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right in respect of a claim, can be created without notice to the debtor of the claim. 
This relaxation enables the creation of these rights in respect of future claims. 
Furthermore, these rights can be created not only to secure the performance of an 
already existing obligation, but also, under conditions of specificity, to secure a 
future obligation.358 Therefore, by contract, parties may specify the obligations or set 
of obligations the property right secures, and also the claim or set of claims on 
which it is created, both present and future. 
The combination of these developments, the increasing role of contract law 
and the increasing importance of new objects of property law, can lead to two 
questions. First, in the light of these developments, is the numerus clausus of prop-
erty rights the modern legal systems recognise still sufficient? Second, especially 
with regard to the role contract law plays in modern legal practice, and its in-
creasing importance, also in the law of property, as well as the fading of fears about 
a return to the feudal system, do we still need a numerus clausus of property rights? 
3.4. Struycken: Why we Need a Numerus Clausus 
The first question is less difficult to answer than the second. The above analysis 
shows that, at this moment, the numerus clausus is under more pressure than ever, 
but that at the same time it seems to function adequately. Struycken, in his thesis on 
this subject, argues for the continuation and maintenance of the numerus clausus. 
Although he is critical of the content of the numerus clausus, he explicitly states that 
the rule itself should remain.359  
In terms of this Chapter, the concept of numerus clausus Struycken uses is a 
rule of numerus clausus.360 In that respect, his analysis is that of a Dutch civil lawyer 
of Dutch law, albeit taking into account several foreign jurisdictions. In Struycken’s 
view, numerus clausus should be seen in a broad sense, taking not only the number 
and content of lesser rights into account, but numerus clausus is the system of rules 
in the system of property law that governs the creation, transfer and destruction of 
property rights.361 In this view, numerus clausus, even as a rule, should be placed in 
the general doctrinal context of the legal system. The doctrinal context in this 
respect is that of the Pandectist system as developed by Von Savigny and others, as 
dealt with in Chapter 4 on German law.362 In this system, the law of obligations and 
the law of property are strictly separated, and the law of property provides its own 
rules for the creation, transfer and destruction of property rights.363 These rules 
should be seen as part of the rejection of the system that prevailed before the Civil 
Codes, in which there was not a strict separation between these areas of law, and in 
 
358 The difference between the future claim, i.e., the object of the property right, and the future 
obligation is that the lesser security right seeks to secure the performance of the obligation by 
existing on the claim. 
359 Struycken 2007, p. 796. 
360 See above; 1.3.2. Numerus Clausus as a Principle or as a Rule? 
361 Struycken 2007, p. 9-10, 799-801. 
362 See Chapter 4; 1. Introduction. 
363 On this see also Füller 2006, p. 8 et seq. 
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which the right of ownership could be fragmented in such a way as to impose 
positive duties on persons in their feudal relations to their feudal lords.364 
As a rejection of this system of property law, a unitary concept of ownership 
was introduced in which ownership could no longer be fragmented in such a way 
as to create several forms of ownership. Instead, the right of ownership could only 
be fragmented in those ways that are prescribed by law, and these take the form of 
lesser property rights. In order to continue protecting the right of ownership, conse-
quently the number, but certainly also the content, of property rights was limited.365 
Placing numerus clausus in this partly historical perspective – the Pandectist 
system was developed after the beginning of the nineteenth century – provides 
strong arguments for maintaining the closed system of property rights. First of all, 
numerus clausus is part of a system in which the legislator has taken the principal 
position in authorising the recognition and regulation of property rights.366 
Changing this in favour of private parties is not only ‘opening up’ the numerus 
clausus with the creation of new property rights created by parties themselves, but 
also changing the primacy in respect to the authority to recognise property rights 
from the legislator to private parties themselves. Such a change would bring a 
movement away from a system in which the legislature imposes and enforces the 
strict separation between the law of obligations and the law of property. 
Secondly, numerus clausus fulfils a function to determine the applicability of 
the law of property.367 When a legal relation passes through the filter of the numerus 
clausus, the law of property will apply and thus legal certainty is ensured. When, as 
Struycken emphasises, no numerus clausus exists, there should be clear criteria to 
decide which legal relations are property rights.368 The existence of a rule of numerus 
clausus compensates for a less clear definition of what constitutes a property right. 
With reference to Meijers, who drafted a large part of the current Dutch Civil Code, 
Struycken concludes that all sorts of problems concerning registrability, destruction, 
and execution, including seizure, would arise.369 In this respect, numerus clausus 
creates legal certainty in respect of information to third parties about the property 
rights and the provisions applicable to that property right.370 
Moreover, when looking further into the content of the legal system, argu-
ments in favour of numerus clausus can be found. As stated above, although 
Struycken’s analysis is based on Dutch law, his arguments are valid for, and can be 
applied to, any other legal system as well. When it comes to the numerus clausus as a 
 
364 See Chapter 2; 4. The Ius Commune. 
365 It is these two elements of the Pandectist system that Struycken seems to focus on. See 
Struycken 2007, p. 695-724. 
366 Struycken 2007, p. 762-765, in the same sense see Foëx 1987, p. 113. See above; 1.3.4. Numerus 
Clausus as a Principle of ‘Constitutional’ Property Law. 
367 Struycken 2007, p. 350-356, 759-760, see above; 1.3.1. Requirements of Numerus Clausus. 
368 Struycken 2007, p. 759. 
369 In Dutch law the concept of property right is based on the ‘normal-type’ (normal type), which 
is a set of criteria to which a certain legal relation can confirm. As long as the majority of 
these criteria are fulfilled, the legal relation can be a property right. See Struycken 2007,  
p. 759, Meijers 1948, p. 269-270, Meijers 1907, p. 24. See also Chapter 5; 1. Introduction. 
370 In the words of Struycken oriënteringszekerheid, Struycken 2007, p. 759-760. 
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closed system of property rights, it is the limitation on party autonomy that is its 
consequence. 
Party autonomy is that concept, usually identified in the area of contract law, 
and hence also known as the principle of freedom of contract, that allows parties to 
agree on anything they wish (albeit between themselves) within the scope of the 
law, public order or public morality. In contrast with contract law, in property law 
this principle of party autonomy is limited, and in some cases even absent. In legal 
systems adhering to the rule of numerus clausus, the numerus clausus is enforced 
through legislation, usually a Civil Code. In those systems, party autonomy in the 
law of property is only allowed under specific authorisation of the legislature. How-
ever, in modern property law systems, in particular in Dutch law, the legislature 
has created several areas in which parties are allowed to shape their legal property 
relation through agreement. This is the case in the area of real servitudes, emphy-
teusis and superficies.371 
In Dutch law, there are two elements that are connected to the recognition of 
party autonomy. One is offered through a criterion formulated by the Supreme 
Court in the context of the right of emphyteusis, stating that an agreement between 
parties that has a sufficient connection to the emphyteusis, and that is not contrary to 
the nature of the right, is treated as part of the property right.372 Struycken deals 
with this decision and the criteria following from it in respect to party autonomy, 
and shows that as a part of the Typenfixierung, the limitations on the content of 
property rights, parties have to stay within the limitations the property right 
offers.373 In this respect, Typenfixierung also ensures that parties do not modify a 
property right in such a way that it fulfils the function of another property right. As 
an example, Struycken mentions the right of usufruct formed in such a way that a 
right of superficies is created.374 In his view, this is an unauthorised use of party 
autonomy that is prevented by the closed system. The closed system thus ensures 
legal certainty in the sense that parties remain within the boundaries set by the 
legislature. 
Struycken finds a second element in what he calls the subtraction principle. 
Inspired by the South African test of subtraction from the dominium, Struycken’s 
principle of subtraction refers to the starting point that a lesser right can only com-
prise part of the rights or powers of the primary right, or mother right, from which 
it is derived.375 Following a method of démembrement, as is done in Dutch law, in 
which lesser rights are conceived as rights or powers from a primary right that are 
transferred to another person and take the form of a lesser right, there are several 
 
371 See Arts. 5:73 (servitudes), 5:85 and 5:86 (emphyteusis) and 5:101 and 5:102 (superficies) BW. 
See, e.g., also the discussion in Epstein 1982, p. 1353 et seq. 
372 HR 16 March 1977, NJ 1977, 399. See Struycken 2007, p. 386 et seq. See Chapter 5; 3.3. 
Emphyteusis.  
373 Struycken 2007, p. 400-401. 
374 Struycken 2007, p. 625-627. He also mentions the right of emphyteusis, apartment rights and 
the footprint, p. 627-632. 
375 Struycken 2007, p. 401. On South African law see also below; 3.6. A Legal System without a 
Numerus Clausus: South African Law. 
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consequences for the content of these lesser rights.376 A prime result of Struycken’s 
subtraction principle is that a lesser right cannot contain a positive duty, usually 
seen as one of the best expressions of the existence of a rule of numerus clausus, 
because the primary right from which it is derived does not contain a positive duty 
either.377 Again, this theory is part of the Typenfixierung as a part of numerus clausus. 
The content of lesser rights that is outside the specific provisions of the law, which 
is that content the parties give to the right themselves, cannot exceed the content of 
the mother right from which it is derived or subtracted.378 Struycken emphasises 
that the subtraction principle is a theoretical model, connected to the criterion of 
sufficient connection dealt with above, that does not necessarily apply for all lesser 
rights, but certainly applies to clarify why in principle no positive duties, or duties 
in faciendo, can be imposed.379 
The two elements of party autonomy again illustrate the link of the numerus 
clausus to the separation between the law of obligations, where parties can make 
agreements containing a positive duty for one of them or both of them, and the law 
of property, which provides its own rules and regulations, and in which party 
autonomy has a very limited place. As a general guideline, parties must remain 
within the boundaries set by the legislature, even when they have been granted a 
certain amount of party autonomy.380  
Struycken adds another strong argument for why a rule of numerus clausus 
should be recognised by illustrating how parties can make use of the space within 
the limits set by law, or, in other words, within the Typenfixierung. Under the head-
ing of forming property rights in three dimensions, he discusses content, object, and 
time or, in other words, fragmentation, space and time.381  
As to the first dimension, fragmentation, a numerus clausus is strongly related 
to the prohibition on fragmenting a property right beyond the possibilities to do this 
authorised by law. Creating a lesser right, at least in Dutch law, but also in French 
law, and partly in English law, brings with it a fragmentation of the primary right 
or the right from which it is derived.382 These forms of fragmentation, in Struycken’s 
view, can only exist if there is a specific legal basis for it, as the rule of numerus 
clausus would lose its meaning because the other property rights would be neglect-
ed.383 Forms of fragmentation, which have been dealt with in terms of content 
above, as well as earlier in the discussion on the several legal systems, are the trans-
fer of a primary right, in this case ownership, for security purposes, which is not 
considered as a full transfer because the transferee continues to have some property 
right in the object he transferred. Therefore such a fragmentation is limited in Dutch 
 
376 See above; 2.2. Of Ways to Create a Lesser Property Right. 
377 Struycken 2007, p. 402-403. 
378 Struycken 2007, p. 404-405. 
379 Struycken 2007, p. 407-415. 
380 Struycken 2007, p. 427-431. See also Rank-Berenschot 1992, p. 335. On Rank-Berenschot see 
Struycken 2007, p. 445-446. 
381 Struycken 2007, p. 447, 448 (content), 453 (space), 463 (time). 
382 Struycken 2007, p. 467. 
383 Struycken 2007, p. 467-470. 
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law and is usually seen as enforcing the rule of numerus clausus, because only those 
fragmentations that are authorised by law can be made.384 Another form of frag-
mentation is a transfer of a primary right, again in this case ownership, for manage-
ment purposes.385 In a Dutch perspective, a transfer for management purposes 
brings the English trust to mind.386 In the way in which English trust law is tra-
ditionally conceived in Dutch law, a fragmentation of the primary right is required 
so that both trustee and beneficiary hold a part of the primary right.  
Finally, there is another danger resulting from fragmentation of the right of 
ownership, in the creation of a separate set of objects to which normal creditors do 
not have access.387 The rule in any civil law system that all creditors are equal and 
that a person is liable to these creditors with all his assets can be violated with a 
fragmentation of ownership in two ways. First, the fragmentation of ownership 
might violate the equality rule, known as paritas creditorum, in the form of lesser 
rights for security such as pledge and hypothec. However, these special rights only 
exist when explicitly dealt with by law. Second, fragmenting the right of ownership 
will divide the right of ownership over two sets of assets. Where formerly creditors 
of the full right of ownership could acquire the object’s full value, now only a part 
of the value remains, as only one fragment of ownership remains with the original 
owner and the other fragment of ownership is with someone else.388  
As to the second dimension, there are the requirements of space to which the 
parties must conform.389 Through the use of their party autonomy when creating 
property rights, parties may attempt to fragment ownership in such a way that a 
horizontal or vertical separation occurs. In this way, parties can split a building 
from the ownership of the land on which the building is constructed, or parties can 
separate the ownership of floors in a building from each other. Such separations are 
known as horizontal separations. In order to achieve this, parties usually make use 
of a right of superficies.390 A second way is that parties can vertically divide the land, 
such as splitting a piece of land in two or splitting a building into two different 
entities, each capable of being subject to a property right.391 Here also, Struycken 
emphasises, parties should remain within the limits of the law, although many 
solutions can be found there.392 
Thirdly, a final form of separation is that in time. As an example of a separa-
tion in time, a property right can be fragmented through a conditional transfer.393 
Such a transfer either takes place under suspension, with the result that the transfer 
will only take effect upon the occurrence of a certain condition, or under resolution, 
with the result that the transfer will take place until the occurrence of a certain 
 
384 Struycken 2007, p. 510-512. 
385 Struycken 2007, p. 512. 
386 Struycken 2007, p. 513. See also Sagaert 2005b, p. 1018-1021. 
387 Or a separate patrimony (afgescheiden vermogen), see Struycken 2007, p. 539. 
388 Struycken 2007, p. 539-548. See also Sagaert 2005b, p. 1029-1030. 
389 Struycken 2007, p. 453. 
390 Struycken 2007, p. 455-460. 
391 Struycken 2007, p. 453-455. 
392 See, e.g., on the Footprint-construction Struycken 2007, p. 461-462. 
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condition. The property right that is transferred, or not yet transferred, under condi-
tion is best described as a temporal property right that will only regain its full form 
when the condition under which is was created has taken effect.394  
The effects of a transfer under condition of a property right are debated in 
many systems, and these systems offer different solutions. In French law, both 
parties to a transfer receive a property right, one under condition of suspension, and 
the other under resolutive condition.395 In German law, a separate lesser right, the 
expectation right, is recognised.396 In English law, the entitlement to a property right 
that is transferred under condition is solved through the law of trust.397 In Dutch 
law, unlike any of the other legal systems, the other party that is not the owner only 
has a personal right.398 Creating a type of ownership limited in time is in direct con-
flict with the unitary concept of ownership as the primary right, and therefore also 
in direct conflict with the closed list of lesser rights.399 It is also in this context that 
Struycken concludes that, without a specific legal basis, fragmentation of property 
rights in time should not be allowed.400 
It is, in particular, the argument that property law is a coherent system of law, 
built on the foundations of Pandectist legal thinking, as civil law jurisdictions are, 
that justifies the existence of and need for a rule of numerus clausus of property 
rights that is enforced by the legislator.401 In Struycken’s view, it is undesirable to 
leave complete freedom for parties to shape their own legal relations with third-
party effect.402 Arguments used in favour of more freedom for parties to create new 
property rights have an enormous and unpredictable impact on the system of 
property law, and are therefore not convincing enough to accept.403  
However, that does not imply that property law should not be subject to 
change. Through the analysis of the content of property law, such as the transfer 
system, specificity and publicity requirements, deduced into principles of property 
law, which form a part of numerus clausus as Struycken sees it, we can move away 
from the Pandectist legal thinking and move forward.404 In the ‘constitutional’ di-
mension of the numerus clausus, renewing the law of property and moving towards 
a more dynamic property law is a task for the legislator, with whom the authority to 
recognise and regulate new property rights is entrusted in the system of property 
law as it is adhered to by civil law systems.405 
 
394 Struycken 2007, p. 551-553. 
395 See Chapter 3; 2.1. Ownership. 
396 See Chapter 4; 2.1. Ownership. 
397 See Chapter 6; 2.9. Mortgage of Land and Equity of Redemption. 
398 Struycken 2007, p. 557-558. See Chapter 5; 2.1. Ownership. 
399 See above; 2. The Content of Property Law Systems in Europe. 
400 Struycken 2007, p. 567. 
401 Struycken 2007, p. 753-762. See also Smits 1996, p. 53-54. 
402 Struycken 2007, p. 796. 
403 Struycken 2007, p. 796-797. 
404 Struycken 2007, p. 784. 
405 Struycken 2007, p. 809-810. On the ‘constitutional’ dimension see above; 1.3.4. Numerus 
Clausus as a Principle of ‘Constitutional’ Property Law. 
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3.5. Füller: Restructuring Property Law but Maintaining a Closed System 
In a German thesis Füller discusses the state of modern German property law.406 His 
study concerns German law only, especially the influence of the Pandectist legal 
thinking on the law of property, but it is of general European importance.407 Many 
European legal systems have taken over influences from German law. These influ-
ences include the separation between the law of obligations and the law of property, 
the primary subject of Füller’s work. 
Füller analyses the influence of contract law on the German law of property. 
He emphasises that even though the German legislature created an autonomous, 
independent, property law, contract law was not left out completely.408 To the 
contrary, the German legislature placed the law of property into a separate book to 
show the independence of property law from contract law, but this did not prevent 
it from including contract law in the book on property law at all. Füller shows that 
in many places the property law part of the German Civil Code recognises obliga-
tions between holders of property rights, for example, the subsidiary legal obliga-
tions between holders of a primary right and the holder of a lesser right, but also the 
relation between possessor and owner, between finder and owner, and between co-
owners.409  
In other words, even though, as a fundamental principle of German private 
law, the law of property is separate from the law of contract, there are explicit and 
deliberate links between the two. However, at the same time there are also influ-
ences of contract law on German property that were not foreseen by the legisla-
ture.410 Füller mentions Treuhand as an example of these unwanted influences.411 
Füller’s central issue is therefore whether the strict separation between the law of 
contract and the law of property in German law should be maintained.412 Apart 
from influences of contract law on aspects of property law, such as the system of 
transfer and creation of property rights, Füller sees a direct influence on the rule of 
numerus clausus of property rights in German law.413 
He argues that through the influence of contract law, rights such as the right of 
superficies, the ownership of an apartment, and security ownership, can hardly be 
categorised as a normal right of ownership anymore.414 Furthermore, the acquisition 
right and ownership for management purposes also cause problems in respect of 
the normal right of ownership.415 Also in respect of lesser rights, the demarcations 
 
406 Füller 2006, p. 2-7. For a discussion of Füller’s opinion on German substantive property law 
see Chapter 4; 4. Borderline Cases in German Property Law. 
407 Füller 2006, p. 571. 
408 Füller 2006, p. 528. 
409 See Füller 2006, p. 529-542. See also Chapter 4; 3. Other Property Rights. 
410 Füller 2006, p. 528-529. 
411 Füller 2006, p. 527. 
412 Füller 2006, p. 543. 
413 Füller 2006, p. 558-560. 
414 In German the Erbbaurecht, Wohnungseigentum and Treuhandeigentum. On the same conclusion 
see Chapter 4; 4. Borderline Cases in German Property Law. Füller 2006, p. 559. 
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between various rights, because of the freedom parties enjoy to shape these rights 
through contract law, have become blurred and unclear. As an example, Füller 
mentions the distinction between a right of usufruct and a right of real servitude.416 
Moreover, the case law on the possibility of both ownership and a lesser right in 
respect of the same object being held by the same person, and the case law on the 
co-entitlement of lesser property rights, especially security rights, enlarge the cate-
gory of types of lesser property rights.417 
The reason for the limitations that are imposed on parties in the creation of 
property rights, according to Füller, is the third-party effect of property rights.418 
However, with these developments in respect of the right of ownership and the 
blurring of the distinctions between the lesser property rights, he asks the question 
whether the limitations, the Typenzwang, can still be justified. In Füller’s view, the 
Typenzwang is an over-reaction to the problem of the third-party effect of property 
rights, the fact that parties can be bound by a right to which they did not consent.419 
Moreover, Füller emphasises that a system that adheres to a rule of numerus 
clausus, and therefore a strict Typenzwang, hinders the development of property law. 
On this he states: 
He who wants to maintain the Typenzwang as fundamental principle of property law, 
must consequently deny the case law concerning the rights in respect of the own object 
and the co-entitlement to lesser rights, reject the ownership for management purposes 
and declare the acquisition right as incompatible with the Typenzwang.420 
Instead of such an approach, but without leaving the Typenzwang as an essential ele-
ment of the rule of numerus clausus, Füller proposes to reform the law of property. 
His proposal is to bring the law of property, together with the law of obligations, 
into a general system of patrimonial law, the law dealing with the set of assets and 
debts of a person.421 In other words, Füller proposes abandoning the strict separa-
tion between the law of property and the law of obligations. However, the conse-
quence of a re-organisation of property law is not to abolish the separation between 
property rights and personal rights. Füller proposes to maintain this distinction, but 
to reform the right of ownership and lesser property rights so that they better fit the 
demands of modern property law. 
First, Füller concentrates on the lesser rights to use. He recalls the blurring of 
the demarcations between the various lesser rights and proposes to replace the vari-
ous rights to use, which are distinguished from one another for mainly historical 
 
416 Füller 2006, p. 560-561. 
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reasons, with one lesser right to use.422 Moreover, he compares the current lesser 
rights to use with the right of lease, in German law a personal right, and comes to 
the conclusion that the lesser right created for a limited period of time, in particular, 
now the right of usufruct, is almost similar to a lease.423 Also the housing-right, a 
special type of limited personal servitude, very much resembles a lease of land.424 A 
single lesser right to use could embody all of these, including the right of lease. 
Secondly, Füller deals with three lesser rights that do not fit in the traditional 
distinction between lesser rights to use and lesser rights for security purposes. The 
real burden, for example, is a relic of the feudal system and cannot be entirely fitted 
in the separation between the law of property and the law of obligations.425 Füller 
mentions how the German courts treat real burdens and personal rights to the per-
formance of an owner, Rentenschulden, alike.426 Therefore, Füller proposes to abolish 
the real burden and let the function it fulfils be taken over by these personal 
rights.427  
As another example, Füller deals with pre-emptive registration and the 
German option to purchase.428 He considers the possibility of removing the option 
to purchase in exchange for a full possibility to pre-emptively register personal 
rights in respect to land. When these personal rights can be registered through 
Vormerkung, pre-emptive registration, the option to purchase will, in his view, no 
longer be needed.429 
In Füller’s view, the autonomy of the law of property is under great pressure 
and a restructuring of property law is needed to free it from its isolation.430 He 
therefore proposes to enlarge the general part of the German Civil Code so that it 
also deals with the right of ownership and the law between neighbours.431 Matters 
like pre-emptive registration and actions to revindicate the right of ownership 
should be moved to the law dealing with registration, the Grundbuchordnung.432  
The part of the German Civil Code dealing with contract law should, 
according to Füller, be enlarged with rules on third-party protection. Leases should 
be removed from contract law and take over the function of the lesser rights to use 
as property rights. The end of this part on contract law in the German Civil Code 
could deal with co-entitlement, as the nature of the rights of the co-owners and the 
relations between them is almost fully defined by contract law.433 Lesser rights for 
security are deliberately left out of his proposals. Füller recognises that there is so 
much to say about property security rights that a separate reform is needed to deal 
 
422 Füller 2006, p. 560-561. 
423 Füller 2006, p. 561-563. 
424 Füller 2006, p. 563-564. 
425 Füller 2006, p. 564. 
426 BGH WM 1970, 92, 93, Füller 2006, p; 564. 
427 Füller 2006, p. 564. 
428 Füller 2006, p. 565. 
429 Füller 2006, p. 565. 
430 Füller 2006, p. 567. 
431 Füller 2006, p. 567-568. 
432 Füller 2006, p. 567. 
433 Füller 2006, p. 567-568. 
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with these. He does mention aspects that need reform, amongst which publicity is 
the most important. Füller considers property security rights without registration a 
danger for the appearance of a persons’ set of assets and debts. When a property 
security right is created, the holder of that right is entitled to separate objects from 
the set of assets and debts of the debtor, or to claim from that set of assets and debts, 
before other creditors. A secret lesser security right will not inform the other 
creditors about the existence of such preferential rights and should therefore be 
considered with great caution by the legal system.434 Especially in respect of lesser 
security rights in respect of concerning movables and claims, Füller considers 
publicity should be reintroduced.435 
In Füller’s view it is remarkable that the strict separation between the law of 
property and the law of obligations is so strongly defended by German lawyers, but 
broken by practice when needed. In his view, there is nothing against removing this 
strict separation in favour of a more workable system in which the law of obliga-
tions and the law of property would work together.436 Such a re-organisation would 
restructure the law of property, but would not give up the rule of numerus clausus. 
Instead, the content of the closed system would be reorganised such that it fulfils 
the demands of modern practice again.437 
3.6. Van Erp: a Less Rigid Numerus Clausus  
Adhering to a rule of numerus clausus limits the development of property law in 
such a way that parties themselves cannot create any new property rights.438 When 
we follow Struycken in arguing that it is only for the legislator to add rights to the 
list of recognised property rights, this might not lead to the desired developments, 
as the politics of the legislative process would come into play.439 Others have there-
fore chosen a more flexible approach. Among these is Van Erp who has offered an 
analysis of numerus clausus in the context of developing ideas, on a comparative 
basis, about the future of European property law.440 
After recalling the impact of the French revolution, Van Erp focuses attention 
on the role numerus clausus plays in a legal system.441 The numerus clausus of what he 
calls ‘absolute rights’ is the limitation imposed by a Civil Code on private parties to 
 
434 Füller 2006, p. 568-569. 
435 Füller 2006, p. 569. 
436 Füller 2006, p. 571-572. 
437 Füller himself refers to the developments in European Union law in respect to property law, 
in particular the development of a Euro-hypothec or Euro-mortgage, which will require the 
national property law systems to be rethought in any case. Füller 2006, p. 572. On these 
European developments see Chapter 8; 2.1.3. European Commission Initiatives for Future 
Legislation. 
438 See Füller 2006, p. 558-560. 
439 In the same sense see Van Velten 2007, p. 376. 
440 Hence the title of Van Erp’s contribution a numerus quasi-clausus of property rights as a con-
stitutive element of a future European property law? 
441 Van Erp 2003b, p. 5 et seq. 
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create new property rights, introduced after the French Revolution.442 In this 
respect, civil law is different from common law, although Van Erp also sees a stan-
dardisation of property rights in the common law system.443 However, like Füller, 
Van Erp considers the developments of property law, and recognises that a numerus 
clausus that is too rigid will prevent innovation.444 
Van Erp mentions the trust and time-share arrangements as examples of inno-
vations that property law is facing.445 These two forms of holding property rights 
are especially difficult for a civil lawyer coming from a ‘unitary’ system, which is a 
system that applies to both movables and immovables as much as possible.446 A 
trust creates a situation in which two parties hold property rights in the same object, 
without, for a civil lawyer, it being clear what these rights are. There is no lesser 
property right in the numerus clausus of any civil law system that covers the rights of 
the beneficiary or the rights of a trustee in a trust. In the case of time-share arrange-
ments, there is also a separation, but different from a trust, a separation in time, so 
that several holders can be entitled to ‘own’ an object for a limited, but recurring, 
period of time. 
Van Erp is correct in focussing on trusts and time-shares now that civil law 
systems are increasingly confronted with these two common law methods of hol-
ding rights.447 However, civil law systems have dealt with them differently. In the 
case of trusts, several civil law systems, in particular France and Germany, have 
offered their own civil law solution to create a similar device in the form of fiducie or 
Treuhand.448 The Netherlands continues to reject trusts, but has created several forms 
of trust-like devices for particular purposes, for example, the certification of shares 
in a public company. As the Netherlands is also a party to the Hague Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Trusts and their Recognition, Dutch law is obliged to recog-
nise foreign trusts.449  
Another example is the transfer of ownership for security purposes which 
effectively creates a type of security ownership, although according to strict Dutch 
doctrine it does not.450 In Dutch law, the transfer of ownership for security purposes 
was introduced through case law under the old Civil Code and was later prohibited 
by the legislature when the new Dutch Civil Code entered into force in 1992.451 In 
 
442 Absolute rights in civil law systems are rights that are good against the whole world, but 
include a larger number of rights than just property rights. Also intellectual property rights 
such as copyrights or patents are absolute rights. Therefore it is better to speak of a numerus 
clausus of property rights instead. See Struycken 2007, p. 109-114, Snijders 2002, p. 36. 
443 Van Erp 2003b, p. 8-10. 
444 On Füller’s view see above; 3.5. Füller: Restructuring Property Law but Maintaining a Closed 
System. 
445 Van Erp 2003b, p. 11. 
446 Van Erp 2003b, p. 4. 
447 See also Reid 1997b, p. 229-230. 
448 See Chapter 3; 4.5. Fiducie, and Chapter 4; 2.5. Security Ownership, 4.5. Treuhand Bank 
Account. 
449 See Chapter 5; 4.9. EC and International Influences. 
450 Van Erp 2003b, p. 11. 
451 HR 25 January 1929, NJ 1929, 616, see Chapter 5; 2.3. Security Ownership. 
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German law, however, the transfer of ownership for security purposes was also 
created by case law, but has not been prohibited at all.452 
Van Erp concludes that the numerus clausus in civil law systems also serves an 
economic purpose and that this purpose should always be borne in mind.453 There-
fore a too strict approach to numerus clausus could be economically harmful. In Van 
Erp’s view, numerus clausus should develop in the direction of a numerus quasi-
clausus, a more flexible system in which new property rights, such as those enabling 
trusts and time-shares, as well as security ownership, can be recognised.454 In Van 
Erp’s view, the legislature should preferably recognise new property rights, but if 
the legislature fails to act, he would allow the courts to act, but with extreme care.455 
3.7. Smits and Sagaert: Property Law as a System of Obligations 
Apart from Van Erp’s suggestion, Sagaert, but also, before him, Smits, have gone 
much further in their attempts to bring more dynamics into the law of property.456 
Smits, in his analysis of property law, tries to translate the Pandectist concept of 
numerus clausus, in particular that of Von Savigny, into what he calls modern con-
cepts of third-party effect of obligations. In this view, numerus clausus refers to the 
concept that the law only authorises specific situations in which parties are allowed 
to create a legal relation that will have third-party effect.457 The requirement for this 
approach in Smits’ view is that a property right is conceived as a relation between 
two persons in respect of a thing.458 
In this approach, the law of obligations and the law of property are brought 
under one single concept – an obligation, with or without third-party effect. This 
single concept is needed, Smits argues, because the legal system is increasingly 
confronted with hybrid figures situated between the law of obligation and the law 
of property.459 In the current system, Smits continues, a top-down approach is 
followed, by which he refers to the approach in which the law decides that a certain 
legal relation is a property right and that therefore third-party effect results.460 In-
stead, a bottom-up approach is needed; if there is third-party effect, a property right 
is created. Smits seems to be correct when he states that it is this approach that is 
 
452 See Chapter 4; 2.5. Security Ownership. 
453 Van Erp comes to this conclusion, inter alia, through reference to several American Law and 
Economics Scholars who dealt with numerus clausus. These are dealt with later in this chapter. 
Van Erp 2003b, p. 11. See above; 3.2.2. Numerus Clausus as Optimal Standardisation of 
Property Rights and 3.2.3. Numerus Clausus as Verification of Property Rights. 
454 Van Erp 2003b, p. 11-12. 
455 Van Erp 2003b, p. 11. 
456 Smits 1996, p. 41 et seq. Sagaert 2005b, p. 986 et seq. 
457 Smits 1996, p. 54. 
458 I.e., relationalist theory as mentioned above. See above; 2. The Content of Property Law 
Systems in Europe. 
459 These include Dutch qualitative duties, lease and right of retention (lien). See Smits 1996,  
p. 41, 63. 
460 Smits 1996, p. 55. 
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followed in English law, where, in small steps, personal rights, a right of lease, for 
instance, have gradually developed into property rights.461 
With reference to South African law, which will be dealt with in the next 
section, Smits comes to the conclusion that it is the Pandectist system that enforces 
the separation between the law of obligations and the law of property, and the sepa-
ration between personal rights and property rights connected to that.462 Numerus 
clausus is the decision-making device with which it becomes clear ex ante whether a 
legal relation is personal or proprietary. If we want to break free from the Pandectist 
tradition, and Smits thinks we should, we should abandon the separation between 
the law of obligations and the law of property.463  
A property right in this perspective is no longer dependent on a mother-right, 
but on the basis of other criteria for an obligation with third-party effect. Smits 
offers the intention of the parties and the publicity of the right so that third parties 
know about its existence as criteria to decide which relations have third-party effect 
and which do not.464 However, what exactly is the relation between these criteria, 
and if there are any additional criteria, remains unanswered. 
Along the same lines of reasoning, Sagaert has developed ideas on property 
law as an open system of obligations.465 Following the ideas of Ginossar, Sagaert 
describes what he calls the neo-personalist approach to property rights.466 This 
approach takes the relationalist theory, dealt with at the beginning of this Section, 
one step further. It can therefore be seen as a neo-relationalist theory, which sees all 
property rights as obligations against third parties.467 The content of the obligation 
corresponding to a property right is that a third party must refrain from interfer-
ing.468 However, the obligation is not a normal obligation but is connected to the 
holder of the right in respect of the object and runs with the object to a new holder. 
In that regard, the obligation is a qualitative obligation. Ginossar analyses the 
system of the law of obligations and the law of property together in a system of 
ownership, qualitative obligations and normal obligations.469  
In Ginossar’s view, in other words, there is no longer a place for the separation 
between the law of obligations and the law of property. Instead one system of 
‘patrimonial law’ should take its place.470 It is with this idea that Sagaert offers four 
 
461 Smits 1996, p. 55. The best example is a lease, see Chapter 6; 2.2. Leases of Land. Swadling 
2000a, p. 232-233, Swadling 2007, p. 234-236. 
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African law see below; 3.6. A Legal System without a Numerus Clausus: South African Law. 
463 Smits 1996, p. 61-62. 
464 Smits 1996, p. 63. 
465 Sagaert 2005b, p. 983. 
466 Sagaert 2005b, p. 996-998, Ginossar 1960, p. 181 et seq. 
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Systems in Europe. 
468 Sagaert 2005b, p. 996-997. 
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property right (in Sagaert’s words qualita qua). See Sagaert 2005b, p. 997, Ginossar 1960, p. 181 
et seq. 
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new categories of rights, which are no longer based on the distinction between 
personal right and property right, but on the effects a right can have against third 
parties.471 The need for these new categories comes, in this respect Sagaert and Smits 
agree, from the difficulties presented to the current legal systems by hybrid figures 
such as qualitative duties as parts of property rights, as well as trusts or trust-like 
devices.472  
Sagaert’s new distinction is based on the analysis of a right. He assumes that 
both property rights and personal rights have an active and a passive side. The 
active side is the party that is entitled to the right, the passive side the party that is 
bound by the right.473 Depending on the content of the right, the right is in respect 
of performance by another party or it is related – in Sagaert’s words, accessory – to 
an object with which it may transfer to another party. In other words, those rights 
are qualitative rights in respect of the active side or rights that follow, the droit de 
suite, on the passive side. The first new category comprises rights that are not acces-
sory to an object, neither on the passive, nor on the active side.474 These rights com-
prise the current category of personal rights, now dealt with by the law of obliga-
tions. The second new category comprises rights that are accessory to an object, 
both on the passive and on the active side.475 These rights are property rights in the 
traditional sense of the word, with third-party effect on both sides. Sagaert classifies 
servitudes, pledge, hypothec and special priority rights under this heading. The 
third new category comprises rights that are accessory to an object on the passive 
side, but not on the active side.476 These are property rights that only exist in respect 
of an owner, for example, a right of usufruct, superficies or emphyteusis and co-
ownership. They are different from the rights in the second category where, apart 
from the right of ownership, the property right is defined in terms of two parties, in 
case of servitudes in the holder of the dominant and the holder of the servient land 
for instance, or in case of pledge, the pledgor and the pledgee. In case of a right of 
usufruct there is ownership and the holder of the right of usufruct.  
The fourth and final new category comprises rights that are accessory to an 
object on the active side, but not on the passive side.477 It is this category, Sagaert 
argues, that has been mostly neglected.478 Rights included would be personal 
servitudes, unknown to French law, but known in German, Dutch and English 
law.479  
 
471 Sagaert 2005b, p. 1022. 
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and Chapter 6; 2.5. Restrictive Covenants. 
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In respect to numerus clausus, Sagaert shows that, depending on the category of 
rights, the legislature and judiciary have used different approaches.480 In respect of 
the first category, which contains purely personal rights, there is the starting point 
of freedom of contract, but there are more and more limitations in, for instance, the 
areas of consumer protection, environmental protection, and through good faith.481 
Nevertheless, the starting point remains an open system in which parties have 
maximum freedom to shape their legal relations. In respect of the second category, 
in particular as a reaction against the feudal system of landholding, a numerus 
clausus has been enforced. In respect to servitudes, this can best be seen from the 
prohibition against imposing a positive burden on another party.482 However, inso-
far as the parties stay within the boundaries set by law, within the Typenfixierung, 
there is some limited freedom to shape legal relations. In this respect, most legal 
systems recognise the possibility to impose positive duties as secondary obligations 
to a primary negative duty.483 In respect of the third category, Sagaert asserts the 
numerus clausus is less important, and that in French and Belgian doctrine it is 
sometimes held that the rules of, in particular, Typenfixierung do not apply.484 As 
examples he mentions possibilities to shape the right of ownership in a co-owner-
ship regime and the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court quoted above, in which a 
party agreement becomes part of a property right if there is a sufficient connection 
to the property right and the parties stay within the nature of the right.485 Finally, in 
respect of the fourth category, Sagaert explains that this category of rights has been 
traditionally neglected in French and Belgian law, because the rights in this category 
might resemble old feudal duties, as property rights bind persons.486 Therefore, 
numerus clausus has traditionally not been applied to this category. 
The current system of property law uses an ex ante method to decide which 
rights have effect against third parties and which have not. With Sagaert’s new 
division, it might be possible to choose a more modern approach, in which an ex 
post method allows for more freedom to create new property rights.487 Creating new 
rights, however, is subject to conditions: 
… on the condition that they do not cause damage from an economic point of view. 
When, after creation, it becomes apparent that it does cause damage, this method 
should have sufficient gravity to re-integrate the separated right back into the right of 
ownership. The gravity can be created for instance through extinction of a property 
 
480 Sagaert 2005b, p. 1062 et seq. 
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482 Sagaert 2005b, p. 1064-1065. 
483 Sagaert 2005b, p. 1067-1068. 
484 Sagaert 2005b, p. 1073. 
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right when its purpose is gone, it has not been used for a long duration of time …, 
when it can no longer be used, when using the right would be unreasonable, etc.488 
Sagaert therefore seems to want to retain a principle of numerus clausus through an 
ex post model that does not limit party autonomy before parties create their relation, 
but controls the effect of the relation they choose with criteria of economic rele-
vance. In such a way the separation of the law of obligations and the law of proper-
ty is no longer needed and a gradual system in which more, or less, third-party 
effect, on the active or on the passive side of a right, can be awarded.489 
3.8. A Legal System without a Numerus Clausus: South African Law 
The above analysis shows how civil law systems, in particular, all adhere to a 
numerus clausus of property rights, albeit to different degrees, and also how legal 
scholarship in these systems continues to value numerus clausus as a fundamental 
principle of property law. Although the numerus clausus fulfils an important filter-
ing function to restrict the application of property law to those legal relations that 
are not property rights, other solutions that achieve the same result can be imag-
ined.  
Until now, the numerus clausus has always been defended with the argument 
of legal certainty. As stated above, this argument is twofold. It seeks to protect the 
unitary nature of the right of ownership, as well as seeking to protect third parties 
from a large amount of unknown property rights. In the name of legal certainty, 
therefore, party autonomy is seriously restricted.490 However, without such restric-
tions to party autonomy, an unworkable system will not necessarily result. There 
are legal systems in the world in which no numerus clausus is recognised. One of 
these legal systems, that of South Africa, deserves special attention.491 South African 
law is interesting in particular because it combines the civil law and common law 
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tradition in one legal system.492 Therefore, South African law is also confronted with 
doctrine from civil law and common law. Over and above that, South African law 
has also developed its own doctrine to deal with property rights and the limitations 
on party autonomy in the creation of property rights. The system of South African 
law is therefore particularly interesting.493 
In South African law it is traditionally held that no numerus clausus exists.494 
South Africa is a mixed legal system, where English law and Roman-Dutch law are 
combined into one legal system.495 South Africa does not have a Civil Code, and 
applies the South African common law in the same way as the English legal system 
applies the English common law. However, in content, South African common law 
is different from English common law.496  
As a result of its Roman-Dutch origins, the foundation of the South African 
property law system is the general catalogue of property rights derived from 
Roman law. First and foremost, the primary right is a unitary concept of ownership. 
This right of ownership is a right of ownership in the civil law sense, including a 
vindicatio for the owner to protect his right. Secondly, there are lesser rights to use 
and for security purposes. These lesser rights, following the Roman law categories, 
are; rights of servitude, both real and personal, pledge and hypothec.497 However, 
unlike the civil law systems, apart from these traditional property rights, South 
African law has seen the development of new types of property rights. Some of 
these rights result from the influence of English common law, for example, a lease 
of land, but others are very specific to the South African environment, for example, 
mineral rights. Furthermore, with the entry into force of the Constitution there is a 
discussion on the recognition of human rights, and other rights that are protected 
under the Constitution as property rights.498 These highly complicated constitution-
al influences will be left aside. 
Without a Civil Code or a judgment stating that the Roman law property 
rights mentioned by the Roman-Dutch writers are an exhaustive list of property 
rights, both the courts as well as the legislature have given recognition to new 
property rights. When the courts recognise new property rights, they characterise a 
legal relation created by two private parties as constituting a property right. 
Remarkably, these new property rights in South African law have all been property 
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rights in respect of land. The reason for this is that recognition of new property 
rights in South African law is dealt with as a question of registration. It is through 
registration, in particular the law dealing with registration of property rights, that 
parties can be allowed to register rights that are, as yet, unknown as property rights. 
The effect of this approach is that the decision whether a right is a property right or 
a personal right is dealt with as a question of registration.499 In particular, the com-
bination of property rights and other rights that are capable of registration has 
caused some confusion when personal rights have been offered for registration.500 
In Ex Parte Geldenhuys the Orange Free State Provincial Division was asked to 
rule on the registrability of a clause in a testament stating that the children of the 
testator would be entitled to a piece of land.501 The relevant portions of the clause 
stated:  
‘As soon as our first child reaches his or her majority, the survivor of the testators shall 
be bound to subdivide the said land in equal portions and distribute it among the 
children, such distributions to be made by the survivor and such major child by 
drawing lots … and we declare and direct that the child who by such lot obtains the 
portion comprising the homestead of the farm Jakhalskop shall pay the sum of £200 to 
our other children within a specified time’.502 
The Registrar of Deeds had refused to register the deed with the argument that the 
rights created by the clause were only personal rights, and that, following previous 
case law, personal rights could not be registered.503 In dealing with the question of 
registrability De Villiers JP held: 
‘The reference is to rights, which are merely binding on the present owner of the land, 
and which thus do not bind the land, and do not constitute jura in re aliena over the 
land, and do not bind the successors in title of the present owner. These are the 
‘personal rights’ which are not registrable, according to the above cited case of Hollins 
v Registrar of Deeds 1904 TS 603… One has to look not so much to the right, but to the 
correlative obligation. If that obligation is a burden upon the land, a subtraction from 
the dominium, the corresponding right is real and registrable; if it is not such an obliga-
tion, but merely an obligation binding on some person or other, the corresponding 
right is a personal right, or right in personam, and it cannot as a rule be registered’.504 
In this case the court developed a test to determine which rights are property rights 
and therefore can be registered and which rights are personal rights and can there-
fore not be registered. This test, by which the court looks at the corresponding obli-
gation of a right and sees if this obligation is a burden upon the land, in other words 
a subtraction from the dominium, would become known as the subtraction from 
 
499 This question is becoming increasingly relevant in the human rights aspects of property law, 
the constitutional property law, as it is known by in South Africa. On this aspect see Van der 
Walt 2005, p. 101 et seq. 
500 Van Warmelo 1959, p. 85, Boraine 1987, p. 77, Badenhorst 2000, p. 509. 
501 Ex Parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155. 
502 Ex Parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155, at 155. 
503 Hollins v Registrar of Deeds 1904 TS 603, Ex Parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155, at 157. 
504 Ex Parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155, at 164 per De Villiers JP. 
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dominium test.505 Applied to the facts of this case, in Ex Parte Geldenhuys the court 
held that the rights of the children to the subdivision, at the moment of registration 
of the indivisible shares in the land, directly affected the ownership of land and 
therefore constituted a real burden on the current ownership that was capable of 
registration. The obligation to pay the sum of money was held to be personal and 
not registrable per se.506 
This judgment was delivered under the Deeds Registries Act of 1918, which 
dealt with the registrability of rights.507 In 1937, a new Act was adopted that restated 
the requirements a legal relation had to fulfil in order to be registered as a property 
right.508 Furthermore, the introduction of the 1937 Act was used to restate the availa-
ble property rights, without closing the possibility for parties to create new rights.509 
These rights include leases of land and of mineral rights, mortgage bonds, notarial 
bonds, personal and real servitudes and notarial prospecting contracts.510  
The South African system of registration of rights is complicated and has 
caused several uncertainties, mostly because the Deeds Registries Act 1937 is not 
concerned with property rights, but with registrable rights.511 Usually, only proper-
ty rights are rights capable of registration, but as a result of the focus on registrabili-
ty of rights, personal rights can also be included. Furthermore, Section 102 of the 
Deeds Registries Act 1937 defines property rights as any right that becomes a prop-
erty right on registration, which could imply that personal rights that are registered 
become property rights.512 In order to provide some guidelines to the Registrar of 
Deeds, Section 63(1) of the Deed Registries Act 1937 states: 
‘No deed, or condition in a deed, purporting to create or embodying any personal 
right, and no condition which does not restrict the exercise of any right of ownership in 
respect of immovable property, shall be capable of registration: Provided that a deed 
containing such a condition as aforesaid may be registered if, in the opinion of the 
registrar, such condition is complementary or otherwise ancillary to a registrable con-
dition or right contained or conferred in such deed’.513  
It is in particular the end of the first sentence, the requirement for a deed to restrict 
any right of ownership in respect of immovable property, of which it is argued that 
it embodies the subtraction from dominium test.514 Therefore, the introduction of the 
Deeds Registries Act 1937 has not put a hold on the courts applying the subtraction 
 
505 Best formulated in Erlax Properties (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1992 (1) SA 879 (A). De Waal 
2004, p. 87-88, Van der Walt 1992, p. 171, Badenhorst et al. 2003, p. 58, Van der Merwe, De 
Waal & Carey-Miller 2002, p. 84-87. 
506 Ex Parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155, at 164-166, per De Villiers JP. 
507 Sec. 3(1) Deeds Registries Act 13 of 1918.  
508 Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. 
509 Sec. 3(1)(r) Deeds Registries Act 1937, see Badenhorst 2000, p. 509. 
510 Sec 3(1) Deeds Registries Act 1937, see Badenhorst & Coetser 1991, p. 376. 
511 See Boraine 1987, p. 53-83, Reid 1997b, p. 228-229. 
512 Badenhorst et al. 2003, p. 58, Van der Walt 1992, p. 179. 
513 Sec 63(1) Deeds Registries Act 1937. 
514 Van Warmelo 1959, p. 91, De Waal 2004, p. 86, Badenhorst & Coetser 1991, p. 377, Badenhorst 
2000, p. 509, Van der Walt 1992, p. 171. 
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from dominium test. In fact the test was refined in later case law and achieved a 
standardised form. The test now comprises the following two elements; in order for 
a right to be registrable, it must be the intention of the parties to bind not only them-
selves but also their successors in title, and the nature of the right or condition must 
be such that registration of it results in a subtraction from the dominium of the land 
against which it is registered.515 However, the application of the test does not al-
ways answer the question about the division between personal rights and property 
rights. In particular, the criterion that an arrangement must restrict the exercise of 
the right of ownership, in other words, be a subtraction from the dominium, is not 
always helpful, as personal rights can also limit the exercise of a right of owner-
ship.516 Therefore in some cases the courts have struggled with the correct applica-
tion of the test. 
In Ex parte Pierce and Others, the court held that a clause in a testament stating 
that the profits from any minerals or precious stones, metals or oils that were found 
on the land should be divided between the heirs, did constitute a property right as it 
resulted in a ‘diminution of the ownership’ and therefore should be seen ‘as creat-
ing real rights’.517  
An even better illustration was offered three years later in Oldensaalsrus Gold, 
General Investments and Extensions Ltd v Registrar of Deeds.518 In this case the Olden-
saalsrus Gold company owned several farms for the purpose of township develop-
ment. The land had been proclaimed a public digging site for precious metals.519 
When certain parts of the land were developed, the company attempted to sell and 
transfer this land under the condition that a share of any income received from the 
land, in licence money, rent profits, or profits otherwise, would be reserved for the 
company.520 The deed containing this provision was refused registration with the 
argument that it constituted a personal right and that registration under Section 
63(1) Deeds Registries Act 1937 was not allowed. The court, however, argued that 
the company had acquired a property right, which, looking at the corresponding 
obligation, entitled it to claim that the transferee should refrain from claiming a 
share in the money received from the land.521 In the opinion of the court, such a 
clause constituted a subtraction from the dominium, and would therefore have to be 
capable of registration.522 
 
515 See Erlax Properties (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1992 (1) SA 879 (A). 
516 See Registrar of Deeds (Transvaal) v The Ferreira Deep Ltd 1930 AD 169 at 176 per De Villiers CJ, 
Low Water Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wahloo Sand CC 1999 1 SA 655 (SE), Van der Walt 1987, p. 346, 
Van der Walt 1992, p. 171, Sonnekus 1991, p. 179-180, Lewis 1987, p. 601. 
517 Ex parte Pierce and Others 1950 (3) SA 628 (O), at 635D. Lewis 1987, p. 605-606. 
518 Oldensaalsrus Gold, General Investments and extensions Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1953 (1) SA 600 
(O). 
519 Badenhorst et al. 2003, p. 60-61. 
520 Oldensaalsrus Gold, General Investments and extensions Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1953 (1) SA 600 
(O), at 607B-C. 
521 Oldensaalsrus Gold, General Investments and extensions Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1953 (1) SA 600 
(O), at 606A-D, per Horwitz AJP, at 611G per Smit J. 
522 Oldensaalsrus Gold, General Investments and extensions Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1953 (1) SA 600 
(O), at 606D, per Horwitz AJP. 
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These cases have been criticised on the grounds that a monetary obligation 
cannot constitute a subtraction from the dominium. Behind this reasoning is the idea 
that an owner does not have an obligation to pay money, so this part of the right of 
ownership cannot be made part of a property right either.523 In Lorenz v Melle and 
Others, the Transvaal Provincial Division considered another case with a profits 
clause.524 In this case, two parties had acquired a farm in co-ownership and had 
agreed on a division of a certain part of the farm. As a part of the notarial deed cre-
ating the division, the parties granted each other rights to receive half of the income 
of minerals, grazing or hunting rights, but also for profits of a township that would 
possibly be developed. The parties explicitly stated that these clauses were not only 
applicable to them, but also to their ‘heirs, executors and assigns’.525 One of the heirs 
of one of the parties creating the deed became owner of the land and wanted to 
transfer part of the land to a company for the development of a township, but 
wanted to ensure that she would not have to give half of the profits to the heirs of 
the other party who had created the deed. Therefore, she sought and obtained, at 
first instance, a declaratory order that the profit clause only created personal rights. 
On appeal, the nature of the rights created by the clause was reviewed. The court 
considered, because of the arguments brought forward by the appellant, the 
question of whether the clause in the deed constituted a real servitude. The court 
came to the conclusion that it could not be a real servitude, as the right did not bind 
the land to pay but merely the owner of that land to do so.526 However, if the 
requirement of subtraction from dominium have been applied alone, the court ad-
mitted it would have come to the conclusion that a property right was created.527 
Therefore, an additional argument was used to come to the conclusion that a right is 
a property right – the right must relate to the enjoyment of the land in the physical 
sense.528 
The additional requirement might have brought some clarification as to which 
rights would classify under the subtraction from dominium test, but in Pearly Beach 
Trust v Registrar of Deeds, in which the Cape Provincial Division dealt with the regis-
trability of a clause in a deed of sale, this additional requirement was not follow-
ed.529 In Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds, the nature of a clause granting a third 
party the right to receive certain benefits in the event of a grant of prospecting 
rights, contained in a deed of sale of land, was considered. The clause provided that 
a third party was entitled to: 
 
523 See Badenhorst et al. 2003, p. 61, De Waal 2004, p. 88. 
524 Lorenz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T). 
525 Lorenz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T), at 1045F per Nedstadt J. 
526 Lorenz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T), at 1052E per Nedstadt J. 
527 Lorenz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T), at 1052A per Nedstadt J. De Waal 2004, p. 90, 
Badenhorst & Coetser 1991, p. 377, Badenhorst et al. 2003, p. 61-62, Lewis 1987, p. 606-607, 
Van der Merwe, De Waal & Carey-Miller 2002, p. 87-88. 
528 Lorenz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T), at 1052E per Nedstadt J. Badenhorst et al. 2003, 
p. 62, De Waal 2004, p. 90. 
529 Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 (4) SA 614 (C). 
 479 
Chapter 7 
‘… receive from the transferee and/or its successors in title -: 
(a) one third of the net consideration received from the grantee of any option or rights 
to prospect for minerals etc. on the property; 
(b) one third of the net compensation received in consequence of the expropriation of 
the property; 
(c) one third of the net consideration received upon the disposal of the property to any 
authority who is vested by law with the power of expropriation’.530 
The Registrar, probably relying on the interpretation of Section 63(1) in Lorenz v 
Melle and Others, refused registration because the clause did not restrict any right of 
ownership in the land.531 However, the court, in dealing with the issue of regis-
tration, returned to the classic definition of the subtraction test from Ex parte 
Geldenhuys and Ex parte Pierce, and neglected the additional requirement from 
Lorenz v Melle.532 On the applicability of the subtraction test in Lorenz v Melle and 
Others, King J. stated: 
‘Lorentz’ case recognises (at 1052A – B) that a clause requiring an owner to give up of 
his profits amounted to a subtraction from the ‘dominium, however this fact did not 
make the clause a real servitude; what was required (1052E) was a curtailment of the 
right of the owner to the enjoyment of the land in the physical sense’. 
In my view one of the rights of ownership is the jus disponendi or right of alienation 
and if this right is limited in the sense that the owner is precluded from obtaining the 
full fruits of the disposition it can be said that one of his rights of ownership is 
restricted’.533 
With this case the court therefore also returned to the acceptability of profit clauses 
as property rights. The decision of the court has therefore been received with criti-
cism and was not followed, when the opportunity arose in a different context in 
respect to a profit clause.534 The case of Kain v Kahn concerned not a profit clause, 
but a clause in a contract of sale reserving the right to occupy one of the rooms in a 
house for a monthly rent of R10.535 After some years of occupation, the applicant 
making use of this right sought registration of the clause. The Registrar refused on 
the ground that the clause only granted a right to occupy a part of a building and 
therefore did not result in a restriction on the right of ownership of the whole.536 
When considering the registrability of the clause, the court came to the conclusion 
that the right granted was a subtraction from the dominium in the form of a lease 
and was therefore capable of registration.537 
 
530 Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 (4) SA 614 (C), at 615B-C per King J. 
531 Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 (4) SA 614 (C), at 615E per King J. See also 
Badenhorst & Coetser 1991, p. 383. Sonnekus 1991, p. 173, Van der Merwe, De Waal & Carey-
Miller 2002, p. 89-90. 
532 Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 (4) SA 614 (C), at 615G per King J. 
533 Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 (4) SA 614 (C), at 617G-I per King J. 
534 Denel (Pty) v Cape Explosive Works Ltd 1999 (2) SA 419 (T). See Sonnekus 1991, 173 et seq., Van 
der Walt 1992, p. 202-203, De Waal 2004, p. 92. 
535 Kain v Kahn 1986 (4) SA 251 (C). 
536 Kain v Kahn 1986 (4) SA 251 (C), at 253B-C. 
537 Kain v Kahn 1986 (4) SA 251 (C), at 253G-H. On this conclusion, see Lewis 1987, p. 600. 
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Finally, in Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd, the Transvaal Provincial 
Division was confronted with two clauses contained in a contract of sale of a piece 
of land.538 The clauses had been made before the transaction under review by the 
court, and had in fact been part of several transactions before that.539 One of these 
clauses stipulated that the land could only be used for the manufacture of arma-
ments by the government for any defence or military purpose. The other clause 
granted the seller the first right to repurchase the land.540 However, deciding not to 
follow Pearly Beach, the court considered that it was bound by Lorenz v Melle, and 
applied a more conservative test. Hartzenberg J, on behalf of the court, developed a 
two-stage test approach.541 First, the court determined whether a clause in a contract 
was capable of being a property right. In order to determine this, the court applied 
the Ex parte Geldenhuys version of the subtraction from dominium test.542 As a result, 
the court looked at the correlative obligation to see whether the burden rested on 
the land itself, or rather on the owner. In deciding this, the court recalled earlier case 
law and held that the owner’s rights must be curtailed in relation to the enjoyment 
of the land in the physical sense, as was held in Lorenz v Melle.543 Furthermore, the 
court held that other arguments that could answer the question whether a right is a 
personal or a property right could be admitted. When, for example, the right has as 
its object a performance of the owner, the right could be a personal right. When the 
right is made in respect of an object, the right could be a property right.544 Secondly, 
only if the result of the first stage is that a property right is created, must the court 
establish whether or not the creator of the right intended it to be a property right.545 
On this aspect, Hartzenberg J held that if the parties agree that the right is a 
personal right, then registration is not possible. If the parties agree that the right is a 
property right, then it may be registered.546 
Badenhorst has emphasised that originally the courts would look at the inten-
tion of the parties first and only after that would consider whether a right could be a 
subtraction from the dominium. She emphasises that by changing the order of these 
 
538 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another 1999 (2) SA 419 (T). 
539 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another 1999 (2) SA 419 (T), at 423D-H per 
Hartzenberg J. 
540 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another 1999 (2) SA 419 (T), at 422-423 per 
Hartzenberg J. 
541 See Badenhorst 2000, p. 512-513. 
542 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another 1999 (2) SA 419 (T), at 435E-H per 
Hartzenberg J. 
543 Or, following another earlier case of Fine Wool Products of South Africa Ltd v Director of 
Valuations 1950 4 SA 490, in which it was held that the obligation must affect the land or run 
with the land, Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another 1999 (2) SA 419 (T), at 
435H-I per Hartzenberg J. 
544 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another 1999 (2) SA 419 (T), at 435I-J per 
Hartzenberg J. 
545 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another 1999 (2) SA 43619 (T), at 436C-D per 
Hartzenberg J. 
546 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another 1999 (2) SA 419 (T), at 436C-E per 
Hartzenberg J. 
 481 
Chapter 7 
requirements around, the results can be much more predictable.547 The result of the 
case of Denel v Cape Explosive Works, before it was considered on appeal, was 
therefore that the first clause, containing a restriction on the use of the land, could 
be registered, but that the second clause, the repurchase agreement, could not be 
registered, as this clause did not affect the land itself, but required a performance by 
an owner.548 Unfortunately, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the 
two-stage approach, but came partly to the opposite conclusion on the interpreta-
tion of the facts of the case.549 The Court of Appeal held that the two clauses in the 
contract should be read together, because the right to repurchase the land contained 
in the second clause would only apply if the land was no longer used for the pur-
pose set by the first clause. Streicher JA therefore held that as a whole a subtraction 
from the dominium of the land resulted.550 De Waal states that this case on appeal 
illustrates the inherent unpredictability of the subtraction from dominium test.551 
Other authors have also been critical of the predictability of the outcome of the 
test.552 This criticism should not be taken as an argument in favour of a numerus 
clausus, but more as a plea for a stricter and more coherent application of the criteria 
to determine which right is a property right and which right is not. 
A short analysis of South African law in terms of this Chapter may reveal 
some of the problems with the subtraction from dominium test. In terms of the prop-
erty law system, South African law recognises a primary property right in the right 
of ownership. As this is a right of ownership in the civil law sense of the word, the 
paramount entitlement a person can have to an object, there is only one primary 
right in South African law. From this primary right, lesser rights may be derived in 
the form of property rights with effect against third parties. The South African 
method of creation of property rights is through a subtraction from dominium test. 
South African law finds its inspiration here in the Roman-Dutch author Grotius 
who wrote about lesser rights as gebreckelicke eigendom or limited ownership.553 This 
method is essentially the same as the French method of démembrement, in which 
parts of the rights of ownership are taken, subtracted, and transferred to another 
person for a limited duration in the form of a lesser property right.554  
Like other legal systems, South African law recognises property rights to use 
and property rights for security purposes. The third category, anticipatory rights, is 
unknown as such to South African law, although, as can be seen from Denel (Pty) 
Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd, an option to purchase can be part of a lesser right re-
 
547 Badenhorst 2000, p. 512. 
548 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another 1999 (2) SA 419 (T), at 437-439 per 
Hartzenberg J. See Badenhorst 2000, p. 512-513, De Waal 2004, p. 94-95. 
549 Cape Explosive Works Ltd; AECI Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd; Armaments Corporation of SA Ltd and the 
Registrar of Deeds (3) SA 569 (SCA). 
550 Cape Explosive Works Ltd; AECI Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd; Armaments Corporation of SA Ltd and the 
Registrar of Deeds (3) SA 569 (SCA), at 578F-I, per Streiger JA. 
551 De Waal 2004, p. 95. 
552 See Badenhorst 2001, p. 195, Badenhorst et al. 2003, p. 66-67, Van der Walt 1992, p. 200-201, 
Lewis 1987, p. 615, Reid 1997b, p. 228-229. 
553 De Groot 1926, II, 3, 11, p. 54, See Van der Walt 1992, p. 175. 
554 See above; 2.2. Of Ways to Create a Lesser Property Right. 
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stricting the use of a piece of land. In fact, it is in particular with this third category 
of lesser rights that South African law has had problems. In South African law, 
these rights are pre-emptive rights, rights against the alienation of land and options 
to land.555 Taking into account that lesser rights in South Africa are a subtraction 
from the primary right, it can be seen how the legal system would experience 
problems with rights that cannot be defined in terms of rights of the holder of the 
primary right.556 Therefore, in particular, lesser rights of the third category (antici-
patory rights) have been generally characterised as personal rights in South African 
law.557 The method of creating lesser rights does not determine, although it has an 
influence on, the open or closed nature of the catalogue of property rights. As South 
African law illustrates, following a method of subtraction or démembrement to create 
lesser property rights can still lead to an open system in which private parties are 
free to offer new property rights for registration. Nevertheless, the open system of 
property rights in South African law has not led to a large increase in the recog-
nition of new property rights.  
4. Conclusion: Numerus Clausus in Property Law Systems in Europe 
Numerus clausus as a principle of property law can be found, albeit in a different 
form and with a different content, in French, German, Dutch and English law. Even 
in legal systems that are traditionally considered not to recognise a numerus clausus, 
such as South African and American law, limitations on the number and content of 
property rights can be found. In the terminology of this Chapter, South African law 
might not adhere to a rule of numerus clausus, but, at least to some extent, it does 
apply a principle of numerus clausus by imposing a test and therefore limitations on 
the creation of new property rights. 
Besides the adherence to a principle of numerus clausus in French, German, 
Dutch and English law, there is also a clear similarity in the catalogue of property 
rights that they recognise. Each of these systems uses a primary right, from which 
lesser rights are derived, either through subtraction or démembrement, or through the 
method of limitation.558 Inside the catalogue of lesser rights, each legal system 
recognises rights to use and rights for security, and struggles with the recognition of 
lesser rights used to acquire a certain legal position.559 
When considering the method of creation of property rights, it is not surpris-
ing that the legal systems adhering to a method of limitation on the creation of 
lesser property rights have fewer difficulties with the recognition of lesser rights 
 
555 Crous v Utilitas Belville 1994 (3) SA 720 (C), Lazerus and Jackson v Wessels, Olivier, and the 
Coronation Freehold Estates, Town and Mines Ltd 1903 TS 499, Vansa Vanadium SA Ltd v Registrar 
of Deeds 1997 (2) SA 784 (T).  
556 On this same analysis in respect to other systems adhering to the démembrement method of 
creating property rights, see above; 2.6. Lesser Rights used to Acquire a Certain Legal 
Position (Anticipatory Rights). 
557 See Badenhorst et al. 2003, p. 67. 
558 See above; 2.2. Of Ways to Create a Lesser Property Right. 
559 On this distinction see above; 2.1. Of Primary Property Rights and Lesser Property Rights. 
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used to acquire a certain legal position. At the same time, legal systems that follow 
the other method, the method of démembrement, are increasingly confronted with the 
demand to recognise anticipatory property rights. In particular, when an object is 
transferred and additional legal certainty for one of the parties is required, the strict 
separation between the law of obligations and the law of property is under pres-
sure. Such a situation can occur when the primary right is transferred or the prima-
ry right is retained for security purposes. Legal systems adhering to a démembrement 
model generally refuse to recognise a special position for the party not holding the 
primary right. Legal systems adhering to the limitation model seem to recognise 
these rights more easily. However, with the démembrement method in mind, those 
systems that award a lesser property right for the acquisition of a property right are 
accused of being doctrinally impure. Those systems that do not award a lesser 
property right in these cases are criticised for their inflexibility and are sometimes 
avoided by legal practice. 
Another distinction that is shared by French, German, Dutch and English law 
is the separation between the law of obligations and the law of property. This sepa-
ration is strongly connected to the numerus clausus, regardless of whether numerus 
clausus appears as a rule or as a principle. Those systems adhering to a separation 
between these two areas of law must have criteria to decide which relations belong 
to either of these areas. In other words, as a result of this distinction, which is 
generally modelled on the distinction already used in Roman law, a legal relation 
cannot belong to both.560 
The way in which numerus clausus is implemented in a legal system seems to 
depend on the hierarchy of sources of law. In those systems where the legislature 
has taken prime position amongst the sources of law, necessarily legislation also has 
exclusive authority to recognise and regulate property rights. In other words, the 
legislature has the authority to make the decision which legal relations have third-
party effect. In doing so, legislators, in particular in civil law systems, have re-
cognised property rights in a very traditional way, mainly by falling back on the 
Roman categories.561 Moreover, as a reaction to the fragmented feudal concept of 
ownership, one unitary primary right and only a very limited category of lesser 
rights is recognised. Legislators mostly reject new solutions, even if these are 
needed in legal practice. 
In German law the Eigentümergrundschuld, or owner-Grundschuld, offers an 
exception. Under pressure from legal practice, the Commission drafting the German 
Civil Code decided to keep this type of property right, even though it did not exact-
ly fit in the Roman categories of property rights.562 In some other countries legis-
lators have also responded to the demands in practice. The French property reforms 
illustrate this. However, mostly, legislators leave property law to remain a static 
area of law. In this respect it is, in particular, the Dutch legislature that failed to take 
the opportunity on the occasion of the new Civil Code of 1992 to make changes to 
 
560 In particular the strict separation as it was devised in German law under the influence of, 
inter alia, Von Savigny. 
561 Gordley 1994, p. 459 et seq. 
562 On the German owner’s-Grundschuld see Chapter 4; 3.8. Grundschuld. 
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the menu of property rights. In fact, with its rejection of the use of the primary right 
for security and management purposes, the Dutch legislature seems to have placed 
Dutch law outside the current European developments. 
Even in English law, traditionally held to be a very different system from civil 
law, the legislature interfered with Section 1 of the Law of Property Act 1925. It 
could be that with this interference the legislature granted itself exclusive authority 
to deal with the recognition of property rights at common law. In equity, primacy of 
the judiciary remains, and, not surprisingly, the courts have acted and recognised 
new property relations such as restrictive covenants, estate contracts, and options to 
purchase. 
The above analysis focuses on numerus clausus as an expression of the actor 
with the primary authority to make law. It shows three elements of comparison. 
First, there are many similarities in the approach legal systems take towards the 
recognition of property rights. In each legal system the legislature has interfered in 
one area or another, and after reforms in that area, the system has become depend-
ent on further legislative reform. Examples of this include apartment ownership, 
security rights, and the use of registration systems.  
Secondly, all of these legal systems adhere to a separation between the law of 
obligations and the law of property. For reasons of legal certainty, usually express-
ed as justification for the third-party effect of property relations, the number and 
content of available property rights is restricted. Although the term legal certainty is 
vague and has been avoided as much as possible, the term does cover all objections 
made against an open system of property rights. In this respect, the objections 
against an open system can be brought under the heading of internal arguments, 
which focus on the relation between the holder of a lesser property right and the 
holder of a primary right, or the holder of another right from which the lesser right 
was derived, and external reasons, which focus on the relation of a holder of a lesser 
right against the rest of the world. Internal arguments include the argument that the 
system of property law as devised by Von Savigny and built by the Pandectists does 
not allow for a fragmentation of ownership in any way other than that prescribed 
by law, in other words, in another way than specifically authorised by the legis-
lature. Ownership in this system is a unitary right and this unitary nature needs to 
be protected above all. Arguments derived from this line of reasoning are protection 
of the freedom of ownership, protection against over-fragmentation of the right 
leading to its inefficient use, pyramiding of rights, and standardisation of rights to 
create the optimal use of property rights. External arguments are also based on the 
doctrinal concepts made by the Pandectists and include problems of orientation on 
the market of property rights, information costs, transaction costs, externalities, 
justification of third-party effect through publicity, and standardisation to ensure 
the minimum costs for third parties. 
Thirdly, the analysis of numerus clausus as an expression of the exclusive 
authority to regulate property rights shows the underlying justification for a (rule 
of) numerus clausus. Although, in my view it does not explain the existence of nume-
rus clausus, the taking of a leading role by the legislator shows how, when through 
the source of legislation the menu of property rights is set, the rest of the system 
consequently also must be dealt with by legislation. By this I intend to state that  
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numerus clausus as the criterion to decide on the applicability of the law of property 
would make little sense if the law of property as such was a set of unclear prin-
ciples. Instead, in this way of systematic thinking, numerus clausus is the beginning 
of the path a legal relation follows, and from which it gains direction on the way to 
other general principles of property law, such as the principle of publicity and 
specificity.563 Moreover, behind these two other principles there are further specific 
rules that must be followed.564 
However, what all these arguments do not show or explain is how a system 
without a rule of numerus clausus can be fully functional. English equity or South 
African law might impose restrictions on party autonomy, but a rule of numerus 
clausus could not be discovered. Nevertheless, these legal systems seem to function 
well, but sometimes invoke harsh criticism, from both inside and outside that legal 
system, because of the flexibility and hence possible unpredictability of the law. It 
could be that, in exchange for flexibility, these systems have given in to some legal 
uncertainty. It could also be the case that this lower standard of legal certainty 
comes from the fact that not the legislator, but the courts are in charge here. The 
system of equity is intended to correct the strict rules of the common law, making 
the outcome of a certain case more just for the parties which are involved. As a 
result, new or different property rights may be recognised. Also in legal systems 
where no system of equity exists, frequently the courts have taken the authority to 
alter the menu of property rights. In this respect balancing interests and reaching 
the optimal result is of the utmost importance. 
These open systems or open aspects of a system of property rights invoke 
more criticism, in my view, due to their lower standard of legal certainty, in this 
respect possibly translated as lesser degree of predictability, but they also allow the 
law of property to develop. It is precisely because of this that authors such as Füller, 
Smits, Sagaert and Van Erp present arguments for the development of a more 
flexible property law, in which there is more room for the increasing role of contract 
law in the law of property, the increasing role of property law in the law of contract, 
and for the development of new objects of property law, including claims and other 
intangible objects.565 
However, for the time being, especially in civil law systems, the development 
of property law remains stuck in the Roman law-inspired separation between the 
law of obligations and the law of property and the Roman law-inspired categories 
of property rights. Other legal systems are less rigid when it comes to the effects of 
these distinctions. In a system such as South African law, contractual relations, such 
as the lease, have been allowed to grow into a property relation, whereas rigid civil 
law systems remain behind, struggling with these hybrid legal relations. As this 
Chapter shows, the civil law systems of France, Germany and the Netherlands 
continue to uphold a closed system of property rights based on their own national 
doctrinal arguments. However, when these national doctrinal arguments are com-
 
563 See specifically Chapter 8; 3.4.2. A Limited Open System of Property Rights. 
564 These include ground rules of property law, such as the prior tempore and nemo plus or nemo 
dat rule. On this distinction see Van Erp 2006b, p. 16-17. 
565 These include, e.g., emission rights, see Van Erp 2006a, p. 1065-1066. 
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pared, it seems that they are not strictly national at all. In fact, all of these arguments 
seem based on the post-Revolutionary ideas of a unitary concept of ownership, 
sharply distinguished from lesser property rights that, in their turn, fall into differ-
ent categories. Moreover, these categories are all based on Roman law. Even in 
English law, where it is usually held that the French Revolution never had a direct 
effect, the systematic way of thinking in terms of the relation between primary and 
lesser rights is very much the same as civil law doctrine. The way in which most 
property rights are approached in English law is not very different from the civil 
lawyer’s approach. Numerous examples can be found; rights to use fall into a 
general category of user rights, they either run with the land or they are held in 
gross. Other property rights are security rights, and these are used to secure the 
performance of a certain obligation. Also in English law, the obligation is contrac-
tual and therefore creates personal rights, but the right that secures the performance 
of that obligation is a property right.566 
What is remarkable is that, even though these similarities in approach can be 
seen, the list of property rights in one legal system is different from the list in 
another system. The comparison between the legal systems shows that German law 
has a larger catalogue of property rights than French and Dutch law. Moreover, the 
list of property rights also differs between French and Dutch law. Finally, the list of 
property rights in English law is altogether different because of the separation 
between law and equity and personal property law and land law.  
A likely explanation for these differences can be found in history. As a rejec-
tion of the feudal system, civil law systems introduced the use of one single primary 
right, clearly distinguished from several categories of lesser rights. In English law, 
the system of land law and the system of personal property law each recognise one 
primary right. Because Roman law was never received in English law as it was in 
civil law systems, the feudal concepts were not explained in terms of Roman law 
and no duplex dominium resulted. Civil law systems, in their turn, struggle with the 
relics of the feudal system. For example, neither the French nor the German Civil 
Code included the right of emphyteusis at the moment these entered into force. Later, 
under pressure from practice, this right came to be reintroduced by special 
legislation.567 German law offers another example; in order to make a compromise 
between the north and the south of Germany, the legislator included both the right 
of hypothec and the right of Grundschuld. In other legal systems only the right of 
hypothec is recognised.568  
In other words, in order to understand the differences between the lists of 
property rights in the various legal systems, the historical development of each of 
these systems must be taken into account. Even though the historical development 
of property rights, especially between the civil law systems, is partly a shared his-
tory, the peculiarities of each legal system influence the list of property rights that it 
recognises.  
 
566 Other examples could include the use of a primary right and the carefulness the property law 
system uses to approach lesser property rights in relation to this primary right. 
567 See Chapter 3; 3.4. Emphyteusis. 
568 See Chapter 4; 3.7. Hypothec, and 3.8. Grundschuld. 
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Although these differences between legal systems, both civil law and common 
law, should be taken seriously, in the twenty-first century it is no longer possible to 
consider the systems of property law in Europe from a purely national point of 
view. European legal systems are increasingly confronted with legal relations, and 
therefore also doctrinal choices, from other jurisdictions. When in one legal system 
the courts have recognised a legal relation as a property right, and the object on 
which that property right is created is transported to another legal system, the other 
legal system, the receiving system, will be confronted with a decision it did not 
choose to make itself. In respect of numerus clausus, the principle of property law 
that French, German, Dutch and English law share, these increasing contacts 
between the doctrines of property law and the systems of property rights from these 
various countries mean that the principle of numerus clausus can no longer be con-
sidered from a purely national point of view.569 
 
569 Therefore the final Chapter of this study will pay attention to the principle of numerus clausus 
as a principle of European property law. See Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 8 
NUMERUS CLAUSUS IN A EUROPEAN PROPERTY LAW? 
1. Introduction 
1.1. European Property Law 
In the previous Chapters, numerus clausus has been looked at from the perspective 
of the national legal systems of France (Chapter 3), Germany (Chapter 4), the 
Netherlands (Chapter 5) and England (Chapter 6). In Chapter 7 the divergences and 
similarities between these legal systems, as well as numerus clausus theory in gener-
al, have been examined. One of the findings of the comparative analysis of the legal 
systems discussed in these Chapters is that the national closed systems of property 
rights are under increasing pressure.1 This pressure comes, first of all, from within 
the system of property law, for example, the increasing use of combinations of 
property rights, the stacking of rights, and the increased use of property rights for a 
different purpose than that for which they were originally intended. Furthermore, 
influences from outside the system of property law, but also from within the legal 
system itself, in particular, from contract law, were discussed. 
In this final Chapter, the pressure on the national systems of property law 
from outside the legal system will be central. Although it is not the objective to pro-
vide a complete overview of international property law, some influences of inter-
national law, in particular, its subspecies European law, have such an influence on 
national property law systems that a discussion of the property law systems in 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and England, and in particular in respect of 
numerus clausus in these systems, brings a different view to the nation-based analy-
sis. Moreover, aspects of French, German, Dutch and English law in respect of 
private international law, especially the recognition of property rights created in 
another country, also have an influence on numerus clausus. 
It could be stated that international property law draws attention to aspects of 
numerus clausus that sometimes cannot be clearly seen when the principle is looked 
at from a purely national perspective. This is not only because at a national level 
 
1 See Chapter 7; 4. Conclusion: Numerus Clausus in Property Law Systems in Europe. 
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property law is a doctrinally coherent system, with which many lawyers argue any 
new situation can be solved, but also because, without influences from other legal 
systems, in particular, when different doctrinal arguments are used, some problems 
just do not come up at a national level.  
In a national legal system, numerus clausus filters legal relations and only 
allows a certain set of rights to be recognised as property rights. All other rights are 
consequently personal rights and belong to the law of obligations. When it comes to 
the recognition of foreign property rights, numerus clausus fulfils another filtering 
function; determining whether a legal relation entered into in another country that 
constituted a property right in the originating country can be recognised as a prop-
erty right in the national, host jurisdiction. The result of the application of numerus 
clausus in this respect is different from the result at a purely national level. At a 
national level, a legal relation that is not recognised as belonging to the law of 
property can still be enforced as a personal right. Perhaps it will not be enforceable 
against a third party, but at least the legal relation will still have some effect. In 
contrast, a foreign legal relation that is not recognised by reference to the national 
closed list of property rights cannot be enforced in that jurisdiction. 
Through the increasing development of European rules, national private law, 
including the law of property, is subject to the development of the Internal Market 
in the European Union. As a result of this development, national legal systems are 
no longer strictly national. They also face influences from other national legal sys-
tems, as well as influences from the international legal order, the European Union in 
particular. 
The influence of these external factors creates a separate pressure on numerus 
clausus in the national systems, but it also raises the question of whether the 
approach to property law whereby we look purely at national systems of property 
law is, especially in the light of the increasing influence of the law of the European 
Union, still sufficient to provide a complete overview.2 Instead, the question will be 
raised whether we should not speak of a European property law, as opposed to 
systems of national property law, in which numerus clausus, to use the formulation 
by Van Erp, is a ‘constitutive element’.3 
1.2. Private International Law 
The external pressure on national property law systems is twofold. First, due to an 
increase in international trade, legal systems are increasingly confronted with prop-
erty rights created in another country. When such a situation occurs, national law 
will decide whether a foreign property right should be recognised and what its 
place is within the national property law system. However, recognition of foreign 
property rights is not easy, especially when the nature and the content of the right 
that must be recognised is different from the rights within the closed list that the 
national legal system recognises. In such a case it will be uncertain whether a prop-
 
2 See below; 3.2. The Status of European Property Law. 
3 Van Erp 2003b. 
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erty right can be recognised at all. This decision depends on a special area of nation-
al law, known as private international law.4 This is not necessarily always an effec-
tive system, and parties may lose their property security right through operation of 
a legal system other than the legal system under which the right was created.5  
As a general rule of private international law, many countries recognise the 
doctrine of vested rights or droits acquis.6 Under this doctrine, a country commits 
itself to grant effect to a right created in another country as far as possible. How-
ever, such a foreign right must fit within the national legal system. When the receiv-
ing jurisdiction cannot fit the right into its system, it reserves the right to refuse 
recognition. 
When it comes to property law and property rights, there are situations in 
which it is necessary to determine which law applies to the creation, existence, exer-
cise or destruction of a property right. In terms of property law, the standard rule of 
private international law to determine the applicable law is the situs rule, or lex rei 
sitae. According to this rule it is the law of the place where an object is located that 
applies.7 In respect of immovable objects, the lex rei sitae offers a clear decision on 
the applicable law.8 In terms of movable objects, which can be moved from the 
territory of one country to that of another, the lex rei sitae rule is used here also to 
determine the applicable law. When a property right in respect of an object is valid-
ly created under the law of one country and the object is moved onto the territory of 
another country, and when the property right in respect of that object must be 
exercised, a rule of private international law is needed to determine which of the 
two countries’ laws applies. Such a situation is known in private international terms 
as a conflit mobile.9 
In order to provide a solution, private international law must determine, as 
well as the place where an object is located, also at what time a certain object was in 
a certain place. The element of time allows the national courts to decide with rea-
sonable precision on the applicable law.10 For example, to determine the applicable 
property regime in the case of a sale of goods, the time of the conclusion of the 
contract usually determines the applicable law.11 However, when an object moves to 
another jurisdiction, so do the property rights in respect of that object. In order to 
 
4 The term conflict of laws is also used to describe the national provisions that decide on the 
applicable law. In that sense, the rules of private international law or conflict of law rules do 
not decide on the substantive matter of a specific case, but only result in a substantive 
solution because a certain law applies. 
5 Drobnig mentions Italian cases in which the Italian courts have refused to recognise a right of 
ownership under retention of title or reservation of ownership because the date of the cre-
ation of the retention or reservation had not been certified according to the Italian standards. 
(the data certa-requirement). See Drobnig 2006, p. 110. See also Kieninger 1996b, p. 46-47. 
6 See, e.g., Grodecki 1976, p. 4, Rutgers 1999, p. 93-94, Van der Weide 2006, p. 36, 93-94, 
Michaels 2006b, p. 18 et seq. 
7 Van der Weide 2006, p. 15-19, Rutgers 1999, p. 69-73, Kieninger 1996a, p. 165-167. 
8 See, in particular, Sparkes 2007, p. 439-441. 
9 See Grodecki 1976, p. 33-42, Rutgers 1999, p. 93-94, Kieninger 1996b, p. 47-48, Kieninger 
1996a, p. 30-34. 
10 Van der Weide 2006, p. 46-52. 
11 Van der Weide 2006, p. 51. 
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determine the applicable law on that object, French, German, Dutch and English 
law use the doctrine of transposition. This doctrine uses the lex rei sitae in the strict 
sense of its meaning, according to which, when an object crosses the border of a 
jurisdiction, the law of the receiving jurisdiction governs the rights in respect of that 
object. Depending on the content of the national law, the recognition of a foreign 
property right will be more or less difficult.  
In national systems of property law that adhere to a closed system of property 
rights, a foreign property right cannot be recognised as such. In order for the foreign 
property right to be recognised it must be ‘transformed’ into a property right from 
the national catalogue of property rights.12 In many cases, recognition by way of 
transformation will not lead to problems. After all, as was shown in the previous 
Chapter, most legal systems use the same set of property rights as a basis.13 How-
ever, according to some, automatic transformation when there is no imminent need 
to do so is unnecessary. They argue that only when the property right in respect of 
the object in question is exercised does the need arise to decide on the applicable 
law and, if necessary, for the recognition of a foreign property right.14 
In any case, a situation may arise where the lex rei sitae rule determines that in 
a specific situation the law of the receiving country is applicable, and that, when the 
substantive national property law of that country is applied, in particular when that 
system adheres to a closed system of property rights, a foreign property right will 
be transformed into one of the recognised national types of property rights. The 
result of this transformation will not always be favourable to the holder of the right. 
Even if countries apply a very flexible and pragmatic approach to the recognition of 
foreign rights, the rights granted under the law of the receiving jurisdiction will not 
always be comparable to rights granted under the law of the original jurisdiction. 
There are many examples of holders of, for instance, security rights, who lose their 
rights or part of their rights when their property right is transformed into a proper-
ty right known in the receiving country.15 One example can be offered by looking at 
the Dutch case of Sisal v TNBC.16 In that case, the Dutch courts were confronted with 
the exercise of a floating charge, later a fixed charge, created under Tanzanian law. 
Although the courts were willing to recognise the effects of the floating charge by 
transforming it into a right of non-possessory pledge under Dutch law, the right 
that the holder of a floating charge had under Tanzanian law to appoint a receiver 
could not be granted.17 
Other examples could result from the differences in property law between 
countries. When it comes to reservation of ownership or retention of title clauses, 
some jurisdictions, Germany, for instance, allow parties to agree that the reservation 
 
12 Van der Weide 2006, p. 35-39, Kieninger 1996b, p. 48-49. 
13 On the same conclusion, see Reid 1997b, p. 228. 
14 In case of a ‘crystallisation’ of rights, in German known as Hinnahmetheorie see Grodecki 1976, 
p. 37-38, Van der Weide 2006, p. 3941. 
15 For other examples, see Kieninger 1996b, p. 47-48, Kieninger 1996a, p. 188-206, Drobnig, 
Snijders & Zippro 2006, p. 3 et seq. 
16 HR 14 December 2001, NJ 2002, 241 (Sisal/TNBC). 
17 See Van der Weide 2006, p. 68-69. 
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of ownership will extend to a newly formed object, formed with the object on which 
a reservation of ownership clause was held.18 When, subsequently, such an object is 
transported to another country that does not recognise such an extension of the 
reservation of ownership clause, such as the Netherlands, the security owner will 
lose his right in the transformation process.19 
To facilitate an effective trade between countries and to prevent certain prop-
erty rights not being recognised, several international initiatives have been taken. In 
the area of security rights, in respect of highly valuable objects, for example, trains, 
ships and aeroplanes, international agreements have been reached under which a 
‘security interest’ can be created and registered that will subsequently be recognised 
in all legal systems of the Contracting Parties.20 Another, very interesting, example 
is the Hague Convention on the Law Relating to Trusts and their Recognition. 
Under this convention, which has already been dealt with briefly in Chapter 5 on 
Dutch law, trusts created under a foreign jurisdiction are recognised by all Contract-
ing Parties.21 In Dutch law, the ratification and entry into force of the convention has 
not led to remarkable results. In Italy, however, the recognition of trusts under this 
convention has led to the creation of a trust known as domestic trust, not only open 
to foreigners under the convention, but also to Italian nationals.22  
This Italian example, although outside the scope of this study, illustrates how 
private international law can, under certain circumstances, lead to a change in sub-
stantive national law, including property law. The pressure from foreign jurisdic-
tions on national law, in particular, as a result of the recognition of foreign property 
rights under the rules of private international law, is therefore to be taken seriously. 
Besides the applicable law, international agreement has also been reached in 
matters concerning jurisdiction. On a European Union level, the Brussels – I 
Regulation has resolved questions of jurisdiction.23 Article 22 of the Regulation 
states that regardless of domicile of the parties to a dispute, the courts of the legal 
system in which ‘rights in rem in immovable property’ or ‘tenancies in immovable 
property’ are situated have jurisdiction. Under these rules, therefore, jurisdiction 
also follows the lex rei sitae rule.24 
 
18 On German law and reservation of ownership, see Chapter 4; 2.5. Security Ownership. 
19 See Kieninger 1996a, p. 207-208, Van der Weide 2006, p. 90-93. 
20 Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, see, inter alia, Goode 
2002, p. 3 et seq., Van Erp 2004a, p. 91 et seq., Van der Weide 2006, p. 72-81. 
21 See Chapter 5; 4.9. EC and International Influences. 
22 See Graziadei 2002b, p. 317 et seq., Lupoi 2005, p. 10 et seq., Braun 2006, p 795 et seq. 
23 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels – I).  
24 Art. 22 of the Brussels – I Regulation was preceded Art. 16 of the Brussels Convention on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matter, a treaty 
between the original six Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC), to 
which new Member States acceded. Therefore, at the moment of creation of the Convention, 
no English term for property relation in respect to an immovable object was needed. Only 
when the United Kingdom became party to the EEC in 1973 (1 January 1973) and to the 
Convention in 1978 (9 October 1978), an English translation was needed. Eventually, the term 
‘rights in rem in immovable property’ was settled on. The term ‘in rem’ can sometimes lead 
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1.3. European Union Law 
A second influence comes from the legal order created by the European Union, to 
establish and maintain an internal market in which there is free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital.25 Under the policy of the accomplishment of the 
internal market, the European Union’s institutions, in particular the European 
Commission, have taken various legislative measures, harmonising areas of former 
national law, so as to ensure a better movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital.26 
In the spheres of private law, which in this respect are rules that can have an 
effect on the functioning of the Internal Market, in particular, the attempts of the 
Commission to harmonise contract law have already been mentioned in the intro-
duction of Chapter 7 above.27 The harmonisation of private law has been part of the 
European Union’s general agenda for some time. In the Tampere programme of the 
European Council, the convergence of private law systems in the area of the 
European Union was mentioned as one of the three main areas in which the EU 
would stay active.28 However, at the same time, in the area of property law the 
European Union has been much more restrictive, sometimes excluding property 
aspects as much as possible, as in case of the Directive on time-share agreements, 
where this property law concept is reduced to rules on information duties on a 
contractual level.29 
Nevertheless, from the very beginning, the European Commission has includ-
ed some property concepts in its attempts to harmonise contract law. In particular 
in the area of property security rights, ‘credit securities’ in the words of the official 
Commission communications, the Commission seems always to have been willing 
to consider including these in its programme for harmonisation.30 Recently, a study 
 
to difficulties. See e.g. Case C-294/92 Webb v Webb [1994] ECR I-467 in which the European 
Court of Justice held Art. 16 of the Brussels Convention did not apply to an action declaring 
an immovable object was held on trust. 
25 See Arts. 28, 39, 43 and 56 EC. 
26 Barnard 2007, p. 3. 
27 See Chapter 7; 1. Introduction. See also Rutgers 2006, p. 217 et seq. and Weatherhill 2005,  
p. 405 et seq. 
28 Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, <http://www. 
europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm>. See Israël & Saarloos 2007, p. 669-
670. 
29 In this respect Chalmers, Hadjiemmanuil, Monti and Tomkins are mistaken when they state 
that the European Union has created its own system of property rights in the course of the 
creation of the Internal Market. Chalmers et al. 2006, p. 470. See Directive 94/47/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 1994 on the protection of purchasers in 
respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable 
properties on a timeshare basis. See also the newly proposed Directive on the protection of 
consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday products, resale and 
exchange of the European Commission of 7 June 2007, 2007/0113 (COD). See also Kieninger 
2007, p. 187-188. 
30 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
European Contract Law, Com(2001) 398 final, No. 13. See Rutgers 2006, p. 218. 
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has been published by Von Bar and Drobnig, at the invitation of the Commission, 
on the effects of harmonisation of contract law on the areas of property law and un-
just enrichment, rules on transfer of movables, on property security rights in respect 
of movables, and on rules on trust. The results of this study show that these areas of 
property law would be seriously affected in the event that contract law were to be 
harmonised.31 In the project of the Commission to create a Common Frame of 
Reference (CFR), a toolbox of rules on the harmonisation of European contract law, 
these areas of property law are now included.32 
Apart from these ‘positive’ harmonisation efforts, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) has made use of the EC Treaty provisions, which are all formulated in 
the form of a prohibition, to declare provisions of national law inapplicable when 
they form an obstacle to one or more of the ‘four freedoms’.33 This ‘negative’ harmo-
nisation of national law was originally most visible in the area of free movement of 
goods, but was also used analogously with regard to the other freedoms; the free 
movement of persons, services, and capital.34 From the line of jurisprudence of the 
ECJ, some cases have become well known, such as Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon 
and, for instance, in the sphere of free movement of persons, Bosman.35 
In the initial phase of European integration, many national provisions discrim-
inated on the grounds of country of origin or on the grounds of nationality. It was, 
at first, against these provisions that the ECJ took action by prohibiting what are 
known as distinctly applicable rules. Examples of these are a rule that would only 
apply to foreign products, or a rule that required imported products to fulfil higher 
standards than domestic products.36 However, soon after the start of this line of 
jurisprudence, the Court extended its case law to national provisions applying in-
distinctly, regardless of the country of origin or nationality, but which still have an 
effect on the trade within the internal market. It is especially the case law on these 
indistinctly applicable rules that is of relevance to European private law today.37 In 
short, under the case law of the ECJ, Member States can be forced to recognise a 
product that was lawfully produced in another Member State under the principle 
that has become known as ‘mutual recognition’. In particular, in situations where an 
object, to stay within the definitions of the free movement of goods, has been subject 
 
31 Von Bar & Drobnig 2002. On this study see, inter alia, Drobnig, Snijders & Zippro 2006, p 3 et 
seq., Rutgers 2006, p. 221. 
32 See <http://www.sgecc.com>. On the applicability of such proposals to property law, see 
Sparkes 2007, p. 523-524. 
33 On these forms of harmonisation, see Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 604-606. On the effects of the 
freedoms on private law, see Israël 2005, p. 106 et seq. 
34 Barnard 2007, p. 10-11. On negative harmonisation or negative integration see Case 15/81 
Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Roosendaal [1982] 
ECR 1409, Para. 33. 
35 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649, Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge 
des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921, [1996] 1 CMLR 
645. 
36 E.g., Case 251/87 Firma Denkavit Futtermiteel GmbH v Minister für Ernährung [1979] ECR 3369, 
Case C-320/93 Lucien Ortscheid GmbH v Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel GmbH [1994] ECR I-5243. 
37 Israël & Saarloos 2007, p. 649-650, Joerges 1997, p. 381. 
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to rules and requirements in one Member State, another Member State under this 
principle of mutual recognition is not allowed to impose another set of rules with 
the same aim or purpose, known as a double burden.38 
In other words, besides the national rules on the recognition of objects – 
known as goods in European law terminology – that originate in other countries, 
and rights in respect of these objects, European Law, in particular Internal Market 
law, applies when there is a European Community dimension to the case. National 
rules of private international law on recognition are therefore also subject to the 
scrutiny of the Court.39 In this respect, the rules of private international law are also 
subject to what might be called EC-private international law, which is sometimes 
based on principles other than the private international law system of some of the 
Member States.40  
National property law, especially numerus clausus, is therefore under increas-
ing pressure to facilitate the development of the Internal Market in the European 
Union. National rules of a Member State stating that national law applies when an 
object is situated in that territory, known as the lex rei sitae rule, are closely watched 
by the European Court of Justice.41 It might very well be that the application of the 
lex rei sitae rule in some instances will be contrary to EC law, making national 
property law, and thus the national numerus clausus, inapplicable.42 It is with this 
European pressure that this Chapter is concerned. The next section will therefore 
deal with EC Internal Market law and its influence on private law in more detail.43 
After that, some conclusions for property law will be drawn and numerus clausus is 
visited once more to see if it could play a role in the development of a European 
property law, and if so, what that role might be.44 
2. The European Union and the Need for a European Property Law 
Of all the external influences on the national property law systems, and on numerus 
clausus specifically, the European influence is the broadest, but at the same time 
most challenging, influence. The focus on the law of the European Union, in partic-
ular the law of the European Community (EC Law) is relevant because of the active 
roles that both the European Commission as a legislator, in the case of positive 
harmonisation, and the European Court of Justice, in the case of negative harmoni-
sation, have played in the achievement of the Internal Market by breaking down 
barriers to trade. 
The active involvement of the European Community (EC), as was already 
mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, has not only included public law, but 
 
38 See Kieninger 1996a, p. 181-183. 
39 See Israël & Saarloos 2007, p. 629-631, 649. 
40 Israël & Saarloos 2007, p. 656-658, Michaels 2006b, p. 18 et seq., Basedow 2007, p. 172 et seq. 
41 See Israël & Saarloos 2007, p. 649-652. 
42 Kieninger 2006, p. 166, Basedow 1995, p. 44, Kieninger 1996a, p. 122 et seq., Rutgers 1999,  
p. 167 et seq., Roth 1999, p. 40 et seq. 
43 See below; 2. The European Union and the Need for a European Property Law. 
44 See below; 3. The Making of European Property Law. 
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also private law, lately in particular in the area of company law dealing with the 
freedom of establishment.45 Although the ‘core areas’ of private law, especially con-
tract law, tort law and property law as a whole, have been left alone for the most 
part, at least the legal environment in which private law functions has changed with 
the rise and development of the Internal Market.46 Undoubtedly, this ‘Europeani-
sation’ has an effect on the way in which national private law functions, including 
scrutiny by the EU’s Institutions of the national performance in respect to the 
functioning of the Internal Market. 
In order to understand and fully appreciate the European efforts and their 
effect on private law, some basics on the law of the European Communities are 
needed. This section will therefore deal first with general EC law in respect to 
private law, from contract law to company law, after which some more specifics of 
European law, in particular the case law of the ECJ, can be discussed. Finally, but 
most importantly for this study, these aspects of EC law will be applied to the law 
of property. 
2.1. EC Private Law 
Within the legal order of the European Union, there are various sources of law that 
affect private law. Moreover, there are also initiatives towards law making by the 
European Union’s Institutions, in particular the European Commission, that deserve 
to be mentioned as they are likely to end up as a form of either primary or secon-
dary Community law. Following the general hierarchy of sources, first the EC 
Treaty as the primary source of Community private law, in particular property law, 
is briefly dealt with. After that some secondary legislation in the area of private law 
will be mentioned. As will be seen, there is an unavoidable connection between the 
primary and secondary legal framework. This is primarily because some secondary 
Community law requires a legal basis in a primary legal instrument. In describing 
these sources of law, the focus will be on legislative efforts in the area of property 
law as much as possible. 
2.1.1. Legal Framework: Primary Community Law 
The Treaty establishing the European Community, the EC Treaty, set as the objec-
tive of the Community the creation of an Internal Market in which there is free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital.47 These four areas in which free 
movement is ensured in the Treaty are known as the four freedoms.48 
 
45 Joerges 1997, p. 382. 
46 See Joerges 1997, p. 382 et seq., Van Erp 2006b, p. 5-7.  
47 Arts. 2 and 3(1)(C) EC. Art. 2 EC uses the term single market, whereas Art. 3 EC uses the term 
Internal Market. It seems however, that there is no real difference between these two terms. 
On this terminological issue see Barnard 2007, p. 10-12, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 6-7. In the 
new Treaty Art. 2 and 3(1) EC Treaty have been repealed and replaced, although slightly 
amended, in Art. 3 TFEU. 
48 Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 605-606, Barnard 2007, p. 3. 
 498 
Numerus Clausus in a European Property Law? 
When it comes to primary Community law, and its effect on private law espe-
cially, the EC Treaty is of relevance.49 In the system of European law, the European 
Union needs a legal basis in the Treaty to be able to legislate. In many subject areas 
there are specific provisions that have been included over the years to give the 
European Union more competences. Examples of these include Article 174 EC 
Treaty on environmental protection and Article 153 EC Treaty on consumer protec-
tion. At this moment, the EC Treaty is subject to reform. Although this reform is 
primarily focused on reforming the structure of the EU and its Institutions, the 
reformed Treaty, known as the Lisbon Treaty, also reforms the substantive articles 
in the EC Treaty, affecting the legal basis for Community legislation.50 The new 
articles in the EC Treaty will also be dealt with. 
No specific provisions have been included to harmonise private law. How-
ever, the EC Treaty provides some general provisions that can and have been used 
as a legal basis for private law harmonising measures. In this respect three articles 
in the EC Treaty should be considered.  
First, Article 94 EC Treaty provides a general basis for legislative measures 
harmonising law when the Internal Market is concerned: 
‘The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue 
directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions 
of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common 
market’.51 
Although Article 94 offers a general basis for the harmonisation of private law when 
it comes to the functioning of the Internal Market, the requirement of unanimity in 
the Council provides a major obstacle. Moreover, Article 94 only offers the possibili-
ty to draft a Directive, which can sometimes be problematic.52  
Article 95 EC Treaty also allows the EU to legislate in order to promote the 
establishment or functioning of the Internal Market, but does not require un-
animity.53 This Article states: 
‘1. By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in this 
Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set 
out in Article 14. The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to 
 
49 There is another Treaty in respect to the European Union, i.e. the Treaty on European Union 
or EU Treaty. 
50 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. On the process towards the making of this Treaty see Craig & De 
Búrca 2007, p. 31-36. 
51 Again, this Article uses a different term to describe the Internal Market. Like the term single 
market that was shortly dealt with above in respect to Art. 2 EC, the term common market 
probably also synonym for the Internal Market. See Barnard 2007, p. 10-12. 
52 E.g., in case of an optional instrument of European Contract law, a Directive cannot offer the 
desired 28th regime. See Hesselink, Rutgers & de Booys 2007, p. 58-59. 
53 See Rutgers 2005, p. 145 et seq., Smits 2007, p. 282-285, Hesselink, Rutgers & de Booys 2007,  
p. 44 et seq. 
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in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market’. 
This Article especially has been used to issue Directives in the area of private law, 
contract law in particular.54 The reference to Article 14 EC Treaty, which refers to 
the progressive establishment of the Internal Market, allows room to include private 
law. For many years Article 95 was used with a statement in the preamble of 
Regulations and Directives that differences in private law between the Member 
States led to an obstacle to the functioning of the Internal Market.55 However, as 
Weatherhill states, there have been two principal objections to this assumption. 
First, the connection between the diversity of law and market fragmentation, more 
specifically the functioning of the Internal Market, has not always been shown.56 
Second, even when the need for harmonisation based on the first assumption has 
been shown, the question remains whether that is enough to justify the adoption of 
the measure.57 
The European Court of Justice, in the Tobacco Advertising case, has addressed 
the first point.58 When confronted with Directive 98/43, based on Article 100a, now 
Article 95 EC Treaty, on the advertising of tobacco products, the Court was asked to 
rule on the use of Article 95 as a legal basis. It stated in this respect: 
‘Those provisions, read together, make it clear that the measures referred to in Article 
100a(1) of the Treaty are intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. To construe that article as meaning that it vests in 
the Community legislature a general power to regulate the internal market would not 
only be contrary to the express wording of the provisions cited above but would also 
be incompatible with the principle embodied in Article 3b of the EC Treaty (now 
Article 5 EC) that the powers of the Community are limited to those specifically 
conferred on it’.59 
As Weatherhill explains, the Court made very clear that the Treaty does not provide 
the European legislature with a competence to harmonise per se, but forces the legis-
lature to show that an act of European law will make a contribution to the establish-
 
54 See Weatherhill 2005, p. 411, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 615-620. Moreover, this is also the 
Article that the Commission intents to use to create the horizontal instrument or horizontal 
directive in the area of EC Consumer Law. See Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions – Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2008, COM(2007) 
640, p. 28. 
55 Weatherhill 2006, p. 136. See also Case 15/81 Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v Inspecteur 
der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Roosendaal [1982] ECR 1409. 
56 Weatherhill 2006, p. 137, Van Erp 2006b, p. 12. 
57 Weatherhill 2006, p. 137. 
58 Case C-276/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419. Weatherhill 2005, p. 412-
413. 
59 Case C-276/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, Para. 83. 
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ment and functioning of the internal market.60 In order to harmonise private law, 
therefore, the Community legislature must not only show divergences between the 
various national legal systems, but must also show that these divergences lead to an 
obstacle to the functioning of the Internal Market.61 
A third Article on which the European legislature could legislate in the area of 
private law is Article 308 EC Treaty. This Article states: 
‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, 
take the appropriate measures’. 
Article 308 EC is one of the final Articles in the EC Treaty, offering last resort for the 
European legislature seeking a legal basis for a measure of European law. As in the 
case of Article 94 EC Treaty, unanimity in the Council is required.62 The legislative 
procedure of a measure adopted under Article 308 is different from the co-decision 
procedure that is followed under Article 95, however. Article 308 only calls for con-
sultation of the European Parliament, thus lowering the democratic legitimacy of a 
measure adopted.63 
2.1.2. Legal Framework: Secondary Community Law 
When it comes to secondary Community private law, which mainly comprises 
Regulations and Directives, the EU has been mainly active in the field of contract 
law.64 Examples of legislation issued in European contract law are the Directive on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts, the Directive on distance selling and the Direc-
tive on time-share agreements.65 All of these, although sometimes the name sug-
gests otherwise, as in the case of time-shares, deal specifically with issues of contract 
law. 
In the field of property law, the Commission has been much more restrictive, 
but has, since 1993, carefully touched upon some property law aspects. Usually, 
these property law aspects are dealt with in the context of a very specific issue. 
However, as property law and, in particular, the system of property rights is based 
 
60 Weatherhill 2006, p. 138-139, see also Rutgers 2005, p. 157-158, Van Erp 2006b, p. 12. 
61 In this sense the requirement on the legislator can be compared to the requirement of an 
individual claiming infringement of a national measure under Article 28 EC. On this see 
below; 2.2.1. Free Movement of Goods. See also Hesselink, Rutgers & de Booys 2007, p. 52 et 
seq. 
62 Weatherhill 2005, p. 415, 417-418. 
63 See on this last point of democratic legitimacy Hesselink, Rutgers & de Booys 2007, p. 59-65. 
In the new Treaty the requirement will not be consultation with the European Parliament, but 
consent of the European Parliament. 
64 On Regulations and Directives see Art. 249 EC. 
65 Directives 93/13 (Unfair Terms), 97/7 (Distance Selling), 94/47 (Timeshare). See also below; 
2.1.3. European Commission Initiatives for Future Legislation. The vast majority of these 
Directives are based on Art. 95 EC as a legal basis. 
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on coherence and systematic application of property rights to all possible cases, the 
introduction of a specific European type of property right will usually, because of 
the coherent nature of the national property law systems implementing European 
legislation, lead to a change of the current national property law as a whole. 
The best example of this is provided by the Directive on late payments.66 In 
this Directive, the European Parliament and the Council specifically wanted to deal 
with late payments and non-payments in commercial transactions. Because of that, 
the Directive focuses on resolving diverging contractual payment periods in the 
Member States.67 As a part of combatting the problem of late payments, the 
Parliament and the Council emphasise that creditors should have the possibility to 
strengthen their position by making use of a retention of title or reservation of 
ownership clause.68 The legislature leaves open what exactly the effects of a reten-
tion of title clause would be when it defines such a clause in Article 1 of the 
Directive as ‘the contractual agreement according to which the seller retains his title 
to the goods in question until the price has been paid in full’.69 Article 4 of the 
Directive obliges the Member States to ensure that a retention of title clause is 
recognised in their national law, and that a retention of title clause made in con-
formity with national law of one of the Member States shall be given effect.70 More-
over, the Insolvency Regulation also deals with retention of title.71 In Article 7, the 
Regulation deals with ‘reservation of title’, a different term than the term used in 
the Directive on late payments. Article 7 of the Regulation attempts to ensure that 
the commencement of insolvency proceedings against a buyer who has made a 
reservation of title agreement does not affect the validity of the reservation of title. 
Furthermore, the commencement of insolvency proceedings against the seller who 
has made a reservation of title agreement does not constitute a ground for rescind-
ing that agreement.72 Although the Directive on late payments and the Insolvency 
Regulation do not create a European right of retention of title, they do attempt to 
ensure effective use of retention of title clauses throughout the Internal Market.73 
The inclusion of property law in a Directive on contract law shows the willingness 
of the EU to deal with matters of property law when they have an effect on the func-
tioning of the Internal Market. 
Another area of property law in which the European legislature has been 
active is the protection of cultural objects.74 In a Directive of 1993, the Council pro-
 
66 Directive 2000/35 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on com-
bating late payment in commercial transactions. 
67 Directive 2000/35, Preamble Paras. 8-10. 
68 Directive 2000/35, Preamble Para. 21. 
69 Art. 1(3) Directive 2000/35/EC. On the tension between the contractual aspects and the 
proprietary aspects of a retention of title clause see Rutgers 1999, p. 167. 
70 Art. 4 Directive 2000/35. 
71 Council Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May on insolvency proceedings. 
72 Art. 7 Council Regulation 1346/2000. See e.g. Remien 2005, p. 2, Van Erp 2006b, p. 8. 
73 See also Sagaert 2007, p. 316-321. 
74 See Biondi 1997, p. 1173 et seq. 
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vided rules on prescription periods and rules of third-party protection.75 Although 
the topic of this Directive is very specific, the results of its application have a serious 
impact on national property law systems. Rules of third-party protection and pre-
scription, which are key concepts of property law, can be set aside in order to 
ensure the return of a stolen or lost cultural object.76  
In environmental law, the Parliament and the Council have issued a Directive 
on emission rights, the tradable right to produce a certain amount of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) in the air.77 As a result, new objects of property law are created to which a 
new regime, ensured by the Directive, applies.78 The specific nature of emission 
rights in the Directive forced some national property law systems, such as the 
Netherlands, to adopt an abstract transfer system, which is a system in which 
invalidity of the underlying agreement does not automatically lead to invalidity of 
the transfer.79 In other words, as a result of the Directive, systems adhering to a 
different model of transfer were forced to adapt their law, at least in respect of 
emission trading.80 
Recently Sparkes has focused attention on rules of secondary EC Law that 
have an effect on immovable objects.81 These include environmental concerns, such 
as the energy performance of buildings, but also rules on competition law and state 
aid, that have an effect on how a market in immovable objects is organised.82 Espe-
cially in respect to immovables there is a growing body of European Community 
legislation that does not explicitly deal with these objects, but which nevertheless 
has an effect on them.83 Possibly the clearest example of this is offered through the 
development of a European family law.84 For example, in respect of marriage and 
the law applicable to marriage and divorce, property law questions in respect to 
immovables, especially matrimonial homes, are very important.85 Moreover, also in 
 
75 Directive 93/7/EEC of the Council on of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects 
unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State. On this Directive see Salomons 
2002, Van der Weide 2006, p. 9. 
76 See e.g. Arts. 2, 4 and 12 Directive 93/7/EEC. 
77 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 2003 estab-
lishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. 
78 On this Directive see, inter alia, Van Erp 2004c, p. 539-540, Van Erp 2006a, p. 1065-1066. 
79 See Van Erp 2006a, p. 1066. 
80 Van Erp 2006a, p. 1065-1066. 
81 Sparkes 2007, p. 130-137. 
82 See, inter alia, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council estab-
lishing a framework for the protection of soil and amending Directive 2004/35/EC COM 
(2006) 232 final, Directive 2002/91/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Energy Performance of Buildings, Council Regulation 1184/2006/EC applying certain rules 
of competition to the production of, and trade in, agricultural products. Sparkes 2007, p. 130-
137. 
83 Sparkes 2007, p. 153. This, according to Sparkes, also includes EC Consumer protection rules. 
See Sparkes 2007, p. 191 et seq. 
84 Sparkes 2007, p. 475 et seq. 
85 See Green Paper on the Conflict of Law Matters concerning matrimonial property regimes, 
including the question of jurisdiction and mutual recognition, Brussels 17 July 2006, Me-
mo/06/288, Regulation 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
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respect to succession law, similar questions arise. In this respect also the European 
legislature is becoming active.86 
Finally, and most importantly, in 2002 the European Parliament and the 
Council adopted a directive on financial collateral arrangements.87 In this Directive, 
a security right in respect of cash or financial instruments, and the possibility to 
transfer title in such cash or financial instruments for security purposes, is created 
throughout the Internal Market.88 Regardless of the rules on national property law, 
the Directive on financial collateral establishes a new regime, to which different 
rules apply. These new rules include the possibility of a lex commissoria and the pos-
sibility of a transfer of ownership for security purposes with, from a civil law point 
of view, all its problems of fragmentation of ownership.89 As a result, Member 
States that did not recognise a transfer of ownership for security purposes, either in 
the form of a repurchase agreement or as a transfer under condition, will now be 
forced to recognise such a transfer in respect of the applicability of the Directive.90 
Member States that hitherto did not allow a lex commissoria will be forced to recog-
nise this possibility, at least for those transactions falling under the Directive.91  
The Directive on financial collateral arrangements has forced Member States 
either to reform their currently existing property rights, or to adopt new, additional, 
property rights. The entry into force of the Directive therefore directly affects the 
closed system of property rights in the national property laws of the Member States. 
Those systems that have created a new type of security right by implementation of 
the Directive, for instance, a special right of pledge, have added one more property 
right to the menu of national property rights. Those systems that have chosen to 
change the existing provisions have, under the influence of European law, changed 
the contents of the already existing menu of national property rights. In any of these 
cases, the effect of European law, and the problems its effect may create for national 
property law systems, has become clearly visible. 
2.1.3. European Commission Initiatives for Future Legislation 
Apart from the currently existing legislation, both primary and secondary, that has 
an effect on property law, there are several European Commission initiatives on 
legislation or investigation into possibilities to prepare legislation that will have an 
 
a European Small Claims Procedure, Art. 2(2)(b), Green Paper on Applicable Law and Juris-
diction in Divorce Matters (Rome III), COM(2005), 82 final. 
86 Green Paper on Succession and Wills COM(2005) 65 final. See Sparkes 2007, p. 493-499. 
87 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial 
collateral arrangements. See Sagaert 2007, p. 321-327, Kieninger 2007, p. 195-197. 
88 Art. 1(4)(a), 5, and 6 Directive 2002/47/EC. See Van Vliet 2005, p. 190 et seq. 
89 On the problems of implementation of the Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive see, 
inter alia, Van Erp 2004c, Keijser 2004,Van Erp 2004d, Van Erp 2005, Van Vliet 2005. 
90 In terms of the Member States included in this study this in particular applies to the 
Netherlands. 
91 In 2006 the French reforms introduced the general possibility of a lex commissoria. Other 
Member States have not and are forced to deal with it in terms of transactions falling under 
the Directive. 
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effect on property law. These initiatives are relevant not only because they are likely 
to change the substance of property law, also property law at a national level, but 
also because their adoption would result in the European Union becoming active in 
the field of property law. When this happens, not only the specific legislation but 
also the full body of European law methodology and legal thinking will become 
applicable to aspects of, property law. This European methodology includes the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and its exclusive competence to 
interpret EU law through answering preliminary questions submitted by national 
courts.92 The European legal thinking includes the impressive line of case law of the 
European Court of Justice in respect of the four freedoms, in particular, the free 
movement of goods which might apply to property law as well. In this line of 
reasoning, traditional distinctions between public law and private law play a less 
important role, as the European legal thinking does not follow the traditional 
national distinctions between private and public law. Instead, the effects of national 
law on the functioning of the internal market are central.93 
Before going into these aspects of the case law of the European Court of 
Justice, some Commission initiatives should be examined. Because these initiatives 
do not yet have the force of legislation, and some of them do not directly, but only 
indirectly, affect property law, they will only be dealt with briefly. 
With the publication of the European Commission’s action plan in 2001 on a 
more coherent European Contract law, the work on a Common Frame of Reference 
was begun.94 Led by the Directorate General (DG) on Consumer Affairs, the 
Commission is undertaking a revision of the currently existing consumer contract 
law, also known as the consumer acquis.95 In terms used by the Commission, and 
therefore in the terms of European law that does not concern itself specifically with 
the traditional distinction between private law and public law, the consumer acquis 
is part of EC consumer law.96 EC consumer law, however, is, in content, restricted 
largely to contract law.  
That is not to say that the Commission is not aware of the traditional dis-
tinctions used in the Member States and does not investigate whether other areas of 
private law should also be included. In 2002 the Commission published a study on 
the effects of harmonisation of contract law on other areas of private law, in particu-
lar tort and property law.97 The results of this study include the conclusion that 
some areas of property law are affected so much by contract law, that they should at 
least be included in the academic research that is at the foundation of this EU 
 
92 See Art. 234 EC. 
93 See e.g. Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. 
94 Action plan 2001, COM(2001) 98. 
95 The term acquis is derived from the term acquis communautaire, the term that is used in Euro-
pean law to describe those legislative instruments that have been created and have entered 
into force thus far.  
96 The use of the term EC Consumer Law has led to some problems of understanding with 
national contract lawyers. For a discussion of the terms and their relation see, inter alia, 
Schuze 2005, p. 17 et seq. 
97 Von Bar & Drobnig 2002. 
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legislative project.98 These areas of property law include the transfer of movables, 
security rights in movables, and trusts.99 
The exact political, and therefore also future legal, status of the Common 
Frame of Reference is unknown at the time of writing. Two major research projects 
are being conducted at the same time to prepare its contents. Under the presidency 
of Professor Von Bar, the Study Group on a European Civil Code is working on a 
set of principles based on the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) but with 
added new insights and, of importance to this study, the abovementioned aspects of 
property law.100 At the same time, under the co-ordination of Professor Schulte-
Nölke, another group of legal scholars, called the Acquis Group, is working on a 
review of the existing consumer law acquis.101 This consumer acquis, for the purposes 
of the research conducted by this group, comprises eight Directives.102 The result of 
the study provides an overview on how these eight Directives have been imple-
mented in the different Member States, and concludes that there is an increasing 
need for more legislative measures.103 In line with its consumer policy and expecting 
the results of the study of the Acquis Group, the Commission proposes to adopt a 
horizontal instrument in the form of a Directive.104 With a horizontal instrument the 
EU intends to harmonise aspects of EC consumer law with a single legal instrument, 
replacing the currently existing fragmentary legislation.105 
Because the nature of the work of the Acquis Group is restricted to the existing 
acquis, the group is not directly confronted with property law.106 Nevertheless, the 
group does make proposals affecting general contract law, which, according to the 
results of the Commission study mentioned above, could have an impact on prop-
erty law as well.107 
 
98 Von Bar & Drobnig 2002, Nos. 730-736, p. 442-444. 
99 In particular in the area of security rights there have been voices for many years to come to 
more European legislation. See, inter alia, Kreuzer 1999, Kieninger 1996b, p. 41 et seq., 
Drobnig, Snijders & Zippro 2006, p. 3 et seq. 
100 See <http://www.sgecc.com and www.copecl.org>. 
101 The group is headed by Prof. Gianmaria Ajani. On the work of the Acquis Group see Schulze 
2007, p. 130 et seq. The first results of this group were published in 2007. See Acquis Group 
2007, p. IX et seq. 
102 Directives 85/577 (Doorstep-selling), 90/314 (Package Travel), 93/13 (Unfair Terms), 94/47 
(Timeshare), 97/7 (Distance Selling), 98/6 (Price Indication), 98/27 (Injunctions) and 99/44 
(Consumer Sales). See also <http://www.eu-consumer-law.org>. 
103 In particular a horizontal instrument. Schulte-Nölke, Twigg-Flesner & Elbers 2007, p. 746. See 
also Briefing Note: Review of the Consumer Acquis, (IP/A/IMCO/FWC/2006-168/C4/SC1), 
PE 385.641 EN, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/imco/studies/ 
0705_consumeracquis_en.pdf>. 
104 Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, 8 February 2007, COM(2006) 744 final,  
p. 8. 
105 Smits 2007, p. 285-289. 
106 Although the Acquis Group has taken a somewhat wider view on what exactly should be in 
the acquis. See Jansen & Zimmermann 2007, p. 1113 et seq., Acquis Group 2007, p. XXIII et seq. 
107 Von Bar & Drobnig 2002. For a critical view on the initial results of the Acquis Group see 
Jansen & Zimmermann 2007, p. 1113-1115. 
 506 
Numerus Clausus in a European Property Law? 
The work of the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Acquis Group 
resulted in the publication of a first draft of the Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR), known as the ‘academic CFR’, at the end of 2007. Another version of the 
DCFR is expected to be published in 2008. The academic CFR was presented to the 
Commission, and from this the Commission will have to make a selection in order 
to compose a horizontal instrument in the field of EC consumer contract law.108  
A second field in which the Commission is active is in the field of financial 
services.109 When it comes to property law, the mortgage market in particular is of 
relevance. In this area, the European Commission has made several initiatives in the 
past, but has most recently published a Green Paper and a White Paper, which will 
now be discussed in turn.110 In the Green Paper, the European Commission, as part 
of the improvement of the Internal Market, in particular of the Lisbon criteria to 
enhance the competitiveness of the EU, considers that intervention in the mortgage 
market by creating a European right of mortgage or right of hypothec would con-
tribute to the economic growth in Europe, and solve many problems of cross-border 
financing.111 In order to investigate the possibilities and possible threats of a 
potential Commission intervention in the national legal systems, the Commission 
commissioned an out-sourced study. This study showed a real need for European 
legislation in this field.112 Already the Commission’s early proposals and the results 
of this study show that there are two aspects to the European mortgage market.113  
Firstly, there is the perspective of the consumer, the primary mortgage market. 
Market research results show that in 2004 only 1% of all transactions in immovables 
in the European Union concerned a cross-border sale of immovable objects.114 In this 
respect, in particular, to increase cross-border mortgage lending, the Commission is 
investigating possibilities for a more flexible, consumer-friendly type of mortgage, 
 
108 At the end of 2007 it was unclear what exactly the Commission considers a horizontal instru-
ment and what will be its legal status. In the Commission Working Programme 2008, there is 
mention of a Consumer Contract Law Directive as a legal instrument. See Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Commission Legislative and Work 
Programme 2008 COM(2007) 640 final, p. 28. 
109 See Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010) COM(2005) 177, p. 12. Communica-
tion from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions A Single Market for 21st Century 
Europe COM(2007) 724 final. Remien 2005, p. 12-14. 
110 Green Paper Mortgage Credit in the EU COM(2005) 237 final. White Paper on Mortgage 
Credit Markets COM(2007) 807 final. 
111 The terminology of European law in this respect is restricted to the term mortgage, although 
of course also rights of hypothec, and even Grundschuld, are considered to be included. As a 
result of possible legislation in this field, the term Mortgage will become a concept of EU law, 
i.e., a term to which European law gives its own meaning and to which the European Court 
of Justice has exclusive authority of interpretation. See Art. 234 EC. Green Paper Mortgage 
Credit in the EU COM(2005) 237 final, p. 3-4. See Sparkes 2007, p. 379-380, 396-397. 
112 London Economics 2005, p. 105-107, see also Mortgage Credit Funding Group 2004, p. 47. 
113 On the development see also Sparkes 2007, p. 397-398. 
114 European Opinion Research Group 2004, p. 58. Green Paper Mortgage Credit in the EU 
COM(2005) 237 final, p. 5. 
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known as a right of Euro-mortgage. This includes abstract mortgages, which are 
property security rights not strictly connected to or dependent on a loan agreement, 
so that the property right can be used again.115 French law has recently adopted the 
hypothèque rechargeable and the prêt viager hypothécaire, or reverse mortgage, which 
create possibilities to release the value of the immovable object in different ways 
than with a traditional type of hypothec.116 Furthermore, the right of Euro-mortgage 
would be accompanied with a document proving its existence, as is the case with 
the German Grundschuld. The right could then also be transferred and executed by 
making use of the document issued by the Registrar.117 
Secondly, there is also the perspective of the banks and large financial 
investors. In this respect, there is a secondary mortgage market in which mortgage 
credit that is granted to consumers is funded.118 Such financing is achieved by 
complicated financial structures known as mortgage-backed security and covered 
bonds.119 Integration of the mortgage market in this field is considered to have an 
immediate positive effect on the primary mortgage market.120 
Although there is no exact proposal for a Euro-mortgage yet, academics have 
been working on proposals for several decades.121 One of the older proposals for a 
pan-European right of mortgage came from the Segré report, in which a group of 
experts proposed to create a flexible European property right in line with the 
German Briefgrundschuld and the Swiss Schuldbrief.122 Although later studies 
changed many details, the core of this original proposal, a flexible, non-accessory 
European property security right in respect of immovable objects, remains today.123 
At the end of 2007 the European Commission published a White Paper on 
Mortgage Credit.124 In contrast with the perspectives raised in the Green Paper, the 
Commission postpones the question of legislation in this area, including the 
question of introducing a right of Euro-mortgage to a later stage.125 It does recognise 
 
115 On the danger of the use of abstract, i.e., non-accessory, security rights, especially in case of 
security-Grundschuld, see Clemente 2007, p. 737. 
116 Green Paper Mortgage Credit in the EU COM(2005) 237 final, p. 5-6. On the French forms of 
hypothec see Chapter 3; 3.6. Hypothec. Sparkes 2007, p. 398-401. 
117 On the workings of the German Briefgrundschuld see Chapter 4; 3.8. Grundschuld.  
118 See Sparkes 2007, p. 409-412. 
119 See Forum Group 2005, Nasarre-Aznar 2004, p. 5 et seq. 
120 Green Paper Mortgage Credit in the EU COM(2005) 237 final, p. 13-14. 
121 See, inter alia, the Segré-report 1966 on the integration of the financial market, to be found at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/chapter1/19
661130en382develeurocapitm_a.pdf>. 
122 Segré-report 1966, p. 23. On the right of Grundschuld in particular Briefgrundschuld see Chapter 
4; 3.8. Grundschuld. Swiss law is, as such, outside the scope of this study. 
123 See, inter alia, Wehrens & Gresser 1992, Stöcker 1992, and Mortgage Credit Funding Group 
2004. 
124 White Paper on Mortgage Credit Markets COM(2007) 807 final. 
125 White Paper on Mortgage Credit Markets COM(2007) 807 final, p. 5. On 18 December 2007 
Commissioner for the Internal Market McCreevy stated in the European Parliament Commit-
tee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), de auditu, that it was not his intention, nor 
had it ever been his intention, to propose a Directive in this area. Such a statement is 
remarkable because several studies, including those contained in he Impact Assessment 
Æ 
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the diversity in legal systems in the mortgage credit market and recognises these as 
an obstacle to trade, but it does not seek a legislative solution.126 Instead, the 
Commission seeks to stimulate the development of a wide spectrum of mortgage 
products, by which it refers to applications of the rights of hypothec in the Member 
States themselves, and seeks to remove barriers to distribution and sale of these 
products. For now, therefore, it seems that the Commission has shifted its focus to 
information duties and the development of national types of property security 
rights in respect of immovable objects. These information duties, however, include 
the further promotion of access to information from other Member States, for 
instance through EULIS, the European Land Information System.127 National 
property rights are to remain for the time being, although naturally some conver-
gence will occur. The White Paper clearly states that, at this moment, the Commis-
sion sees no reason to deviate from the lex rei sitae rule in respect of the applicable 
law.128 
Even more than with the Common Frame of Reference, and a horizontal 
instrument redefining the EU Consumer acquis, the proposals of the Commission in 
the mortgage credit market, will have considerable effects on the national property 
law systems, and on numerus clausus in particular. More types of property security 
rights in respect of immovable objects, or a different application of currently exist-
ing property rights, possibly with new or altered provisions governing creation, 
existence, execution and destruction, will have to be recognised throughout the 
European Union. 
Creating a right of Euro-mortgage would take this development one step fur-
ther.129 In many systems the legal nature of this new European property right will 
be contrary to the existing national provisions on property security rights in respect 
of immovable objects. The introduction of such a European property right could 
cause problems, including the non-accessory nature of the new European right of 
mortgage in legal systems that require all property security rights to be accessory. 
Moreover, it could cause problems in legal systems that do not have a positive reg-
istration system.130 A positive registration system is a system in which the content of 
the register is guaranteed. Opposed to positive systems are negative registration 
systems, in which only the documents relating to immovable objects are registered, 
but the content is not checked. As a result the negative registration systems cannot 
 
accompanying the White Paper make mention of legislation as a solution for the integration 
of the EU Mortgage Market. More information available on <http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal_market/finservices-retail/index_en.htm>. 
126 White Paper on Mortgage Credit Markets COM(2007) 807 final, p. 3-5. 
127 White Paper on Mortgage Credit Markets COM(2007) 807 final, p. 8. 
128 White Paper on Mortgage Credit Markets COM(2007) 807 final. p. 7. 
129 The White Paper makes no mention at all of a European right of mortgage, which could lead 
to the conclusion the Commission has left its legislative intentions in this area. However, it 
could also be argued that, not that the legislative option has been postponed, this topic, as it 
is the most far-reaching legislative solution, has been postponed with it. 
130 The White Paper promises a Recommendation for 2008 in which the Commission will 
address the issue of land registration systems. White Paper on Mortgage Credit Markets 
COM(2007) 807 final, p. 8. 
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guarantee the content of the registration system in the same way as positive regis-
tration systems can. A document proving the existence of a property right can only 
be issued in systems adhering to a positive registration system. England and 
Germany adhere to a positive system of registration, France and the Netherlands to 
a negative system.131 
A large part of this reasoning can also be applied to the current Commission 
initiative as advocated by the White Paper.132 Through convergence of the legal sys-
tems of the Member States, new applications of current lesser rights of hypothec or 
mortgage will arise, possibly requiring substantial adaptation of the national system 
of property law. Even without a pan-European property right, the results of this line 
of policy can be expected to be severe.133 
These Community initiatives show that, as a result of European legislation, 
national property law systems are under pressure, and that not all national property 
law systems are likely to be able to cope with European property rights, at least not 
in a way of creating truly European property rights. The legislative initiatives 
especially show that when property law is looked at from a purely national point of 
view, these European developments are overlooked. Instead, property law should 
be looked at from a more European perspective. Changing this perspective, which 
does not exclude national property law, will enable the appreciation of develop-
ments on a European level and the problems these are likely to cause at a national 
level. 
2.2. The ECJ as a Motor for the Development of European Private Law 
By allowing both the Commission and private parties to challenge national rules 
that hinder intra-Community trade and, if necessary, declaring these rules inappli-
cable, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has played an immensely important role 
in shaping the Internal Market.134 The provisions on the Internal Market, with its 
freedom of goods, services, persons and capital, were originally mostly applied to 
those rules of public national law that formed a direct burden or threat to intra-
 
131 On registration systems, see Cámara-Lapuente 2005, p. 797 et seq., Zevenbergen 2002. More 
on the impacts of EC legislation on national property law below in 2.4. The Effects of 
European Law on the Law of Property. 
132 On convergence of national legal systems below; 2.3. Voluntary Harmonisation. 
133 Possibly, but this is contrary to the statements made by the Commission in its White Paper, 
the 2007 crisis on the US Sub-Prime Market, in which loans were granted to clients that could 
not afford to pay these loans, plays part in a careful legislative approach of the Commission. 
As a result of the financial turmoil the Commission seeks to create and enhance transparency 
in financial services, in particular in structure finance products, for which rights of mortgage 
and hypothec are often used. On the US Sub-Prime Mortgage crisis and the relation to the 
White Paper see White Paper on Mortgage Credit Markets COM(2007) 807 final, p. 2, 4, but 
see p. 7. 
134 In particular the procedures under Arts. 226 and 234 EC. 
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Community trade, such as levies on products, requirements of nationality or 
requirements of language.135  
At a later stage, other areas of law also became included, as the ECJ extended 
its case law to measures which hindered intra-Community trade, but which were 
not necessarily aimed at foreign products only. Examples of these cases include 
cases on the marketing of products.136 It is in this respect that private law, contract 
and property law in particular, became subject to European supervision. In parti-
cular the free movement of goods, the freedom of establishment, the free movement 
of persons, and the free movement of capital have been used to challenge rules of 
private law.137 This Section will deal with the free movement of goods, an area in 
which the ECJ has developed a particular method of case law in respect of the 
Internal Market. Furthermore, it will deal with the application of this case law to 
private law, company law in particular, before returning to the subject of property 
law. 
The case law of the ECJ in this field is an impressive list of cases, each contri-
buting to the development of the approach towards the Internal Market. However, 
in this Section only that case law that is of relevance to property law, numerus 
clausus in particular, will be dealt with. 
2.2.1. Free Movement of Goods 
2.2.1.1. Obstacles to Trade 
At the heart of the case law of the ECJ on free movement is the EC Treaty provision 
on the free movement of goods. In terms of European law, the definition of goods is 
not altogether clear. In the ECJ’s definition, goods are products ‘which can be val-
ued in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial 
transactions’.138 However, electricity has also been considered a good in terms of the 
free movement of goods.139 The provision in the EC Treaty dealing with free 
movement of goods is Article 28 EC Treaty: 
 
135 Famous older cases on free movement include Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos (NV Algemene 
Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming) v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, 
Case 2/73 Geddo v Ente Nationale Risi [1973] ECR 865 and, although slightly later Case C-
213/89) R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (Factortame I) [1990] ECR I-
2433. 
136 See, e.g., Case 120/78 Rewe Zentrale v Bundesmonomolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon) [1979] ECR 649, Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 and 
Joined Cases C-34-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB and 
TV-Shop I Sverige AB [1997] ECR I-3843. 
137 On the applicability of the freedom of capital to property law, see also Von Wilmowsky 1996, 
p. 82-86, Kieninger 2007, p. 188-189, Sparkes 2007, p. 521-522. 
138 Case 7/68 Commission v Italy (Art treasure) [1968] ECR 423, 428-9, Barnard 2007, p. 27. 
139 Case C-393/92 Gemeente Almelo and Others v Energiebedrijf IJsselmij [1994] ECR I-1477, Para. 28. 
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‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between Member States’.140 
This provision prohibits two types of national measures; quantitative restrictions 
(QR) and measures having the equivalent effect of a quantitative restriction 
(MEQR).141 Of course the ECJ has done much work in the prevention of QR, but, for 
purposes of private law especially, the second category, that of MEQRs, is of rele-
vance.142 It has been under the heading of MEQRs that the ECJ has managed to 
declare many measures of national law inapplicable due to hindrance of the func-
tioning of the Internal Market. The ECJ has used a very wide interpretation of what 
may constitute a measure. In general it can be any measure of national law, as long 
as there is an effect on the Internal Market.143 It is the effect of national measures 
that is central in the case law of the ECJ. This is evident in its landmark ruling, 
Dassonville, in which the ECJ held in respect to MEQRs: 
‘All trading rules enacted by Members States which are capable of hindering, directly 
or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as 
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions’.144 
The definition formulated by the ECJ in Dassonville shows that this aspect of 
European law is concerned with the trade between Member States and not with the 
production process. Although a national measure can demand products to be 
composed in a specific way and therefore also concern the production phase, the 
emphasis is on the trade between Member States.145  
In respect of MEQRs, the Court makes a distinction between measures that 
make a distinction based on the country of origin of the good and national measures 
that apply irrespective of the country of origin of a good, but nevertheless have an 
impact on intra-Community trade. The former are discriminatory measures or, as 
they have been termed in the literature, distinctly applicable measures, and the 
latter are non-discriminatory, also known as indistinctly applicable measures.146 
Measures applying specifically to imported products, distinctly applicable 
measures, are fewer in number than indistinctly applicable measures. Distinctly 
 
140 Art. 28 EC is to return in its present form, most likely in Art. 35 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU). Also when a new treaty would take a different form, 
it is not likely that these ‘technical’ provisions would change. 
141 See Barnard 2007, p. 64, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 668-669. 
142 Quantitative Restrictions (QR) are essentially quotas or product bans. On QRs see Barnard 
2007, p. 64-65, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 669. 
143 Case 2/73 Geddo v Ente [1973] ECR 865. 
144 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, Para. 5. 
145 Barnard 2007, p. 92. 
146 On distinctly applicable measures see Case C-320/93 Lucien Ortscheid GmbH v Eurim-Pharm 
Arzneimittel GmbH [1994] ECR I-5243. On indistinctly applicable measures see Joined Cases C-
267 & 268/91 Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. Barnard 2007, 
p. 98, 105, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 669, 677. 
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applicable measures include rules favouring domestic products and price fixing.147 
It could be implied that, at least from a private-law perspective, rules of private 
international law could possibly fall in this category also, as they are specifically 
aimed at dealing with a non-domestic situation, and its relation to national law.148 
This is however highly controversial.149 
Indistinctly applicable measures are the broadest category, as they can include 
almost any measure of national law. The Court’s definition of a MEQR in 
Dassonville, in particular its emphasis on the effects a measure has on intra-Com-
munity trade, is therefore of specific relevance to this category of national measures. 
In a series of decisions starting in 1979, the ECJ has shaped a European legal method 
to deal with national measures that do not make a distinction based on the origin of 
the good, and that have an effect on intra-Community trade. In 1979 the ECJ ren-
dered its Cassis de Dijon judgment, in which it explained its position towards 
indistinctly applicable rules. The case concerned a measure of German law prescrib-
ing the minimum alcohol strength for a beverage classified as a liqueur on the 
German market. Based on this measure, the German authorities refused to allow the 
French product cassis de Dijon, a blackcurrant liqueur, to be sold on the German 
market. The claimant, the French producer, argued the rule was an MEQR, as it 
formed an obstacle to trade because the French producer could not directly export 
its products from France to Germany. The ECJ agreed with the claimant and held 
that, as a rule of Community law, a product lawfully produced in one Member State 
should also be recognised as such in other Member States, unless some good reason 
can be demonstrated in justification.150  
The judgment of the ECJ introduced a new concept and, with that, a new 
approach in European law, the principle of mutual recognition. As a result, the 
Court removed the need for extensive harmonisation and allowed the Commission 
to focus its attention elsewhere.151 Furthermore, from an international trade point of 
view, the Court emphasised that it does not approve of double burdens being 
imposed. When a product has been lawfully produced, it has been subject to a set of 
national requirements and if the product is exported to another Member State it 
cannot, in principle, be made subject to similar rules again. 
 
147 One of the most famous cases is the ‘Buy Irish’ case, in which the Irish government tried to 
promote domestic products, according to the ECJ, to the detriment of imported products. 
Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland (Buy Irish) [1982] ECR 4005. 
148 See Israël & Saarloos 2007, p. 649-653. Along the same line of reasoning, see Von Wilmowsky 
1996, p. 51-52. 
149 Although there are good arguments to deal with rules of private international law in this 
perspective, the topic of measure of private international as subject of EC law is outside the 
scope of this study. However, as far as the lex rei sitae rule is concerned, I feel it could be 
argued this is a distinctly applicable measure. 
150 Case 120/78 Rewe Zentrale v Bundesmonomolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] 
ECR 649, Para. 8. 
151 EC Commission, Communication from the Commission regarding the Cassis de Dijon judg-
ment [1980] OJ C256/2. Barnard 2007, p. 114-115, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 677-679. 
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2.2.1.2. Grounds for Justification 
If a Member State can provide a good reason why it should impose national 
measures on products from another Member State, it can still be allowed to do so. 
The EC Treaty provides a list of reasons a Member State may invoke to justify 
restrictions in respect of QRs or distinctly applicable MEQRs. Article 30 EC Treaty 
states: 
‘The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on 
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; 
the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historical or archaeological 
value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property’.152 
In its Cassis de Dijon judgment, the ECJ added to this that when an indistinctly 
applicable measure is concerned, the grounds of justification of Article 30 EC Treaty 
are complemented with a set of ‘mandatory requirements’.153 Mandatory require-
ments, also known as imperative requirements, are additional reasons a Member 
State may use to justify restrictions it imposes to trade.154 These requirements often 
follow from policy areas defined in the Treaty and include consumer protection, 
environmental protection and the protection of fundamental human rights.155 
Mandatory requirements should, because of the functioning of the Treaty, not be of 
a purely economic nature.156 In any case the current list of mandatory requirements 
is not exhaustive and new types may be added.157 
2.2.1.3. Proportionality 
The ECJ does not accept justifications invoked by Member States readily. The role of 
the Court is the protection of the Internal Market and the promotion of intra-Com-
 
152 Art. 30 is most likely to return, in its present form, in Art. 36 TFEU. 
153 See also Case 788/79 Criminal Proceedings against Gilli and Andres [1980] ECR 2071, Joined 
Cases C-1 & 176/90 Aragonesa [1991] ECR I-4151. 
154 Barnard 2007, p. 115-117. 
155 Barnard mentions the mandatory requirements that the ECJ has thus far recognised. These 
include the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of 
commercial transactions, the defence of the consumer, the protection of the environment, the 
protection of working conditions, the protection of cinema as a form of cultural expression, 
the protection of national or regional socio-cultural characteristics, the maintenance of press 
diversity, preventing the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social 
security system, the protection of fundamental rights, and preserving the maintenance of 
order in society. Barnard 2007, p. 116. 
156 Case C-254/98 Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb v TK-Heimdienst Sass GmbH [2000] 
ECR I-151. Barnard 2007, p. 117. 
157 Barnard 2007, p. 116. 
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munity trade. The Court will therefore examine a national measure closely before it 
allows derogation from the Treaty.158 In its decision in Rau the ECJ added that: 
‘It is also necessary for such rules to be proportionate to the aim in view. If a Member 
State has a choice between various measures to attain the same objective it should 
choose the means which least restricts the free movement of goods’.159 
In the case law of the ECJ, the proportionality test comprises two elements; a test of 
suitability, if the measure used is suitable for the aim pursued, and a test of neces-
sity, whether there are adverse consequences of the national measure worthy of 
legal protection.160 The proportionality test allows the Court a far-reaching ground 
for legislative review and allows it to demand extensive proof from Member States 
that a national measure is really necessary.161  
This basic methodology allows the ECJ to ensure the continuous building of 
the Internal Market, ensuring that all Member States comply with these basic rules 
on the free movement of goods.162 Because the measures the Court initially accepted 
to take under review were indistinctly applicable national measures, most national 
law was included. It is not surprising, therefore, that in later case law the court 
restricted the scope of application of Article 28 EC Treaty to some extent. 
2.2.1.4. Moving Towards a Market Access Test? 
In Keck and Mithouard, the ECJ was confronted with a French legislative act prohib-
iting the selling of products below their cost price.163 Keck and Mithouard argued 
that they needed to sell products under the cost price in order to be able to gain 
access to the French market. The Court, having faced criticism on the wide scope of 
its definition of national measures falling under Article 28 EC Treaty, restated its 
case law by making a distinction between measures concerning a product charac-
teristic, which are those measures directly affecting the content of a certain product, 
and ‘certain selling arrangements’, which are those rules not directly affecting a 
product, but concerning more the way in which the product is placed on a national 
 
158 Craig 2006, p. 687-689, Barnard 2007, p. 66. 
159 Case 261/81 Rau [1982] EXCR 3961, Para. 12. 
160 Case 72/83 Campus Oil Ltd and others v Minister for Industry and Energy and others [1984] ECR 
2727, Para. 37, Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH 
(Familiapress) v Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689, Barnard 2007, p. 81, 119-120. Craig 
discusses whether a third element to this test, ‘whether the measure was disproportionate to 
the restrictions thereby involved’, is also part of the proportionality test. It seems EC law is 
unclear about this. Craig 2006, p. 656. 
161 Case C-17/93 Openbaar Ministerie v Van der Veldt [1994] ECR I-3537, [1995] CMLR 621. See 
Craig 2006, p. 655, 690, Barnard 2007, p. 119-124. 
162 See, e.g., Case C-292/92 Ruth Hünnermund and others v Landersapothekerkammer Baden-
Württemberg [1993] ECR-6787, Para. 1. 
163 Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91 Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-
6097. 
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market.164 In respect to product characteristics, the Court reaffirmed its Cassis de 
Dijon judgment and held that any product rules forming an obstacle to intra-Com-
munity trade would have to be justified under Article 30 EC Treaty, or the 
mandatory requirements. If the measure could not be justified, Article 28 EC Treaty 
would prohibit it.165 However, in respect to certain selling arrangements, the Court 
stated: 
‘Contrary to what has previously been decided, the application to products from other 
Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling 
arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
trade between Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment… 
provided those provisions apply to all affected traders operating within the national 
territory and provided that they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the 
marketing of domestic products and those from other Member States … 
Where those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the sale of 
products from other Member States meeting the requirements laid down by that State 
is not by nature such as to prevent their [foreign goods’] access to the market or to 
impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products’.166 
In other words, those selling arrangements that apply to all traders without distinc-
tion, both in their application and in their effect, are excluded from the scope of 
Article 28 EC Treaty. However, it is in respect of the requirement of non-distinction, 
in particular the way in which a national measure affects traders, that Article 28 
continues to play an important role. In its judgments in De Agostini and Heimdienst 
the ECJ returned to this element of the effect of certain selling arrangements, and 
held that those selling arrangements that do not affect all traders in the same way, 
especially not in fact, would either prevent or at least hinder market access for 
foreign traders. These measures would therefore fall under the scope of Article 28 
EC Treaty.167 
With these two judgments, the Court has put an emphasis on market access, 
including for selling arrangements.168 When a national product characteristic rule 
falls under Article 28, the Cassis de Dijon line of case law assumes that the measure 
 
164 These selling arrangements have also been named market circumstances rules, see Barnard 
2007, p. 137-138, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 684-686. 
165 Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91 Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-
6097, Para. 15. 
166 Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91 Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-
6097, Paras. 16 and 17. 
167 Joined Cases C-34-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB and 
TV-Shop I Sverige AB [1997] ECR I-3843, Case C-254/98 Schutzverband gegen unlauteren 
Wettbewerk v TK-Heimdienst Sass GmbH [2000] ECR I-151. See, before these cases were held the 
opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Société d’Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TFI 
Publicité SA [1995] ECR I-179. Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 688-690. 
168 See also Case C-322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v 0800 DocMorris NV, Jacques Waterval 
[2003] ECR I-14887, Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B & Q Plc [1989] ECR I-3851. 
Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 692-693. 
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impedes market access.169 The burden of proof is then on the Member State to show 
either that the measure falls outside the scope of Article 28, or that it can be justified 
on one of the grounds mentioned in Article 30, or on one of the mandatory require-
ments, the open-ended but exclusive list of justifications that can be used to justify 
indistinctly applicable measures.170 When a selling arrangement is concerned, there 
is no automatic assumption of a hindrance to market access. In those cases the bur-
den of proof is on the trader, and not on the Member State. Moreover, the proof the 
trader must provide is more than just a potential hindrance. A trader will have to 
show a substantial disadvantage that is actual, rather than potential.171 
The emphasis on market access also enables the Court to consider the final set 
of selling arrangements that could potentially fall under Article 28 EC treaty – those 
selling arrangements that are indistinctly applicable, which is non-discriminatory, 
but that nevertheless prevent or hinder market access. It is in this field that many 
uncertainties remain. An example of a rule preventing market access is a total 
product ban, applying both to domestic as well as foreign products. In a pre-Keck 
and Mithouard decision, the Court held that a product ban would constitute a 
Quantitative Restriction (QR) as none is also a quota.172 However, Barnard adds that 
it is not completely certain this case can still be upheld.173 On the analogy of similar 
cases from the free movement of services and the free movement of persons, it 
could be argued that where a national measure prevents market access or provides 
a substantial hindrance to market access, such a measure would fall under Article 
28.174 
2.2.1.5. Conclusion 
This method of the ECJ in its approach to the free movement of goods, in particular 
the focus on national measures preventing market access, provides Internal Market 
lawyers with a systematic way of thinking to deal with rules that hinder intra-
Community trade. The wording of Article 28 EC Treaty shows that the Article is 
addressed to Member States. Unlike some of the other freedoms, it has not been 
 
169 Case C-463/01 Commission v Germany (deposit and return) [2004] ECR I-11705. See Barnard 
2007, p. 155-156. 
170 Barnard 2007, p. 156. On the mandatory requirements, see the discussion on the Cassis de 
Dijon judgment in this same section. 
171 Joined Cases C-34-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB and 
TV-Shop I Sverige AB [1997] ECR I-3843, Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen v Gourmet 
International Products (GIP) [2001] ECR I-1795. In this respect there is a deviation from the 
ECJ’s formula in Dassonville. 
172 Case 34/79 R. v Henn and Darby [1972] ECR 3795. 
173 Barnard 2007, p. 159-160. 
174 Case C-275/92 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039 (Free movement 
of services) and Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments v Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141 
(Free movement of persons). Barnard 2007, p. 159-165, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 690-695. 
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awarded horizontal direct effect. In other words, the Article applies vertically 
between a trader and a Member States and not between private parties.175 
However, when private parties do violate the principles contained in Article 
28, in particular mutual recognition and market access, a Member State doing 
nothing to prevent this could violate European law nonetheless. Member States are 
under an obligation to be loyal to the European Union, including the duty to take 
action when one of the Community’s objectives is at stake.176 Furthermore, not 
taking action when one of the fundamental freedoms is systematically breached 
may also lead to a violation of a duty of a Member State under Community law.177 
In this respect, all measures of national law, including those of private interna-
tional law and substantive law, are subject to the rules on free movement of goods 
in the Internal Market insofar as they have an effect on its functioning.178 Further-
more, they are subject to the other fundamental freedoms as well. A further exam-
ple, that of free movement of persons, especially the freedom of establishment, will 
be provided before moving to the effects of Internal Market law on property law. 
2.2.2. Freedom of Establishment and its Effect on Substantive Private Law 
Within the Internal Market, persons also enjoy freedom of movement.179 When it 
comes to the self-employed and companies, there is a freedom of movement in the 
form of a freedom of establishment.180 In respect to companies, Article 43 EC Treaty 
ensures the freedom to set up a company, as well as to set up subsidiaries, agencies 
or branches of a company in another Member State. However, in order for EU law 
to apply, a Community dimension is needed. A company from within the EU must 
therefore first be established, or attempting to establish itself, in another Member 
State.181  
When such establishment takes place, and a national measure hinders the 
company’s access to the market, a very similar approach to that used in respect of 
 
175 Case C-159/00 Sapod-Audic v Eco-Emballages SA [2002] ECR I-5031, see Barnard 2007, p. 94-95. 
The exception to the strict vertical effect of Art. 28 EC is found in the area of European intel-
lectual property law where the Court has assumed horizontal direct effect. See e.g. Case 
15/74 Centrafarm BV and others v Sterling Drug [1974] ECR 1147, Van den Bogaert 2002, p. 129-
134, Barnard 2007, p. 173 et seq. 
176 Art. 10 EC, the objectives of the Community include those mentioned in Art. 2 EC. In the new 
Treaty Art. 4 (3) EU (i.e. not the TFEU) will deal with the same subject matter. See e.g. Case 
235/87 Matteucci v Communauté française de Belgique [1988] ECR 5589, Case C-251/89 Nikolaos 
Athanasopoulos and others v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1991] ECR I-2797. See Van den Bogaert 
2002, p. 150-151, Craig 2006, p. 703, Israël & Saarloos 2007, p. 645-657. 
177 See Case C-265/95 Commission v France (Spanish Strawberries) [1997] ECR I-6959. Barnard 2007, 
p. 95-96, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 675-676. 
178 Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique v Compagnie de construction mécanique Sulzer SA [1991] ECR 
I-107, Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter GmbH v Pelin Baskiciogullari [1993] ECR I-5009. See 
Rutgers 1999, p. 174-175, 183-184, Kieninger 1996a, p. 124-125, Basedow 1995, p. 5, 15. 
179 Art. 39 EC. 
180 Art. 43 EC, Case C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany and others v Staatsecretaris van Justitie [2001] 
ECR I-8615, Barnard 2007, p. 308. 
181 Case C-196/04 Cadbury’s Schweppes v Commissioners of the Inland Revenue [2006] ECR I-000. 
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the free movement of goods applies. Article 43 EC Treaty provides for equal, non-
discriminatory, treatment in cases of both direct and indirect discrimination. This 
distinction, between direct and indirect discrimination, is the same as the distinctly 
and indistinctly applicable measures in respect of the free movement of goods.182 A 
national measure preventing a national or a company of one Member State from 
becoming established, based on the fact that the person or company has a foreign 
nationality or originates in another Member State, will breach the EC Treaty unless 
it can be justified.183 As in the case of the free movement of goods, indirectly dis-
criminatory measures also fall under the scope of the Treaty, and are prohibited un-
less they can be justified.184 Furthermore, once a person or company has established 
itself in another Member State, it must be treated and continue to be treated in the 
same way as a national person or company.185 With respect to companies, Article 48 
EC Treaty provides that companies are treated in the same way as natural per-
sons.186 However, primary and secondary establishment of companies, which refers 
to setting up the primary office or establishment of an agency, branch or subsidiary, 
are slightly different in content than the free movement of persons.  
Since the 1980s, the ECJ has especially been active in the area of secondary 
establishment.187 The right of secondary establishment enables a company to estab-
lish itself in the Member State with the least strict regulations and then make use of 
the right of secondary establishment to create subsidiaries throughout the EU.188 
Initially, the ECJ was very reluctant to accept this method of working around 
Member States with stricter regulations, but in a series of judgments the Court has 
also applied the Internal Market method of thinking to secondary establishment.189  
The first of these cases, known as Centros, concerned a private limited com-
pany established in England by two Danish citizens.190 The Danish citizens had no 
intention of trading in England, but simply registered their company there, as 
England had no rules on minimum capital requirements. Had they established their 
company in Denmark, they would have had to comply with Danish law, which set a 
minimum capital of 200,000 DKr. Once the company was validly created in 
England, the Danish citizens applied to the Danish registry to have a subsidiary of 
the English company registered in Denmark. The Danish Registrar refused to regis-
ter the subsidiary on the grounds that the Danish citizens did not trade in England, 
and that they simply used English law to avoid the undesirable consequences of 
 
182 On the free movement of goods see above; 2.2.1. Free Movement of Goods. 
183 E.g., Case 2/74 Jean Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECR 631. Barnard 2007, p. 312. 
184 E.g., Case 340/89 Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten 
Baden-Wüttemberg [1991] ECR I-2357. 
185 See Barnard 2007, p. 345-346. 
186 Barnard 2007, p. 330-331, Dohrn 2004, p. 31-32. 
187 On primary establishment, see, inter alia, Case 81/87 Ex parte Daily Mail [1988] ECR 5483. 
188 Barnard 2007, p. 341. See also Charny 1991, p. 423 et seq. 
189 See e.g. Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299, Case 
C-373/97 Diamantis v Elliniko Dimosio and Organismos Ikonomikis Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon 
AE (OAE) [2000] ECR I-1705. 
190 Case C-212/97 Centros v Erhverves- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459. See, inter alia, Dohrn 
2004, p. 35-38. 
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Danish law. The ECJ rejected the argument that this was a fraud case, and held that 
the refusal to register constituted an obstacle to the freedom of establishment.191 The 
Danish government sought to justify the refusal by stating that the capital require-
ments were there to ensure the financial soundness of companies as well as to pro-
tect creditors against a company without any financial means. 
As in the case of the free movement of goods, the justifications used by the 
Member States, in this case the Danish government, are also subject to a test of pro-
portionality. In this case the ECJ held the first justification inadequate as well as dis-
proportional and, although it accepted the validity of creditor protection, the Court 
held that outright refusal to register was not a proportionate measure.192 
The ECJ returned to the question of creditor protection in the Inspire Art 
case.193 In this case a Dutch national had set up a private limited company in the UK 
and established and registered a subsidiary of that UK company in the Netherlands. 
The Netherlands had adopted a law allowing recognition of a ‘foreign company’. 
Under this law, a ‘foreign company’ is a company registered in and governed by the 
law of another country but with which the company has no real link. Connected to 
the characterisation as a foreign company, Dutch law imposed all sorts of obliga-
tions, including a capital requirement equal to that of Dutch private limited com-
panies.194  
The Dutch registration authority, in this case the chamber of commerce, 
applied to a Dutch court to change the registration of the UK company to a ‘foreign 
company’ under this new Dutch law. The UK company argued such a rule infring-
ed the freedom of establishment under Articles 43 and 48 EC Treaty. The ECJ held 
that the rules of Dutch law had the effect of treating a company like Inspire Art as a 
Dutch company, including the provisions on capital requirements and liability.195 
However, the company had already fulfilled the requirements of establishment 
under English law, and therefore the creation of a subsidiary of that company else-
where in the EU would have to fall under the Treaty provisions on the freedom of 
establishment. The rules on capital requirements and liability therefore could not be 
imposed again on the company, also not on a subsidiary. They were therefore con-
trary to the provisions on the freedom of establishment.196 Nevertheless, the Court 
acknowledged that taking measures to stop foreign companies on the grounds of 
fraud prevention could be justified, but only on a case-by-case basis.197 
The decision of the ECJ in Centros and the further elaboration on this issue in 
Inspire Art have led to the question whether Member States remain allowed to 
restrict the recognition of foreign companies. In some Member States, Germany in 
 
191 Case C-212/97 Centros v Erhverves- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459, Paras. 29 and 30. 
192 Case C-212/97 Centros v Erhverves- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459, Para. 38. 
193 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR 
I-10155. See De Kluiver 2004, p. 122-123, Kersting & Schindler 2003, p. 1277 et seq. 
194 Art. 4(1) Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen (WFBV). 
195 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR 
I-10155, Para. 100. 
196 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR 
I-10155, Paras. 104 and 105. See also Barnard 2007, p. 342-343. 
197 On this aspect see De Kluiver 2004, p. 128, Kersting & Schindler 2003, p. 1288-1289. 
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particular, a foreign company form is not immediately recognised. Under the doc-
trine used, known as the real-seat theory or siège réel, the court looks at the actual 
situation at hand. When a company is actually conducting its business in another 
Member State than that in which it was created, the law of the Member State in 
which the company has its real, in the sense of actual, seat will be applied. As a re-
sult, a foreign limited company conducting its actual business in Germany will not 
be treated in Germany as a limited company, because the company has not fulfilled 
the German rules on the creation of private or public limited companies.198 The 
decision of the Court in Centros raised questions on the conformity of the real-seat 
theory with Community law.199 The Danish nationals in that case exercised their 
business in Denmark, but UK law nevertheless allowed this. In a country applying 
the real-seat theory this could not have been the case.200  
The ECJ was confronted with the question of the conformity of the real-seat 
theory in the case of Überseering.201 The case concerned a Dutch company that sued a 
German company for defective work carried out on its behalf in Germany. Prior to 
the case, two German nationals had acquired all the shares in the Dutch company.202 
The German court, applying the real-seat theory, argued that since Überseering had 
transferred its activities to Germany, German law applied, and, because it was a 
Dutch company, this company did not have legal capacity in Germany. The German 
court therefore did not allow the Dutch company standing in court, even though 
Überseering continued to enjoy legal capacity in the Netherlands.203  
The ECJ held that since the Dutch company was validly created under the law 
of the Netherlands, the rule requiring it to incorporate in Germany was contrary to 
the freedom of establishment of Articles 43 and 48 EC Treaty.204 This ‘outright 
negation of the freedom of establishment’ could not be justified because a general 
refusal would not pass the test of proportionality.205 The German court subsequent-
ly had to recognise the Dutch company. 
The approach taken by the ECJ in cases of freedom of establishment resembles 
the approach taken in cases of free movement of goods. However, the nature of the 
cases is sometimes so different that different tests are used to investigate whether 
Community law has been breached. In the case of free movement of goods, the 
Court seems to be moving towards a market access test, seen best in the De Agostini 
decision discussed above.206 In cases concerning the freedom of establishment, only 
 
198 See Barnard 2007, p. 343, Dohrn 2004, p. 31-33. 
199 See Dohrn 2004, p. 37-38, Kieninger 2005, p. 742. 
200 Barnard 2007, p. 343. 
201 Case C-208 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) [2002] 
ECR I-9919. 
202 Dohrn 2004, p. 39. 
203 Barnard 2007, p. 343-344. 
204 Case C-208 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) [2002] 
ECR I-9919, Paras. 80 and 81. 
205 Case C-208 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) [2002] 
ECR I-9919, Paras. 81, 92-93. For a critical view on this judgment, see Dohrn 2004, p. 44-46. 
206 See Joined Cases C-34-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB 
and TV-Shop I Sverige AB [1997] ECR I-3843. See also Case C-322/01 Deutscher Apothekerver-
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the Centros case deals with a refusal of access. Other company law cases have been 
decided following the more traditional test of discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality. In the case of companies, this concerns discrimination based on the 
country where the seat of the company is established.207 However, in other cases 
based on Article 43 EC Treaty, the general article on the freedom of establishment, 
the European Court of Justice seems to have held in favour of the market access test, 
focussing on removing obstacles and hindrances to access.208  
The tendency towards market access brings the case law of the European 
Court of Justice outside the spheres of traditional distinctions between discrimina-
tory and non-discriminatory measures, favouring a more functional approach. It is 
under this approach that Member States themselves might be more stimulated to act 
in order to remove obstacles to the Internal Market. In some cases, in company law 
and contract law, Member States have acted, and this will be dealt with in Section 
2.3 below.209 
2.3. Voluntary Harmonisation 
In the history of European integration, the European Institutions especially have 
created legislation resulting in harmonisation of the law in the Internal Market. 
Although Member States are represented in the Council, the Commission and the 
Parliament also take many initiatives themselves. As a result, many Member States 
tend to conceive of European law as law forced upon their national legal systems.210  
Nevertheless, as a result of the development of European law, Member States 
also take action themselves. Possibly the best example can be seen when looking at 
the development of European contract law. Germany used the project of reforming 
contract law to integrate European legislation in this area into German private 
law.211 The new law, which entered into force in 2002, brings the German Civil Code 
into line with the applicable European contract legislation. In this respect the com-
munications of the Commission concerning the work on a more coherent contract 
law have resulted in the adaptation of national contract law.212 It is certainly also the 
intention of the Commission to investigate the possibilities of convergence of 
national laws without Community intervention.213 
 
band eV v 0800 DocMorris NV, Jacques Waterval [2003] ECR I-14887. See above; 2.2.1. Free 
Movement of Goods. 
207 On this distinction, see Barnard 2007, p. 345. 
208 Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano 
[1995] ECR I-4165, Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge de Société de Football Association v Bosman 
[1995] ECR I-4921. See Barnard 2007, p. 312-315. 
209 This has included adaptation of national law to bring national law in line with the case law of 
the ECJ. See below; 2.3. Voluntary Harmonisation. 
210 See, e.g., Van Erp who discusses this problem under the term antagonism, Van Erp 2006b. 
211 See, inter alia, Zimmermann 2002b, p. 265, 276, 280-282, Zimmermann 2005. 
212 See Weatherhill 2005, p. 407-408. 
213 See Commission Action Plan on a More Coherent Contract Law, COM(2001), 98. 
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Another example of voluntary harmonisation can be seen in the aftermath of 
the decisions of the ECJ in Überseering and Inspire Art, discussed above.214 As a result 
of these decisions, some Member States have feared a race towards the Member 
State with the most attractive company legislation. Instead of allowing such an open 
competition between legal systems, some Member States, such as France, have 
introduced an alternative company form in their national company law, for which 
creation no capital requirements exist.215 In France this is the One Euro SARL.216 As 
a result of this introduction, when parties choose to establish a One Euro SARL 
company, French law will remain applicable.217 This development also shows how 
Member States bring their national legislation into line with legislation from other 
Member States, in particular that of a Member State whose law is often applied, as is 
the case with English law in the field of company law. In doing so, these Member 
States ensure that mutual recognition of company forms is less problematic and, as 
in case of the French developments, national law remains applicable.218 
In the area of property law also, some convergence can be seen. Especially in 
the area of security rights, it has been argued by Drobnig that ‘natural harmonisa-
tion’ is a serious option.219 Because of intra-Community trade, Member States bring 
their national law into line with that of their trading partners, even though there is 
no European legislation yet. The French reforms of 2006 can certainly also be seen 
from this perspective, especially the introduction of non-possessory security rights 
and the abandonment of the prohibition on the lex commissoria in the light of the 
Financial Collateral Directive discussed above.220 
2.4. The Effects of European Law on the Law of Property 
The foregoing has focused on issues of European law and when possible on issues 
of European private law. As was stated in the introduction to this Chapter, private 
law is most definitely affected by European law.221 Section 2.2.1. above, on the case 
law of the ECJ on the free movement of goods, shows that the emphasis the ECJ 
puts on the effect of a national measure on intra-Community trade enables the 
Court to include private law.222 The ECJ has dealt with issues of private law, com-
pany law and contract law in particular, although not often. In only very few cases, 
the European Court of Justice has examined aspects of property law. This Section 
will deal with aspects of property law in the European Union in general, but 
 
214 See Kieninger 2005, p. 768. 
215 In fact the requirement is a minimum capital of 1 Euro. Kieninger 2005, p. 768. 
216 See Kersting & Schindler 2003, p. 1291. 
217 See De Kluiver 2004, p. 132. 
218 Kersting & Schindler 2003, p. 1291, Kieninger 2005, p. 768-770. On the effects of the Inspire Art 
decision in Dutch law, see De Kluiver 2004, p. 131-132, Bouwes 2006, p. 105 et seq. 
219 See Cox 2006, p. 239. See also Kieninger 2004, p. 647-655. 
220 See above; 2.1.2. Legal Framework: Secondary Community Law. On the French 2006 reforms 
see Chapter 3; 1. Introduction. 
221 See above; 1. Introduction. 
222 On the focus of the ECJ on the effect of national measures see also Craig & De Búrca 2007,  
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especially those which have already been dealt with by the ECJ. Moreover, this 
Section will examine the applicability of the case law of the ECJ in the area of the 
free movement of goods to the law of property and the consequences thereof for the 
national property law systems.223 
The application of Internal Market law to property law is not new, but has 
remained an area that has been relatively undiscovered by property lawyers and 
European lawyers alike.224 Exceptions are those authors who look at property law 
from an international point of view. In international property law, aspects of private 
international law, in particular the lex rei sitae rule, have always forced scholars to 
look at the relation of one system of property law to another. The influence of 
European law on private international law, especially since the decision of the ECJ 
in Cassis de Dijon, in which the Court introduced the concept of mutual recognition, 
has led scholars to raise questions about the validity of traditional rules of private 
international law.225 In the field of property law these especially include the work by 
Von Wilmowsky, Kieninger and Rutgers on retention of title or reservation of 
ownership clauses.226  
2.4.1. Article 295 EC Treaty and European Property Law 
Before applying the ECJ’s case law to property law, and to property rights in partic-
ular, some aspects of primary European law with respect to property law should be 
mentioned. From the very beginning of European integration, the Treaty has con-
tained an article in which the relation between the Community and Member States 
with respect to the system of ownership was dealt with. This is Article 295 EC 
Treaty (formerly Article 222), which states: 
‘This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system 
of property ownership’.227 
Although the Commission and the Parliament have occasionally claimed that the 
EU has no competence to regulate property law based on Article 295 EC Treaty, the 
ECJ, as the primary interpreter of Treaty provisions, has taken a different view.228 In 
a series of cases, the Court has held that although Member States are entitled to 
 
223 See below; 2.4. The Effects of Internal Market Law on Property Law. 
224 See, e.g., Basedow 1995, p. 41-48, Kieninger 1996b, p. 41 et seq. 
225 See, e.g., Basedow 1995, Von Wilmowsky 1996, Kieninger 1996b, Rutgers 1999, Roth 1999, 
Israël & Saarloos 2007. 
226 Von Wilmowsky 1996, Kieninger 1996a, Rutgers 1999. 
227 Art. 295 EC will return in its current form, most likely, in Art. 345 TFEU. 
228 See, e.g., Green Paper on Wills and Succession (COM(2005) 65 final) and on this Report of the 
JURI-committee of the European Parliament No. 6/2006-6L of 3 May 2006, Answer to Written 
Question asked by Bert Doorn MEP (PPE-EP) to the Commission. Restitution of property to 
Jewish citizens and Jewish communities in the applicant countries. OJ 12/12/2002, C 309E,  
p. 15. A clear summary of the ECJ’s position is provided in Case C-503/04 Commission v 
Germany [2007] ECR I-6153, Para. 37. See also Bartels 1995, p. 244 et seq., Sagaert 2007, p. 302-
307, Kieninger 2007, p. 190-191. 
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provide rules on their national property law, they are bound by the principles 
governing the Internal Market.229 In one of its ‘Golden Share’ cases, the ECJ held 
that Article 295: 
‘… merely signifies that each Member State may organise as it thinks fit the system of 
ownership of undertakings whilst at the same time respecting the fundamental free-
doms enshrined in the Treaty’.230 
The ECJ seems to emphasise that the provision in Article 295 EC does not prevent 
internal market law from having an influence on the right of ownership.231 
Although Member States are free to create their own system of ownership, in the 
absence of harmonisation, they are required to exercise their competences in the 
field of property law in conformity with EC law.232 When this is not the case, the 
Court is not afraid to interfere. In fact, in the area of intellectual property law, the 
Court has interfered and established a line of case law dealing with the mutual 
recognition of patents, trademarks and copyrights.233 Especially in the area of trade-
marks, where there is Community legislation, the Court has ruled on the relation 
between EC intellectual property law and Article 295 EC Treaty: 
‘With regard, first of all, to Article 295 EC, it must be borne in mind that according to 
that provision the Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States 
governing the system of property ownership. That provision merely recognises the 
power of Member States to define the rules governing the system of property owner-
ship and does not exclude any influence whatever of Community law on the exercise 
of national property rights’.234 
As a result of this interpretation, the Treaty does not prevent the creation of 
secondary Community law in the area of property law in respect to the right of 
ownership. Moreover, the Court’s interpretation of Article 295 also has an effect on 
its case law in the area of free movement. The fact that rules of national property 
law can be subject to European law restricts the possibilities of Member States to 
 
229 See Case 182/83 Robert Fearon and Company Ltd v The Irish Land Commission [1984] ECR 3677, 
and Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731, Case C-483/99 Commission v 
France [2002] ECR I-4781, Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809 (‘Golden 
Share Cases’). 
230 C-367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731, Para. 28. See also Van Erp 2006b, p. 12-13. 
231 Basedow 1995, p. 44-45, Bartels 1995, p. 248-251, Kieninger 1996a, p. 127-128, Rutgers 1999,  
p. 174-175, Remien 2005, Weatherhill 2006, p. 144-147, Van Erp 2006b, p. 12-13, Barnard 2007, 
p. 174-176, Sagaert 2007, p. 306-307, Sparkes 2007, p. 112-114, Hesselink, Rutgers & de Booys 
2007, p. 57-58. 
232 Weatherhill 2006, p. 146. 
233 See Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v Metro [1971] ECR 487, Case 15/74 Centrafarm v 
Sterling Drug [1974] ECR 1147, Case 35/87 Thetford Corporation v Fiamma SpA [1988] ECR 3585, 
Case C-16/03 Peak Holding v Exolin-Elinor AB [2004] ECR I-11313. For an overview of the 
Courts case law in the field of Intellectual Property Law see Van den Bogaert 2002, p. 131-134, 
Barnard 2007, p. 173-210. 
234 Case C-491/01 R v Secretary of State ex parte BAT & Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11543, Para. 
147. See Weatherhill 2006, p. 145-146, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 616-617. 
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invoke peculiarities of their national system of property law in respect of ownership 
as a possible ground for justification for an infringement on one of the four free-
doms.235 
In respect of other areas of property law, not regarding the system of owner-
ship, Article 295 remains silent and therefore does not form an obstacle to the 
creation of secondary legislation in the field of European property law. In fact, the 
Community has issued legislation in areas other than the right of ownership.236  
2.4.2. The Effects of Internal Market Law on Property Law 
There have not been many cases in which the ECJ has been confronted with aspects 
of national property law. There has never been a case in which the ECJ was actually 
concerned with the content of a property right and the system of property rights 
itself.237 Nevertheless, the Court has touched upon various aspects of property law 
in the ‘Golden Share’ cases mentioned in Section 2.4.1. above. Moreover, while deal-
ing with the free movement of capital, the Court has included property law aspects 
in its decisions.238 Although these cases deal with the freedom of capital and the 
freedom of establishment, the Court has declared that the reasoning applies to all 
fundamental freedoms.239 It is therefore worth investigating to what extent aspects 
of property law are subject to the rules on the Internal Market as developed by the 
ECJ. Of particular interest to this Chapter is the recognition of property rights 
created in another Member State under these rules.240 In respect to property security 
rights and the right of security ownership in cases of retention of title or reservation 
of ownership, these questions are becoming increasingly relevant. 
2.4.2.1. Obstacles to Trade 
In her study, Kieninger has applied the case law of the ECJ up to the decision of that 
same Court in Keck and Mithouard to the law of property, the law on international 
retention of title clauses in particular.241 Kieninger shows that in a combined appli-
cation, the rules of private international law and the rules on substantive property 
 
235 Case C-503/04 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-6153, Para. 37. See also Para. 2.4. The 
Effects of Internal Market Law on Property Law. 
236 See Para. 2.1.2. Legal Framework: Secondary Community Law. I owe gratitude to Jona Israël 
for the focus on Art. 295 EC and ownership. 
237 The only case that comes close to a property law case deals with insolvency law and the 
effects of a seizure made by the Dutch tax authorities. In this case the ECJ had to deal with 
property law questions because of the effect this seizure of objects had on a German 
reservation of ownership. See Case C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe 
Belastingen en de Staat der Nederlanden [1990] ECR I-583. 
238 See e.g. Case C-222/97 Manfred Trummer v Peter Mayer [1999] ECR I-1661. On this subject see, 
specifically, Sparkes 2007, p. 25-35. 
239 See, e.g., Case C-350/92 Spain v Council [1995] ECR I-1985, Case C-503/04 Commission v 
Germany [2007] ECR I-6153, Para. 37. On this general applicability, see also Rutgers 1999,  
p. 175. 
240 See also Sparkes 2007, p. 112. 
241 Kieninger 1996a, p. 122 et seq. See also Kieninger 1996b, p. 41 et seq. 
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law can lead to results that hinder the free movement of goods. It is the combination 
of these rules that, in her view, constitutes a measure that, under the Dassonville 
formula, might hinder intra-Community trade.242 
In order to be able to apply Article 28 EC Treaty to rules of property law, first 
the rule must be characterised as a measure having the effect equivalent to a quan-
titative restriction (MEQR). The system of property law does have a direct effect on 
the quantity of goods entering the market of a Member State, however, its rules are 
not the same as directly setting a quota for the importation of goods. Rules on prop-
erty law are therefore not likely to constitute a QR. Instead, the question Kieninger 
addresses is whether a measure of national property law can be a MEQR.243 Provid-
ing an affirmative answer to this question, according to the distinction made in the 
Keck and Mithouard decision, results in a question whether a measure can be quali-
fied as relating to a product characteristic or as relating to a certain selling arrange-
ment.244 Although she provides arguments why a measure of national property law 
could be related to a product characteristic, in particular the effect a security right’s 
quality can have on the price of a product, Kieninger concludes that these measures 
most likely relate to a certain selling arrangement.245 In other words, when a choice 
must be made, the measures of national and international property law are in her 
view rules dealing with market circumstances.246 
In order to understand this line of reasoning, the effect of a measure of 
national property law in an international property law setting must be looked at. 
When, because of the application of lex rei sitae, a national system of property law 
applies, and a property right created according to the law of one Member State is 
not recognised by another Member State, this will affect the way in which trade 
between these Member States is conducted. In Kieninger’s terms of marketing rules, 
a sales promotion used in one Member State cannot be used in another Member 
State or is made more difficult and more expensive than the marketing of domestic 
products.247 In terms of selling arrangements in general, but in particular when the 
concept of selling arrangements is applied to property law, it becomes clear that it is 
very difficult to draw a line between what rules relate to product characteristics, or 
the whether nature of the property security right influences the product itself direct-
ly, and what rules relate to selling arrangements, or whether the rules on property 
law are best compared with sales promotions.248 
 
242 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, Kieninger 1996a, p. 129. 
243 Kieninger 1996a, p. 152 et seq. See also the recent case C-297/05 Commission v The Netherlands 
[2007] ECR I-7467, in which the ECJ held that Dutch law that imposed a compulsory 
roadworthiness test prior to registration of vehicles coming from another Member State, was 
in violation of Art. 28 (and Art. 30) EC. See, in particular, Paras. 73 and 74.  
244 Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097, Kieninger 1996a, p. 152-
153. On difficulties establishing whether measures are selling arrangements see Craig & De 
Búrca 2007, p. 694-695. 
245 Kieninger 1996a, p. 152-153. 
246 On the term market circumstances, see Barnard 2007, p. 137-138. 
247 Kieninger 1996b, p. 58-59. 
248 Kieninger 1996b, p. 59. 
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Kieninger bases her arguments on a post-Keck and Mithouard decision of the 
ECJ. In this case, Clinique, the Court held that a prohibition in German law on 
marketing a product under the name ‘Clinique’, as that term could only be used for 
products with medicinal properties, was not in conformity with EC law. Moreover 
the ECJ held that this imposed additional costs for the alteration of labelling, pack-
aging and advertising and was therefore covered by Article 28 EC Treaty. Kieninger 
argues that the formula the ECJ applied in that case, known as the Oosthoek formula, 
continues to apply.249 In Oosthoek, a pre-Keck and Mithouard decision, the ECJ stated: 
‘15. Legislation which restricts or prohibits certain forms of advertising and certain 
means of sales promotion may, although it does not directly affect imports, be such as 
to restrict their volume because it affects marketing opportunities for the imported 
products. The possibility cannot be ruled out that to compel a producer either to adopt 
advertising or sales promotion schemes which differ from one Member State to 
another or to discontinue a scheme which he considers to be particularly effective may 
constitute an obstacle to imports’.250 
Kieninger argues that the granting of credit is probably the most basic form of pro-
moting the sale of goods and that, in particular, when an international transaction is 
concerned, the seller will want a security right strengthening his claim as he cannot 
check, or would find it very difficult to check, a buyer’s creditworthiness.251 She 
therefore argues that the granting of credit together with the creation of a property 
security right, in her terms a retention of title, can be seen as a method for a seller to 
market its products.252 
A national measure of property law in combination with rules on private inter-
national law restricting a seller to use the same security right in the same way as he 
would in a purely domestic situation, might therefore, as a MEQR, be contrary to 
Article 28 EC Treaty.253 This reasoning remains in line with the Keck and Mithouard 
decision because the certain selling arrangement affects the traders in the same way 
in law, but not in fact. Rules of property law are therefore not excluded from the 
scope of Article 28.254 
Rutgers agrees with Kieninger’s conclusion, but does not base her conclusion 
on the Oosthoek formula.255 Instead, she bases her conclusion directly on the applica-
tion of Keck and Mithouard to rules of property law.256 In Rutgers’ view, these rules 
relate to certain selling arrangements that are capable of discriminating against 
 
249 Case C-315/92 Verband socialer Wettbewerb e.V. v Clinique Laboratories S.N.C. and others [1994] 
ECR I-317. Kieninger 1996b, p. 59-60, Kieninger 1996a, p. 153-155. 
250 Case 286/81 Criminal proceedings against Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV [1982] ECR 4575, 
Para. 15. On the same conclusion see Basedow 1995, p. 43. 
251 Kieninger 1996b, p. 60, Rutgers 1999, p. 199. 
252 Kieninger 1996b, p. 61. 
253 Kieninger 1996b, p. 62, see also Kieninger 2006, p. 166. See also Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 111-
112, Israël 2005, p. 110-111. 
254 This would only be so when the burden would apply in the same way in law and in fact. 
Kieninger 1996a, p. 159-162. 
255 Rutgers 1999, p. 199. 
256 See Rutgers 1999, p. 176 et seq. 
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foreign nationals using property security rights.257 When a property right created in 
one Member State is not recognised in another Member State, in other words it 
cannot be effectively transformed into a property right that is recognised in the 
receiving Member State, the measure affects traders in a different way. In fact it 
hinders intra-Community trade, and therefore constitutes a MEQR under Article 28 
EC Treaty.258 
Von Wilmowsky also considers the applicability of Article 28 EC Treaty to 
property law, especially in the light of limitations on party autonomy in respect of 
the creation of property security rights through the operation of private internation-
al law.259 He comes to the conclusion that, in an international setting, party agree-
ments made in relation to security rights, for example, reservation of ownership 
clauses, will always be treated differently than agreements in a purely national 
setting. After all, the question on the applicable law of a security right will only be 
at stake in an international setting. Therefore, the requirement of equal burden in 
Keck and Mithouard will never be met in these cases.260 
Moreover, the analysis of Kieninger, Rutgers and Von Wilmowsky is of re-
newed relevance because of the movement of the ECJ towards a market access test 
in the area on the free movement of goods.261 The emphasis on market access as 
opposed to requiring a strict distinction between rules relating to product character-
istics and to certain selling arrangements, in particular, when the selling arrange-
ments do have an effect of discriminating against foreign goods, allows for a con-
sistent approach with the other freedoms, where this type of distinction has not 
been recognised. In respect to private law and the applicability of European law, a 
market access test allows the focus to remain on the effect of a measure without the 
need to unnecessarily characterise the rules in terms of marketing concepts first. 
In order for private law to be subject to the rules of the Internal Market under 
the market access test, an effect on intra-Community trade will have to be proven. 
Under the market access test, a return to the Dassonville criteria might be possible 
and a potential indirect effect might be sufficient. The distinction between product 
characteristics and selling arrangements would lose some significance.262 However, 
for as long as it remains unclear whether the market access test is sufficient, the 
rules under Keck and Mithouard and the case law after that require the trader himself 
 
257 Rutgers 1999, p. 195, 200. 
258 Rutgers 1999, p. 196-198. 
259 Von Wilmowsky comes to the question of selling arrangements after a discussion of the 
Krantz judgment of the ECJ. On this case see below in this same Section. Von Wilmowsky 
1996, p. 51-52. 
260 Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 52. 
261 See, in this respect, Weatherhill 2006, p. 132-133, Barnard 2007, p. 150-151, Craig & De Búrca 
2007, p. 690-695. See, recently, Case C-297/05 Commission v The Netherlands [2007] ECR I-7467, 
on Dutch law imposing a roadworthiness test prior to registration of foreign vehicles. 
Limitations on roadworthiness because of environmental reasons and limitations on publicity 
because of creditor protection can possibly be compared. In this case the ECJ simply applies 
the Dassonville-formula without going into the question of product characteristics or certain 
selling arrangements. 
262 On this development in case law see above; 2.2.1. Free Movement of Goods. 
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to show the actual and substantial effect on intra-Community trade of a national 
measure of property law.263  
2.4.2.2. Grounds for Justification 
When the conclusion is drawn that a measure is contrary to Article 28 EC Treaty, 
whether as a product characteristic or as a selling arrangement, the method fol-
lowed by the ECJ requires consideration of whether the receiving Member State 
might offer a justification for the effect its measure has on intra-Community trade. 
Because all these cases concern MEQRs the Court’s decision in Cassis de Dijon 
applies. As a result, the national measure can be justified based on the grounds 
mentioned in Article 30 EC Treaty as well as the mandatory requirements.264  
Of the grounds for justification mentioned in Article 30, public policy might be 
used to justify the application of the lex rei sitae in combination with substantive 
property law, with the effect being the non-recognition or partial loss of a foreign 
property security right in a certain Member State. The closed system of property 
rights, which is the reason why a foreign property security right must be trans-
formed, could be held to be of public policy. Moreover, in respect of the mandatory 
requirements it could be argued that the coherence of the system of property rights 
can be invoked as a ground for justification. The list of mandatory requirements is 
not exhaustive, new types can be added.  
Basedow expresses the most conservative view.265 In considering whether the 
application of the combination of lex rei sitae and national property law, and its 
negative effects on intra-Community trade, might be justified, he states: 
Furthermore the system of property law, that is to say the clear descriptions of proper-
ty rights in respect of objects subject to trade, is a concept of economic constitutional 
importance for the organisation of markets; in so far the system of property rights is 
part of public policy, in which interests a Member State under Art. 36 EC [now 30 EC] 
may justify discriminatory restrictions to trade.266 
Kieninger examines the underlying principles of the lex rei sitae rule. She states that 
the predominant principle behind the lex rei sitae is ‘the protection of third parties 
who trust that property being within the territory of a certain jurisdiction can only 
 
263 See above; 2.2.1. Free Movement of Goods. Joined Cases C-34-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen 
(KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB and TV-Shop I Sverige AB [1997] ECR I-3843, Case C-
405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen v Gourmet International Products (GIP) [2001] ECR I-1795. 
264 See Case 120/78 Rewe Zentrale v Bundesmonomolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
[1979] ECR 649. See above; 2.2.1. Free Movement of Goods. 
265 Basedow 1995, p. 41 et seq. 
266 ‘Um übrigen besitzt aber die Güterordnung, d.h. die eindeutige Umschreibung der ding-
lichen Rechte an Handelsgütern, eine geradezu wirtschaftsverfassungsrechtliche Bedeutung 
für die Organisation von Märkten; insofern ist die Güterordnung Teil der öffentliche 
Ordnung, in deren Interesse der einzelne Mitgliedstaat gemäß Art. 36 EGV diskriminierende 
Handelsbeschränkungen verhängen kann’. Basedow 1995, p. 45. On this quote Rutgers 1999, 
p. 202. For a similar conclusion in respect of Dutch law, see Van der Weide 2006, p. 226-229. 
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be charged according to the laws of that jurisdiction’.267 She also examines the 
closed system of property rights as well as the rules on publicity. Also in respect to 
these elements, Kieninger, in agreement with Basedow, argues that they exist to 
protect third parties against unknown property rights, either, in case of publicity, in 
respect to ranking and existence of other security rights, or, in case of the system of 
property rights, against unknown property rights in general.268 She therefore agrees 
with Basedow that the system of property rights, but in her case in combination 
with the protection of third parties, in particular other creditors, could be a suf-
ficient reason to justify a restrictive measure falling under Article 28 EC.269  
Von Wilmowsky also deals with the question of grounds for justification. He 
focuses, like Kieninger, on the justifications for the lex rei sitae rule. In his view, each 
Member State has the exclusive authority to deal with the organisation of property 
security rights in its own legal system. Member States do this to protect third parties 
who do not have a property security right against secured creditors that allows 
these creditors to take the full set of assets of an insolvent debtor.270 Therefore, Von 
Wilmowsky argues, Member States should be allowed to invoke this authority as a 
justification for imposing measures that might fall under Article 28 EC Treaty.271  
2.4.2.3. Proportionality 
The next step in the process of evaluating grounds for justification is to see whether 
the measure imposed by a Member State is proportional to the aim pursued.272 
When it comes to the question of proportionality, Kieninger raises the question of 
whether outright refusal of recognition of a foreign property right within the Com-
munity is the most moderate method possible.273 In this respect, the type of justifi-
cation that is used must be closely examined. When public policy is of importance, 
the rule in question must be applied consistently in the Member State in order for 
the Member State to be able to invoke it. When the rule is not applied consistently it 
can no longer be part of public policy and hence it cannot be used as a possible justi-
fication for a measure falling under Article 28 EC Treaty.274 
Taking into consideration the current state of property law, as well as the in-
creased pressure on the system of property law from contract law, Kieninger ques-
tions whether the ECJ would accept that public policy as a ground for justification 
would pass the proportionality test.275 Rutgers agrees with this conclusion and 
 
267 Kieninger 1996b, p. 63, see also Kieninger 1996a, p. 165-167. 
268 Kieninger 1996a, p. 168-173. 
269 Kieninger 1996a, p. 173-174. See also Kieninger 1996b, p. 63-64. 
270 Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 123. 
271 Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 122-124. 
272 On the proportionality test and private law see, inter alia, Israël 2005, p. 119-120.  
273 Kieninger 1996a, p. 210. See also Centros, in which the court also held an outright refusal of 
legal capacity of a company could be disproportional. See above; 2.2.2. Freedom of 
Establishment and its Effect on Substantive Private Law. 
274 Kieninger 1996b, p. 64-65. 
275 Kieninger 1996b, p. 65. See e.g. Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227. On this 
case see, inter alia, Barnard 2007, p. 122-123. 
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affirms that, if there is no consistency in national property law, the ECJ will not 
easily accept the argument of a Member State that, because of the consistency of a 
national system, foreign influences may be rejected.276  
A possible example of a less disproportionate solution can be taken from Swiss 
private international law, which does not automatically recognise a reservation of 
ownership created in another jurisdiction. However, instead of refusing recognition 
immediately, a period of three months is given to the security owner to register his 
right in Switzerland, and so to bring his right in conformity with Swiss law.277 When 
the three-month period is not complied with, Swiss law refuses recognition.278 
Von Wilmowsky also deals extensively with the question of proportionality.279 
The justification of Member States that they have the exclusive authority to deal 
with the organisation of property security rights to protect creditors, especially un-
secured creditors, is, in his view, not likely to pass the proportionality test. Many 
Member States use a restricted number of property security rights in respect of 
movable objects. These restrictions are usually explained with a statement that a res-
tricted number of rights protect creditors. However, at the same time these Member 
States might recognise additional preferential positions in insolvency through, for 
example, priority rights.280 
Proportionality is not an easy subject. The outcome of the proportionality test 
very much depends on the reasoning of the Court. What is clear is that in cases 
where the European legislature has not been active, the Court will allow Member 
States more freedom to choose a certain degree of regulation.281 
The first part of the proportionality test of the ECJ comprises the question of 
suitability. When other solutions can be employed that have a less extensive effect 
on intra-Community trade, this is a sign that the measure is not suitable for the aim 
pursued.282 Von Wilmowsky states that the justification of Member States to be 
allowed to organise their own national systems of property security rights is aimed 
at protecting unsecured creditors from an empty set of assets after the secured cred-
itors have claimed their share. By only allowing a limited set of property security 
rights, it is likely that the unsecured creditors will be left with something in the 
insolvency to claim from. Von Wilmowsky argues that enacting a rule that a per-
centage of all objects in insolvency is open specifically for unsecured creditors is 
another way of protecting unsecured creditors.283 
The second part of the proportionality test is the question of necessity. It is in 
this part of the test that the Court looks at the effect of the measure and critically 
reviews it in the light of the aim that is pursued.284 The creditor protection rule is 
 
276 Rutgers 1999, p. 205-206. 
277 Art. 102(2) IPRG, see Van der Weide 2006, p. 38-39. 
278 Bundesgericht 6 July 1967, JDI 1976, 469-470, Art. 715(1) ZGB. Van der Weide 2006, p. 39. 
279 Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 133-149. 
280 Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 134-135. 
281 See Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227. Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 706-709. 
282 On the proportionality test see above; 2.2.1. Free Movement of Goods. Von Wilmowsky 1996, 
p. 135-136. 
283 Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 136. 
284 See Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227. 
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founded on the principle of paritas creditorum, which is the equality of creditors. In 
respect of this principle, Von Wilmowsky holds that Member States themselves 
choose to make exceptions by granting holders of a property security right a prefer-
ential position compared with unsecured creditors.285 This, in his view, is also 
necessary, because the functioning of the economy is dependent on the existence of 
secured creditors.286 The protection of unsecured creditors is therefore in his view 
less important than the protection of the functioning of the Internal Market through 
the recognition of secured creditors. As a general group, therefore, unsecured cred-
itors should not be protected.287 However, there are unsecured creditors that 
deserve protection, for example, employees and consumers, but Von Wilmowsky 
argues these should be protected in a different way than by refusal to recognise 
foreign property security rights.288 In Von Wilmowsky’s view, therefore, the meas-
ure of a Member State and the statement that this measure is taken because the 
Member State has the exclusive authority to organise the system of property securi-
ty rights in order to protect unsecured creditors is not likely to be proportional to 
the aim pursued. A measure restricting intra-Community trade that falls under 
Article 28 EC Treaty would therefore be in violation of EC law. 
The same reasoning can be used in respect of the justifications advocated by 
Basedow and Kieninger. When the closed system of property rights is presented as 
a measure to protect third parties against unknown property rights, the same 
questions of suitability and necessity must be asked. Possibly, in this respect, 
because of the complete absence of Community law, the ECJ will take into account 
the exclusive powers of the Member States in this field.289 In the absence of Com-
munity legislation, Member States are free to choose the measures they deem 
appropriate to fulfil the aim they seek to pursue. However, although the ECJ will 
accept this, Member States must choose those measures that have the least restric-
tive effect on the Internal Market.290 The Court will investigate whether there are 
other, less restrictive measures in respect to trade which could fulfil the same aim. 
In respect to property rights, publicity could possibly offer a less restrictive meas-
ure.291 Therefore, the general refusal of a Member State to recognise the full validity 
and effect of property rights created in another Member State, even though Member 
States are entitled to give form and content to their own system of property rela-
tions, is not likely to pass the test of proportionality.  
2.4.2.4. Example: Krantz 
In one of the relatively few cases touching upon aspects of property law, the ECJ 
exactly focused on this aspect. In its decision in Krantz, the Court was confronted 
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with a reservation of ownership clause in a contract of sale of a machine concluded 
between a German company, Krantz GmbH, and a Dutch company, J. Krantz & 
Zoon NV.292 The Dutch company placed the machine in the possession of another 
Dutch company, Vaalser Textielbedrijf BV. When both of the Dutch companies 
became insolvent, the Dutch collector of taxes seized all movable objects available 
on the premises of the insolvent companies to recover unpaid tax. The machine had 
not been paid for, and the German company invoked its reservation of ownership, 
claiming it was still the owner of the machine and could revindicate it. The Dutch 
collector of taxes, based on a provision of Dutch law, did not allow this until the 
German company paid the outstanding taxes.293 After payment, the Germany com-
pany went to court claiming the seizure made by the tax collector was contrary to 
Article 28 EC Treaty, because the application of Dutch law restricted trade between 
Germany and the Netherlands.294 The ECJ was not convinced and held that: 
‘It must, however, be observed that the national provision referred to by the national 
court applies without distinction to both domestic and imported goods, and does not 
seek to control trade with other Member States. 
… Furthermore, the possibility that nationals of other Member States would hesitate to 
sell goods on instalment terms to purchasers in the Member State concerned because 
such goods would be liable to seizure by the collector of taxes if the purchasers failed 
to discharge their Netherlands tax debts is too uncertain and indirect to warrant the 
conclusion that a national provision authorizing such seizure is liable to hinder trade 
between Member States’.295 
In this slightly disappointing judgment the ECJ did not accept that there was sub-
stantial hindrance to intra-Community trade. It is not entirely clear why the Court 
did not investigate the effects of the restrictions to property security further. When 
closely examined, it could very well be that the trade between Member States is 
affected because parties will demand a different, more demanding and more 
expensive, but safer, security right.  
In respect of these more expensive security rights, the reasoning of Advocate 
General Darmon could be of relevance. The Advocate General argued that because 
of the specific nature of the right of seizure of the Dutch tax authorities, which is 
restricted to movables available on the premises, but not stocks of the company, the 
restriction to trade was minimal.296 In other words, if the case would have had a 
more general application, the result could have been that foreign traders would 
 
292 Case C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen en de Staat der 
Nederlanden [1990] ECR I-583. 
293 Specifically, Art. 16 Invorderingswet.  
294 On this case see, inter alia, Kieninger 1996a, p. 156-157, Rutgers 1999, p. 197, Barnard 2007,  
p. 139-140. 
295 Case C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen en de Staat der 
Nederlanden [1990] ECR I-583, Paras. 10 and 11. 
296 Case C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen en de Staat der 
Nederlanden [1990] ECR I-583, Opinion AG Darmon, Paras. 12 and 16. Although it is generally 
held that Art. 28 EC is not subject to a de minimis rule. On this subject, see Barnard 2007,  
p. 162-165. 
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demand more expensive security rights for an international transaction. Domestic 
traders in a purely domestic situation can rely on the national system and will not 
require the creation of such more demanding or more expensive security rights. 
Therefore the application of the lex rei sitae rule in combination with domestic law 
could result in an actual and substantial hindrance to intra-Community trade under 
Article 28 EC. Whether such a rule can be justified under Article 30 or one of the 
mandatory requirements will depend on the ground for justification and the 
circumstances of the case. 
2.4.2.5. Evaluation 
It is very likely that a Member State will try to invoke the public policy exception 
and state that its domestic law is intended to safeguard the system of property law, 
as well as third-party protection, both for creditors as well as for other third parties. 
Whether such justifications will be allowed will depend on the Member State in 
question. It is clear, as this study shows, as well as those conducted by Kieninger 
and Rutgers, that the closed system of property rights is not always applied con-
sistently at a national level. It will be difficult under the standing case law for the 
ECJ to accept that a foreign property right is not recognised, whereas in domestic 
law several new property rights have been recognised.297 
In deciding whether a measure can be justified under Article 30 EC Treaty or 
the mandatory requirements, the ECJ will look at the aim that the measure seeks to 
protect. When, however, such an aim has already been fulfilled under the law of the 
Member State in which the good originates, it is not likely to accept the double 
burden imposed on it by the receiving Member State.298  
In other words, the case law of the ECJ requires a Member State to accept the 
actions taken by one Member State in the pursuit of a certain aim, in this case third-
party protection and creditor protection, and does not allow the receiving Member 
State to impose measures pursuing the same aim. When a Member State does 
impose such a double burden, this burden must not only fall within the categories 
mentioned in Article 30 EC or one of the mandatory requirements, but must also be 
proportionate, or, in other words, suitable and necessary. 
It seems unlikely that the outright refusal to recognise a foreign property right 
from within the EU will pass the test the ECJ imposes.299 Even in case of transforma-
tion or assimilation of a property right, the application of national law would fall 
under Article 28 EC Treaty, with the result being the loss of certain rights the right 
 
297 See Barnard 2007, p. 122-123. 
298 See Case 220/81 Criminal proceedings against Timothy Frederick Robertson and others [1982] ECR 
2349, Para. 12, Case 27/80, Criminal proceedings against Anton Adriaan Fietje [1980] ECR 3839, 
Para. 12. Basedow 1995, p. 22, Kieninger 1996a, p. 181-183, 191. 
299 In this respect, a direct comparison to Cassis de Dijon can be made. In that case the Court held 
that an outright refusal of blackcurrant liqueur on the German market as ‘liqueur’ was dis-
proportionate and labelling requirements could solve the same objections than those under-
lying the refusal. In respect to property law the same question could be asked. What 
measures, i.e. labelling requirements, can be taken by the producer at the time of bringing the 
product on the market to fulfil the same objections as the outright refusal does? 
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holder had under the law of the original Member State. These measures could 
hardly be justified. Moreover, should a ground for justification be accepted, the pro-
portionality test of the ECJ is likely to capture the ground for justification, making 
the measure in violation of EC law. 
When a Member State uses third-party and creditor protection as a possible 
ground for justification, the case law of the ECJ in respect of the freedom of estab-
lishment is recalled. Especially in Inspire Art, the Dutch government argued that, in 
Dutch law, a private limited company requires a certain capital in order to protect 
creditors against an ‘empty’ company.300 The ECJ held that creditors have some 
responsibility of their own and must rely on the national law of the original 
Member State that protects their interests, or insist on additional security form the 
company when dealing with it.301 In this respect the Court stated: 
‘… with regard to protection of creditors, and there being no need for the Court to con-
sider whether the rules on minimum share capital constitute in themselves an ap-
propriate protection measure, it is clear that Inspire Art holds itself out as a company 
governed by the law of England and Wales and not as a Netherlands company. Its 
potential creditors are put on sufficient notice that it is covered by legislation other 
than that regulating the formation in the Netherlands of limited liability companies 
and, in particular, laying down rules in respect of minimum capital and directors’ 
liability …’302 
As a result of this reasoning, there is at least a possibility, if not an obligation, for 
Member States to deal effectively with property rights created in other Member 
States. However, the burden of proof will be on the trader to show that there is an 
actual and substantive impediment to intra-Community trade. When the trader 
succeeds, the burden of proof is placed on the Member State, which will to attempt 
to use the system of property law, creditor and third-party protection as possible 
grounds for justification. When these grounds for justification of a national measure 
that actually and substantially hinders intra-Community trade have been put for-
ward, the Court will examine the proportionality of such measure, and might 
conclude that the measure refusing to recognise or only partly recognise a property 
right is contrary to European law.303 
From a property law perspective, we see numerus clausus playing a different 
role in the field of European private international law. The reasons used to justify a 
closed system of property rights are the same in private international law as they 
are in national law. In particular, when the public policy exception is invoked, and 
 
300 See Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] 
ECR I-10155, Paras. 82 and 142. See also Case 212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- of Selsabsstryrelsen 
[1999] ECR I-1459. 
301 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR 
I-10155, Para. 125. 
302 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR 
I-10155, Para. 135. Although it should be added that in respect of the information for creditors 
there is some Community law guaranteeing information that does not exist in the area of 
property law. 
303 See Kieninger 2005, p. 166. 
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the effect of the application of the numerus clausus is a direct limitation on party 
autonomy, an alteration of party autonomy when a foreign property right is trans-
formed into the national property law system in the same way as a domestic party 
agreement would be altered by the numerus clausus, the effect of the application of 
the numerus clausus is a protection of the domestic market to the detriment of a 
foreign market that imposes its own regulations of public policy on the existence of 
property rights already.  
Another function, therefore, of numerus clausus is the protection of the national 
system of property law. However, when it comes to European law and, especially, 
the creation of an Internal Market, there is a tension between this protective func-
tion of numerus clausus and the principle of mutual recognition, most visible in the 
area of free movement of goods.  
2.4.2.6. Other Freedoms 
When it comes to a relation between two private parties, whereby one of the parties 
is in violation of EU law, possibly one of the other freedoms can be invoked.304 An 
example can be found in the area of free movement of services, in particular the 
freedom to provide services. Invoking other freedoms, in particular the freedom of 
services of Article 49 EC Treaty, could result in a case against a Member State for the 
contra-European effect of a provision of private international law in combination 
with a provision of substantive property law, but could also enable a private party 
to invoke European law directly against another private party. 
In respect to the freedom to provide services, a bank losing the security right 
that it received in exchange for the granting of credit, a commercial service that 
banks provide, could possibly invoke Article 49 EC Treaty. In order for a measure 
which has the effect of depriving the bank of its security right to be justified it 
would have to fulfil four conditions. The measure must be applied in a non-discrim-
inatory manner, it must be justified by a imperative requirement in the public inter-
est, which is the equivalent of mandatory requirements in the area of free move-
ment of goods, the measure must be suitable for the aim it pursues, and, finally, it 
must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim.305 
The requirements for the justification of measures in the area of free move-
ment of goods are very similar to those required in the case of freedom to provide 
services. The fact that a measure must not discriminate in its application either, 
creates special difficulties for the justification used by a Member State. In the case of 
freedom to move goods, it is exactly the discriminatory effect of the lex rei sitae rule 
in combination with a provision of substantive property law depriving a national of 
another Member State from his property right, that might bring the combination of 
 
304 It should be noted that Art. 28 EC has not been awarded horizontal direct effect, but that this 
effect has been recognised in respect to the other freedoms. See Van den Bogaert 2002, p. 144-
145. 
305 See, in case of freedom of establishment, Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken 
voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR I-10155, Para. 133. 
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national measures under Article 28 EC. There is no reason to assume that, in case of 
the freedom to provide services, this conclusion would be different.  
The freedom to provide services might be highly relevant when it comes to 
immovable objects. Traditionally, property law in respect of immovable objects has 
been seen as a purely domestic aspect of property law, not subject to European law. 
However, as the developments towards a right of Euro-mortgage show, there is an 
increasing need for banks to create a European property security right in respect of 
immovables.306  
In terms of the freedom to provide services, the question can be posed why a 
bank in one Member State can provide a service, mortgage lending, to nationals in 
the same Member State by using one property right, but is required to create 
another, more expensive, property right in another Member State in respect of that 
same national? Possibly a bank could also invoke the freedom of services if it is able 
to show that the requirement of creating a foreign security right constitutes a 
hindrance to intra-Community trade.307 With respect to Article 49 EC Treaty, the 
Member State would face the same problems with the justification of a national 
measure; both in selecting a possible justification and in showing that the measure 
is proportional. With regard to public policy and creditor and third-party protec-
tion, Kieninger’s and Rutgers’ conclusions on the lack of consistency and propor-
tionality remain valid.308 
As a final possibility, horizontal direct effect might be helpful in a case where a 
private party provided a service, such as a bank, in the granting of credit, and the 
bank refuses to recognise a property security right created in another Member State. 
In such a situation the bank’s client that offered the security right might argue that 
the refusal of the bank is contrary to the free movement of services.  
2.4.2.7. Conclusion 
The effect of Internal Market law on substantive property law is substantial. The 
national property laws of the Member States are designed as coherent systems, 
especially as systems of property rights, no deviations are accepted. Internally, these 
systems are under pressure, in particular from influences coming from contract law. 
This analysis shows that there is also serious pressure externally, from outside the 
national system of property law. 
In terms of numerus clausus it could very well be that a national legal system is 
forced by European law to recognise an unknown, foreign, type of property right. 
When this happens, the numerus clausus in that Member State will be extended with 
an additional property right and the legal system will face difficulties. To what 
extent the legal system of a Member State will experience difficulties depends on 
 
306 See, for the most recent developments in this area, White Paper on Mortgage Credit Markets 
COM(2007) 807 final. 
307 On the shift in focus to services in respect to immovable objects, see Sparkes 2007, p. 521-522. 
Moreover, a bank could invoke the free movement of capital. See Case C-222/97 Manfred 
Trummer v Peter Mayer [1999] ECR I-1661. 
308 Kieninger 1996b, p. 65, Rutgers 1999, p. 205-206. 
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the analysis of the effect of the applicability of European law. Some might argue 
that a newly recognised property right can only be used in case of an intra-Com-
munity trade situation, whereas others may argue that this new property right 
should also be available to nationals of the receiving Member State. Preventing na-
tionals access to a property right that is available to competitors, in the case of intra-
Community trade, seems unequal treatment and might be covered by European law 
as well.309 
In any case, European law adds a dimension to the discussion on the remain-
ing validity of a closed system of property rights by adding an imminent external 
pressure. It is therefore not surprising that authors such as Basedow and Kieninger 
expect Member States to use the public policy exception to save their national 
systems of property law.310 However, should a Member State not succeed in justify-
ing restrictive measures, it would be confronted with the pragmatism of European 
law. 
If the national property law systems of the Member States of the European 
Union are connected through the application of Internal Market law, it can be 
questioned whether these national property law systems are still really purely 
national. If all these systems are linked and property rights created in one Member 
State might have effect in another Member State if needed, this signals the rise of a 
new system of property law, a European property law. However, what the status of 
the system of property rights in European property law is depends on how a 
European property law is constructed. 
3. The Making of European Property Law 
The above analysis has shown that there is a substantial influence of European law 
on national property law.311 This influence comes not only from European rules on 
national contract law, but also from European rules on property law itself. More-
over, there is a potential influence of European law on the rules of private interna-
tional law, in particular on the rules of private international law in respect to prop-
erty law. When this increasing influence is taken into account, and an overview is 
provided of the consequences and possible consequences on national systems of 
property law, a fragmented picture arises. The explanation why this is a fragmented 
picture can be found in the method the European legislature must follow in order to 
be able to legislate. 
Without proof of a hindrance to the functioning of the Internal Market under 
one of the provisions in the EC Treaty, legislation cannot be adopted. Therefore, 
 
309 See Art. 12 EC. It has been argued, although the courts have not explicitly dealt with this, that 
because of the Constitutional concept of equality in the Italian Constitution, a trust relation 
recognised under the Hague Convention should also be open to Italian nationals. The Italian 
courts have recognised this through the recognition of an internal trust, but not specifically 
on the basis of equality. See Braun 2006, p. 797 et seq. 
310 Basedow 1995, p. 45, Kieninger 1996a, p. 210, Kieninger 1996b, p. 65. See also Roth 1999, p. 57-
58, Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 122. 
311 The title of this section is inspired by the title used by Smits. See Smits 2002. 
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European legislation is issued in specific areas that require harmonisation. In 
European private law, legislation therefore virtually does not deal with general as-
pects of private law. Decisions of the European Court of Justice are also taken in 
specific areas that require the Court’s attention. In these cases, a specific barrier to 
the functioning of the Internal Market has arisen.  
In other words, the European method of legislating and guarding the func-
tioning of the Internal Market might allow the development of general underlying 
principles in respect to the functioning of the Internal Market, but this method does 
not necessarily allow room for underlying principles of the substantive private law 
they are dealing with.312 
Private law, and property law in particular, is an area of law in which under-
lying concepts and principles are highly relevant. When, under the influence of the 
functioning of the Internal Market, a European property law is formed, the need to 
answer some fundamental questions of European private law, in particular 
European property law, arises. These questions have been answered, be it to differ-
ent degrees, in the private law systems of the Member States. Consequently, now 
that the European legislature is involved in law-making in this area, there is no 
reason why this European legislature should be exempted from answering these 
questions. As a minimum, therefore, the European legislature should deal with 
fundamental principles of private law. 
In dealing with European property law, the principle of numerus clausus 
should take centre stage. The principle of numerus clausus is the fundamental prin-
ciple of property law guarding the door that grants access to the other principles 
and rules of property law.313 Possibly, the European legislature could take the prin-
ciple of numerus clausus as its starting point and, with it, give form to a more coher-
ent European property law. 
This final section will deal with these three aspects of European property law. 
First, the influence of European law on the national legal systems will be placed in 
the perspective of the general development of a European property law, and a 
closer look will be taken at the current state of European property law.314 Second, 
when a European property law is created, two fundamental choices should be 
made, one on the separation between the law of obligations and the law of property 
and one on the system of property rights.315 Thirdly and finally, after these funda-
mental questions have been answered, the principle of numerus clausus could fulfil a 
leading role in the further development of European property law.316 A model, 
 
312 There is an increasing body of literature that examines the influence of general principles of 
Community law. For a good overview and also a discussion on the influence of these princi-
ples on private law relations, see Devroe 2007, p. 133 et seq. 
313 Van Erp 2006b, p. 14-17. 
314 Below; 3.1. The Influence of European Law on National Property Law Systems, and 3.2. The 
Status of European Property Law. 
315 Below; 3.3. Two Fundamental Questions for a Coherent European Property Law. 
316 Below; 3.4. A Possible Model for a European Property Law: Numerus Clausus as a Constitu-
tive Element of European Property Law. 
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based on the comparative research in this study, will be presented as a possible 
solution to take the development of European property law forward. 
3.1. The Influence of European Law on National Property Law Systems 
The influence of European law on private law is twofold. Through European leg-
islation, issued in the form of Regulations and Directives, the European legislature 
can harmonise law in the Member States to different degrees.317 Furthermore, 
through the case law of the European Court of Justice, certain areas of private law 
can be strongly affected.318 
The effect of European legislation on the private law of the Member States is 
that, either based directly on European law, or based indirectly on European law 
through the implementation of a Directive into the national law of a Member State, 
the contents of the laws of the Member States are made similar.319 In the area of 
property law, where national legal systems form a doctrinally coherent system, 
European legislation, based on different, usually pragmatic, considerations, will not 
automatically fit in. In the case of Directives, the most often used method of 
European legislation in the area of European private law, the Member States are 
allowed freedom to implement the European rules in the national doctrinally coher-
ent system. Implementation allows the Member States some freedom to maintain 
the national coherence of the private law system. 
However, on some occasions, choices that were made by national legislatures 
must be set aside to enable the implementation of European legislation. In the area 
of property law, the Late-payments Directive forced Member States to create the 
possibility for private parties to reserve the right of ownership for security purposes 
by introducing a reservation of ownership or retention of title.320 Furthermore, the 
Directive on Financial Collateral Arrangements forced Member States to adopt the 
possibility for parties to transfer the right of ownership for security purposes, as 
well as the recognition of a right of pledge that allows the pledgee to keep the object 
under pledge in case of non-performance by the debtor.321 
Member States that had made different doctrinal choices were forced to re-
consider these choices and possibly to create exceptions. The Netherlands offers two 
clear examples of solutions that were found to circumvent an undesirable 
application of international and European rules to the general provisions on proper-
 
317 Art. 249 EC. 
318 E.g., in the area of company law the ECJ’s case law on the freedom of establishment has led to 
a change in substantive company law in some Member States. See above; 2.2.2. Freedom of 
Establishment and its Effect on Substantive Private Law. 
319 For examples of European legislation in the area of private law, see above; 2.1.2. Legal 
Framework: Secondary Community Law. 
320 See Art. 4 Directive 2000/35 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 
on combating late payment in commercial transactions. 
321 Directive 2000/35 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on com-
bating late payment in commercial transactions. This Directive caused a discussion in the 
Netherlands whether an actual introduction of a transfer of ownership for security purposes 
was required. For an overview of the discussion, see Van Vliet 2005, p. 190 et seq. 
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ty law.322 First, the introduction of the Directive on Financial Collateral Arrange-
ments was implemented in the section of the Civil Code on special contracts. This 
implementation was effected under explicit statement that the proprietary effects of 
financial collateral arrangements would not violate the general principles of Dutch 
property law, in particular the prohibition of a transfer of ownership for security 
purposes. Secondly, the Dutch legislature had already been creative with this fi-
ducia-ban, which is the prohibition of a transfer of ownership for a specific purpose, 
when the Hague Trust Convention was ratified.323 Although this Convention is not 
directly an example of European law, the ratification of the Hague Convention 
shows the unwillingness of the Dutch legislature to amend the general rules of 
property law in the light of international developments.  
The law that ratified the Convention explicitly states that the fiducia-ban does 
not apply in case of a trust that is recognised under the application of the Conven-
tion.324 There is no reason to assume that in case of the implementation of European 
legislation, the Dutch legislature would make a different choice. This argument is 
only strengthened by the implementation of the Financial Collateral Arrangements 
Directive in the Netherlands. 
Next to the influence of European substantive law on the property law 
systems of the Member States, the European Court of Justice has also contributed to 
the creation and perfection of the Internal Market. Not only in the area of free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital, but also in the area of competi-
tion law, the Court has been a motor for European integration.325 In the area of 
private law, the four freedoms have been particularly important.326 Especially in the 
area of company law, the free movement of persons, in the form of the freedom of 
establishment, has led to major changes.327 
In respect to the free movement of goods, beginning with the Court’s land-
mark decision in Cassis de Dijon, in which the Court introduced the concept of 
mutual recognition, the Court has made a substantial contribution to the formation 
of the Internal Market.328 The recognition of the principle of mutual recognition, the 
idea of equivalence of national standards, allowed the European Commission to 
focus its lawmaking activities on those areas that the ECJ left aside.329 In other 
 
322 Another example is offered through the implementation of Directive 2003/87/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC. The implementation of this Directive forced the Dutch legislator to 
adapt an abstract transfer system for emission rights, but only for emission rights under the 
directive, leaving the causal transfer system in the general provisions on property law 
untouched. On this development see Van Erp 2004c, p. 539-540, Van Erp 2006a, p. 1065-1066. 
323 The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition. On this 
convention and property law, see Sparkes 2007, p. 509-517. 
324 Art. 4 Wet Conflictenrecht Trusts (WCT), see Chapter 5; 4.9. EC and International Influences. 
325 Barnard 2007, p. 17-23. 
326 See above; 2.2. The ECJ as a Motor for the Development of European Private Law. 
327 See above; 2.2.2. Freedom of Establishment and its Effect on Substantive Private Law. 
328 Barnard 2007, p. 18-19. 
329 See Communication from the Commission regarding the Cassis de Dijon judgment [1980] OJ 
C256/2. Barnard 2007, p. 114-115, Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 714-716. 
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words, in those areas where the ECJ was active, the Commission could focus its 
attention elsewhere. The Court, in its turn, would accept the existence of European 
legislation in its case law on free movement.330 
The interpretation the Commission attached to the Cassis de Dijon judgment 
has consequences for the law-making authorities in the Member States. National 
legislators remain free to regulate their own national market, but must accept and 
recognise the market rules from other Member States as well.331 
In respect to the law of property, the case law of the ECJ in the area of the free 
movement of goods is of special interest. When the law of property is, in European 
law terminology, considered as a measure, or as a set of measures, the rules on the 
Internal Market can certainly be applied to property law.332 The analysis of the case 
law of the ECJ and the work of Kieninger, Rutgers, and Von Wilmowsky in this 
field shows that it could very well be possible that rules of property law of the 
Member State, in their application in the Internal Market, constitute a violation of 
the principles on the free movement of goods.333 Applying the case law of the ECJ to 
property law centres on the application of rules of national property law in an 
Internal Market setting. In the law of property, this Internal Market setting arises 
when the property law systems of two Member States come into conflict with each 
other, and, most importantly, the application of one of these legal systems leads to 
an actual and substantial disturbance of the functioning of the Internal Market.  
In terms of traditional private law, the case law of the ECJ in respect of the 
four freedoms therefore also concerns private international law. The effects of this 
are substantial. Whereas national legal systems are traditionally free to decide on 
the application of foreign law and on the recognition of rights created under the law 
of another jurisdiction, the law of the Internal Market forces Member States to 
accept rules and rights created under those rules from other Member States under 
the principle of mutual recognition. 
3.2. The Status of European Property Law 
The influence of the case law of the European Court of Justice on the national 
systems of private law, both substantive rules of private law and private interna-
tional law, in combination with legislative measures taken by the European legis-
lature, lead to a constant influence of European law on national law. Central to this 
approach is that when a national legislature creates a measure of national private 
law, this national legislature is bound by the rules on the Internal Market. This 
reasoning does not only apply to contract law but also to the law of property, con-
 
330 As a result of European legislation, the Court will not accept justifications from Member 
States when a violation of one of the four freedoms has been found. After all, when there is 
European legislation in an area, Member States cannot argue that national legislation resists 
against the application of European law. 
331 Barnard calls this competitive federalism, see Barnard 2007, p. 19-21. See also Craig & De 
Búrca 2007, p. 715-716. 
332 See Kieninger 1996b, p. 41 et seq., Rutgers 1999, p. 167 et seq. 
333 Kieninger 1996a, p. 122 et seq., Rutgers 1999, p. 169 et seq., Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 111-112. 
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sidering the possible application of the free movement of goods, and also poten-
tially of services and capital.334 National property law, therefore, is no longer purely 
national property law.335 
Through the adoption of Regulations and Directives, the European Union has 
already taken the opportunity to regulate some specific areas of property law. Even 
though some of this legislation takes the form of national property law through the 
implementation of Directives, the content of these rules as well as the final inter-
pretation is for the European Union.336 Furthermore, through the potential case law 
of the ECJ on national property law and the application of the lex rei sitae rule, the 
Member States are not only confronted with European law in the area of property 
law, but also with the property law systems of the other Member States. When, 
under the case law of the ECJ, a Member State is forced to recognise a property right 
created in another Member State, elements of foreign property law enter the law of 
the receiving Member State.  
Theoretically, the result of this case law is that there is no longer a comprehen-
sive national list of property rights, as, potentially, property rights created in other 
Member States must be recognised. Unlike under normal rules of private interna-
tional law where jurisdictions themselves decide on the rules concerning recogni-
tion, the rules on the Internal Market take away that power from the Member States. 
Although it will be controversial, if the ECJ should compel Member States to recog-
nise property rights created in another Member State, the rules of private interna-
tional law in respect to the law of property will be made subject to the scrutiny of 
Internal Market law, or, potentially, even be replaced by rules of European law. 
The influence of national property law systems of the Member States on each 
other and the possible forced recognition of property rights created in other Mem-
ber States confront Member States with doctrinal choices made in other Member 
States. Under the traditional model of national property law, the national legislature 
has made doctrinal choices on the separation between the law of obligations and the 
law of property, as well as on the available menu of rights that are dealt with by 
property law.337  
When in a national legal system a choice has been made not to recognise a 
certain property relation, for example security-ownership or anticipation rights, but 
the legal system is forced to recognise such a legal relation under the rules of the 
Internal Market, the receiving jurisdiction is likely to have problems with the 
recognition.338 Under ordinary rules of private international law it is not likely that 
legal relations which were decided against by the receiving legal systems will be 
accepted. But without the possibility to create rules of private international law that 
 
334 On the application of these three freedoms to the law of property, see above; 2.4. The Effects 
of European Law on the Law of Property. 
335 See Joerges 2005, p. 16-19. 
336 On Directives and Regulations that have effect on property law, see above; 2.1.2. Legal 
Framework: Secondary Community Law. 
337 See also Joerges 1997, p. 385. 
338 On these types of rights, see Chapter 7; 2. The Content of Property Law Systems in Europe. 
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are not subject to Internal Market law, Member States are left with only a limited 
possibility to justify non-recognition under the rules of the Internal Market.339 
As a ground for justification, Member States could try to invoke the internal 
coherence of the legal system. However, is not likely that the ECJ will accept this 
argument easily. Especially when comparative research shows that the internal 
coherence is also deviated from by the Member States themselves, either by legisla-
tion or by case law, the ECJ will not be inclined to accept a national coherent system, 
in other words, a rule of numerus clausus, as a valid ground for justification.340 The 
consequence of acceptance of the principle of mutual recognition implies therefore 
also mutual recognition of property law doctrines from other Member States.341 The 
conflicts that arise in national legal systems, therefore, not only concern the specific 
recognition of a certain foreign property right, but also the doctrinal choices that 
support the creation of that certain foreign property right in that other Member 
State. The receiving Member State will have to accommodate these doctrinal choices 
that will often be contrary to its own choices. 
The current fragmented approach, in which there is some European legislation 
and a constant threat of a decision of the ECJ on the law of property, creates 
uncertainty in respect to the relation between European and national property law. 
In theory, all rules of national property law are subject to the rules of the Internal 
Market if they, in combination with the lex rei sitae rule, lead to an actual and sub-
stantial hindrance of intra-Community trade.342 In terms of the modern law on free 
movement of goods, when the application of national property law actually and 
substantially prevents access to the market from another Member State, the national 
measure might be contrary to the rules of the Internal Market, unless it is justified 
and proportional. 
European property law is an area of law in which the pragmatic approach of 
European law reigns. Fundamental aspects, which have been dealt with at the level 
of national property law, are neglected by the European legislature. When property 
law systems were formed or created, national legislatures as well as national courts 
formed the law of property based on assumptions of a separation between the law 
of obligations and the law of property, on the policy question of what can be prop-
erty rights, and on the decision as to which criteria these property rights should be 
subject.343 
National property law systems form a coherent system of law in which con-
cepts and rules are connected to each other to form a system that provides legal 
certainty. At the same time, under the influence of, especially, contract law, there is 
 
339 See above; 2.2. The ECJ as a Motor for the Development of European Private Law. 
340 See also Rutgers 1999, p. 202. See further above; 2.4. The Effects of Internal Market Law on 
Property Law. 
341 See Joerges 1997, p. 385. 
342 As formulated under the Dassonville-formula. See above; 2.2.1. Free Movement of Goods. 
343 Although this formulation sounds very civil law oriented, also in English law these same 
questions have been dealt with. One of the best examples is offered by National Provincial 
Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, HL at 1247-1248 per Lord Wilberforce. On this case see 
Chapter 6; 4. A Numerus Clausus in English Property Law? 
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a tendency to create more flexibility in the law of property and to move to a more 
dynamic system of property law.344 These influences of contract law are received 
carefully and placed in the coherent national system in order to prevent uncertainty 
in respect to the legal status of legal relations. Property law concerns legal relations 
that have effect against third parties. In order to safeguard this third-party effect, 
and having learned lessons from history in which too many property rights led to 
an unbalanced system, for instance under the ancien régime, each property law 
system must strike a balance between legal certainty and flexibility. 
Against the possibility that the ECJ might rule on a question of property law, it 
could be argued that in fact the European Union, as well as the ECJ, has not dealt 
with principal questions of property law yet. Furthermore, in a case where the ECJ 
did go into property law, the Court was very careful in accepting a violation of 
provisions of property law.345 The critical argument would be that, because there is 
no or almost no European activity in this area, the Court would refrain from making 
a fundamental decision.  
Against this argument the ECJ’s judgment in Centros can be recalled. In that 
case the Court held that the fact that company law was not completely harmonised 
did not prevent the Court from giving a decision in which European company law 
was further developed.346 In respect to property law, now that some EU legislation 
is passed on aspects of property law, the same argument could possibly be used.347 
In fact, in a very recent case the ECJ did not refrain from holding a transfer of 
ownership of land invalid, based on European law.348 This decision adds more 
weight to the threat of another ECJ decision ruling against the non-recognition of a 
property right created in another Member State.349 
At this moment, under the current pragmatic decision-making procedure of 
the European Union, if a decision of the ECJ on national property law should arise, 
the confrontation between the balanced systems of national property law and the 
pragmatic system of European property law could lead to undesirable results. The 
coherence of national property law suffers under the pragmatic approach of Euro-
pean Internal Market regulation. Not surprisingly, therefore, an increasing number 
of authors argue that in those fields where it is very likely that the European Union 
 
344 On these aspects see Chapter 7; 1.1. Property Law in Development and 4. Numerus Clausus in 
Property Law Systems in Europe. 
345 See, e.g., Case C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen en de Staat der 
Nederlanden [1990] ECR I-583. 
346 Case C-212/97 Centros v Erhverves- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459, Para. 28. 
347 On EC property law, see above; 2.1.2. Legal Framework: Secondary Community Law. 
348 Case C-117/06 Gerda Mölendorf v Christiana Mölendorf-Niehuus [2007] ECR I-8361. This case 
concerns the transfer of ownership of land in violation of Regulation 467/2001 prohibiting 
the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan strengthening the flight ban and 
extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of 
Afghanistan, as amended by Council Regulation 561/2003 of 27 March 2003. 
349 On this threat see, in particular, Kieninger 2006, p. 166. 
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will interfere or, to put it positively, where the Internal Market would benefit, 
harmonisation of aspects of property law is needed.350  
Alternatively, European law could regulate the interaction between the na-
tional legal systems. European property law as a federation of national legal sys-
tems, or better as a federation of national property law doctrines, a system in which 
European law would only regulate the interaction between these systems, offers a 
solution but does not fulfil doctrinal objections on the balance of legal certainty and 
flexibility. When arguments of legal certainty are used, and, under pressure from 
European law, foreign, as yet unknown, property rights are recognised in a legal 
system, legal certainty is not well served. 
In respect of property law as a coherent system with many highly developed 
doctrinal foundations justifying its existence, the method of positive harmonisation 
through enactment of EU law is well worth considering. Such an approach has an 
advantage over negative harmonisation in that legal certainty is safeguarded 
through a clear formulation of rules instead of a judgment of a court on the status of 
substantive law. Furthermore, positive harmonisation allows the European legisla-
ture to make choices on the doctrinal foundations of European property law itself.  
Legal certainty would be served through European legislation because in 
matters of Community legislation the ECJ has the right to interpret these provi-
sions.351 By granting one court the right to interpret rules of European law, a more 
consistent interpretation can be guaranteed. Especially in cases of property law, 
consistent interpretation of provisions that provide rules in respect to third parties, 
whether these provisions deal with third party effect or with third party protection, 
will lead to increased legal certainty.  
In short, European property law is not just a vague prospect for the future, but 
is a system already in development. At present European property law is frag-
mented. It is actually a combination of a federation of national property law systems 
with specific European legislation in some areas.352 This leads to legal uncertainty in 
respect of a possible ECJ decision on the validity of a measure of national property 
law in a setting of intra-Community trade. Furthermore, without a European doc-
trine on fundamental aspects of property law, future European legislation is likely 
to upset the national property law systems when they are confronted with this legis-
lation. 
These objections could be solved by looking at the possibilities of creating a 
basic framework of European property law from an Internal Market perspective. 
This would contribute to the further creation of a European property law. 
 
350 See, inter alia, Snijders 2006, p. 153 et seq., and on this proposal, Kieninger 2006, p. 165 et seq., 
Rank 2006, Rutgers 2006, Kieninger 1996a, p. 215 et seq., Roth 1999, p. 225 et seq., Kieninger 
2004, p. 664-672, Von Bar & Drobnig 2002, p. 321-322, Nasarre-Aznar 2004, Kieninger 2007,  
p. 198-202. 
351 Art. 234 EC. 
352 On a similar conclusion see Van Erp 2006b, p. 7-11. 
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3.3. Two Fundamental Questions for a Coherent European Property Law 
If we look at European property law as more than a federation of national legal sys-
tems of the Member States, and accept that there is already some European legisla-
tion in the area of property law, the need to deal with two fundamental aspects of 
European private law, property law in particular, arises. 
At this moment, European property law is a pragmatic system of law, increas-
ing in volume through the adoption of legislation or through decisions of the ECJ. 
These types of legislation and court decisions are issued without fundamental 
principles of European private law. In order to ensure the continuous development 
and to provide more legal certainty, European property law therefore is in need of 
more coherence and, although perhaps not to the same extent or in the same form as 
in the Member States, a doctrinal basis. Only with these can a balance be found 
between flexibility and legal certainty.  
Based on the model adhered to by French, German, Dutch and English law, 
that was discussed in Chapter 7, two fundamental questions can be formulated.353 
First, should a European property law make a distinction between the law of obliga-
tions and the law of property? Part of this question is whether a European property 
law should recognise the difference between personal rights and property rights. 
Second, should a European property law adhere to the principle of numerus clausus, 
and if so, in what form? These two fundamental questions will be discussed in the 
next two sections.354 
3.3.1. Separation between the Law of Obligations and the Law of Property? 
The separation between the law of obligations and the law of property has, like the 
principle of numerus clausus, taken different forms in different Member States. As 
was discussed in Chapter 7, there is a strong connection between the separation of 
the law of obligations and the law of property, and the way in which a legal system 
adheres to a numerus clausus.355 French, German, Dutch and English law all adhere 
to the principle of separation between the law of obligations and the law of prop-
erty, as well as to the principle of numerus clausus. Both are fundamental principles 
of property law.356 As a result, each of these legal systems has rules on the basis of 
which it is possible to decide which legal relation is granted access to the realm of 
property law and which legal relation must remain in the realm of the law of 
obligations. 
The European Commission, in its current activities, also seems to be adhering 
to some separation between the law of obligations and the law of property, as the 
work on the Common Frame of Reference as well as of the Acquis group is in par-
 
353 On this model see Chapter 7; 2. The Content of Property Law Systems in Europe. 
354 See below; 3.3.1. Separation between the Law of Obligations and the Law of Property?, and 
3.3.2. Numerus Clausus: the Available Menu of Property Rights? 
355 See Chapter 7; 1.2. Considering Numerus Clausus. 
356 On this theme, see Füller 2006, p. 526 et seq. 
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ticular concerned with contract law.357 It was only through the study of Von Bar and 
Drobnig on contract law and how it relates to property law that the law of property 
became included in the academic work on a Common Frame of Reference.358 How-
ever, at the same time, the Commission has dealt with credit securities, including 
property security rights, as a part of the sale of goods, and therefore as a part of 
contract law.359 It seems therefore that, at this moment, the European legislature is 
adhering to some degree of separation, but only insofar as it seems practical. 
The European Union does not adhere to a clearly formulated set of funda-
mental principles, except those mentioned in the EC and EU Treaties.360 Article 6 of 
the EU Treaty mentions the foundations of the European Union. Among these foun-
dations is respect for fundamental freedoms, which is one of the principles that are 
common to the Member States.361 When the separation between the law of obliga-
tions and the law of property is seen as a fundamental principle of private law that 
is common to the Member States, be it in different degrees, it seems that the Euro-
pean legal order will also have to adhere to some degree of separation. Subsequent-
ly, the European legal order will also have to adhere to the distinction between legal 
relations without third-party effect, personal rights, and legal relations with third-
party effect, property rights. 
Only when the law of obligations and the law of property are also separated at 
a European level to the degree that it remains possible to distinguish between legal 
relations with and without third-party effect, in other words between the law of 
property and the law of obligations, will the legal systems of the Member States be 
able to cope with the influence of European law in this area. European law and 
national law will then be able to co-operate in the development of a system of prop-
erty law for the European Union. 
3.3.2. Numerus Clausus: the Available Menu of Property Rights? 
A second question concerns the adherence to the principle of numerus clausus. Ad-
hering to numerus clausus brings systematic reasoning to the law of property, even 
when an open system of property rights is used, as in a legal system such as South 
Africa. When the system of European property law adheres to a separation between 
the law of obligations and the law of property, the question of how property law 
must deal with those legal relations that fall under it, relations with third-party 
effect, becomes important to answer. 
 
357 See above; 2.1.3. European Commission Initiatives for Future Legislation. 
358 See Von Bar & Drobnig 2002, p. 309 et seq. 
359 See above; 2.1.2. Legal Framework: Secondary Community Law. 
360 After the Lisbon Treaty these will be the EU Treaty and the TFEU. 
361 Art. 6 EU mentions liberty, democracy and respect for human rights as other principles, 
which are common to the Member States. See also Case 155/79 AM & S v Commission [1982] 
ECR 1575, see also Devroe 2007, p. 134-135, 138-139. On the effect of general principles of 
Community law on private relations see Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdinger Helm 
[2005] ECR I-9981. 
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The discussion of the legal systems of France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
England shows that there are different degrees of adherence to the principle of 
numerus clausus. It could be held that Germany and England are on opposite sides in 
the way in which they adhere to the principle.362 However, in none of these systems 
are parties completely free to create new property relations themselves.  
In a system that is traditionally held not to adhere to a numerus clausus but to a 
numerus apertus, like South African law, parties do have freedom to create new 
property relations, but this freedom is severely limited. I have argued therefore that, 
although South Africa does not have a closed system of property relations, it does 
adhere to the principle of numerus clausus to some degree.363 
When, under pressure from decisions of the ECJ, Member States are forced to 
recognise property relations created in another Member State, a federation of legal 
systems will be formed in which the national closed systems are no longer closed. 
When a property relation from another Member State is imported under the rules of 
the Internal Market, the receiving Member State will have to accommodate that 
relation. Member States will therefore be confronted with legal relations and doc-
trinal choices of another Member State.364  
This could result in recognising German Anwartschaftsrechte or English estate 
contracts and options to purchase in legal systems that have explicitly chosen not to 
recognise these. Furthermore, most visible in case of property security rights, ques-
tions of publicity and third-party protection may show undesirable results when, in 
a purely national situation, a national property security right must be registered, 
but a foreign property security right that is recognised does not have to fulfil this 
requirement or must fulfil this requirement to a different degree.365  
In any case, the principle of mutual recognition could lead to competition 
between Member States for the best law. However, what the best law is depends on 
the perspective that is taken. As in the case of company law, a Delaware effect may 
occur. A Delaware effect arises when companies choose the most favourable legal 
system and then, under the freedom of establishment, create branches in other 
Member States that must be recognised.366 For the law of property this could include 
a rush on German law or English law to create, for example, options to purchase or 
other anticipation rights. 
In respect of property law, such competition between Member States could 
result in enlarging the number of recognised property rights in the national legal 
systems. However, these results will not be so dramatic as they seem at first sight. 
As long as the national legal systems in Europe do not use an open system of prop-
erty rights, a numerus apertus, the national legal systems will also remain closed. 
Private parties will not be granted the possibility to create new property rights to 
their own liking.  
 
362 See Chapter 7; 4. Conclusion: Numerus Clausus in Property Law Systems in Europe. 
363 See Chapter 7; 3.8. A Legal System Without a Numerus Clausus: South African Law. 
364 See Joerges 1997, p. 385, Rank 2006, p. 206-207. 
365 Although most of the time a property relation that is recognised will also be subject to the 
rules of registration in the receiving legal system. 
366 See Charny 1991, p. 428 et seq., Barnard 2007, p. 342, 20-21. 
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However, when an open system of property rights does exist in one Member 
State, theoretically this would, in combination with a decision by the ECJ that prop-
erty rights from other Member States must be recognised, open the other national 
property law systems to some degree.367 Concerning France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and England, in the previous chapters the conclusion was reached that 
the menu of property relations in these systems is not absolutely closed, but parties 
do not enjoy the freedom to create new, as yet unrecognised types of property rights 
themselves in those systems. However, in respect of other legal systems in the 
European Union that have not been included in this research, open systems of 
property rights do exist. Spain is the best example of such a system, where Spanish 
authors hold the system, at least in respect to property rights in respect of immova-
bles, to be open.368 Nevertheless, no new property rights have been recognised in 
Spanish law.  
What would be the result of an open competition can only be predicted. Based 
on the studies in Law and Economics, standardisation of property rights through 
either voluntary harmonisation or changes made by the European legislature might 
occur to enhance legal certainty and to create the optimal standardisation.369 
Numerus clausus theory therefore also applies to European property law, and, 
not surprisingly, much in the same way as it applies at a national level. Given that 
European contract law already exists, it makes sense to reinvestigate whether there 
should be a European property law that is separated, at least to some degree, from 
European contract law.370 The national legal traditions, in particular of France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and England, all adhere to the distinction between per-
sonal rights and property rights. There is, and there seems, no need to change this. 
3.4. A Possible Model for a European Property Law: Numerus Clausus as 
a Constitutive Element of European Property Law.371 
The term European property law offers at least two interpretations. First, the term 
can be interpreted as the current European legislation that deals with property law 
or has an effect, or could have an effect, on property law of the Member States. It is 
this type of European property law that has been central in this Chapter so far. A 
second interpretation of European property law, with a perspective of the future in 
mind, could be that of a true property law system on a European level, possibly 
replacing or partly replacing the national systems of property law in the Member 
 
367 I.e., in as far as they are forced under Community law to recognise an unknown property 
right in cross-border situations originating in a Member State adhering to an open system of 
property right. 
368 On Spanish law, see Goni Rodriguez de Almeida 2006, O'Callaghan 2002, Fulgencia Angosto 
Sáez 2006, p. 281 et seq. 
369 See Boeckaert 2006, p. 182-184, 187 (solution), Merrill & Smith 2000. On numerus clausus and 
Law and Economics, see Chapter 7; 3.2. Law and Economics on Numerus Clausus.  
370 See, in respect to the separation between the law of obligations and the law of property, the 
remarks by Füller, who holds that a completely autonomous property law can no longer be 
maintained. Füller 2006, p. 525 et seq. 
371 See Van Erp 2003b. 
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States. This interpretation of the term European property law should be handled 
with great care. 
As this Chapter seeks to illustrate, at this moment there is no European legis-
lation replacing national property law provisions.372 Moreover, this Chapter also 
emphasises that with the current system of European legislation, primary law does 
not offer a basis for general harmonisation of property law. Not only can Articles 95 
and 308 EC Treaty themselves not be interpreted as providing the European Union 
with a general competence to harmonise private law, including property law, but 
also the decision of the ECJ in the Tobacco Advertising case makes very clear that an 
obstacle to the functioning of the Internal Market must be shown in order to 
authorise legislation.373 Furthermore, the renewed version of the European Treaties 
will not offer a more general competence of harmonisation. The judgment of the ECJ 
in the Tobacco Advertising case should also be read in combination with the principle 
of subsidiarity as contained in Article 5 EC Treaty. This Article, which was inserted 
in the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Maastricht, forces the European Community to 
remain within the powers conferred to it by the Treaty.374 Subsidiarity is in par-
ticular relevant in cases where the European Community does not have exclusive 
competence. Article 5 EC Treaty states that the Community can only act if ‘the ob-
jectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community’.375 
Describing European property law as a system of property law on a European 
level, replacing or partly replacing the national property law of the Members States, 
is not a realistic issue for the moment. However, as this Chapter also seeks to 
illustrate, problems with the current system of European property law are increas-
ing. A lack of legislative competences for the European Community and a possible 
ECJ decision on the recognition of foreign property rights, might increase the need 
for the development of a European property law in the second, truly European, 
meaning. 
The harmonisation of property law in the European Union is a controversial 
issue, which has raised and will continue to raise many legal and political objec-
tions. Nevertheless, it could be interesting, without further taking the current legal 
and political objections to harmonisation of property law in Europe into considera-
tion, to investigate a possible future for a truly European property law. The results 
of such an investigation are not a proposal for legislation, but could possibly offer 
food for thought in the debate on the making of European property law. This Sec-
tion therefore offers a possible model for the development of European property 
law, not with a simple argument for the full harmonisation of property law in the 
European Union, but with a more nuanced system of interaction between European 
competences and national substantive property law. 
 
372 See above; 2.1. EC Private Law. 
373 Case C-276/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, Para. 83. See above; 2.1.1. 
Legal Framework: Primary Community Law. 
374 Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 100. 
375 Art. 5 EC. See further Craig & De Búrca 2007, p. 101-105. 
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The model that was developed as a result of a comparative analysis of French, 
German, Dutch and English law in Chapter 7 could serve as a basis for the develop-
ment of a model for European property law. Such a model would not be based on 
an analysis of all the Member States, but would be formed on a combination of civil 
law and common law traditions.  
All of these legal systems adhere to a system of property law, or systems of 
property law in case of English law, in which there is one primary right from which 
several lesser property rights are derived, either through subtraction or through 
limitation of the primary right.376 However, as a result of varying doctrinal choices, 
differences between Member States exist that do have an actual effect on the func-
tioning of the Internal Market. This is especially so when, through the application of 
a lex rei sitae rule together with a more restrictive national property law in the 
receiving Member State, a property relation, or part of a property relation, can be 
lost.  
Coherence between the national systems of property law is needed in order for 
the system of European property law to function. Only when national property law 
systems efficiently deal with property rights from other jurisdictions without a ne-
gative effect on the functioning of the Internal Market, can national doctrinal argu-
ments of legal certainty and third-party protection be maintained. However, when 
not only European law, but also other national legal systems are involved, unavoid-
ably some national doctrinal arguments must be set aside. In particular when it 
comes to a confrontation between static and dynamic systems of property law, com-
promises will have to be made. The pragmatic, as opposed to doctrinal, approach of 
the European Union, especially with regard to the functioning of the Internal 
Market, could result in doctrinal reasons giving way in favour of market access. 
However, as a ground for justification for refusing to accept a certain solution, 
national doctrinal arguments may remain valid. 
3.4.1. Towards a European Property Law as a Flexible System of Property Rights 
In view of the pragmatic approach the European Court of Justice, but also European 
law in general, takes in respect to systems of private law, a pragmatic and dynamic 
solution for a European property law seems to fit better than a discussion on which 
national model of static property law should prevail. In other words, national 
doctrinal arguments and arguments of doctrinal coherence of property law systems 
should only be taken into account in so far as they have an actual effect on the func-
tioning of the Internal Market. 
A dynamic property law is altogether more suitable in respect of what is hap-
pening in the national property law systems of France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and England. As discussed in the previous Chapter, national property law systems 
are under increasing pressure from contract law, both from within the system of 
property law, and from outside the system, in particular from contract law itself, to 
 
376 See Chapter 7; 2.1. Of Primary Property Rights and Lesser Property Rights. 
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develop into a more open and flexible, pragmatic, system.377 Although no one 
questions the need for limitations on private parties when it comes to the creation of 
those legal relations that have effect on third parties, and a full limitation through 
an outright rejection of party autonomy is also not realistic, the balance between 
these two extremes remains to shift to the side of rejecting party autonomy. At the 
same time, systems that do not reject the influence of party autonomy, but never-
theless limit the creation of property relations, also adhere to the principle of nume-
rus clausus.378 In legal systems like South Africa, the economy has not collapsed and 
legal certainty and third-party protection remain assured through the requirement 
of registration. The publicity principle is thus awarded a more important role in 
South African law than it is in systems adhering to a rule of numerus clausus, which 
are those systems with a strictly closed list of property rights.379 
Taking into account these two developments; the increased internal, national, 
problems the numerus clausus system faces from contract law, and the external, 
international and European, pressure from private international law and European 
Internal Market law, it is worth considering further development of European 
property law so that it better fulfils the needs of modern legal practice.380 
3.4.2. A Limited Open System of Property Relations 
A European property law could adhere to a limited open system of property 
relations. In such a system the fundamental distinction between property rights and 
personal rights, the law of property and the law of contract, continues to be upheld, 
but at the same time more responsibility is granted to private parties to opt for a 
combination of the two areas of law to create new legal relations with third-party 
effect.381 At the same time, under a limited open system, parties should not be com-
pletely free to give any legal relation third-party effect. As a principle of this system, 
parties should have an interest in granting third-party effect, not just because it is 
convenient or to avoid certain other aspects of law, for example the law of succes-
sion, from applying. A limited open system of property relations therefore also ad-
heres to the principle of numerus clausus. It imposes restrictions on the freedom for 
private parties to create new property rights. 
With such a new approach to property law, the focus of the legal system shifts 
from a closed system, what parties may not do, to an open system, what parties 
may do. Nevertheless, at the same time, the system of European property law 
should strike a balance between flexibility, which implies a pure dynamic system of 
 
377 See Chapter 7; 4. Conclusion: Numerus Clausus in Property Law Systems in Europe. 
378 See Chapter 7; 1.3.2. Numerus Clausus as a Principle or as a Rule? 
379 On South African law see Chapter 7; 3.8. A Legal System Without a Numerus Clausus: South 
African law. An example of registration in legal systems adhering to a rule of numerus clausus 
can be seen in Dutch law in case of a silent right of pledge on (future) claims that is only 
registered to be able to determine when the right of pledge was created in case the right must 
be executed, not to inform third parties. On this, see Van der Weide 2006, p. 67-68. 
380 For similar conclusions see, inter alia, Van Erp 2003b, Sagaert 2005b, Smits 1996. 
381 On this distinction, see Reid 1997b, p. 444. 
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property law, and legal certainty, which implies a pure static system of property 
law.382  
When the focus of a system of property rights is more directed towards the 
possibilities parties have to create new rights, inspiration can be drawn from those 
systems that already adhere to this model. South African law provides an 
opportunity to see the effects of a limited open system of property rights.383 The 
system of property law in South Africa starts with the traditional set of property 
rights following from Roman-Dutch law. These include a primary right, in the case 
of South African law, the right of ownership, lesser rights to use of servitude and 
usufruct, and lesser rights for security of pledge and hypothec. Under the famous 
‘subtraction from the dominium test’, which was discussed in the previous Chapter, 
new lesser property rights in respect of immovable objects have been created when 
it was the intention of the parties to bind not only themselves but also their succes-
sors in title and when the right that results constituted a subtraction from the right 
of ownership. When this two-stage test is fulfilled, the new lesser right in respect to 
an immovable object can be registered under Section 63(1) of the Deed Registries 
Act 1937. 
In many aspects, South African law fulfils the requirements for a limited open 
system of property rights needed in Europe. It limits the possibilities for private 
parties to create new property rights in two ways. First, it must be the expressed 
intention of the parties to bind successors in title, third parties, and second, the right 
the parties seek to create must be able to be expressed in terms of a subtraction from 
the primary right of ownership. In South African law, therefore, a lesser right can 
never comprise more than the primary right from which it is derived. As was dealt 
with in Chapter 7, the requirement of subtraction itself represents a limitation on 
party autonomy.384 However, the effects of the subtraction test have led to situations 
of unpredictability, demonstrating its failure in respect of legal certainty so badly 
needed in the field of property law.385 Many have, therefore, both from within and 
from outside South Africa, criticised the subtraction test for leading to unpredict-
able results.386  
Criticism does not mean the test should be abandoned altogether. South 
African law continues to adhere to its principles. Systems adhering to a closed sys-
tem of property rights are also under criticism. As a rule it could be held that the 
more strict a system is, the more criticism it invokes from those seeking more flexi-
bility. Consequently, the less strictly the system is applied, the more criticism it 
invokes from those seeking more legal certainty. 
 
382 In the words of Reid, ‘certainty and rigidity are familiar companions’, Reid 1997b, p. 445. 
383 On South African law see Chapter 7; 3.8. A Legal System Without a Numerus Clausus: South 
African law. 
384 See Chapter 7; 2.2. Of Ways to Create a Lesser Property Right. 
385 E.g., Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 (4) SA 614 (C), at 615B-C per King J. 
386 See, e.g., De Waal 2000, De Waal 2004, Van der Walt 1992, Sonnekus 1991, Badenhorst 2000, 
Badenhorst 2001, but also Reid 1997b, p. 228-229. 
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3.4.3. Formulating the Access Test 
Possibly, a fine-tuning of the subtraction from dominium test by adapting it to the 
European circumstances, specifically based on comparative analysis made in Chap-
ter 7, could provide inspiration for a numerus clausus in European property law. 
Such a solution will not answer all questions in respect of European property law, 
but could provide a solid basis for discussion. In any case, it will bring the discus-
sion on principles of property law to a European level and will offer one possible 
solution in which the principle of numerus clausus as a principle of European prop-
erty law can be expressed. 
When the South African subtraction test and the experiences with that test are 
used as an example for Europe, some changes are necessary to increase the predicta-
bility of its outcome. As was seen in the discussion on South African law in the 
previous Chapter, changing the order in which the test is applied by bringing the 
focus onto the objective element, the subtraction from the primary right, could offer 
a better, and especially more predictable, solution.387 Such a test would allow the 
courts to look at the content of the lesser right first, before deciding if any third-
party effect should be awarded through registration. When a lesser right cannot be 
formulated in terms of powers contained in the primary right from which it is 
supposed to be derived, the intention of the parties is no longer needed. When, 
however, such a lesser right can be brought under the powers contained in the 
primary right, it is up to the parties if they wish to provide third-party effect. In 
other words, if the parties have expressed and shown a sufficient interest in creating 
third-party effect, it can be granted. The focus of the European test should therefore 
be on the objective part, which suits property law best as it offers a strong element 
of predictability. However, the content of the objective test could also be made the 
subject of fine-tuning in order to achieve even more predictable results.  
When the subtraction test is taken as a basis, the European system is imme-
diately confronted with a choice between the démembrement, or subtraction, model 
and the limitation models as set out in Chapter 7.388 Although a choice does not 
necessarily have to be made, subtraction could be interpreted in a broad sense as 
including both methods of creating lesser property rights, making an explicit choice 
will enhance the predictability of the outcome of the test. When looking at the cur-
rent developments in European property law, in particular, the Commission’s pro-
posals for a Euro-mortgage, a non-accessory type of lesser security right in respect 
of immovables based on lesser property rights originating in a system adhering to 
the limitations method, it seems that the Commission has already, although im-
plicitly, made a choice.389 When indeed a lesser property right is introduced which 
limits the primary right and which can be held by the same person holding the 
primary right, such as the German owner-Grundschuld or Eigentümergrundschuld, the 
 
387 See Badenhorst 2000, p. 512. See Chapter 7; 3.8. A Legal System Without a Numerus Clausus: 
South African law. 
388 See Chapter 7; 2.2. Of Ways to Create a Lesser Property Right. 
389 See above; 2.1.3. European Commission Initiatives for Future Legislation. 
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limitation model must be followed.390 Furthermore, it seems, when looking at the 
contents of the list of property rights in systems adhering to a limitations method – 
German law and English law in respect of equity – that especially these systems 
have succeeded to some extent in developing new property rights under pressure 
from contract law. A more dynamic property law therefore seems better served by 
the limitations method. 
Therefore, reformulating the very first requirement of the subtraction test to 
the requirement that the legal relation created must be able to be expressed in terms 
of rights or powers of the holder of the primary right, would offer flexibility to 
follow the limitation model. However, the concept of subtraction would no longer 
cover the test. Instead, looking at the test from a functional point of view, as the test 
that grants legal relations access to the law of property, could result in naming it the 
access test. The link to the primary property right remains of relevance as many 
criteria contained in the test follow from the requirements of a primary right. When, 
for example, a primary right cannot be held on a certain object, for example, the 
human body, no lesser right can be created on that human body either. In order to 
avoid confusion, a second part of the access test could therefore be that the legal 
relation must be made with regard to an object capable of being subject to property 
law. This nuance will give more power to the courts applying the access test in 
deciding on the matter of whether a property right should be recognised or whether 
there are serious objections to its recognition. By withholding the effect of a primary 
right in respect of a certain object, no lesser property rights in respect of such an 
object can be created either. 
To summarise, the first step of the access test would consist of two parts. The 
first part would require examining whether a legal relation entered into by the 
parties can be expressed in terms of rights of the holder of a primary right. The 
second part would require examining whether a legal relation can be held in respect 
to the object in question. 
As a second step, the intention of the parties should be examined. In this 
second phase of the European access test, the courts could examine whether the 
parties have a sufficient interest to create a legal relation with third-party effect. A 
sufficient interest exists when the party agreement is not made for fraudulent 
purposes, and the court can understand why parties would desire a third-party 
effect. For example, in the case of a simple contract of sale of an object there is no 
need to provide for eternal third-party effect and the court should not allow this. 
This second part, which acknowledges the role of contract law, is therefore more of 
a subjective nature.  
When the court is satisfied that the parties have indeed validly expressed their 
interest in granting third-party effect, a third additional element to the access test 
could be the attempt of the court to characterise the property right in terms of the 
already existing categories of property relations.391 When, for example, two parties 
draft a document including terms in which one party has the right to walk over the 
 
390 See Chapter 4; 3.7. Hypothec, and 3.8. Grundschuld. 
391 In the same sense, see Reid 1997b, p. 445. 
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other party’s land, in exchange for a yearly sum of money, and the parties have 
expressed that this right as well as the duty to pay money should remain connected 
to the land with which the right runs, the court must acknowledge the document as 
validly creating a property relation and try to categorise it in terms of a lesser right 
of use, in particular, of servitude. 
The categories of lesser rights should be examined in the third phase of the test 
and should allow more legal certainty in respect of the exact nature of the property 
relation. As a starting point, a European property law could work with the existing 
categories of lesser rights to use, for security and in anticipation of the acquisition of 
another property right, be it a primary or another lesser right.392 
Under the access test, which is the expression of a limited open system of 
property relations, adding a new category of property relations would be possible. 
Creating the requirement for a court to deal explicitly with the category of property 
relations in the third phase of the test will require that court to deal explicitly with a 
new category of lesser property rights. Accepting a new property relation will 
require a weighing of the balance between more flexibility and maintaining legal 
certainty. Allowing a new category of property rights would, as suggested by Van 
der Walt, become a matter of public policy.393 
As a result of the test, the filtering function of the numerus clausus decides that 
property law applies. The result of the test, however, is not necessarily application 
of European property law legislation. Depending on the legal relation in question, 
the characterisation and categorisation of the legal relation will usually lead to the 
applicability of national law. Only in cases where the European legislature has 
acted, which implies it has had the competence to act, will European property law 
legislation be applicable. In this respect, the test is of a somewhat procedural 
character. It is the European principle of numerus clausus that decides whether the 
applicable property law is EU law or national law, but the test does not decide on 
the content of that law. The numerus clausus test only decides that a legal relation 
has third-party effect and shall be governed by property law. When the European 
legislature has chosen to harmonise a certain area of property law, the applicable 
law will be Community law and, under the principle of precedence of Community 
law, it will apply throughout the EU.394 
The access test is also functional in its categorisation of rights as primary and 
lesser rights. As the comparative analysis in Chapter 7 shows, it is possible to ex-
press the property law systems of France, Germany, the Netherlands and England 
in terms of these rights. Using functional categorisations offers some advantages. 
For instance, by requiring a lesser right to be expressed in terms of a primary right, 
the system of European property law for now does not have to choose between 
ownership and title, either to land or to personalty. When a property relation from 
England is brought under the test, the courts can look at that right in terms of 
 
392 On these categories, see also Reid 1997b,p. 228. On this distinction, see Chapter 7; 2. The 
Content of Property Law Systems in Europe. 
393 Van der Walt 1992, p. 197-200, 202-203. 
394 Case 6/64 Faminio Costa v ENEL [1964] 585. 
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English law. Consequently, the primary right will not be ownership but one of the 
English primary rights, depending on the content of the lesser right.  
The courts could do this and at the same time maintain the access test, because 
comparative analysis shows that, although there are differences between ownership 
and title as primary rights, these rights, in terms of their function as primary rights, 
are similar.395 Expressing an easement in terms of a fee simple, or expressing a right 
of servitude in terms of ownership will not lead to changes in categorisation of 
easements and servitudes as lesser rights.  
Finally, although not as such part of the test, but together with its implemen-
tation, parties should be given the possibility of approaching a court to terminate 
their legal relation when such a relation becomes too much of a burden, or when, in 
terms of Sagaert’s suggestions, the right no longer fulfils its purpose, is no longer 
used, can no longer be used, or its use would be unreasonable.396 Allowing the pos-
sibility to terminate a property relation allows for more flexibility in deciding on the 
third-party effect by way of a test. As a result, the doctrinal argument that a proper-
ty right lasts forever and that therefore we should be very careful in deciding which 
legal relations have this effect, is removed in some, undesirable, aspects.  
Schematically, numerus clausus in a system of European property law could be 
formulated as an access test, which, in case of problems or uncertainties, a court 
applies to see whether a certain legal relation constitutes a property relation: 
1. Phase I – Objective Part 
(a) Can a legal relation in respect of an object be expressed in terms of compe-
tences contained in the primary right? 
(b) Is the object with respect to which the legal relation is created capable of being 
subject to a property relation? 
2. Phase II – Subjective Part 
(a) Do the parties have a sufficient interest to provide third-party effect to their 
legal relation? 
(b) Have the parties sufficiently expressed their intention to provide third-party 
effect? 
3. Phase III – Characterisation 
Can the legal relation be fitted into one of the categories of property rights? 
If not, what new category does the right belong to? (public policy) 
Result: (European) property law applies. 
3.4.4. Advantages of an Access Test and a Limited Open System of Property 
Rights 
Using the access test combines elements of national property law doctrine into what 
could possibly be a workable system. While numerus clausus is about filtering legal 
relations to decide whether property law applies, this test offers guidance on how to 
do so. While numerus clausus is about deciding which property relation is involved 
and which rules apply, the test also provides an answer. In that respect, the German 
 
395 See Chapter 7; 2.3. Primary Property Rights. 
396 Sagaert 2005b, p. 1079-1080. See also Heyman 2003, p. 23. On Sagaert’s ideas, see Chapter 7; 
3.7. Smits and Sagaert: Property Law as a System of Obligations. 
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concepts of Typenzwang and Typenfixierung can be recalled.397 As a part of the prin-
ciple of numerus clausus, the legal system decides on how the legal relation is charac-
terised and which requirements this legal relation must fulfil. The European access 
test decides on the question of whether property law applies, and through catego-
rising of the legal relation provides guidance as to which property law rules apply. 
When, for example, a right of way is concerned, the property law on servitudes can 
apply. When a property security right is concerned, provisions on security rights 
can apply. 
The advantage of this system is that it will transfer the competence to decide if 
property law applies to a European level. Although this transfer of competence 
takes away powers from the Member States, it may help avoid a conflict between 
national doctrinal systems under the principle of mutual recognition and the case 
law of the European Court of Justice. It can therefore no longer be that in one 
Member State a legal relation does not have third-party effect, while it does in 
another Member State. A European principle of numerus clausus would enable 
European property law to decide on what legal relation is a property right and 
which property law provisions apply. As stated above, these provisions of property 
law are not necessarily of European law. Insofar as there is no need to provide 
European rules, national property law may apply as a result of the test. The prin-
ciple of subsidiarity as contained in Article 5 EC Treaty, and the judgment of the 
European Court of Justice in the Tobacco Advertising case, therefore would remain 
strongly upheld in this system of reasoning.398 The balance between taking away 
competences from the Member States and providing legal certainty on the status of 
legal relations as property rights or personal rights, should shift to the European 
Union while taking into account the further competences to frame property law by 
the Member States as much as possible.  
As an advantage, because the fundamental question of what is property rela-
tion has become an issue of Community law under this test, the ECJ becomes the 
highest interpretative authority. However, this would not place the national legal 
systems on the side at all. National courts are also courts of European law and must 
apply Community law, but when a difficult case on the interpretation of Com-
munity law, in this case most likely the adding of a new category of property rights 
comes along, the ECJ will have the final say.399 In matters of substantive national 
property law the national supreme courts would remain the highest authority. 
However, already under the current situation, national property law is subject to 
 
397 On these concepts of Typenfixierung and Typenzwang, see Chapter 1; 1.2.2. Numerus Clausus of 
Property Rights. 
398 In the new Treaty the principle of subsidiarity will return as Art. 5 EU. On the Tobacco case 
see above; 2.1.1. Legal Framework: Primary Community Law. On subsidiarity in respect to 
property law, especially land law, see Sparkes 2007, p. 118-120. 
399 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos (NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming) v Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, Claes 2004, 
p. 51 et seq. Moreover, in respect to the completion of the Common Frame of Reference (CFR) 
there is now also a coherent body of principles and rules that will enable the ECJ to interpret 
national law in conformity with this new standard. On this idea specifically, see Basedow 
2007, p. 184-185. 
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the rules on the Internal Market and therefore even national courts must accept the 
binding judgments of the ECJ on the interpretation of national law in the light of 
European law.400  
In terms of substantive property law, what exactly is the primary right from 
which a lesser right under this access test is derived, can be, at least for the moment, 
left to the legal systems of the Member States. Under Article 295 EC Treaty, Member 
States remain free to create their own rules on property law. However, as a prin-
ciple of property law following from the approach taken by numerus clausus as an 
access test, it follows that a legal system should recognise only one primary right 
per set of property law rules.401 
The system of numerus clausus as a test in European property law offers an ex 
post decision model as opposed to the currently recognised ex ante decision models. 
In other words, only after the legal relation has been created will the system of 
property law decide on the property effect. Traditionally, ex ante models mean that 
only when certain criteria are fulfilled can a property relation come into existence. 
The great advantage of an ex post system is that it offers more flexibility and that 
only in cases where something goes wrong with the characterisation of the right, 
does the test need to be invoked. Moving towards an ex post model would require 
some alterations to the national systems of property law, but not too many altera-
tions. The creation of property rights has, under the test, become partly a matter of 
Community law, especially the decision whether a legal relation is a property right 
or not. However, the remaining rules on its existence and the rules on its exercise 
and, partly, its destruction, continue to belong to national property law, at least 
until Community legislation in that field is passed. 
A further advantage offered through the use of a test is that it could be a way 
to avoid the stacking of property rights. In particular in civil law systems property 
rights are sometimes created on top of each other to reach a desired solution. For 
example, ownership of a building is split from the ownership of the land through a 
lesser right of superficies and the right of superficies is subsequently divided into 
apartment rights. Instead, parties could attempt to create an apartment right in a 
building, but not in the land, directly. Although the result of the test might be more 
variations of property rights, it would be more clear which primary right is 
burdened in which way by which lesser rights. Solutions of up to three to five 
property rights stacked on top of each other could belong to the past. 
A final advantage is that the access test offers a model on which the system of 
European property law could be built. By allowing the courts, or legislators, to 
recognise new property rights as a matter of public policy, the development of the 
dynamic system of property law is ensured. At the same time, however, the de-
velopment of property law can also be carefully guarded as only the legislature and 
the ECJ, as the highest court in this matter, will have the power to authorise new 
categories of property rights. A new category of rights, such as anticipatory rights, 
 
400 See, in this respect, inter alia, the critical remarks by Baroness Hale of Richmont in Kola (FC) 
and another (FC) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Respondent) [2007] 
UKHL 54, at 149 per Baroness Hale of Richmont. 
401 On Art. 295 EC, see above; 2.4.1. Article 295 EC Treaty and European Property Law. 
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will therefore be closely examined before it will be recognised as allowing legal 
relations with third-party effect. 
3.4.5. Possible Objections to an Access Test and to a Limited Open System of 
Property Rights 
Of course there can be objections towards a limited open system as well as a 
numerus clausus by way of an access test. Especially in the light of arguments used at 
a national doctrinal level, some objections can be answered immediately with 
counter-arguments. 
A first possible objection could be that a test that requires a legal relation just 
to be expressed in terms of a primary right, but which does not require the lesser 
right to comprise parts of the primary right, may not prevent the creation of a 
positive burden. According to many national doctrinal arguments, positive burdens 
are considered undesirable, as in particular the experiences under the ancien régime 
before the French Revolution.402 Furthermore, in the systems adhering to a 
démembrement method for the creation of lesser rights, the argument is used that 
because a lesser rights comprises part of the more extensive primary right, and such 
a right does not contain positive duties, a lesser right cannot contain a positive duty. 
Such an argument against the test would not hold automatically as even legal 
systems that do recognise the method of limitation, such as German law, do not 
recognise positive burdens. However, it is correct that in a system adhering to the 
limitations model, positive burdens can be accepted more easily than in a system 
adhering to the démembrement or subtraction model.403 Accepting positive burdens is 
a matter of public policy, which also under the test, for now, is a matter for the 
Member States. 
Moreover, even when positive burdens are recognised, there are other ways of 
preventing the unnecessary consequences of long-lasting positive burdens. The 
suggestion that a party could approach a court and ask for a relief from the burden 
could provide a sufficient solution.404 Furthermore, a requirement to re-evaluate the 
burden every few years and allowing a decision on its continuation to be made by 
the parties, could also provide a less disproportionate solution than an outright 
prohibition. 
The acceptance of a positive burden will depend on the circumstances of the 
case, which is exactly why an approach using a test can provide much more pro-
tection than a simple prohibition. In respect of the outright prohibition of a positive 
duty in the field of servitudes, German law has shown that an effective use of 
contract law creates a de facto positive burden with the recognition of security-ser-
vitudes.405 Even worse, these positive burdens in the case of security-servitudes are 
usually secret in respect of third parties. In a test approach, more circumstances can 
 
402 On the idea of allowing a positive burden in the law of property, see Reid 1997b, p. 445. 
403 Also here possibly German law could offer illustration with the recognition of the Real 
Burden or Reallast. 
404 In the same sense, see Heyman 2003, p. 23. 
405 See Chapter 4; 3.1. Real Servitudes. 
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be taken into account and it is not automatically said that security-servitudes will be 
denied access to property law. In particular because the content of the contracts 
underlying these security-servitudes will also be subject to rules on competition 
law, either national or EU competition law, which provide protection to the original 
as well as third parties. When the courts look at the intention of the parties these 
questions can be taken into account. 
A further objection of civil lawyers might be that there is no longer a statute 
that contains the list of available property rights and that the available menu will 
depend on court decisions. However, reliance on court decisions, especially of the 
ECJ, is necessary in many areas of law. The case law on the free movement of goods 
offers a good example. In English law, too, although Section 1 of the Law of Proper-
ty Act 1925 mentions most property relations, English lawyers continue to rely on 
court decisions in respect of relations not mentioned by the Law of Property Act 
1925, as well as in respect of the content of property relations.406 
Another objection could be that this test does not provide for registration of 
lesser property rights, in particular not when immovable objects are concerned. 
However, this possible objection does not take into account the function of the 
principle of numerus clausus. When through the application of numerus clausus the 
decision is made that the law of property applies to a certain legal relation, the other 
principles of property law, including the principle of publicity, will start to apply.407 
When, as a result of the test, the law of property does not apply, no registration is 
necessary, as the legal relation will not have third-party effect. Registration is not a 
question of numerus clausus, but of publicity. Registration of lesser rights in respect 
of immovable objects is a matter of national property law, or, in case of harmonisa-
tion of registration systems in Europe, of substantive Community law.408  
A final objection might be that an open system would create an impenetrable 
forest, or a web of property relations, in which no one could recognise the content of 
rights anymore, or to whom they belong.409 Two arguments can be put forward 
against this. First, in those legal systems that openly do not recognise a rule of nume-
rus clausus, such as South African law, such an outbreak of rights has not occurred. 
Only in exceptional circumstances, even with a test of which the outcome could not 
always be predicted, have new property rights been created.410  
Second, Law and Economics, especially the theory on the optimal standardisa-
tion of property rights, but also the theories on the tragedy of the commons and of 
the anti-commons, explain why this effect does not happen. When too many proper-
ty rights exist, the information costs of finding out about the existence of all availa-
ble property law will outweigh the benefits of the creation of an as yet unknown 
 
406 On the English approach, see Chapter 6; 1. Introduction. 
407 See Van Erp 2006b, p. 14-17. 
408 See Cámara-Lapuente 2005, p. 797 et seq. On the European Land Information Service (EULIS) 
– project, which links land registration systems in Europe see <http://www.eulis.org>. 
409 Cf., the rich forest of property rights that according to Heck existed before the introduction of 
the German BGB. See Heck 1930, p. 85. 
410 The same applies for other jurisdiction with a rule of numerus apertus, e.g., Spain. See 
Fulgencia Angosto Sáez 2006, p. 281 et seq. 
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property right.411 As a result there will be a standardisation of property rights, lead-
ing to the opposite of an impenetrable forest of property rights. 
4. Conclusions 
The making of European property law by which, at a Community level, the prin-
ciple of numerus clausus is expressed through a test, or, stated differently, as an ac-
cess test to property law, could provide a way forward. When the criteria of test 
have been fulfilled at a Community level, a legal relation created by two private 
parties will be a property relation and subsequently it will be governed by property 
law. Depending on the situation and on the state of harmonisation of property law 
in the European Union, the applicable property law will be national law, especially 
when there is no Community dimension or when no Community law has been 
drafted, or has not yet been drafted. Alternatively, the applicable law will be EU 
law, in which case an actual and substantial hindrance to the functioning of the 
Internal Market, under the ECJ’s case law and following the principle of subsidiari-
ty, has been proven. 
Such a test, however, should not just be arbitrarily applied, but should be 
carefully drafted. After all, the principle of numerus clausus safeguards the law of 
property. As Reid suggests: 
‘Modern life, and more especially modern commercial life, may make demands which 
the traditional categories find difficult to meet. For example, there may be a need for 
positive obligations which bind successive owners of land, or for preferential rights for 
purchasers who have paid for property without having received ownership. If the 
traditional categories are to survive, they may require to be adapted. 
…, any adoption or innovation must work as far as possible within the traditional 
categories. The alternative is structural incoherence, conceptual drift and, if pressed too 
far, the collapse of the law of property into the law of obligations’.412 
The European property law access test suggests changing the focus from static 
property law to dynamic property law where there is more room for party autono-
my. In the light of the developments in national property law, as well as in interna-
tional and European property law, such a change in focus seems justified.  
What the test does is maintain the distinction between the law of property and 
the law of obligations, the law of contract in particular. Furthermore, it upholds the 
difference between personal and property relations. In other words, it brings fun-
damental questions of property law to a European level. When carefully applied by 
the courts of the European Union, and this also includes all national courts, the test 
could allow property law to move into the twenty-first century as a modern, dy-
namic, system of property law with respect for the traditions from whence it came 
in the form of the traditional categories of property rights. 
 
411 See Chapter 7; 3.2.2. Numerus Clausus as Optimal Standardisation of Property Rights. 
412 Reid 1997b, p. 245. 
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Numerus clausus is thus a principle of property law that may find expression, 
as it has done in many civil law systems, in a rule. However, numerus clausus can 
also be adhered to in other ways. As a principle of property law, numerus clausus is 
nothing more than the idea that a system of private law imposes limitations on 
private parties in their attempts to create new property relations. The principle of 
numerus clausus determines that there is a set of existing property relations and that, 
once it has been decided that the law of property applies, and not the law of 
contract, the content of the property relation is governed by that law of property. 
The principle of numerus clausus can therefore not exist without the distinction 
between the law of property and the law of obligations. When such distinction does 
not exist, there is no need to determine whether a legal relation is a property right to 
which property law applies. 
Until now, the principle of numerus clausus has found expression in a rule 
created by a legislature, or as a principle of law advocated by a court, depending on 
the hierarchy of sources in a legal system. When it comes to the further making of 
European property law, property law in the European Union, applying in all the 
Member States, the principle of numerus clausus might possibly find expression as 
an access test, using an ex post approach to the creation of property relations. Not 
only the pragmatic nature of European law, but also the increased danger of poten-
tial conflicts between the doctrinally internal coherent systems of the Member 
States, demands an approach different from any approach that has been taken so 
far. 
Using an access test to determine to which law of property, national or 
European, a legal relation is granted access, could provide a solution to avoid 
Europeanisation of national property law where this is not, or not yet, necessary. 
With that development the principle of numerus clausus would become the first true 
principle of European property law. 
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SUMMARY 
Numerus clausus is a fundamental principle of property law. It is the principle that is 
strongly connected to the distinction between the law of obligations, in particular, 
contract law, and the law of property. Moreover, it is connected to the distinction 
between personal relations and property relations. A personal relation is a relation 
between two or more persons that only binds the parties to that legal relation. The 
law of obligations governs this type of relation. A property relation is a relation 
between two or more persons in respect to an object with third-party effect. The law 
of property governs this type of relation. Numerus clausus as a fundamental prin-
ciple of property law decides on which legal relation belongs to the law of property, 
and is therefore awarded third-party effect. Numerus clausus is, in other words, the 
access test to the law of property. Only after the numerus clausus test is passed, other 
principles of property law, such as specificity and publicity, begin to apply. 
The numerus clausus as an access test comprises of two parts. First, the prin-
ciple of numerus clausus sets the available menu of property rights. Only a limited 
number of property rights are recognised. In French, German, Dutch and English 
law, the catalogue of property rights starts with a primary right. Moreover, there 
are a limited number of property rights other than the primary right, which can be 
named lesser rights. In respect to the creation of these rights, the principle of 
numerus clausus limits private parties in the creation of these lesser rights. There is, 
in other words, a Typenzwang of property rights. 
The second part of the access test concerns the content of property rights. Once 
parties have selected a property relation from the available menu, the system of 
property law also determines the content of this property relation. Private parties 
are not free to give content to their property relation outside the freedom to do this 
that is allowed by the system of property law. In other words, there is also a 
Typenfixierung of property rights. 
Numerus clausus as a principle of property law finds expression in French, 
German, Dutch and English law, but to different degrees. Depending on the hierar-
chy of sources of law and the doctrinal choices legislatures in a legal system have 
made, there is a rule of numerus clausus. A rule of numerus clausus exists if there is an 
absolutely limited list of property rights. Private parties have no freedom to create 
new types of property rights at all in these systems, and are only granted limited 
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freedom under the rule of numerus clausus to provide content to existing types of 
property relations. 
Other systems adhere to a principle of numerus clausus. The principle of nume-
rus clausus refers to the idea that there is a more or less clear set of property rights 
established by one or more sources of law, but parties are nevertheless limited in 
the free creation of new, thus far unrecognised, types of property rights. These 
systems also impose limitations on parties in respect to the content of property 
rights. When parties create an already recognised property relation, they must stick 
to the boundaries set for this relation by the legal system. 
When the rule of numerus clausus and the principle of numerus clausus are seen 
as two ends of the same spectrum, French, German, Dutch and English law all find 
there place in this system of classification. German law, with its pandectist origin, is 
at the most rigid side (that of the rule of numerus clausus). Dutch law, having been 
strongly influenced by German law also finds itself on the more rigid side of the 
spectrum. French law takes a much more pragmatic approach to the creation of 
property rights. It is therefore in between adhering to a rule and a principle of 
numerus clausus. English law, finally, adheres to a principle of numerus clausus that 
is, contrary to the civil law systems, clearly formulated by case law. 
With the start of the twenty-first century, property law is subject to various 
new developments. These developments form a pressure on the currently existing 
systems of property law. This includes pressure to recognise new objects of proper-
ty law, a stronger influence of contract law in the law of property, and pressure to 
recognise new, yet unknown, types of property rights. 
All four legal systems adhere to a similar classification of property rights. In 
each system of property law, there is a primary right. In civil law systems, this is the 
right of ownership. In English law, which recognises two systems of property law, 
there are two primary rights. In land law this is the fee simple, in personal property 
law it is title to chattels. Connected to the recognition of a single primary right, in 
each of the legal systems there is a limited list of property rights other than the 
primary right. These rights are lesser rights, as they are lesser in content than the 
primary right. They are created either through a démembrement, or subtraction, of 
powers contained in the primary right in the form of a lesser property right, or 
through a limitation of the primary right by the creation of a lesser right that is 
modelled to the content of the primary right. There is a subtle difference in the two 
methods of creation. 
In the civil law systems, the number and content of lesser property rights can 
mostly be directly derived from Roman law. Although property law systems have 
developed since (pre-) classical Roman law, the main property rights have remained 
the same. Only in the last century, some legal systems have added new types of 
property right to the Roman law inspired catalogue. English property law, although 
it should be considered not to share a basis in Roman law, recognises a similar list 
of property rights. However, because of this different historical development, the 
list of property rights in English law is slightly longer than in most civil law 
systems. 
In French, German, Dutch and English law, lesser rights are organised in two 
main categories: lesser rights to use and lesser rights for security. Lesser rights to 
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use exist either for a long duration of time, which usually results in a more limited 
content of the right, or they exist for a short period of time, which usually results in 
a more extensive content of the right. In civil law systems these lesser rights to use 
for a longer period are rights of servitude. Lesser rights to use for a shorter period of 
time are rights of usufruct. In English law there are easements and profits à prendre 
that fulfil the same requirements. Moreover, an estate for life, a right for a shorter 
period of time, does no longer exist as a distinct property right, but can be created 
by making use of trust law. 
Lesser rights for security are usually divided depending on the type of object 
they can be created on. Lesser rights on movables include rights of pledge in civil 
law systems and rights of pledge and charges in English law. Lesser rights for secu-
rity on immovables are rights of hypothec in the civil law and mortgage in English 
law. Although there are variations in the content of these rights, they grant the 
holder of the lesser right for security a right to sell the object under security, the 
right to satisfy their claim from the proceeds of that sale, and the right of preference 
in case of insolvency of the debtor. 
The characterisation in primary rights and lesser rights to use and for security 
is a division that was mainly developed historically since the period of Roman law, 
which adhered to a similar division in real actions. Also in English law, the distinc-
tion between rights to use and rights for security is a historical one. Apart from this 
general characterisation, also due to historical development and due to different 
doctrinal choices that legal systems have made, there are additional property rights 
that not fit this general characterisation. 
Examples of additional property rights that do not fit these classical distinc-
tions are German acquisition rights, French real suretyships and English estate con-
tacts. Moreover, also options to purchase, recognised by both German and English 
law create problems. The right of lease, which, in civil law systems remains a per-
sonal right, but in English law has developed into a property relation, offers a final 
example. The recognition of these additional types of property rights seems linked 
to the method of creation of property rights that is followed in a legal systems. 
Systems adhering to a limitation method have recognised more additional property 
rights than systems adhering to the subtraction method. 
In addition, the law of property is subject to influences, both from within the 
own legal system as well as from the increasing development of the Internal Market 
in the European Union. These developments lead to a different use of already 
existing property rights as well as the recognition of new types of property rights, 
either through positive harmonisation, or, through the recognition of property 
rights validly created in another Member State under the case law of the European 
Court of Justice. 
Influences from within the own legal system include developments from 
within the system of property law, but also the increased influence of the law of 
contract in the law of property. Mainly due to changes in society and the increasing 
demand for a more flexible property law, parties attempt to create property rights 
on top of other property rights, the so-called stacking of rights, to achieve a situa-
tion that a single property right cannot achieve. Examples of such stacking include a 
right of apartment on a right of superficies to separate the right of ownership from a 
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building from the right of ownership of land, in order to be able to divide the 
ownership of the building into apartment rights. 
Other influences include the increased influence of contract law in the law of 
property. Especially regarding security rights, the law of contract has become more 
and more important. Through the recognition of trust-like relations such as Treu-
hand and fiducie, the use of a primary right for security purposes has become much 
more attractive. Also in English law, the possibility to give shape and content to a 
charge by agreement between the parties creates many possibilities for parties in 
legal practice. 
Traditionally, the law of property is a system of mandatory rules that cannot 
be deviated from by the law of contract. Contract law is considered an area of law 
from which the law of property is separated. Traditional property law is therefore a 
static area of law in which there is relatively little, or at least limited, party autono-
my. Due to the influence of contract law property law becomes much more 
dynamic. 
Examples of this are the recognition of subsidiary legal obligations that arise in 
German law between the holder of a primary right and the holder of a limited prop-
erty right by operation of law. Through developments in case law it has become 
accepted that parties may provide new and additional content to these legal rela-
tions. Another example includes the German security-servitudes, in which a con-
tract is made to create a de facto positive burden next to a negatively formulated 
right of servitude. 
The second group of influences comes from outside the own legal system. The 
European Union is increasingly also becoming active in the field of property law. 
This does not only include already existing European legislation in the area of 
retention of title, insolvency, emission rights, the protection of cultural objects, and 
financial collateral arrangements, but also developments in the work on a Common 
Frame of Reference that will possibly include rules on personal property security 
rights, systems of transfer, and trusts. 
Moreover, the property law systems of the Member States are increasingly 
confronted with property rights originating in another Member State. Through the 
operation of the rules on private international law in the national law of the 
Member States, in particular the lex rei sitae rule, the national menu of property 
relations becomes applicable to the recognition of foreign property rights. As a 
result, a property right created in another Member State may not fit in the national 
list, because of a different historical development or a different doctrinal choice 
made by the original Member State. In this respect, numerus clausus shows a differ-
ent face: it protects the national legal system. 
When the law of property is seen as a set of rules that have an effect on trade 
in the Internal Market of the European Union, in particular rules that have an effect 
on the free movement of goods, it could very well be that through a court decision 
by the European Court of Justice Member States become forced to recognise a 
property right validly created in another Member State. Member States may try to 
justify their refusal to recognise or limited recognition by offering grounds for 
justification and by showing their measure is proportional to the aim that is 
pursued. As a justification against recognition of foreign property rights, Member  
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States may try to invoke their national sovereignty to deal with property rights in 
order to protect third parties, especially creditors. Moreover, they may argue for the 
national coherence of the legal system. Whether these grounds for justification will 
be accepted remains questionable. Moreover, even when these justifications are 
accepted, whether the measures the Member State has taken will pass the propor-
tionality test remains to be seen. 
When, through a decision of the ECJ, property rights from other Member 
States must be recognised, a federation of property law systems arises. The national 
systems of property law will then no longer be closed, but will, at least, be open to 
property rights from the lists of other Member States. Such a development might 
lead to more legal uncertainty that it seeks to solve.  
Property law, in other words, is becoming an increasingly dynamic area of 
law. However, the current European systems of property law are all formed and 
designed as static areas of property law. Therefore, the need to rethink the tradition-
al elements of property law, including especially the way in which the principle of 
numerus clausus is adhered to, arises. 
It could be necessary to rethink numerus clausus in the light of the development 
of, or the making of, a European property law. In a system of European property 
law two fundamental questions would have to be answered. When a European 
property law would be formed, should the system adhere to a separation between 
the law of obligations and the law of property, as well as to a corresponding divi-
sion in personal and property relations? When this question is answered positively, 
and that is the second fundamental issue, European law would have to develop 
rules that make it possible to decide which relations are personal and which a 
property relations. 
The making of a European property law offers possibilities to rethink the 
structure of the law of property and to allow property law to develop into a more 
dynamic system of law, in which there is more place for party autonomy. The 
principle of numerus clausus does not oppose party autonomy at all, it merely limits 
party autonomy in such a way that a balance between legal certainty, which in this 
case results in rigidity, and flexibility can be found. Even in legal systems that 
adhere to an open system of property rights, there are limitations on party autono-
my in the creation of new property rights. South African law, with its subtraction 
from dominium test, offers an example of one of these systems. 
Moreover, law and economic scholars have explained why, even in a system 
where parties would be completely free to create new types of property rights, no 
unlimited number of property rights would arise. Either through the prevention of 
fragmentation, when a tragedy of the commons or of the anti-commons would arise, 
or through the increase in information costs, either by third parties dealing with 
property rights or by third parties in general, an optimal standardisation of proper-
ty rights may result. 
A European property law might, possibly, provide expression to the principle 
of numerus clausus by forming an access test. When a legal relation would pass the 
European access test, that legal relation would become a property relation and will 
be governed by property law, either national law or, in case there is European 
legislation, by Community law. 
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The access test could be formulated in three phases. First, when parties at-
tempt to create a relation, that relation must be expressed in terms of powers 
contained in the primary right, and the relation must be made in respect to an object 
that is capable of being subject to that primary right. Secondly, the parties must 
have expressed their intent to bind not only themselves, but also their successors in 
title. Parties must have a sufficient interest to do so. Thirdly and finally, as a matter 
of policy, the relation that is created must be classified in terms of one of the existing 
categories of property relations: lesser rights to use, lesser rights for security, or 
anticipatory rights. When the legal relation cannot be expressed in terms of one of 
these categories, express attention, and this is the policy part, must be paid to the 
creation of a new, additional category. 
The access test of European property law is an ex post model that is applied by 
the courts. Because it would be a test of EU law, all courts in the European Union 
would have to apply it. Moreover, because the ECJ will have the final interpretation 
over it, the question of recognition of a new category of property rights would be a 
subject for the ECJ to decide on through a preliminary ruling. 
With this creation of a substantive ex post test at a European level, the principle of 
numerus clausus would find new, yet unknown, expression. As a result there will be 
more legal certainty on the status of property relations throughout the EU. In other 
words, the principle of numerus clausus could become the first true principle of 
European property law. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Numerus clausus is een fundamenteel beginsel in het goederenrecht. Dit beginsel is 
sterk verbonden met het onderscheid tussen het verbintenissenrecht, in het bijzon-
der het contractenrecht, en het goederenrecht. Daarnaast is het beginsel ook sterk 
verbonden met het onderscheid tussen persoonlijke en goederenrechtelijke rechts-
betrekkingen. Een persoonlijke rechtsbetrekking is een rechtsrelatie die enkel par-
tijen bindt. Deze rechtsbetrekkingen worden beheerst door het verbintenissenrecht. 
Een goederenrechtelijke rechtsbetrekking is een rechtsrelatie tussen twee of meer 
personen ten opzichte van een object. Deze relaties hebben derdenwerking. Deze 
rechtsrelaties worden door het goederenrecht beheerst. Het fundamenteel beginsel 
van de numerus clausus bepaalt welke rechtsbetrekking tot het goederenrecht hoort 
en daarom derdenwerking heeft. Numerus clausus is, met andere woorden, de toe-
gangstest tot het goederenrecht. Pas als de toets van de numerus clausus is door-
staan, zijn andere beginselen van goederenrecht, zoals specificiteit en publiciteit van 
toepassing. 
De numerus clausus als toegangstest omvat twee delen. Ten eerste stelt het 
numerus clausus beginsel het beschikbare menu van goederenrechtelijke rechten 
vast. In elk rechtstelsel worden slechts een beperkt aantal goederenrechtelijke 
rechten erkend. In het Franse, Duitse, Nederlandse en Engelse recht vangt het menu 
van goederenrechtelijke rechten aan met een ‘primair recht’. Naast het primaire 
recht zijn er een beperkt aantal rechten, welke ‘mindere rechten’ genoemd kunnen 
worden. Het is in de vestiging van deze laatste groep rechten dat partijen beperkt 
worden door het numerus clausus beginsel. Er is, met andere woorden een Typen-
zwang van goederenrechtelijke rechten. 
Het tweede deel van de toegangstest heeft betrekking op de inhoud van goe-
derenrechtelijke rechten. Wanneer partijen een recht van het menu van beschikbare 
rechten hebben gekozen, bepaalt het stelsel van goederenrecht ook de inhoud van 
deze rechtsbetrekking. Het staat partijen niet vrij om inhoud aan hun rechtsbe-
trekking te geven die buiten de grenzen van het door het goederenrecht aangegeven 
gebied gaat. Met andere woorden, er is ook een Typenfixierung van goederenrech-
telijke rechten. 
Numerus clausus als beginsel van goederenrecht vindt uitdrukking in het 
Franse, Duitse, Nederlandse en Engelse recht, zij het in andere mate. Afhankelijk  
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van de hiërarchie van rechtsbronnen en de dogmatische keuzes die wetgevers in de 
verschillende rechtsstelsels gemaakt hebben, is er een regel van numerus clausus. Een 
numerus clausus regel bestaat als er een absoluut gesloten stelsel van goederenrech-
telijke rechten aanwezig is. In deze stelsels hebben partijen geen vrijheid om nieuwe 
typen goederenrechtelijke rechten te vestigen en genieten slechts een beperkte, door 
de numerus clausus regel vastgestelde, vrijheid om inhoud aan hun goederenrechte-
lijke rechtsbetrekkingen te geven.  
Andere rechtssystemen erkennen een beginsel van numerus clausus. Het nume-
rus clausus beginsel verwijst naar het idee dat een min of meer duidelijke set van 
goederenrechtelijke rechten is vastgesteld door middel van één of meer rechtsbron-
nen, en dat partijen enigszins beperkt zijn om nieuwe, tot op heden onbekende, 
typen van goederenrechtelijke rechten te vestigen. Deze stelsels leggen ook beper-
kingen op aan partijen met betrekking tot de inhoud van goederenrechtelijke rech-
ten. Als partijen een reeds erkende goederenrechtelijke rechtsbetrekking kiezen, 
dienen zij zich te houden aan de grenzen die voor deze rechtsverhouding gelden. 
Als de numerus clausus regel en het numerus clausus beginsel als twee uiteinde 
van hetzelfde spectrum worden gezien, vinden het Franse, Duitse, Nederlandse en 
Engelse recht allen een plaatst in dit kwalificatiestelsel. Duits recht, dat zijn oor-
sprong vindt in het pandektistische systeem, staat aan de meest statische kant (dat 
van de numerus clausus regel). Het Nederlandse recht is sterk beïnvloed door het 
Duitse recht en kan ook aan de meer statische kant van het spectrum geplaatst 
worden. Het Franse recht kent een meer pragmatische benadering met betrekking 
tot het vestigingen van goederenrechtelijke rechten. Het dient daarom geplaatst te 
worden tussen een stelsel dat de numerus clausus regel en het numerus clausus 
beginsel volgt. Het Engelse recht, ten slotte, volgt het numerus clausus beginsel dat, 
anders dan in de civil law stelsels, duidelijk door jurisprudentie geformuleerd is. 
Met het begin van de 21e eeuw is het goederenrecht onderhevig geworden aan 
nieuwe ontwikkelingen. Deze ontwikkelingen vragen om nieuwe objecten van goe-
derenrecht te erkennen, om meer invloed van het contractenrecht in het goederen-
recht te erkennen, en om nieuwe, tot op heden onbekende, typen van goederen-
rechtelijke rechten te erkennen. 
Zowel het Franse, Duitse, Nederlandse als Engelse recht volgen een vergelijk-
bare benadering van kwalificatie van goederenrechtelijke rechtsbetrekkingen. In elk 
stelsel is er een primair recht. In civil law systemen is dit het recht van eigendom. In 
het Engelse recht, dat twee stelsels van goederenrecht kent, zijn er twee primaire 
rechten. In het onroerende zaken recht (land law) is dit de fee simple, in het recht met 
betrekking tot roerende zaken en vorderingen (personal property law) is dit de title to 
chattels. 
Verbonden aan het erkennen van een enkel primair recht is een lijst van goe-
derenrechtelijke rechten anders dan het primaire recht. Dit zijn de mindere rechten. 
Deze zijn minder omdat zij minder tot inhoud hebben dan het primaire recht. Deze 
rechten worden gevestigd door een, met een Franse term uitgedrukt, démembrement, 
of, in het Nederlands, subtractie van bevoegdheden van het primaire recht, of door 
beperking van het primaire recht met bevoegdheden die gemodelleerd worden naar 
het primaire recht. Er bestaat een subtiel verschil tussen deze twee vormen van 
vestiging. 
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In de civil law stelsels is het aantal en de inhoud van de goederenrechtelijke 
rechten vrijwel geheel geïnspireerd op het Romeinse recht. Hoewel het goederen-
recht in ontwikkeling is geweest sinds het (pre-) klassieke Romeinse recht, zijn de 
belangrijkste goederenrechtelijke rechten hetzelfde gebleven. Pas in de laatste eeuw 
hebben verschillende rechtsstelsels nieuwe typen van goederenrechtelijke rechten 
aan de door het Romeinse recht geïnspireerde catalogus toegevoegd. Het Engelse 
recht, dat niet direct op het Romeinse recht gebaseerd is, erkent een vergelijkbare 
catalogus van goederenrechtelijke rechten. Echter, door andere historische ontwik-
kelingen is de lijst met goederenrechtelijke verhoudingen in het Engelse recht langer 
dan de lijst in de meeste civil law stelsels.  
In het Franse, Duitse, Nederlandse en Engelse recht worden mindere rechten 
ingedeeld in twee categorieën: mindere gebruiksrechten en mindere zekerheids-
rechten. Mindere gebruiksrechten bestaan voor een lange tijdsperiode en hebben 
meestal een minder verstrekkende inhoud, of voor een korte tijdsperiode en hebben 
doorgaans een meer omvattende inhoud. Deze gebruiksrechten voor een langere 
periode zijn erfdienstbaarheden in de civil law stelsels. Gebruiksrechten voor een 
kortere periode zijn rechten van vruchtgebruik. In het Engelse recht zijn er rechten 
van easement en profits à prendre die aan dezelfde kenmerken voldoen. Daarnaast 
kan, hoewel deze niet meer als zelfstandig recht kan bestaan, een life estate via een 
trustconstructie gerealiseerd worden. 
Mindere zekerheidsrechten worden verder verdeeld naar gelang het type van 
object waarop ze gevestigd kunnen worden. Zekerheidsrechten op roerende zaken 
zijn rechten van pand in civil law stelsels en rechten van pledge en charges in het 
Engelse recht. Zekerheidsrechten op onroerende zaken in civil law systemen zijn het 
recht van hypotheek. In het Engelse recht wordt hier het recht van mortgage 
gebruikt. Hoewel er variaties zijn in de inhoud van deze rechten, schenken alle 
rechten de rechthebbende de bevoegdheid het object dat tot zekerheid is gegeven te 
verkopen en met de opbrengst van deze verkoop hun vordering te voldoen. Daar-
naast geven deze rechten ook een voorrangsrecht in geval van faillissement van de 
debiteur. 
De indeling in primaire en mindere gebruiks- en zekerheidsrechten is een 
indeling die vanaf de periode van het Romeinse recht, dat ook een vergelijkbare 
indeling in zakelijke acties aanhing, ontwikkeld is. Ook in het Engelse recht wordt 
er onderscheid gemaakt tussen gebruiksrechten en zekerheidsrechten. Echter, door 
de historische ontwikkeling van de verschillende rechtsstelsels en met name ook 
door de verschillende dogmatische keuzes die de verschillende wetgevers gemaakt 
hebben, worden ook additionele goederenrechtelijke rechten erkend die niet (goed) 
in deze indeling passen.  
Voorbeelden van deze additionele mindere rechten die niet in het systeem van 
goederenrechtelijke rechten passen zijn de Duitse verkrijgingrechten, de Franse za-
kelijke borgtocht en de Engelse estate contracts. Daarnaast vallen ook koopopties, 
erkend als goederenrechtelijke verhouding in zowel Duitsland als Engeland, onder 
deze voorbeelden die problemen veroorzaken met het goederenrechtelijke stelsel. 
Tot slot kan het recht van huur, dat in civil law stelsels een persoonlijk recht is, maar 
in het Engelse recht zich tot een goederenrechtelijk recht ontwikkeld heeft, 
genoemd worden. De erkenning van deze additionele mindere rechten lijkt verband  
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te houden met de methode van vestiging die wordt gevolgd. Stelsels die een metho-
de van beperking aanhouden hebben meer additionele rechten erkend dan stelsels 
die de subtractie methode volgen. 
Het goederenrecht recht is onderhevig aan invloeden van binnen het eigen 
rechtssysteem, maar ook van daarbuiten. Het gaat dan met name om de invloed die 
komt door de ontwikkeling van de interne markt in de Europese Unie. Deze 
ontwikkeling leidt tot een andere toepassing van de reeds bestaande goederenrech-
telijke rechtsbetrekkingen, maar ook tot de erkenning van nieuwe typen goederen-
rechtelijke rechten door positieve harmonisatie, en ook door, onder druk van de 
rechtspraak van het Europese Hof van Justitie, erkenning van goederenrechtelijke 
verhoudingen die geldig in een andere lidstaat van de Europese Unie zijn 
gevestigd. 
Binnen het eigen rechtssysteem ondergaat het goederenrecht druk van binnen 
het stelsel van goederenrecht, maar ook door de toenemende invloed van het con-
tractenrecht in het goederenrecht. Met name door maatschappelijke veranderingen 
en de stijgende vraag naar meer flexibele goederenrechtelijke verhoudingen, pro-
beren partijen in toenemende mate goederenrechtelijke rechten te combineren, met 
andere woorden, te stapelen, om zo resultaten te bereiken die voorheen onmogelijk 
waren met het gebruik van een enkel goederenrechtelijk recht. Een voorbeeld van 
een dergelijke stapeling is het recht van appartement op een opstalrecht om het 
eigendomsrecht van een gebouw van het eigendomsrecht van de grond te scheiden, 
om zo alleen het gebouw in appartementsrechten te kunnen splitsen. 
Andere invloeden betreffen de toenemende invloed van het contractenrecht. 
Met name in verband met zekerheidsrechten is het contractenrecht belangrijker 
geworden. Door de erkenning van trustachtige verhoudingen als de Treuhand en de 
Fiducie, wordt het gebruik van primaire rechten tot zekerheid interessanter. Ook in 
het Engelse recht biedt de mogelijkheid een charge met een partij afspraak vrijwel 
geheel vorm te geven voor de praktijk interessante mogelijkheden.  
Het goederenrecht is van oorsprong een systeem van dwingende regels waar-
van niet kan worden afgeweken door het gebruik van het contractenrecht. Het 
contractenrecht is oorspronkelijk een rechtsgebied waarvan het goederenrecht is af-
gescheiden. Klassiek goederenrecht is daarom een statisch rechtsgebied waar geen, 
of althans weinig, partij autonomie wordt getolereerd. Door de toenemende invloed 
van het contractenrecht wordt het goederenrecht meer dynamisch.  
Voorbeelden hiervan zijn de erkenning van de wettelijke verbintenissen tussen 
de houder van een primair recht en de houder van een minder recht in het Duitse 
recht. Via de ontwikkeling van deze verbintenissen in de Duitse jurisprudentie is 
het mogelijk geworden dat partijen zelf additionele inhoud aan deze verhouding 
geven door het maken van verdere partijafspraken. Een ander voorbeeld wordt ge-
boden door de Duitse dienstbaarheden tot zekerheid, waarbij een contract gemaakt 
word om een de facto positieve plicht te creëren naast een negatief geformuleerde 
dienstbaarheid.  
De tweede groep van invloeden komt van buiten het eigen rechtssysteem. De 
Europese Unie wordt in toenemende mate actief in het goederenrecht. Het gaat 
hierbij dan niet alleen om bestaande Europese wetgeving over eigendomsvoorbe-
houd, insolventie, emissierechten, de bescherming van cultuurgoederen, en finan 
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ciëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten, maar ook om het werk aan het zogenaamde Euro-
pese Gemeenschappelijk Referentiekader dat waarschijnlijk regels over zekerheden 
op roerende zaken, stelsels van overdracht en trustverhoudingen zal bevatten.  
Nationale stelsels van goederenrecht in toenemende mate geconfronteerd met 
goederenrechtelijke rechten die gevestigd zijn in een andere lidstaat. Door de 
werking van de regels van het internationale privaatrecht in het nationale recht van 
de lidstaten, met name de situs-regel, wordt het nationale menu van goederen-
rechtelijke rechten van toepassing op de erkenning van buitenlandse goederenrech-
telijke rechten. Het resultaat hiervan is dat een goederenrechtelijke verhouding die 
gecreëerd is in een andere lidstaat niet altijd past in de lijst van de ontvangende 
lidstaat. De lijst van de ontvangende lidstaat is bepaald door een andere historische 
ontwikkeling en andere dogmatische keuzes. De numerus clausus laat zich zo van 
een andere kant zien: de bescherming van het nationale recht.  
Wanneer het goederenrecht wordt gezien als een set van regels die een effect 
hebben op de handel tussen lidstaten in de interne markt van de Europese Unie, 
met name als regels die gevolgen hebben voor het vrij verkeer van goederen, zou 
het kunnen zijn dat door een beslissing van het Europese Hof van Justitie lidstaten 
gedwongen worden om buitenlandse goederenrechtelijke rechten te erkenning in 
hun eigen stelsel. Lidstaten mogen gronden aanvoeren om hun weigering tot erken-
ning of beperkte erkenning te rechtvaardigen. Daarnaast dienen zij aan te tonen dat 
de door hen getroffen maatregel proportioneel is ten opzichte van het doel dat de 
maatregel nastreeft. Lidstaten zouden kunnen proberen om tegen deze erkenning 
hun nationale bevoegdheden op het gebied van het goederenrecht als rechtvaardi-
ging aan te voeren. Met name als het gaat om derdenbescherming, of bescherming 
van andere crediteuren, zou dit argument gebruikt kunnen worden. Daarnaast zou 
een lidstaat kunnen proberen de interne coherentie van het systeem van goederen-
recht aan te voeren. Of deze rechtvaardigingsgronden geaccepteerd zullen worden 
is maar zeer de vraag. Zelfs als deze geaccepteerd worden is het niet zeker dat deze 
argumentatie de proportionaliteitstest van het Europese Hof van Justitie zal door-
staan. 
Als lidstaten, door een beslissing van het Europese Hof van Justitie, gedwon-
gen worden om buitenlandse goederenrechtelijke rechtsverhoudingen te erkennen, 
ontstaat een federatie van goederenrechtelijke stelsels in Europa. De nationale stel-
sels van goederenrecht zullen dan niet langer gesloten zijn, maar zullen, ten minste, 
open zijn voor goederenrechtelijke rechten die voorkomen op de lijst van goederen-
rechtelijke rechten in andere lidstaten. Een dergelijke ontwikkeling zou wel eens tot 
meer rechtsonzekerheid kunnen leiden dan het op moet lossen.  
Goederenrecht, met andere worden, wordt in toenemende mate een dyna-
misch rechtsgebied. Echter, de huidige stelsels van goederenrecht in de lidstaten 
zijn ontwikkeld als een statisch goederenrechtelijk stelsel. Het is daarom nodig om 
de traditionele uitgangspunten van het goederenrecht te heroverwegen, met name 
de manier waarop het numerus clausus beginsel wordt aangehangen. 
Het zou nodig kunnen zijn om de numerus clausus te heroverwegen in het licht 
van de ontwikkeling van een Europees goederenrecht. In een stelsel van Europees 
goederenrecht zouden twee fundamentele aspecten behandeld moeten worden. Als 
een Europees goederenrecht gevormd zou worden, zou dit stelsel moeten vast 
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houden aan de scheiding tussen het verbintenissenrecht en het goederenrecht en het 
daarbij behorende onderscheid tussen persoonlijke en goederenrechtelijke rechten? 
Als deze vraag positief wordt beantwoord, en dat is het tweede aspect, dan zou het 
Europese goederenrecht regels moeten hebben om te beslissen welke rechtsverhou-
dingen goederenrechtelijk zijn en welke niet.  
De ontwikkeling van een Europees goederenrechten biedt de mogelijkheid de 
structuur van het goederenrecht te heroverwegen en het goederenrecht tot een meer 
dynamisch rechtsgebied te maken, waarin er meer plaats zal zijn voor partij autono-
mie. Het numerus clausus beginsel verzet zich zeker niet tegen partij autonomie, de 
numerus clausus regel doet dit wel. Het beginsel beperkt partij autonomie voor zover 
het nodig is om een juiste balans tussen rechtszekerheid, wat in dit geval tot star-
heid leidt, en flexibiliteit. Zelfs in rechtsstelsels die een open stelsel van goederen-
rechtelijke rechten aanhangen zijn er beperkingen voor partijen in de vestiging van 
nieuwe goederenrechtelijke rechten. Het Zuid-Afrikaanse recht, met de bekende 
subtraction from dominium test, biedt een voorbeeld van een dergelijk stelsel.  
Rechtseconomen hebben verklaard waarom, in een stelsel waarin partijen vol-
komen vrij zijn om nieuwe goederenrechtelijke verhoudingen te creëren, geen on-
eindig aantal goederenrechtelijke verhoudingen zal ontstaan. Door het voorkomen 
van te vergaande fragmentatie die een tragedy of the commons of anti-commons zou 
kunnen veroorzaken, of door de toename van informatiekosten voor derden die of 
met het beperkte recht in aanraking komen, of derden in het algemeen, zou een 
optimale standaardisatie van goederenrechtelijke rechten het gevolg zijn. 
Een Europees goederenrecht zou, wellicht, uiting kunnen geven aan het begin-
sel van numerus clausus via een toegangstest. Wanneer een rechtsverhouding deze 
voor deze test zou slagen, wordt deze verhouding een goederenrechtelijke verhou-
ding die beheerst wordt door het, nationale goederenrecht of, indien er Europese 
wetgeving bestaat, het Europese goederenrecht.  
Deze toegangstest zou uit drie onderdelen kunnen bestaan. Ten eerste, wan-
neer partijen proberen een rechtsverhouding te creëren moet deze rechtsverhouding 
uitgedrukt worden in bevoegdheden die besloten zijn in een primair goederenrech-
telijke recht. Daarnaast moet het object waarop ze deze verhouding willen vestigen 
onderwerp van dat primaire recht kunnen zijn. Ten tweede moeten partijen hun 
intentie kenbaar maken om niet slechts elkaar, maar ook hun rechtsopvolgers aan 
deze rechtsverhouding te willen binden. De partijen moeten hier een voldoende be-
lang bij hebben. Ten derde, als een beleidspunt, de verhouding die resulteert moet 
worden gecategoriseerd als een van de bestaande typen van goederenrechtelijke 
rechten: mindere rechten tot gebruik, mindere rechten tot zekerheid of verkrijging-
rechten. Als de verhouding niet in een van deze categorieën past, en dat is het 
beleidspunt, dient uitdrukkelijke aandacht besteed te worden aan het maken van 
een nieuwe, additionele, categorie. 
Een dergelijke toegangstest van het Europese goederenrecht zou een ex post 
model kunnen zijn dat door de gerechtshoven en rechtbanken zal moeten worden 
toegepast. Omdat het een EU rechtelijke test betreft, zal deze door alle gerechtelijke 
instanties in de Europese Unie toegepast moeten worden. Het Europese Hof van 
Justitie zal de uiteindelijke interpretatie in handen hebben. De vraag naar de 
erkenning van een nieuwe categorie van goederenrechtelijke rechten zou dan ook 
 577 
Samenvatting 
aan het Europese Hof van Justitie moeten worden voorgelegd via een prejustitiële 
procedure. 
Met het maken van deze inhoudelijke ex post toegangstest op een Europees 
niveau zou een nieuwe, tot op heden onbekende, invulling van het numerus clausus 
beginsel gegeven worden. Het resultaat zou meer rechtszekerheid over de status 
van rechtsbetrekkingen in de Europese Unie moeten zijn. Met andere woorden, met 
deze ontwikkeling zou het numerus clausus beginsel het eerste werkelijke beginsel 
van Europees goederenrecht worden. 
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